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

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EDMUND D. MOREL

(1873—1925)

IN
QUEST OF TRUTH
AND
JUSTICE

De-Bunking the War Guilt Myth

By Harry Elmer Barnes, Ph. D.

Author of

The Genesis of the World War

CHICAGO

NATIONAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

1928

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To

C. Raymond Beazley

Scholar, Humanitarian,
and
Devoted Friend of Peace

PREFACE

THE progress of scholarship in regard to the question of responsibility for the World War in the last decade leaves little to be desired by the friends of truth and justice. In the publication of source-material, the preparation of memoirs, monographic treatment of special phases of diplomatic history and general syntheses of scattered sources and studies, the achievements have been remarkable and unprecedented. Already we are aware of the outstanding facts with respect to war responsibility to so complete a degree that the general outlines of the picture can never be seriously altered by subsequent developments in this field of scholarship. These facts implicitly involve and necessitate one of the greatest political and diplomatic revolutions in human history. Europe was remodelled after 1918 on the basis of one of the greatest deceptions recorded in history, and there can be little hope of permanent European and world peace until the evil work of the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon is undone and a reconstruction is undertaken in harmony with reason and fair play. Neither a return to the anachronisms and injustices of the pre-War régime nor a continuance of the much worse system created by the greedy and revengful "peace-makers" of 1919 can furnish any substantial basis for the future realization of international coöperation and good-will.

It is with a feeling of regret, then, that the student of war guilt and world affairs is compelled to recognize that a vast gulf exists between the facts about war responsibility, as established by scholars, and the practical application of these facts to public policies by statesmen and diplomats. While the work of the scholars has been all but completed, the task of the statesmen has scarcely been admitted or recognized, to say nothing of being executed. Yet, the feats of scholarship will possess no real significance until they produce some sort of moral and material reconstruction of the system of international society which is based upon the flagrant errors and misrepresentations which the scholars have riddled. The writer does

not belong to that group of historians who hold that scholarship exists for its own sake, that all sound pieces of research are equally valuable, irrespective of the subject-matter, and that it is of no concern to the historian whether or not his facts are applied to practical affairs. It is certain that original scholarly work must be executed in an impartial manner, in keeping with the facts in the case and quite independent of the ultimate practical applications of the results. At the same time, it is equally true that historical research is of little or no ultimate value unless its results have some actual bearing upon the improvement of the well-being of man in some aspect of his life. Therefore, while the specialized research as to the origins of the World War must be conducted in as detached a manner as possible, the activities of the war guilt historians will be essentially sterile if their discoveries do not to an increasing degree achieve the remaking of Europe.

The present writer has devoted his own efforts in the field of war guilt publications primarily to the task of bringing the facts revealed by scholars to bear upon public opinion and upon the policies and achievements of statesmen. Much of the criticism directed against his work on the ground of tone and presentation has been beside the point, as he has never posed in the guise of a solemn academic annalist of war guilt. His activities have ever been directed towards assembling in clear form the scattered facts established by the scholars and then applying these facts to the subject of war guilt and its contemporary international relationships. Yet, the present writer did not begin his interest in the field with any such broad or practical ambition. His reading on the question of war guilt during the first few years was carried on in a very detached professional manner as a trained historical student. He was brought around to Revisionism very slowly and quite against his original convictions by a thorough examination of monographs and documents. In due time, however, he became so convinced of the magnitude of the implications of the new evidence on war guilt that he deemed it highly essential to depart from the activities and interests of the esoteric investigator of historical facts and to devote himself to a synthesis of the facts which had been gathered by the

best research students and to the clarification of the international issues involved in this synthesis. If this be propaganda or counter-propaganda, then the writer invites his critics to make the most of it. The writer is not, as his critics are fond of asserting, professionally a sociologist, penologist, political philosopher or journalist, but a technically trained historian, with a far wider and more varied preparation in historical studies that can be claimed by any of those historians who have thus far been numbered among his critics.

In other words, the writer possesses the training to enable him to pursue independent research in this field and to estimate the validity of the researches of others and he has thoroughly studied the sources and monographs bearing on the crisis of 1914. He has chosen, however, for two very definite reasons, to act in addition as an organizer and interpreter of the facts gathered by others. The first is that there are many more men working on contemporary diplomatic history as specialists, uninterested in and unqualified for general exposition of the body of facts as a whole, than there are who are devoting themselves to the task of expounding the significance of the work the specialists are doing or who have talent for this sort of educational endeavor. In the second place the writer believes that at the present stage of the work there is more need for popular exposition than there is for esoteric research and he regards himself as relatively better adapted to general synthesis and controversy than to abstruse and detailed research. There is a desirable division of labor here which requires mutual esteem and in no sense calls for depreciation. Research without potent exposition is essentially futile; while argumentation without information is little more than congressional debating or political campaigning.

Some two years ago the writer published his chief effort at a synthetic presentation of the status of war guilt controversy, in the hope that it would bring about a sufficient popular interest in the topic to produce some significant change in public opinion upon this subject. In spite, however, of very unusual courage upon the part of the publisher and special generosity in expenditures for advertising, the *Genesis of the World War* has not attained to the degree of distribution which was hoped for, even though it has met with a

much more kindly reception from a wide and varied group of reviewers than either the author or the publisher had dared to anticipate. A major difficulty has been the unwillingness of booksellers to coöperate, even when it was to their pecuniary advantage to do so. Many of them have assumed to censor their customers' reading in the field of international relations as in the matter of morals. Not infrequently have booksellers even discouraged prospective customers who desired to have the *Genesis of the World War* ordered for them. Therefore, the writer has now made a second attempt to stir popular concern with this vital subject, through a method of distribution based upon private mailing lists rather than upon the usual commercial channels.

The present volume has been especially designed to appeal to a wide group of readers. It states the case in regard to war responsibility with brevity and clarity, so that any person interested enough to read the book can understand the facts and their implications. In the second place, an additional and special effort has been made to produce confidence in the Revisionist position by including all the major controversies in which the present writer has engaged on this subject. It has been deemed only fair to allow the readers to examine the worst that can be said against the point of view set forth by the author of this book. If he cannot meet and refute the arguments of his opponents, then he deserves to be discomforted and driven into appropriate oblivion. The writer in no sense means to imply that the struggle for truth in this field is by any means associated primarily with his own writings and the attacks thereupon. He can scarcely be accused of having been reluctant to recognize the achievements and assistance of others. He has, however, drawn the fire of a greater number and variety of "bitter-enders" than any other writer in the field, and, hence, a review of his controversies illuminates every conceivable angle of the war guilt discussion. It is doubtful if there is any argument against Revisionism which has not been raised by one or another of his critics. Finally, there is herein embodied an effort to relate the facts of war guilt to the war debt situation and to desirable readjustments in Europe.

Yet, while there has been a real effort to produce a book which will appeal to a popular audience, there has been no departure from the standards of rigorous scholarship. The facts are those gathered from the sources and the best monographs, as well as from a more extensive series of interviews with the leading diplomats of 1914 than has been undertaken by any other student of war guilt. This book is not designed to supersede the author's more systematic book on the outbreak of the World War but rather to get more people interested in the latter. It is hoped that the present volume will naturally lead the reader to the *Genesis of the World War*, Dickinson's *International Anarchy*, Professor Fay's *Origins of the World War* and Ebray's *A Frenchman Looks at Peace.*

The National Historical Society has been chosen as the distributor of this volume because it has the largest and most relevant list for mail order distribution among the type of citizens most likely to be immediately interested in the book and because it has kindly offered to coöperate in the distribution of the *Genesis of the World War.* With the general activities of the National Historical Society the writer is in no way associated either as critic or collaborator. His views on nationalism, patriotism and international relations have been sufficiently revealed by the written and spoken word so as to leave no doubt as to their nature. He is here solely interested in the fact that the National Historical Society is devoting itself sincerely to the campaign of dissipating the war guilt myth, a line of endeavor which should long since have claimed the earnest attention and extensive support of the Carnegie Endowment for International Conciliation, the World Peace Foundation, the New York Peace Society, the Foreign Policy Association and other organizations of the sort, supposedly concerned entirely with the problem of the causes and cures of wars. Yet, the richest of them all, the Carnegie Endowment, has refused repeated requests to publish even an English edition of the Russian diplomatic documents.

The writer desires in particular to express his gratitude to his friend and former student, Mr. John Edward Ratigan, for efficient assistance in reading the galley proofs of the volume. I am also indebted to Mr. Robert W. Hankins for a careful reading of the

page proofs. Before correcting the page proofs of this book it was the writer's privilege to read in full the proof sheets of Professor Fay's monumental work, *The Origins of the World War.* The writer discerned no reason for altering the facts or interpretations contained in his book, and Part I of the present work may be regarded as a brief statement of his latest—and essentially final—views as to the responsibility for the World War. They will be stated more fully, with appropriate documentary evidence, in the forthcoming third American edition of his *Genesis of the World War.*

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

Northampton, Mass.
June 15, 1928.

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PART I

The Facts as To War Guilt

War Guilt

FRANCE'S reply to President Hindenburg's Tannenberg anniversary speech will be a request to the other Allied powers to join in an admonition to Germany to keep the war guilt question out of reconstruction politics. The victor at Tannenberg spoke without Dr. Stresemann's knowledge or approval. In flattering the German conviction of innocence of aggression in 1914 he failed to realize the effects of such a declaration on the diplomacy of understanding and reconciliation which culminated at Locarno and which promises so much for European tranquillity and progress.

The German repudiation of war guilt is easy enough to understand. History will eventually determine whether it is valid or not. In that sense it can be safely left to the scholars of the future. Psychologically it is natural for Germans to deny the war responsibility fixed on their government by the Versailles Treaty. Those controlling in Austria-Hungary and Germany were so habituated in 1914 to the idea of war and so persuaded of its inevitability and political benefits that they were content, to say the least, to drift into hostilities. They did not consider themselves aggressors, but simply men prepared to take advantage of circumstances.

Most Germans may be no more conscious today of war guilt than they were conscious of the persistent "saber-rattling" which preceded the war. Both the military leaders and the masses were confident of military superiority and hoped for early and easy victory, which cannot be said of the relatively poorly prepared Allies.

The majority in Germany can probably be convinced of war guilt only against its will. Yet the present European structure rests on a treaty which affirms such guilt and imposes penalties for it. Whether they are penalties of guilt or only of defeat, they are a part of the law of Europe. They cannot be escaped by German disavowal of guilt or German protest against the moral basis for reparations.

Non-agitation in the Reich of the war innocence claim is therefore in the interest of European peace and progress. The Germans may cling to their own view. But it leads to useless irritation to exploit it in a way to challenge the peace settlements and the later security compacts. Germany is obligated to pay through losing the war. The best way to abate such payment is to accept as cheerfully and loyally as possible at least the general theory of accountability and reparation.

—*The New York Herald-Tribune, October* 3, 1927.

Chapter I

IMPORTANCE OF WAR GUILT

THE problem of who started the World War has now reached a stage where it can be discussed with assurance, with respect to both the facts and the bearing of these facts upon the peace of the world and the future of Europe. There is no longer any doubt about the facts with regard to any fundamental issue in the question of who caused the war. Candid scholars in all countries—Demartial, Fabre-Luce, Montgelas, Barbagallo, Gooch, Beazley, Fay, and others—are in agreement upon the essential facts. The so-called "Revisionist" view of the case is by no means "made in Germany." There have been more good books written in France repudiating the guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles than there have been in Germany and Austria combined.

There are many who agree with the above statement of the case, but, nevertheless, contend that it would be better not to discuss the matter. They hold that to bring up the question of war responsibility only revives war hatreds and postpones the desirable healing process which must precede any permanent peace. They claim that it is best to forget the war propaganda and Versailles and to put our trust in Locarno.

Now most sensible people will agree that world peace is a larger and more important issue than settling the question of who started the War, and if it could be shown that silence upon the question of war guilt would hasten and assure world peace we should remain silent, however great the moral injustice to the Central Powers. It would appear to the writer of the present volume, however, that the position of those now opposed to a discussion of the causes of the War is illogical and untenable. There can be no hope of establishing peace in Europe until the moral and material injustices of the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon are undone and Europe is reconstructed in harmony with justice

and decency. The plant of Locarno cannot flourish in the pot of Versailles. The facts and the principles underlying these two settlements are irreconcilably opposed. One can scarcely expect peace in a Europe with no adequate international organization when thirty national states threaten peace instead of the eighteen which existed in 1914. A settled state of affairs can hardly be expected to develop when Germany and her allies are disarmed and compelled to pay crushing indemnities on the ground of their sole responsibility for the great conflict, while the Entente Powers, armed to the teeth, endeavor to reduce or evade altogether their pecuniary obligations to the United States on the ground that they saved us from perpetual slavery under the heavy hand of the Hun. The crying injustices of Transylvania, the Tyrol, Bessarabia, Macedonia, the Polish Corridor, the Saar, the occupied cities on the Rhine, and Silesia, to mention but a few of the more atrocious fruits of Versailles, must be rectified before Europe can aspire to peace. Otherwise, the oppressed nations will but await a more favorable alignment of European powers to begin anew the attempt to secure justice by deceit and force.

Inasmuch as the post-War settlement, with its abuses all too briefly catalogued above, was based upon the wartime assumption and the Versailles charge of the unique guilt of Germany in causing the World War, it is no more permanent or defensible than the cornerstone upon which it was erected. As we now know for all time that there is not an iota of truth in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, there is no mode of attacking this nefarious document which is so potent as a consideration of the real facts as to who launched Europe upon the four years of unparalleled carnage which have been followed by a decade of chaos, misery and oppression.

Another constructive and pragmatic reason for re-examining the facts concerning war responsibility arises from the hope that a dawning consciousness of how badly we were deceived about the actual issues in the European situation from 1914 to 1918 may serve to make us rather more cautious and hesitant about capitulating to propaganda in the event of another European cataclysm.

We may be led to more of a tendency to scrutinize evidence and to avoid being the victims of skilful foreign press-agents and silver-tongued orators. It cannot be successfully maintained that the Entente Powers of 1914-1918 are the only ones in Europe likely to try to deceive us. All sides to any great conflict are bound to do their best to enlist our aid and sympathy. Sometime in the future England and Germany may be united against France and Italy. If so, England's command of the seas would give Germany that access to our attention which she was denied in 1914-1918. Under such circumstances we might need to be as critical of German propaganda as we ought to have been of French and British partisanship in the Great War. It so happens, however, that in the present instance we have to consider the manner in which Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia deceived us as to the facts relating to the outbreak of the World War and as to the issues at stake in the struggle. An understanding of these facts certainly should do much to make us less ready to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for any European nation or coalition whatever in the event of another European conflagration.

Finally, the facts about the War and its results should help along the cause of peace by making it clear how futile it is to hope that we can end war by more war. The war spirit and methods create a psychological attitude on the part of the participants in the struggle which makes it well-nigh impossible to expect constructive, far-sighted and generous conduct at its conclusion. Statesmanship does not emerge headlong on the heels of savagery. If we desire peace, it must be achieved in a period of peace and not hoped for as the aftermath of war. The greatest words of President Wilson during the War were that there could be no permanent peace which was not a "peace without victory." If, by setting forth the facts about war guilt and the post-War treaties, we can arouse a sufficient wave of moral revulsion and indignation to force a revision of the Treaties in harmony with facts and justice, more will have been achieved than can be hoped for from any armed conflict of whatever proportions.

Therefore, it would appear that the question of who brought on

the World War is a problem of the greatest moment and the utmost timeliness. It is such: (1) because upon the lies of the war period were erected the detestable treaties which followed its close; (2) because the chief sound moral basis for revising these treaties is the truth about the causes of the World War; (3) because European peace can be secured only as a result of the revision of the treaties; (4) because a study of the facts about war propaganda from 1914 to 1918 affords the best possible protection against our being so rudely and completely deceived another time; and (5) because the results of the conflict demonstrate for all time the futility of expecting war to be ended by war and show us that if we are to secure peace it must be worked for in a time of pacific relations.

Bibliographic Suggestions

The most valuable and suggestive book dealing with the relation of the war guilt issue to the question of the future peace of Europe is Alcide Ebray's *A Frenchman Looks at Peace.* Along with this may be suggested Alfred Fabre-Luce's *The Limitations of Victory* and John Kenneth Turner's *Shall It Be Again.* The question of the relation of war guilt to the Treaty of Versailles is well handled by Alfred von Wegerer in the *Krieggschuldfrage* for January, 1928, a briefer version of which will be published in English in *Current History* for August, 1928.

Chapter II

WHY THE SUBJECT OF WAR GUILT CAN BE DISCUSSED WITH ASSURANCE AT THE PRESENT TIME

HAVING now shown that the subject of responsibility for the coming of the World War is one of real and immediate importance for international peace and world order, we shall now consider why it can be discussed at this time with some certainty that we are adequately informed and that our present conclusions will not be overthrown by subsequently revealed facts. Up to the time of the World War it was the universal practice for governments to keep their documents relating to foreign politics secret to from forty to sixty years after the event. In 1914, for example, the documents bearing on the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 had not been published with any completeness by either France or Germany. How is it possible, then, for historians now to contend that in less than fifteen years since 1914 we can talk with an air of finality about who brought on the World War?

The situation is wholly novel in human experience. As a result of the revolutions in Russia, Austria and Germany, new governments appeared on the scene and had no reason for desiring to conceal the facts which might possibly turn out to be discreditable to the preceding royal régimes. Indeed, they hoped that the documents in the foreign offices would actually show that the imperial governments had been responsible for bringing on the Great War. They believed that such proof would help to maintain the revolutionary governments in power because of the popular hatred of the older régimes which was likely to result from the knowledge that the monarchical governments had been responsible for the suffering which the World War had produced.

Therefore, the Austrian and German governments voluntarily published a full and complete edition of the documents in their respective foreign offices bearing on the crisis of 1914: the so-called *Red Book* and the *Kautsky Documents*. The Germans subsequently published all

of the important documents on the whole period from 1870 to 1914, the *Grosse Politik*, allowing the facts to speak for themselves as to German foreign policy in the half century before the War and challenging the other states to do likewise. Austria would have followed suit had not the Allies prevented her from doing so by a clause connected with the Treaty of St. Germain, thus proving by implication that the Entente feared the revelation of the facts. No other state has accepted the German challenge, though England is to publish her documents from 1898 onward and the Russians are publishing portions of their pre-War documents. The Russian Bolshevik government did not systematically publish its documents, but allowed French and German scholars, such as Marchand and Stieve to have access to the archives and to make adequate selections. The Stieve collection, known as *Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis*, is the standard edition and its honesty and adequacy cannot be challenged.

The British government was the first non-revolutionary government voluntarily to publish its documents bearing on the outbreak of the World War. This it did in the autumn of 1926, and ten other volumes will soon appear on the period from 1898 to 1914. Though the French have not published their documents, we can discover the essential facts concerning the French diplomacy of the period in the Russian and British documents, for the French were allied to Great Britain and Russia. If the French documents are ever published they are bound to make the case against France somewhat worse than it stands today. Otherwise, the French would have made a clean breast of the affair long since. Such check-ups as we have already secured show that the French *Yellow Book* of the War period —full of forgeries and omissions—was the most seriously distorted of any of the apologetic publications issued during the War. Due to the continued taunts of impartial scholars throughout the world and to the demands of the friends of truth in France, the French government has at last reluctantly announced that it will publish the documents in its Foreign Office bearing on the crisis of 1914. As Robert Dell points out, however, in the following article from the London *Nation* for January 14, 1928, the nature of the committee entrusted with the task of selecting and editing the documents

gives little assurance of candor, integrity or completeness in the forthcoming publication:

> The French Government having at last recognized that it cannot with decency refrain any longer from any publication of the diplomatic documents concerning the origin of the War, has appointed a commission of forty-eight persons to superintend their publication. Three of the four Secretaries of the Commission are Government officials, and the Commission includes thirteen other permanent officials of the Quai d'Orsay and diplomatists, most of whom were intimately concerned with the events leading to the War. Such a commission is a guarantee of bad faith. The French Government will never publish all the documents, for their publication would show that many of the documents in the French Yellow Book of 1914 were faked or even forged. That has already been proved by M. Georges Demartial in his little book, "*L'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay*," to which no reply has been or can be made.

The above information explains how we can talk authoritatively about war guilt so soon after the conflict. For the first time in human history, a generation which lived through a great war can know the facts as to its origins. It would be a moral crime if such facts as these were not mastered as soon as possible and their implications made clear for the benefit of mankind.

In addition to the authoritative documents, most of the important participants in the diplomatic crisis of 1914—the Kaiser, Bethmann-Hollweg, von Jagow, Tirpitz, Moltke, Falkenhayn, Pourtalès, Schoen, Lichnowsky, Hoyos, Conrad, Musulin, Sazonov, Schilling, Rosen, Dobrorolski, Poincaré, Viviani, Paléologue, Asquith, Grey, Churchill, Bertie, Buchanan and Nitti—have published memoirs or extended diaries giving their version of the crisis. Izvolski was prevented by death from finishing his memoirs, but his letters, preserved in great completeness, have been edited and tell more than his memoirs could ever have been expected to reveal. Count Berchtold has been delayed in publishing his memoirs on account of Entente interference with the free use of the documents in Vienna, but his book is now announced for early publication. While these books have to be used with caution, they often enable us to understand the documents more fully and to comprehend better the attitudes and motives of the diplomats who either initiated or failed to prevent the War. In addition, it has been the privilege of the present writer to interview in person most of those prominent in the diplomacy of 1914 and to induce them to clear up

as far as possible obscure or controverted points. The nature and significance of much of this vast body of material has been admirably described in a remarkable book published in 1927 by Dr. George Peabody Gooch, a leading British authority. It is entitled, *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*. It is fair, accurate, judicious and reasonably complete, though at times somewhat over-polite to myth-mongers in high places.

Next we come to the authoritative monographs on special aspects of the causes of the World War. Representative of these are Gunther Frantz's work on the Russian mobilization, Dr. Boghitschevitch's work on the Serbian plot to murder the Archduke, Hermann Lutz's monumental book on the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey, Erich Brandenburg's volume on German foreign policy from 1890 to 1914, George Michon's analysis of the Franco-Russian Alliance, Ernest Judet's estimate of Georges Louis and Franco-Russian diplomacy, Alcide Ebray's analysis of treaty violations from 1815 to 1926, Dr. Scott's survey of newspaper opinion in 1914, the studies of war propaganda by Lasswell, Demartial and Miss Cooper Willis, and the devastating critique of the Treaty of Versailles by Alcide Ebray.

Finally, we have the efforts to sift, digest, evaluate and set forth all of the above materials in comprehensive attempts to describe the events of 1914 and to ascertain the responsibility for the coming of the War. As books of this type we should mention the works of Count Montgelas in Germany, of Fabre-Luce, Margueritte, Morhardt, Pevet and Renouvin in France, of Barbagallo and Lumbroso in Italy, of Dickinson, Morel and Gooch in England, of Ewart in Canada, and of Bausman, Fay and the present writer in the United States. Of these the book by Dickinson is to be recommended as the best brief summary of the decade preceding the War, and Professor Fay's work is the most comprehensive and up-to-date handling of the whole debated question. In several chapters of the present writer's *Genesis of the World War* (Chapters II, X and Appendix) there is an effort to describe and evaluate this literature of war guilt. It is sufficient to say in this place that we now have available the literary basis for formulating a definitive verdict as to "how the War came."

Bibliographic Suggestions.

The best book on the appearance and nature of the newer materials, out of which the Revisionist view of war guilt has been constructed, is George Peabody Gooch's *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy.* A supplement dealing with publications during 1927 has just been issued (March, 1928). Chapter I of Professor Fay's *Origins of the World War* provides an excellent brief survey of the literature of war guilt.

Chapter III

THE BACKGROUND OF JULY, 1914

I. LEVELS OR TYPES OF RESPONSIBILITY.

IN generalizing about responsibility for the World War it is necessary to be specific as to just what is meant by this term "responsibility." There are some Revisionists who contend that all of the Great Powers involved were about equally responsible. There are others who state that France, Russia and Serbia were the only leading powers in 1914 who desired a European war and that they worked cleverly to bring it on with the least possible appearance of aggression. Both of these opinions could be correct if one clarifies what is meant. Those who argue for equal responsibility in this sense usually mean that, in regard to the causes of wars in general in Europe from 1870 to 1914, all the Great Powers were about equally responsible for the war system. They do not refer primarily to the crisis of 1914, but rather to the situation lying back of the July clash. Those who contend for the primary guilt of France, Russia and Serbia have in mind the responsibility for unnecessarily forcing the Austro-Serbian dispute of 1914 into a general European conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to know just what one implies when he says that everybody was guilty or that this or that group of nations was guilty.

The best authorities on the question of responsibility for the World War contend that we must examine the problem on at least four levels: (1) those causes of war in general which made war possible if not inevitable in 1914; (2) the diplomatic history of Europe from 1870-1912; (3) the diplomatic revolution of 1912-1914; and (4) the crisis of June 28th to August 5th, 1914. We shall briefly review the situation up to 1914 in this chapter and later take up in more detail the crisis of 1914.

II. THE CAUSES OF WARS IN GENERAL.

By the causes of wars in general we mean those divers aspects of the European international system in the half century before the

War which predisposed Europe to war whenever a crisis of sufficient proportions arose. As characteristic of this state of affairs making for war in times of international tension, one would naturally list such things as the super-patriotic national state, the cult of war, racial and national arrogance, the growth of great armaments, secret diplomacy, the struggle for raw materials and markets, the system of differential and discriminatory tariffs, population pressure, the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty, the conception of national honor, opposition to international organization and arbitration—in short, the whole complex of factors which led to what Professor G. Lowes Dickinson has well described as "the international anarchy" which prevailed throughout Europe in 1914.

When we consider such causes of war as the general factors listed above, it must be frankly admitted that all parties involved in the War were about equally guilty. They were all a part of the system, and if one had a larger army than his neighbor, the neighbor was likely to have a larger navy. If one was more patriotic, another was pushed ahead more inexorably by economic forces. If one pursued a more clever program of international duplicity through secret diplomacy, another disturbed the peace more by startling frankness in international behavior. Therefore, it cannot be held that, as far as general causes of war are concerned, any one European state or group of powers was uniquely at fault.

During the War the Entente asserted and reiterated that Germany was, beyond comparison, the chief representative of the war system in Europe; that, for example, she had a larger army and navy than any other state, was more given to enthusiastic reading of the prophets of war, like Nietzsche and Bernhardi, whose names were on the tongues of every German household, and was dominated in her foreign policy by the bellicose and arrogant Pan-German League, which desired German dominion throughout the world. Let us look into the facts in regard to the above Entente indictment of Germany.

The chief French authority on military history, General Buat, has shown that on July 1, 1914, before a soldier had been called to the colors because of the crisis of that year, the active French army numbered 910,000 with 1,250,000 reservists, while the active

German army at this time numbered 870,000 with 1,180,000 reservists. The Russian army lacked little of being twice as large as the German. The British navy was actually twice as large as the German, while the combined British, Russian, and French navies made the German-Austrian naval combination appear almost insignificant. Of course, numbers do not mean efficiency, but they are the test of the existence and degree of armament, and the Entente contended that Germany far surpassed any other nation in the world in 1914 in the extent of her armaments. The fact that the Germans proved the most efficient soldiers once war broke out does not alter the case in any degree. The French army was as well prepared for war in general as the German, and the Russian army was well prepared for a short war, which was what the Russians expected if they were joined by France, Great Britain and Serbia against Austria and Germany.

Likewise, with regard to the assertion of the worship of Nietzsche and Bernhardi by the German people, the contention receives no support from the facts. In the first place, patriotic writing in Germany can easily be matched by equal examples of jingoism in the other European states; for example, in the writings of Barrès and Déroulède in France, of Kipling, Lea and Maxse in England, of D'Annunzio in Italy, and of the Pan-Slavists in Russia. In the second place, Nietzsche was in no sense an obsessed exponent of the Prussian military system. He hated the Prussian military oligarchy, and, as Professor Charles Andler, the foremost French authority on Nietzsche, has shown, he was by no means an indiscriminate eulogist of the war cult. As Andler says: "It is a mistake to continue to picture Nietzsche as the apologist of Saint Devastation." Yet, even if we conceded the worst things said about Nietzsche by the Entente propagandists during the World War, it cannot be shown that he had any appreciable influence upon either the German masses or the German officialdom before the War. He was vigorously anti-Christian in his philosophy, and hence anathema to the majority of the Germans, especially the Prussian bureaucracy, who were loyal and pious Christians. No one could have been more repugnant to them than the prophet of the Anti-Christ.

Nor was Bernhardi any more widely followed. He was not read by the masses, and the present writer ascertained that not a single person in the German Foreign Office in 1914 had ever read his book on *Germany and the Next War*. He was known only among the military clique who shared his views without any necessity of being converted to them by his books. Nor were his works terrifying to foreigners in the pre-War period. M. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister in 1914, once admitted to a friend of the present writer that he had never heard of Bernhardi before the War.

During the War Americans were frequently warned by André Chéradame and other propagandists as to the dangerous nature of the Pan-German plot to annex the world. They were told that the German people and government were willingly in the grip of the Pan-German League and were eager abettors of its aggressive plans. The nature, activities and influences of the Pan-German League were made the subject of a learned study by Miss Mildred Wertheimer. She showed that it was constituted of a small group of noisy jingoes, who had no hold on the German government, which regarded them as a nuisance and an embarrassing handicap to German diplomacy. They could be matched by similar groups in any leading country in Europe, and had about as much influence on the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg as the National Security League or the "preparedness" societies had on Wilson and Bryan in 1915. They were a blatant and aggressive group, but in no sense represented Germany and German opinion. It may be true that the German people accepted the military yoke somewhat more willingly than most other European citizens, but in 1914 the civil government in Germany retained control to the last and resolutely held out against war until all hope for peace was destroyed by the Russian general mobilization.

We may, therefore, contend with complete assurance that, with respect to the causes of war in general, the guilt was divided; in fact, about equally distributed. In holding Germany, along with England and Italy, as relatively guiltless in the crisis of 1914, we do not in any sense attempt to prove her innocent of her equal share in producing the system of international anarchy which made war probable whenever Europe faced a major diplomatic crisis. At the

same time, it can no longer be asserted with any show of proof that she was uniquely black in her pre-War record.

III. EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY FROM 1870 TO 1912.

Some may express surprise that the diplomatic history since 1870 is here divided into two sections: (1) 1870 to 1912; and (2) 1912 to 1914. Why should we not treat it as a single unit from 1870 to 1914? The answer is to be found in the fact that down to 1912 the European system of alliances and the European diplomacy were ostensibly, at least, devoted to the preservation of the balance of power and the maintenance of peace. Between 1912 and 1914, however, Russia and France, through their agents Izvolski and Poincaré, abandoned this order of things and laid plans to exploit an appropriate European crisis in such a manner as either to humiliate the Central Powers or to provoke a war which would bring to Russia the Straits and a warm water port on the Black Sea, and to France the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. They also endeavored, with success, to get England so involved with the Franco-Russian Alliance that she would be bound to come in on the side of France and Russia in the event of a European war. Therefore, we have to draw a dividing line in European diplomacy at 1912, while fully realizing that the break was not sharp and that the policy which Izvolski brought to fruition in 1914 was begun by him as early as 1908.

In the diplomatic history from 1870 to 1912 the developments and episodes of greatest moment were: (1) the genesis of the two great alliances—the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente; (2) the French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine; (3) the diplomatic clashes over the Near East and Morocco; (4) the superficial and somewhat hypocritical effort of the nations to secure disarmament and arbitration at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907; and (5) the development of Anglo-German naval rivalry, especially after 1908.

The Triple Alliance was arranged by Bismarck between 1878 and 1882, and brought Germany, Austria and Italy together in a defensive alliance, designed primarily to frustrate a French war of revenge. Bismarck also secured benevolent relations with Russia

through a reinsurance treaty made in 1884 and renewed in 1887. After Bismarck's retirement in 1890 the Kaiser abandoned the Russian link and turned to England as the chief country for Germany to cultivate outside of the Triple Alliance. The French were on the alert and quickly picked up Russia. They had successfully negotiated even a defensive military alliance by 1893. When England and Germany failed to draw together between 1898 and 1903, because of the inadequacy of the British offers and the opposition of Baron Holstein, the French made a bid for English friendship. By 1904 they had succeeded in forming an Anglo-French agreement. Indeed, they even created a Triple Entente in 1907 through promoting an understanding between England and Russia, and successfully tested British support in the second Morocco crisis of 1911, when England took a more bellicose stand than either France or Germany.

The two great counter-alliances were unquestionably organized primarily to preserve the peace of Europe. Bismarck formed the Triple Alliance to prevent France from fomenting a war of revenge, and Grey perfected the Triple Entente to preserve the balance of power, whatever may have been in the back of the heads of Théophile Delcassé and Paul Cambon, who led the English safely into the alliance. Yet, in due time, the counter-alliances became a menace to Europe, because either group of powers would hesitate to back down in a serious crisis for fear of losing prestige. Further, as we shall show later, Izvolski and Poincaré were successful in 1912 in transforming the purpose of the Triple Entente from a defensive and pacific organization into one which was preparing for a European war and was arming itself so as to be ready when the hoped-for crisis arose. As between the two camps, it must be held that after 1911 the Triple Entente was much the greater danger to Europe: (1) because the Triple Alliance was going to pieces on account of the secret Italian withdrawal in 1902 and because of Austro-German friction over Serbia in 1912-1913; and (2) because from 1912 to 1914 the Triple Entente was being transformed into a firm and potentially bellicose association, as we have just indicated above.

At the close of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 the Germans had annexed the two former German provinces of Alsace and Lorraine,

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which had been added to France by Louis XIV. and other French monarchs. It proved an unwise move for Germany, as the French never ceased to hope for their recovery. France could scarcely hold Prussia responsible for the War of 1870, for even the Revanchard, Clemenceau, has admitted that "in 1870 Napoleon III., in a moment of folly declared war on Germany without even having the excuse of military preparedness. No true Frenchman has ever hesitated to admit that the wrongs of that day were committed by our side." But the German annexations at the close of the War in 1871, whether just or not, aroused a French aspiration for a war of revenge and laid the basis for the diplomatic manoeuvres which ultimately led Europe to war in 1914. As Dr. Ewart well states it: "Alsace-Lorraine was the cause of the maze of military combinations and counter-combinations which had perplexed European diplomats for over forty years. . . . Not France only, but all Europe, kept in mind, between 1871 and 1914, with varying intensity, the prospect—one might say the assumed certainty—of the recurrence of the Franco-Prussian War."

Since the time of the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia had desired a warm water port to assure her free and unimpeded transport for her commercial products and her war vessels. She had attempted to secure access through the Straits as a motivating incident of the Crimean War and of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, but was blocked by Great Britain and other European powers. Russia next turned to the Far East and sought a warm water port on the Pacific after the building of the trans-Siberian railroad. She secured this in Port Arthur, but was driven out of this commercial and naval base as a result of her defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. She then returned to the Near East and the Straits, which were now all the more desirable, as Russia had in 1907 come to terms with her old rival, Great Britain, who controlled the outlet from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. The Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander Izvolski, first tried diplomacy. He proposed in 1908 that the Austrians should annex two south Serb provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in return for which Austria was to support the Russian demand for the Straits.[1]

[1] The author secured positive proof from Count Berchtold in the summer of 1927 that the negotiations leading to the Buchlau conference of 1908 were initiated by Izvolski.

Austria agreed and annexed the two provinces, but England blocked the Russian plan in regard to the Straits. Izvolski, usually bankrupt, did not dare openly to criticize England, as he was then being supported in part by gifts from Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, so he violently attacked Austria and denied previous knowledge or approval of the annexation plan.

Izvolski next turned to Turkey, and in the fall of 1911 Russia made Turkey an offer of a defensive alliance if she would open the Straits to Russian vessels. Turkey was then somewhat under the domination of the Germans and did not care to accept this attractive offer of Russian protection against the Balkan states. A most significant aspect of the diplomacy of Izvolski in 1908 and 1911 was that, on both occasions, he was prepared to sacrifice the interests of the Slavic states of the Balkans when Russia stood to gain by such action, whereas, in 1914, Russia set forth as the justification of her measures which brought on the War the contention that she was bound by honor, tradition and precedent to act as the protector of her Slavic kinsmen in the Balkans.

After the failure of his Balkan diplomacy, Izvolski became convinced that the Straits could only be obtained by a war. Therefore, he decided to see if he could not get them by a local war rather than by a European war, provided peace could be maintained on the larger scale. He organized the Balkan League in 1912 and launched the Balkan States on a war against Turkey, hoping that the former would be victorious and that Russia could use her influence with them to secure the Straits. All went well until the Balkan states began fighting among themselves, when the plan of Izvolski was wrecked. He then became more than ever convinced that only a European war would bring Russia the Straits, and the Russian government followed him in this decision. Such was the state of affairs in the Near East at the outset of 1914.

In the Morocco crises of 1905 and 1911, Germany was in the right both morally and legally, but her diplomatic methods left much to be desired with respect to tact and *finesse.* In 1905 she insisted that France should not be allowed to occupy northern Africa without taking the other European nations into consideration, and in 1911 she

endeavored to prevent France from violating the Pact of Algeciras, which had been drawn up at the close of the First Morocco crisis. Incidentally, in the last Morocco crisis, Germany desired to break down the Anglo-French Alliance, but only made it firmer and more bellicose. Indeed, England seems to have been more eager for a test of arms in 1911 than either France or Germany. The writer possesses first-hand information that in 1911 the English urged Caillaux to adopt an attitude which would probably have led to war had he yielded to British advice. The most important result of the Second Morocco crisis was its effect upon internal French politics. The French jingoes attacked Caillaux for his pacific policies in 1911 and drove this great French statesman from power, supplanting him by the valiant and revengeful Poincaré. Had Caillaux remained in power, there is little probability that Izvolski could have brought France around to a warlike policy by 1914.

In the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 Germany made rather a worse showing than the other major European states by being more honest, frank and public about her attitude. She was no more opposed to land disarmament than France and no more averse to naval reduction than Great Britain, but she did not conceal her attitudes on these subjects from the public as carefully as did France and Great Britain, and made less hypocritical show of pacific intentions. To this degree Germany was diplomatically less competent than the other states just mentioned. The Russian disarmament proposals were not made in good faith, as Count Witte later admitted. Further, Germany was as active as the other states in any arbitration plans of significance. Finally, it must be made clear that there were no plans seriously submitted at the Hague for the arbitration of any of the real causes of wars. Therefore, the common allegation that Germany at the Hague prevented Europe from putting an end to all wars a decade or more before 1914 is seen to be the most ridiculous nonsense. But her candor, in other words, her diplomatic stupidity, allowed her enemies to portray her with some success as the outstanding challenge to the peace of Europe.

One of the most persistent myths of the War period is the notion that Great Britain's naval increases after 1908 were due to

the German naval program and were but a reluctant answer to the German challenge. Indeed, the present writer has been inclined to accept this version of the matter and included such an interpretation in his *Genesis of the World War.* In a notable article in the *Century Magazine* for January, 1928, Mr. Henry Kittredge Norton has completely demolished this contention and has shown that the British naval increases were due to the vicious chauvinism of Balfour and the British Tories, who were bent upon the destruction of Germany and were able to bulldoze the Liberal Government in England into the vast augmentation of the British naval construction project. It will be remembered that this was the same Mr. Balfour who was introduced to the American public in the early summer of 1917 as a dreamy, sweet-mannered and ascetic essayist, metaphysician and aesthete who had reluctantly left his library and studio to devote his high talents to repulsing the enemies of human culture and decency. Mr. Norton, comparing the situation with the present naval *impasse* between the United States and Great Britain, thus describes the manner in which the Tories loaded England with the naval burden and stirred the war fever in Europe:

> It was in just this way that the friendly feeling of England toward Germany between 1908 and 1914 was whipped and tortured into fear, antipathy, antagonism, hatred and finally war. The Liberal Government, itself influenced by the talk of war, increased the naval estimates in 1909 by nearly $14,000,000. M. Asquith justified the increase by a statement which he wanted to "keep strictly within verifiable truth," that during the previous year "there was an anticipation with four ships which belong to the German program of 1909-10, in the sense that orders were given, materials collected, it may be that in one or two cases, possibly more, ships were actually laid down."
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> The German Chancellor and Admiral von Tirpitz at once denied this acceleration of the German building program. Mr. Asquith was inclined to accept their denial. He said: "We cannot possibly put before the House of Commons and Parliament a program based on the assumption that a declaration of that kind will not be carried out." But he did put such a program before the House—and it was adopted! Why?
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> A certain Mr. Mulliner, a former director of one of Britain's great ordinance companies, had for three years been pouring into the ears of an eager Admiralty stories of vast and secret increases in the German armament works. Krupp's was undergoing a gigantic expansion and there was a general acceleration of German effort both in actual ship construction and in factory equipment which could be used for the manufacture of ships and munitions. Mr. Asquith, counseled by the Admiralty, swallowed

this story and justified his increase in naval appropriations accordingly. "There has been such an enormous development in Germany, not only in the provision of shipyards and slips on which the bulk or fabric of a ship can be built or repaired, but what is still more serious, in the provision of gun-mountings and armaments of those great monsters, those 'dreadnaughts' which are now the dominating type of ship. Such an enormous development, and I will venture to say, being most anxious not to excite anything in the nature of unnecessary alarm in this country, such an enormous development is so serious from our national point of view that we could no longer take to ourselves as we could a year ago with reason the consoling and comforting reflection that we have the advantage in speed and the rate at which ships can be constructed."

The German naval authorities had told the Reichstag but a few days before that there would be only 13 ships of their battleship program ready in the autumn of 1912. The British Cabinet, however, preferred to reckon on the fabled "acceleration" of Mr. Mulliner and estimated for itself that Germany would have 17 ships ready in March of 1912. Mr. Balfour, who from the Conservative Opposition benches had characterized the Government's increased appropriation as "utterly insufficient," made his own calculation and insisted that Germany could have 25—or, in any case, 21—of these ships ready by that date. And the truth? Germany had only 9 ships of her program ready by March of 1912 and only 13 by April of 1914.

But it was not the truth that was wanted. It was battleships. Mr. Balfour, feeling keenly the "insufficiency" of the Government's plan for four ships that year and a possible four more to be laid down the following April, demanded in a Guildhall meeting that eight ships should be built that year—and eight more the next! "You must not only have the power to build," he insisted, "you must build without delay, without hesitation, without waiting for contingencies, for obscure circumstances, for future necessities. You must build now to meet the present necessity. For, believe me, the necessity is upon you. It is not coming to you in July, or November, or April next; it is on you now. And it is now that you must begin to meet it."

The result of all this clamor was a substantial increase in the British program in spite of the fact that Britain had a wide margin in excess of the total of the next three navies of the world. The absurdity of the thing was exposed by Sir Edward Grey's remark that "We are not in stormy weather in foreign politics at the present moment but the excessive expenditure on armaments makes the weather sultry." There could be no franker confession of the dangers of excessive armaments. There was no quarrel about anything, but both sides were building such fleets that it made the political weather sultry!

Mr. Balfour viciously attacked the Government's claim that Britain had a sufficient number of ships. "Those ships, of the number of which they boasted, were the ships we left behind." He meant they were ships which his Conservative Government, when it resigned in 1905, had considered obsolete. Yet the figures were available if the expansionists had cared to be influenced by them. Between 1904 and 1910 Great Britain had increased the number of her battleships from 16 to 44, of first-class cruisers from 13 to 37, of small cruisers from 30 to 58, of destroyers from 24 to 121, of

torpedo boats from 16 to 88 and of submarines from none to 59. In the face of these figures it is fair to ask: "Would any program have satisfied the armament men?" Apparently not, for in the same speech Mr. Balfour gave new currency to the idea that war with Germany was "inevitable."

Mr. Asquith was moved to rebuke this sort of talk in the Commons in a July, 1910, speech which is uncannily suggestive of the words of Sir Austen Chamberlain quoted above. Said Mr. Asquith: "I can say with the most perfect sincerity that our relations with Germany have been, and at this moment are of the most cordial character. I look forward to increasing warmth and fervor and intimacy in these relations year by year. I welcome, as every man on both sides with any sense of true patriotism welcomes, all the various agencies and movements by which the two peoples are getting more and more to understand each other."

But there was no stopping the patriotic frenzy of Mr. Balfour. In October of the same year he made his own comparisons of the British and the German strength in dreadnaughts and pre-dreadnaughts for that year and the three succeeding years. He did not believe the margin in British strength had ever "in the last hundred years—nay more than a hundred years—sunk so low" as it would be in 1913. And yet the figures were available to the public. Britain's fleet according to the authorized programs would be increased from 48 to 67 ships while Germany's from 22 to 37, an enlargement of the British margin in the four year from 26 to 30.

If Mr. Balfour had the then prevailing system of alliances in mind, there was certainly no greater excuse for his exaggerations. The combined British and French fleets, not counting the Russian, were to be expanded during those same four years from 63 ships to 88, while the combined German, Austrian and Italian fleets would increase from 34 to 48, an increase in the Entente margin from 29 to 40. And yet Mr. Balfour said he was unable to understand why, in view of the imminent danger, "there should be slips not used, on which no ship is being built."

By this time such talk was accepted at its face value. All thought of economy or reasonableness in naval construction had walked the plank. The naval scare-mongers had the country on the run and scarce an Englishman could see a ship on the horizon without a shiver lest it be a new German dreadnaught. The German "challenge to British Naval supremacy" was accepted as a fact and big-navy men vied with each other in calculating additional millions that Germany was supposed to be spending on her navy. So generally is it the belief that Germany was forcing the pace on naval construction that the figures come as something of a shock. British appropriations for new construction increased steadily each year from $55,000,000 in 1909 to $93,000,000 in 1924. French appropriations for the same purpose also increased steadily from $22,500,000 in 1909 to $58,000,000 in 1914. The corresponding Russian figures were $8,500,000 and $65,000,000. Thus were these members of the Entente unwillingly forced by the "pressure of German building," to add $140,000,000 to their annual expenditures for new naval construction. But the German figures? Yes. On new construction Germany appropriated $50,000,000 in 1909 and $51,500,000 in 1914. Her largest appropriation in the intervening years was $58,500,000. The total German appropriations above the 1909 rate were $25,000,000 and to meet

this Britain, France and Russia were persuaded to increase their appropriations during those five years by more than $350,000,000. A tidy sum for the builders of ships and ordnance. Even a ten per cent profit would be worth the expenditure of several millions in war-scare propaganda.

The tragedy of the thing is apparent when it is evident that the real situation was known in England. Sir Edward Grey stated it frankly: "Our Navy Estimates for 1909 are said to have given provocation. They have not given rise to increased naval expenditure in Germany, or, I believe, in any other country. The last addition to the German Naval program was settled by law in 1908." And Mr. Churchill, now become First Lord of the Admiralty, added his testimony: "Next year the Naval Law . . . prescribes that the limit of expansion has been reached and that the annual quota of new ships added to the German navy will fall to half the quota of recent years. Hitherto that law, as fixed by the German Parliament, has not been in any way exceeded, and I gladly bear witness to the fact that the statements of the German Ministers about it have been strictly borne out by events."

Here is the word of leading English statesmen that Germany had not only not forced the pace in naval construction but had refused to follow the provocation of England, France and Russia when those countries, under the spur of mendacious propaganda, had nearly trebled their expenditures. And yet it was the German "challenge to British naval supremacy" that reconciled the people of England to the orgy of slaughter and destruction which began in August, 1914.

Therefore, we may say that from 1870 to 1912 the responsibility for diplomatic arrangements likely to make for war was divided. On the whole, however, with the possible exception of England, Germany has the best record of any of the major states during this period. After a most careful examination of the *Grosse Politik* Professor Sidney Bradshaw Fay has come to the following conclusions as to Germany and Europe from 1870 to 1912:

In the years 1871-1890 Bismarck's great aim was to preserve the peace of Europe. He did this successfully by a skilful system of alliances, in the interests of monarchical solidarity of the three Eastern Empires and the preservation of the *status quo* as fixed by the Peace of Frankfort. These alliances were all essentially defensive in form and character, except that in 1887 Italy extracted from Germany promises in regard to North Africa which were hardly defensive in purpose. Bismarck was able to achieve his aim of preserving peace, because he was always wise enough to have regard for the self-interests of his neighbors as well as of Germany.

After 1890 the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance made a counter-weight to the Triple Alliance. This new coalition of Powers, which had been Bismarck's nightmare, also tended at first toward the preservation of peace, because it was originally defensive in character and because it was no stronger than the Triple Alliance. It sufficiently balanced the Triple Alliance so that neither group of Powers was markedly superior in strength

to the other; therefore neither was a serious menace to the other, and neither cared or dared attack the other. This situation changed with England's decision to abandon splendid isolation. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's "alliance feelers" to Germany at the turn of the century were coldly received by Count Bülow and the Kaiser, who were irritated at what seemed England's unwillingness to afford Germany colonial advantages in connection with Samoa, the Portuguese colonies, and China, and who judged that the international situation did not yet make it desirable for Germany to enter into an alliance with England. As it turned out, this was a fatal mistake on their part. Yet it is by no means certain that any real alliance with England could have been secured, even had they received the Chamberlain offers more cordially; because Chamberlain did not have full support of Lord Salisbury and the rest of the Cabinet; moreover, such alliance would only have been possible if Germany had been willing to abandon the Tirpitz program for a large German navy; this was a concession which the Kaiser was unwilling to make.

After the rejection of the Chamberlain offers England turned to Japan and France, and made the Alliance of 1902 and the Entente of 1904. The latter, giving England a free hand in Egypt and France a free hand in Morocco, threatened the commercial interests and political rights of Germany in a matter in which she had not been consulted. As Holstein summed the matter up: "If we let our toes be trodden upon in Morocco without saying a word, we encourage others to do the same thing elsewhere." (Grosse Politik, XX. 209). Count Bülow's Morocco policy aimed to prevent this. Legally he had a good case, but politically he managed it badly, causing undying resentment in France, and leading the English to think he was trying to weaken or break up the newly-made Anglo-French Entente. This turned the first Morocco crisis into almost more of an Anglo-German than a Franco-German diplomatic conflict. It led directly to the military and naval "conversations" between England and France (and Belgium) which gradually ripened into bonds which had the practical effect (in spite of Sir Edward Grey's repeated reservations of a "free hand") of assuring the French of British armed support in case of a German aggression. Germany had no intention of making an aggression, but her growing navy and Agadir policy made England and France fear the contrary.

From 1907 to 1914 Europe tended to become more and more sharply divided into two opposing groups—Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. But there was no longer an equal balance between them. The Triple Alliance became relatively weaker, owing to Italy's dubious loyalty to her nominal allies, and owing to the dangers threatening to Austria from her internal difficulties and the nationalistic ambitions of her Balkan neighbors. But the Triple Entente tended to become relatively stronger and more closely united. Owing to English fear of the German navy, to Russian ambitions in the Balkans, and to French bitterness over Alsace-Lorraine and the Morocco crisis, it was possible to tighten the bonds between England, Russia, and France by a series of military and naval arrangements and by closer diplomatic cooperation. In population, natural resources, naval forces, and perhaps even in military strength, the Triple Entente outmatched the Triple Alliance. Under these circumstances it was obviously to German's

interest to preserve the peace, and she accordingly used her influence for this purpose in the region from which danger was most likely to come, namely, from a conflict between Austria and Russia over Balkan matters. In the Annexation Crisis of 1908-09 Germany helped find the solution which extricated Izvolski from the embarrassment into which he had brought himself by the Buchlau bargain and by Sir Edward Grey's refusal to assent to opening the Straits to the warships of Russia but not of the other Great Powers. In the Balkan Wars Germany's cooperation with England was decisive in preventing a general conflagration. While M. Poincaré had been inclined to push Russia forward in the rash policy of supporting Serbian ambitions, Germany had been inclined to restrain and moderate the claims of her Austrian ally. In the Liman von Sanders affair Germany, for the sake of peace, readily conceded a solution to satisfy Russia. While it is true that Germany, no less than all the other Great Powers, did some things which contributed to produce a situation which ultimately resulted in the World War, it is altogether false to say that she deliberately plotted to bring it about or was solely responsible for it. On the contrary, she worked more effectively than any other Great Power, except England, to avert it, not only in the last days of July, 1914, but also in the years immediately preceding.

IV. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION: 1912-1914.

In 1910, Izvolski, who had been Russian Foreign Minister since 1906, resigned to accept the position of Ambassador in Paris. This he did in part because of Russian criticism of the failure of his plan to secure the Straits in 1908 and the Russian humiliation which followed, but chiefly because he believed that he could do more to forward the essential Franco-Russian diplomatic manoeuvres in Paris than in St. Petersburg. During 1910-1911 he was unable to make much headway, as Caillaux and the friends of peace were in power in Paris and a pacifically inclined French Ambassador, Georges Louis, represented his country at St. Petersburg. In January, 1912, the Caillaux group was superseded by Poincaré and his supporters. This marked a momentous turning-point in European international relations. These two able diplomats, Izvolski and Poincaré, had at heart goals which could only be realized by one and the same method and means, namely, a war on Germany. Izvolski admitted that "the road to Constantinople runs through Berlin," and Poincaré's life passion, as he himself admitted, was to recover Alsace-Lorraine, which could be achieved only by a victory over Germany. Poincaré once asserted in an address to university students:

In my years at school, my thought, bowed before the spectre of defeat, dwelt ceaselessly upon the frontier which the Treaty of Frankfort had imposed upon us, and when I descended from my metaphysical clouds I could discover no other reasons why my generation should go on living except for the hope of recovering our lost provinces.

This is a matter of great importance, for Poincaré and his group represented the first Republican *bloc* willing to go to war for Alsace and Lorraine. Hitherto, the active Revanchards had been, for the most part, Royalists and enemies of the Third Republic. Plenty of Republicans had hoped for the return of the provinces, but no party of them had been willing to face the responsibility of waging a war to get them back for France. The linking of the Straits and Alsace-Lorraine as the common program of France and Russia, once a European war broke out, had of course, been long taken for granted as the whole basis of the Franco-Russian Alliance. As early as 1910, Georges Louis, the French Ambassador in Russia, tells how, for many years, the Straits and Alsace-Lorraine had been inseparably connected in Franco-Russian diplomacy:

In the Alliance, Constantinople and the Straits form the counterpart of Alsace-Lorraine.

It is not specifically written down in any definite agreement, but it is the supreme goal of the Alliance which one takes for granted.

If the Russians open the question of the Straits with us, we must respond: "All right, when you aid us with respect to Alsace-Lorraine."

I have discovered the same idea in the correspondence of Hanotaux with Montebello.

Izvolski reported to his home government that he "felt like a new man" after his first conference with Poincaré, and, while the two men disliked each other personally and distrusted each other to some degree, they worked together cordially in diplomacy. Nothing which Poincaré has written in his apologetic memoirs can challenge the assertion of the essential unanimity of the two men in regard to the basic aspirations of Franco-Russian diplomacy from 1912 to the outbreak of the World War.

The first practical step in their diplomacy was the completion of a naval treaty between France and Russia in July, 1912, the military union of the two states having been completed nearly twenty years before. In August, 1912, Poincaré visited St. Petersburg.

There he learned much more of the ambitious Russian plans in regard to the Straits and other territorial readjustments, and became convinced that France must cöoperate enthusiastically if she were to gain her objectives in the dual arrangements. One of the most famous of contemporary French statesmen, in speaking to the present writer of Poincaré and Izvolski, not inaccurately compared them to Jesus and the Devil, the difference being that in 1912 Poincaré actually capitulated to the diabolical suggestions of Izvolski. It is the belief of some of the best historical students who have gone through the recently published Russian source-material that Poincaré's fall was chiefly due to this Russian visit in 1912. Before that he had only contemplated war as a future eventuality. After the return from St. Petersburg he came to regard it as an essential certainty, to be prepared for and chosen at the most advantageous moment; if possible, after the Franco-Russian plans had been completed. On November 17, 1912, Poincaré informed Izvolski that if a crisis broke out in the Balkans which brought Russia in against Austria, and Germany followed to protect Austria, then France would most certainly aid Russia and fulfil all the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance. From then onward it was chiefly a matter of getting ready for the crisis.

November, 1912, was second in importance only to July, 1914, in witnessing events which helped on the World War. It was in this month that Poincaré pledged France to execute her full obligations to Russia in support of Russian diplomacy in the Balkans, that Grey pledged British naval, and by implication British military, support to France, and that Russia drew up her secret military protocol in which she stated that when the crisis came diplomatic negotiations were to be employed to screen military preparations leading to war.

The Russian army had made a poor showing against the Japanese in 1905. Though something had since been done to improve Russian military resources, the French believed that much further preparation was essential. Hence, the French made large loans to the Russians, on condition that they should be spent under French supervision chiefly for munitions of war and for strategic railroads to the German frontier. The Russians also greatly increased the size of their

army and the French reciprocated by enacting the Three Year Service Act, thus notably adding to the active French army.

In 1911-12 Izvolski had found French opinion generally opposed to having France enter a European war over the Balkans. Something had to be done about this if the French public was to support the diplomatic plans of Poincaré and Izvolski. Therefore, some of the French money loaned to Russia was sent back to be used by Izvolski in bribing the leading French papers to publish incendiary articles against Austria and Germany and to make it appear that it was to the interest of France to block all alleged Austro-German intrigues in the Balkans. Most of the greatest French papers were on the payroll of Izvolski, including the *Temps,* the leading Paris paper, and the organs of Millerand and Clemenceau. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of francs were dispensed in this way, Izvolski ultimately putting the papers on a monthly payment basis and withdrawing the subvention if they failed to be useful. He wrote home to his government frequently, telling them of the success of his campaign and asking for further funds. He told how, before the bribery campaign got under way, the French people were complaining about the danger of having France involved in Balkan controversies, but how, after the press campaign had been operating for some time, the French were impatient because the Russians were so complacent about Austria's threats against Serbia.

Izvolski even imported Russian gold to assist in the election of Poincaré to the French Presidency early in 1913. It was deemed wise to have Poincaré elected to the Presidency in order to give him official permanence. A French Prime Minister may be easily overthrown, but a President holds office for seven years, and a forceful man like Poincaré, by appointing weak Foreign Ministers, could direct French foreign policy as easily in the President's office as in the much more hazardous position of Prime Minister. In fact, Poincaré told Izvolski after his election to the Presidency that he proposed to be his own Foreign Minister in fact, and this he was right down through the outbreak of the World War.

In order to keep their plans moving smoothly it was desirable for Poincaré and Izvolski to have a sympathetic French Ambassador

in St. Petersburg. M. Georges Louis, who held the office, was a member of the old Caillaux régime and was opposed to the bellicose schemes of Poincaré and Izvolski. Therefore, he was removed and replaced by M. Delcassé, a chief apostle of the war of revenge among the Republicans of France. Poincaré cleverly arranged it so that the Russians requested M. Louis' recall. With Delcassé and his successor, M. Paléologue, as the French Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, there was no danger of opposition to the policies of Poincaré and Izvolski.

It was also necessary to convince M. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, of the necessity of a European war to obtain the Straits. This was done: (1) by a ceaseless bombardment of letters written by Izvolski from Paris; (2) by Sazonov's consciousness that the Balkan Wars had proved futile as a means of obtaining the Straits for Russia; and (3) by Sazonov's resentment when, in 1913, a German general, Liman von Sanders, was sent to Constantinople to train the Turkish army. This was no worse than what had already existed, namely, that an English admiral was in charge of the Turkish navy, but England was supposed to be friendly with Russia. Hence, on December 8, 1913, Sazonov sent a famous memorandum to the Tsar stating that Russia could not tolerate any other nation in control of the Straits, that Russia must have the Straits, and that Russia could obtain the Straits only by a European war. On December 31, 1913, and February 8, 1914, the Russians held long and secret ministerial councils at which they carefully laid out the strategy to be followed when this war came. The Tsar approved the minutes of the councils in March, 1914. Incidentally, Sazonov mentioned the fact that English aid must be assured if France and Russia were to hope to crush Germany, though they could probably defeat Germany and Austria even if England did not intervene on the side of France and Russia.

It is quite true, as certain Russian writers have insisted, that the holding of these council meetings does not prove that Russia was planning war immediately but it does prove that Russia was very seriously considering the prospect of a war which would not be started by an attack upon Russia. Moreover, we hesitate to think what Entente supporters such as Professor Bernadotte Schmitt would say if

a record of similar council meetings of the German Cabinet in December, 1913, and February, 1914, had been uncovered, along with the Kaiser's blanket approval!

This brings us to the final scene in the dramatic revolution of European diplomacy from 1912-1914, namely, getting England so involved in the Franco-Russian net that she scarcely hesitated in the crisis of 1914. In 1911, through the Mansion House Speech of Lloyd George, the British government had lined up decisively with France against Germany and had done all it could to inspire in the British press an anti-German tone. But Caillaux and the German leaders were inclined towards peace and war was averted. In September, 1912, Sazonov visited London in behalf of an Anglo-Russian naval alliance. While he was not immediately successful in this, he received from the British hearty assurance of naval coöperation against Germany in the event of war and was told of a secret military engagement to help France if war broke out. In late November, 1912, Poincaré induced Sir Edward Grey to agree to an arrangement whereby the French fleet could be concentrated in the Mediterranean Sea while the British fleet could be relied upon to protect the French Channel ports. In 1912 also, France was able to frustrate a possible Anglo-German agreement growing out of Lord Haldane's visit to Germany. In April, 1914, the British King and Grey went to Paris and there Grey, with Izvolski and Poincaré, laid the basis for an Anglo-Russian naval alliance which was moving towards completion when the War broke out in August.

The fact that England and Germany seemed to be coming to an agreement over naval increases and over the Bagdad Railway project greatly alarmed the French and Russians early in 1914 and probably explains why they decided that the European war must be fought over the Austro-Serbian crisis of 1914, before England might slip away from the Triple Entente. France and Russia never felt absolutely certain of British support until August, 1914, but the recently published British Documents show that the British Foreign Office never had any doubts about its obligations to the Entente in the crisis of 1914 and made its decision to come in on the side of France and Russia with no reference whatever to the Belgian question. As Morel

once remarked, the French and Russians had thoroughly "hooked" the British by the close of 1912, even if Izvolski and Poincaré did not thoroughly realize they had done so.

We have often had our attention called to the bellicose tone of the relatively non-influential Pan-German press and we have here pointed out the methods employed by Izvolski to buy the French press. There has not, however, been sufficient emphasis on the vicious influence of the Northcliffe press in England before the War as a factor in bringing a large section of the English people into a frame of mind favorable to the war policy by the time Grey decided to cast his lot with the war party in 1914. As an indictment of Northliffe and his methods we shall not quote from a German critic, but from A. G. Gardiner, one of the greatest of contemporary British editors. In the following letter, published in the London *Daily News* for December 5, 1914, Gardiner fully reveals the sinister influence of the utterly unscrupulous Northcliffe press in England in stirring up British hatreds and leading to a demand for a war upon Germany:

London, December 5, 1914.

My Lord,

This is not a time when I should wish to write to you, or about you, for there is something indecent at such a moment in inflicting the old battle-cries on the public. But you have chosen to issue a book of newspaper scraps the object of which is to cover yourself and the *Daily Mail* with honor as the true prophets of war and *The Daily News* and other representatives of Liberalism with odium as the false prophets of peace. To let such a challenge pass would be a wrong to the cause which this journal holds sacred and therefore, unwillingly, I address you.

Your claim to be the true prophet of the war does not call for dispute. It has always been your part to prophesy war and cultivate hate. There is nothing more tempting to the journalist than to be an incendiary. It is the short cut to success, for it is always easier to appeal to the lower passions of men than to their better instincts. There is a larger crowd to address and you have never deserted the larger crowd. The student of your career will find it difficult to point to anything that you have done and to say "Here Lord Northcliffe sacrificed his journalistic interests for the common good, for the cause of peace, for some great human ideal that brought no grist to his mill, here he used his enormous power not to enrich himself but to enrich the world." But he will have no difficulty in pointing to the wars you have fomented, the hatreds you have cultivated, the causes you have deserted, the sensations, from the Pekin falsehood to the Amiens falsehood about the defeat of the British Army, that you have spread broadcast. You have done these things, not because of any faith that was

in you, not because of any principle you cherished. You have done them because they were the short cut to success—that success which is the only thing you reverence amidst all the mysteries and sanctities of life.

"Nothing"

If one could find in you some ultimate purpose, even some wholesome and honest hate, you would present a less pitiful spectacle to the world. You would at least be a reality. But you are nothing. In all this great and moving drama of humanity you represent no idea, no passion, no policy, no disinterested enthusiasm. In Hosea Biglow's words, you

> "scent which pays the best an' then
> Go into it baldheaded."

When you preached war against the Boers it was not that you hated the Boers or loved England; it was only that you understood how to sell your papers. When you preached war against France, told her that we would roll her in "mud and blood" and give her colonies to Germany it was not that you had any rooted antagonism to France but that you knew how to exploit the momentary passions of the British mob. When you called for reprisals against Russia for the North Sea incident it was not that you did not know that there had been a mistake, but that you knew that a cry for war was a good newspaper thrill. When last spring you set all your newspapers from *The Times* downwards prophesying "civil war" and went to Ulster to organize your brigade of war correspondents and triumphantly announced that hostilities were about to begin, it was not that you cared for Unionism or hated Home Rule. You care for neither and have coquetted with both. It was only that you thought that Parliament was going to be beaten and that you could be the prophet of red ruin and the breaking up of laws. Even your loves are rooted in hates as meaningless as your loves. When you covered the Kaiser with adulation, called him "Our friend in need," and pleaded for an alliance with Germany, it was only to make your gospel of war with France more effective. In a word, you have been the incendiary of journalism for twenty years—a man ever ready to set the world in a blaze to make a newspaper placard.

Mr. F. E. Smith's Tribute.

And as you have been a preacher of war abroad so you have been the preacher of hate and discord at home. There is not a movement of our time to which you have contributed one idea, one peaceful influence, one constant loyalty. When you thought that the Insurance Bill was popular you supported it; when you thought it was going to be unpopular you travestied it, misrepresented it, and organized the servant girls and the duchesses to resist it. When the Progressives were assured of victory in 1904 you were their champion; when you saw that the tide had turned in 1907 you turned a stream of virulent slander against them and headed the most infamous campaign in all the annals of our public life.

Do you say that this is malice dictated by party feeling? You are mistaken. I am conscious of no feeling for you except scorn, and I think a little pity, for indeed a life like yours is a thing for pity. But lest anyone

should think that I am prejudiced let me call Mr. F. E. Smith as a witness. This is what he said of you on August 5, 1911:

"I remember a few years ago, when Mr. Chamberlain introduced his Tariff Reform proposals, the *Daily Mail* said it was opposed to them because they constituted a stomach tax. Well, being at that time very young and simple, I thought they must be right. A few days later I opened the *Daily Mail* and read, 'Mr. Chamberlain's great campaign, Triumph of Tariff Reform. Necessity of taxes on corn to cement the Empire.' Well, I, like the *Daily Mail*, have always had a mind open to conviction. So I said, 'Certainly' and I spent four or five years backing up the *Daily Mail* over that. Well, I opened the *Daily Mail* about three months ago and I read the leading article and it said, 'Tariff Reform is dead.' Where are we? No one has followed them more faithfully than I have. When they said to me 'Don't buy Trust soap' I didn't. When they told me there had been a massacre in Pekin I bought crepe. I think it is rather hard lines that in the middle of my political life I should be left with only two subjects on which I can give them ungrudging support—'Standard' bread and sweet peas. I can understand and even admire their desire to preserve an ancient barony from contamination."

That is what your friends think of you. What is there left for your foes to say? Indeed, the late Lord Salisbury said the final word about you long ago. The *Daily Mail*, he said, was "written by office boys for office boys," and though you have soared to *The Times* since then, you have only succeeded in dyeing it with the colors of the office boy's mind. For just as it was the *Daily Mail* which proclaimed the massacre of Pekin, so it was *The Times* that proclaimed the rout of the British Army.

And you charge Mr. Cadbury's *Daily News* with "horrible commercialism." Mr. George Cadbury has ceased his connection with the *Daily News* for years past and you know it, but it pleases you to strew the pages of the *Daily Mail* and the *Evening News* with venomous allusions to his name. In the abysses of your mind you discover that that name appeals to some poor prejudice or some vulgar ignorance. Perhaps you are right. But the record of George Cadbury can be left to the judgment of his countrymen. His work is known. Your work, too, is known. I think I know on which side the scales of judgment will fall.

But you say that we prophesied peace. Yes, we not only prophesied peace, but we worked for peace, just as you prophesied war and worked for war. We lost and you won. And you rejoice in the victory that has made Europe a shambles. Is it really a matter for rejoicing? A million men have died on the battle fields of Europe already and a million more will die. Millions of lives are being broken, millions of poor homes darkened by death and suffering. Is this really a subject for newspaper advertisement? Do you suppose that we could not have preached war too? It is the easiest thing in the world. It makes you popular and brings you readers—as you know. It is so much simpler to burn down than to build up, and a fool can light a powder barrel. The crowd will run to a fire, but it will never run to see the builder add stone to slow stone.

No, we did not work for peace because it paid. It does not pay to go against the popular tide. No one knows that so well as you who talk of the

"horrible commercialism of the *Daily News*," and who have spent your life in an infamous servitude to the changing passions of the hour. We worked for peace because we believed that that was the duty of a responsible journal. We worked for peace because we wanted to see a better and a juster world, because we believed that the fulcrum of human society is international cooperation, and not international enmity, that civilization cannot coexist with barbarism, that war would ruin all the hope of that social readjustment, that alleviation of the lot of the poor that was the purpose for which the *Daily News* was founded and for which, whatever its failures, it has lived.

And who shall say that in working for peace we were working for a lost cause? It was not a lost cause. Did Mr. Bonar Law believe that it was a lost cause when the made that memorable speech in November, 1911, in which he repudiated the doctrine of the inevitable war, recalled how in past years there had been prophecies of "inevitable" wars with Russia which had not taken place, showed how the perspective of the world was constantly changing and declared that if war took place it would be due not to any irresistible natural laws, but to the want of human wisdom? Were we wrong in working to strengthen that human wisdom or were you wrong in working to destroy it? You yourself had moments of penitence. Only last year you published in the *Evening News* an eulogium of the Kaiser far more extravagant than anything that has ever appeared in these columns —an eulogium in which you spoke of that "gallant gentleman's" efforts for the peaceful development of his country, of his just ambitions, of his word "which was better than many another's bond" and of the respect in which this country held him. If you believed that war was inevitable, what was the motive for that extravagant praise? But, most conclusive of all on this question of whether peace was a lost cause, turn to the French *Yellow Book* published this week. There you will find the King of the Belgians and the French Ambassador at Berlin recording only last year a change in the attitude of the Kaiser. Till then, they agreed, he had stood for peace and resisted the war-like influences around him as he had resisted them for a quarter of a century. Now, at last, they saw he had yielded. Only a year ago. Why had he yielded? Why was the cause of peace lost? I do not minimize the evil influence of the militarist party in Germany. Perhaps that evil influence was destined in any case to prevail. Who shall say? But can you doubt that among the factors that finally delivered the Kaiser into the hands of the militarists was the ten years of bitter newspaper war carried on between the incendiary press of this country and the equally incendiary press of Germany? Can you absolve yourself from any share in bringing this calamity upon the world? Nay, do you wish to absolve yourself? Are you not rather claiming this war as a tribute to your prescience and your power?

But even if, in working for peace, we were working for a lost cause, is that a fact for which we need to apologize? What is the case of this country before the world? Is it not this, that we have no designs against Germany, that we desired to live at peace with her, that we strove to live at peace with her, that we were driven to war regretfully and by compulsion? If that is our case, then to have worked for peace is to have worked for the good name of this country, for its honour, and for its freedom from complicity in this vast crime. But you deny this case. You proclaim to

all the world that the most powerful press in this country worked steadily not for peace but for war. And to that extent you have made us partners with the guilty. That is your claim. That is your boast. And you think to shame us because we do not share your guilt.

You are mistaken. You are without shame and without regret. When this nightmare passes away we shall still work to bring the nations together and you will still work to keep them asunder. You will discover some new foe with whom to play upon the fears of the public and through whom to stimulate your sales. But may you not find the world less amenable to your influence? This war will change much. The world that will emerge will be a world that will belong to the democracy. It will make an end of many things, and among them may be, we hope, that it will make an end of the most sinister influence that has ever corrupted the soul of British journalism.

I am, my dear Lord, yours, etc.

A. G. G.

While Northcliffe was bringing the Tory public and the British mob around to his point of view, the imperialistic and nationalistic propaganda was being successfully spread among the Liberals by Mr. J. Alfred Spender, editor of the Westminster *Gazette*, and the chief upholder of imperialism and Continental entanglements among the Liberal newspapermen of England. Spender was probably a more dangerous influence than Northcliffe, for a Liberal Government was in power in 1914 and the Liberals were not likely to be greatly influenced by the Tory press. One of the great Liberal leaders of 1914 informed the writer in 1927 that he regarded Spender as second only to the war clique in the Cabinet among those who made it possible for Grey to throw England into the conflict. It might be mentioned in this connection that it was Spender who helped Grey write his *Twenty-five Years*.

In this way Izvolski and Poincaré transformed European diplomacy in the two years prior to 1914 and were ready for whatever crisis arose. They did not originally expect that 1914 would be the year of the decisive crisis which would bring on the European War. They had expected this to come at the death of Franz Joseph, which they believed would bring about a serious Austro-Balkan crisis. When the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in the summer of 1914, they decided, however, that the potential Anglo-German rapprochement was too dangerous to allow the test to be postponed. England was known not to make wars for her health, and

without British aid there was little hope that France and Russia could crush Germany and Austria.

Poincaré has denied the truth of this indictment which we have been able to formulate on the basis of the Izvolski correspondence, but he has been unable to bring forward any French documents that contradict Izvoski's general interpretation of affairs. Moreover, there is little probability that Izvolski would have dared to lie regarding matters of such vital concern for the foreign policy of his country and for his own diplomatic ambitions. Professor William L. Langer, the foremost American authority on pre-War Russian diplomacy, in reviewing the latest edition of the Izvolski correspondence, says in the *Political Science Quarterly* for December, 1927:

> When all is said and done this correspondence still formulates the most serious indictment of Franco-Russian pre-War policy and lends considerable color to the theory that there was a conspiracy against the peace of the world.

While the Triple Entente was being thus more firmly cemented and made aggressive in character, as far as the Franco-Russian nucleus was concerned, the Triple Alliance was disintegrating. Italy had made a secret agreement with France in 1902 to the effect that she would enter no war against France. Though the Germans counted on Italian aid in 1914, we know there was no chance of their obtaining such assistance. Then from 1912 to 1914 there was considerable friction between Germany and Austria over Serbia. The Austrians felt that Serbia must be punished in order to stop Russo-Serbian intrigues in the Balkans. The Kaiser, however, under the influence of the pro-Serbian German Minister in Belgrade, Baron von Griesinger, opposed the imminent Austrian aggression and twice prevented an Austrian offensive against Serbia. Heinrich Kanner, a disgruntled enemy of the old régime in Austria, together with Bernadotte Schmitt, have claimed to find in the memoirs of Conrad von Hötzendorf, the former Austrian Chief of Staff, evidence of a dark Austro-German war plot secretly laid in 1909 and executed in 1914, but Professor Fay, Count Montgelas and others have shown that there is no factual foundation whatever for this Schmitt-Kanner myth.

V. THE EVE OF THE WORLD WAR

In the first half of 1914 many developments were taking place which were likely to make any crisis in that year pregnant with the probability of a European war. The Anglo-German agreement greatly worried the Freneh and Russians and made them feel that delay with the European war was dangerous. The Tory gang in England was favorable to a European war, as it would be likely to stop the menacing soeial reforms of the Liberal Party in England, particularly the proposed land reforms, and also would make it more difficult to enforce the Irish Home Rule Act. The Northcliffe press was bellowing for war against Germany, partly because of its Tory sympathies and partly beeause a war was good for newspapers. Russia had decided that she must have the Straits and eould only obtain them by a European war. She held two long ministerial councils in December, 1913, and February, 1914, to decide on the proper strategy for the war. In Mareh, 1914, General Danilov congratulated Russia on her readiness for the impending conflict and in June General Suckhomlinov, the Russian War Minister, boasted that Russia was ready for war and that France must also be ready. This was done in part to silence the foes of the Three Year Service Act in France. In the spring of 1914 France had refused to allow the retirement into the reserves of the class normally entitled to leave active service that year, thus having four classes instead of two with the colors in July, 1914. The Tsar had received the Serbian Premier, M. Pashitsch, in February, 1914, had asked him how many men Serbia could put in the field when war came, promised him arms and ammunition from Russia, and told him to inform the Serbian King that Russia would do all in her power to aid Serbia.

In his memoirs Sir Edward Grey represents Russia as drifting into war because of laek of any decisive poliey or leadership: "Perhaps it may be true to say, of Russia, that she was like a huge, unwieldy ship, which in time of agitation kept an uncertain course; not because she was direeted by malevolent intentions, but because the steering-gear was weak." It is interesting to compare Grey's view with Sazonov's sharp denial, embodied in his memorandum to the Tsar on December 8, 1913, telling him that Russia must have the

Straits and, in all probability, could secure them only by war: "In considering the future and in impressing upon ourselves that the maintenance of peace, so much desired, will not always lie in our power, we are forced not to limit ourselves to the problems of today and tomorrow. This we must do in order to escape the reproach so often made of the Russian ship of state, namely, that it is at the mercy of the winds and drifts with the current, without a rudder capable of firmly directing her course." From the reports of the ministerial conferences of December 31, 1913, and February 8, 1914, we can readily perceive that Sazonov had seized the rudder with determination and knew in what direction he was steering the Muscovite craft.

By January the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austrian throne, was under consideration and in March it had taken definite form. In May it was perfected by high officers in the Serbian army, and high Russian military authorities approved of it and promised Russian aid in the event of an Austrian attack upon Serbia. N. Hartwig, the Russian Minister in Belgrade, was organizing a wide-spread Balkan intrigue against Austria, and the Austrians had captured many of his telegrams and had decoded them. This enabled the Austrian statesman to know of the Russo-Balkan menace to the Dual Monarchy, and before the murder of the Archduke they had drawn up a memorandum to be taken to Berlin, asking for German aid in thwarting the Russian intrigues in the Balkans. They particularly desired Germany to drop Rumania and to take on Bulgaria as the pivotal state for Austro-German diplomacy in the Balkans. Such was the state of affairs when the Archduke, Franz Ferdinand, was shot down on the streets of Sarajevo in Bosnia on St. Vitus' Day, June 28, 1914.

In regard to this third level of war responsibility, then, that of diplomatic developments from 1912 to 1914, we may hold that the guilt is almost exclusively that of France and Russia among the major powers.

Bibliographic Suggestions.

The best general survey of the diplomatic history of Europe from 1870 to 1914 is contained in G. P. Gooch's *History of Modern Europe (1878-*

1920), some parts of which are now rather out of date due to the subsequent publication of new documentary material. There is an admirable brief summary of the diplomatic developments after 1870 in Part I of Fabre-Luce's *Limitations of Victory*. For the decade before the War we have an excellent book in G. Lowes Dickinson's *The International Anarchy*. For the general forces making wars likely one should consult Henry Kittredge Norton's *Back of War* and John Bakeless' *The Origins of the Next War*. There is a monumental work on the background of the World War by a distinguished Canadian jurist, Dr. John S. Ewart, entitled *The Roots and Causes of the Wars* (1914-1918). The diplomatic revolution of 1912 to 1914 is presented with great cleverness from a somewhat anti-Russian point of view in Friedrich Stieve's *Isvolsky and the World War*. The best German work on this period is Erich Brandenburg's *From Bismarck to the World War*. All earlier works on the diplomatic history of the decades before the World War are now superseded by the first volume of S. B. Fay's *The Origins of the World War*.

Chapter IV

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR: JULY-AUGUST, 1914*

I. THE SUNDAY SCHOOL THEORY OF WAR GUILT.

Before passing on to a consideration of the facts regarding the outbreak of the World War in August, 1914, it is desirable to summarize briefly the mythology regarding the unique guilt of Germany and Austria, which was embodied in the Entente propaganda for the consumption of their own citizens and for the "education" of the United States and other neutrals as to war issues. Nobody has stated this myth more effectively or concisely than Professor Charles Austin Beard in his magnificent work on *The Rise of American Civilization:* [1]

> In their work of "educating the United States" the (Entente) propagandists soon discovered that the American people were more easily moved by stories of atrocities than by the folios of Red, White and Yellow books packed with carefully selected diplomatic documents, issued by the belligerents in their own defense. On this score the Germans had laid themselves especially open to attack by their invasion of Belgium whose neutrality, including the British guarantee, was as Delphic mysteries to a nation that found high entertainment in the comic sections of Sunday newspapers. Taking advantage of this psychology, the British government made a master stroke by inducing James Bryce, so widely esteemed in America, to sign its report on German "frightfulness" in Belgium—a weighty state paper of dubious contents and worse propriety but none the less a horrible tale that sent shivers through the spines of those who read the newspaper headlines purporting to summarize it. Though the balance sheet of offenses against American intelligence committed by both belligerents in the days of President Wilson's neutrality cannot now be struck for want of totals, the slight revelations already made show how desperate were the designs pursued and how venomous was the poison fed to the public by interested partisans.
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> With a view to perfecting the technique of Entente propaganda, a complete official thesis was evolved for the guidance of those who needed a creed to support thir emotions. It ran in the following form: Germany and Austria, under autocratic war lords, had long been plotting and preparing for the day when they could overwhelm their neighbors and make themselves

* Because of the crucial significance of this chapter, ample footnotes are appended to defend all assertions made by the author.

[1] Beard, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 616-618.

masters of the world. England, France and Russia, on the other hand, all unsuspecting, had pursued ways of innocence, had sincerely desired peace, and made no adequate preparations for a great cataclysm. When England and France were trying to preserve equal rights for all in Morocco, Germany had rattled the sword and now, taking advantage of the controversy over the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, the central powers had leaped like tigers upon their guileless victims.

To further their ends, the story for babes continued, the Germans had hacked their way through Belgium, a small and helpless country whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the powers in their fond desire to safeguard the rights of little countries: and in cutting their way through this defenseless kingdom, the Germans had committed nameless and shocking deeds, crimes against humanity, offenses not justifiable in the name of war, horrors not usually incident to armed conflicts. To crown their infamy, so ran the Entente articles of faith, the Germans did what no other Christian people would do, namely, employ the submarine, a new instrument of warfare, against unarmed merchant vessels, sending cargo, crew, and passengers alike to the bottom of the sea. Embellished in many details, embroidered with rumors and ghastly stories, this Entente war creed was pressed upon the people of the United States with such reiteration and zeal that in wide and powerful circles it became as fixed as the law of the Medes and Persians. To question any part of it in those spheres was to set one's self down as a boor and a "Hun" and, after 1917, as a traitor to America besides.

II. SERBIA AND THE ASSASSINATION OF FRANZ FERDINAND.

The precious war time legend of a "poor, innocent little Serbia" that bravely defied extinction by the brutal and unprovoked Hapsburg bully was dealt a staggering blow as early as 1923 by the revelation that the plot was laid and executed by the chief of the intelligence division of the Serbian general staff, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievitch, and that one of his two lieutenants, Milan Tsiganovitch, was a government employee and a confidant of Premier Nikolas Pashitch of Serbia.[2] Still there was little to implicate the Serbian government in any direct fashion except its incessant propaganda against Austria-Hungary. In the last three years the revelations as to Serbian guilt in the Archduke's assassination have been truly amazing.

In 1924, in a volume, entitled *The Blood of Slavdom*, celebrating the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of the World War, which had brought to realization the Serbian aims for a Great Serbia, Ljuba

[2] S. Stanojevitch, *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand.* See the detailed treatment of the whole subject by Dr. von Wiesner in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* for April, 1928.

Jovanovitch, Minister of Education in the 1914 Serbian Cabinet, revealed how the Cabinet members had been told about the assassination plot by Premier Pashitch at least three weeks before its execution. He admitted, also, that nothing was done to stop the plotters, and no adequate warning passed on to Austria.[3] The only semblance of a warning lay in the hint passed on by the Serbian minister at Vienna to the Austrian minister in charge of Bosnian affairs, to the effect that if Franz Ferdinand went to Sarajevo some Bosnian soldier might substitute a ball cartridge for a blank one.[4] The writer was informed in the summer of 1927 by Counts Berchtold and Hoyos that even this misleading apology for a warning never reached the Austrian court or foreign office.

This revelation by Jovanovitch was a body blow to those who, like R. W. Seton-Watson, the "Father of Jugo-Slavia," had been steadily maintaining the innocence of the Serbs.[5] For more than two years thereafter Seton-Watson publicly and privately urged his friend, Premier Pashitch, to issue a denial of the truth of Jovanovitch's assertion. The best he could do, however, was to get the veteran premier to state that he gave out the information informally before the cabinet meeting had been called to order, so that it was not technically true that he had told a cabinet meeting about the plot.[6] This evasion was, of course, scarcely satisfactory to Seton-Watson, and in despair he endeavored to aid his friends by the method of obscuration. He wrote a considerable book, entitled *Sarajevo*, in which he rehashed the war-time fictions about the baseness of Austria-Hungary, and then offered much material on the subject of the many persons or groups who might sometime or somewhere have shot Franz Ferdinand if he had not been killed at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, by a member of the "Black Hand" who was executing a plot directed from Belgrade.[7] There thus passed automatically and ignominiously from the scene of war guilt controversy the man who had boasted

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[3] L. Jovanovitch, *The Murder of Sarajevo*.

[4] M. Edith Durham, *The Serajevo Crime*, pp. 148-57.

[5] See H. W. Nevinson, in New York *Nation*, February 16, 1927; and R. W. Seton-Watson, in *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1925.

[6] See a brief summary in *Current History*, February, 1927, p. 662; and *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, January, 1927, pp. 58-60.

[7] See my comments on his book in the *Revue de Hongrie*, April 15, 1927; and below pp. 318 ff.

that he would make short work of Dr. Boghitschevitch, Professor Fay and Miss Durham once he got down to serious work on the Serbian matter.[8]

During the winter of 1926 Jotza Jovanovitch attempted to clear his country by stating that there were actually two plots in 1914. The one which Pashitch uncovered and announced to the Cabinet was frustrated, but the other, of which Pashitch was ignorant, was carried out. This is the most transparent nonsense, as we know that the plot referred to by Ljuba Jovanovitch was the one which actually led to the assassination of the Archduke. Further, if anything of the kind suggested by Jotza Jovanovitch had been the case it would have been revealed to Seton-Watson while he was fretfully languishing about Belgrade for months awaiting extenuating information in behalf of his Serbs. Documents which were seized by the Austrians when they occupied Serbia during the World War and have just been examined by Miss Durham and others show conclusively that the activities of the "Black Hand" in Bosnia were both inspired and directed from Belgrade.[9] Within the last three years we have also discovered conclusive evidence that the Serbian royal family was cognizant of the "Black Hand" and fully supported its work. Both the King and the Crown Prince were aware of the plot in 1914, and aided the "Black Hand" by personal presents.[10]

The full complicity of the Serbian government, civil and military, in the assassination plot is now established beyond the shadow of doubt, and Dimitrievitch, the leader of the assassions, has now become the chief Serbian national hero, next to Karageorge himself, with Printsip the third member of the trinity. Beyond this stands the even more momentous and spectacular problem of the possible collaboration of the Russians with the Serbians in this matter. There seems to be little ground for the assertion of some writers that

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[8] He vigorously attacked Professor Fay at the Richmond meeting of the American Historical Association in December, 1924; and Miss Durham in the *Slavonic Review*, December, 1926.

[9] "The Sarajevo Murder Plot," in *Current History*, February, 1927.

[10] This was confirmed to the writer by members of the "Black Hand" in the summer of 1926. See also the articles in the *Kriegsschuldfrage*, July and September, 1926.

Russia actually instigated the plot.[11] On the other hand, there is almost conclusive evidence that certain Russians, especially in military circles, knew of the plot in advance, approved of it, and gave assurance of Russian support. The question is an important one, because if it can be shown that the Russians approved of the assassination and promised protection to the accomplices of the assassins, then the whole question of war responsibility may be allowed to rest at this point, with Serbia and Russia the primary and original culprits.

Of one thing we are certain, namely, that Colonel Dimitrievitch, who directed the assassination plot, worked in collusion with Artamanov, the Russian military attaché in Belgrade, and also with the knowledge of Hartwig, the Russian minister in Belgrade. These two men were aware of the plot long in advance of the 28th of June, 1914. Hence it is obvious that either they did not inform their home government or else the Russians did not attempt to crush the conspiracy.[12] What is the evidence that Russians in Paris and St. Petersburg were aware of the plot in advance? Robert Dell inclines to the belief that Izvolski was aware of the plot because of the nature of a communication of felicitation to Izvolski from the King of Serbia shortly after the assassination.[13] It has been stated from a number of independent Serbian sources that, before he dared to send the assassins to Bosnia, Dimitrievitch secured a Russian promise of protection for Serbia against Austria in the event of an Austrian attack.[14] Miss Durham and Dr. Boghitschevitch believe that the evidence indicates that certainly the Russian general staff knew of the plot in advance and approved of it.[15] Though in June, 1914, Sazonov and the Tsar visited Rumania, and while there Sazonov inquired as to the probable attitude of the Rumanians in the event of complications growing out of a possible Austro-Russian war over the Balkans,

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[11] R. Dell in the London *Nation*, September 19, 1925, p. 723.

[12] See Victor Serge in *Clarté*, May, 1925; Boghitschevitch, *Le Procès de Salonique*; M. E. Durham, *The Serajevo Crime*, pp. 197-99. The prior knowledge of Artamanov and Hartwig in regard to the plot was reaffirmed to the writer by members of the "Black Hand" in 1926.

[13] Dell, loc. cit.

[14] References as in footnote 12. This fact was also stated to me by the above mentioned Serbians. See *Clarté*, p. 210.

[15] M. E. Durham, *The Sarajevo Crime*, p. 201.

there is little probability that Sazonov knew of the existing plot.[16] Whatever the ultimate outcome of research in this field, it is obvious that the legend of "poor little Serbia" is gone forever and that we have a much different basis for judging the acts and policies of the Austrian and Serbian leaders in 1914 than we possessed five years ago. Impartial authorities like Gooch and Dickinson indicate the necessity of taking a far more favorable attitude towards Austria than the present author did in his *Current History* article of 1924. Gooch frankly says: "Austria fought under the banner of self-preservation; Russia, whom nobody threatened to attack, marched out to battle in the name of prestige." Dickinson confesses: "I do not believe that there was a state in existence that would not, under similar circumstances, have determined, as Austria did, to finish the menace, once for all, by war."

III. THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PERIL.

As the research into the question of war responsibility from 1919 to 1923 resulted in a distinct improvement of the case of Germany before the world, so in the last three years the indictment of Austria has been notably softened. The question arises as to how much change there can be made in the picture as established by 1923, namely, that Austria was determined to wage a punitive war against Serbia, and that her ultimatum was merely a diplomatic subterfuge resorted to in order to reduce the probability of bringing in Russia and precipitating a general European war. All prominent Austrian diplomats of 1914 vigorously deny this interpretation. In the summer of 1926 the present writer listened to Dr. Friedrich von Wiesner as he stated at length to a group of experts on war responsibility that, between the 15th and the 23rd of July, 1914, the Austrians had decided that they would remain satisfied with complete Serbian acceptance of the ultimatum. He further stated that the ultimatum, as finally drawn up, was so formulated, not in the hope of bringing about a Serbian refusal of certain sections, but because the conditions laid down appeared to be the minimum which would guarantee Austria safety from the Serbian menace. Count Berchtold, the

[16] There is a good account of the Rumanian visit in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* for July, 1926. See also E. A. Adamov, *Constantinopol i Prolivi*, Vol. I, pp. 87, 356-60.

Austrian Foreign Secretary in 1914 and his associate, Count Hoyos, vigorously reaffirmed this interpretation to the writer in the summer of 1927.

Our present-day knowledge of the nature and extent of the Serbian plots and intrigues, supplied in part by the courageous Serbian diplomat and scholar, Dr. M. Boghitschevitch,[17] furnishes an adequate foundation for the belief that with Austria it was either a case: (1) of acquiescence in gradual extinction; (2) of securing Serbian consent to the ultimatum; or (3) of war against Serbia. This view is sustained by the opinions expressed in 1914 by both De Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, and Dumaine, the French Ambassador in Vienna. [18] In other words, it is becoming progressively more difficult to show how any country in the position of Austria in 1914 could have accepted anything less than war or Serbian acquiescence in the ultimatum.

The Austrian statesmen of the 1914 period take exactly this attitude. In the summer of 1927 Counts Berchtold and Hoyos and Dr. von Wiesner all agreed in holding that Austria's permanent case before the world must rest upon the justice of her stand against Serbia in 1914 and upon nothing else. They admit that Austria acted independently and was not urged on by Germany. They also admit that they foresaw the possibility of a European war through Russian intervention, but that they believed the probability less in 1914 than it would be later when Russian preparations were nearer to completion. They hold, however, that the danger to Austria-Hungary from any failure to punish Serbia adequately was greater than that involved in the risk of a world war, and, in the light of the way things stood in 1914, we may agree that they are right. It would seem that, when viewed from the Austrian angle, the Austrian case against Serbia is impregnable.[18a]

Likewise it can be shown that Austria had in 1914 much more

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[17] See his *Les Causes de la Guerre*, new edition, Paris, 1925; and his *Le Procès de Salonique*.

[18] *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, Vol. XI, Nos. 21, 28, 29, 40, 55, 56, 265.

[18a] See the comments of Berchtold, Hoyos, Wiesner, von Jagow and Zimmermann on the writer's article on Austro-German relations in 1914 in *Current History*, July, 1928.

information concerning Serbian guilt than we have hitherto supposed. Lansing and Scott, American experts at Paris, tore out a short paragraph from Dr. von Wiesner's report to Berchtold on the Sarajevo murder, making it seem that Austria was convinced of Serbian innocence in 1914. Dr. von Wiesner has since published his full telegraphic report showing that the Scott-Lansing excerpt grossly and wilfully misrepresented the facts. Again, this preliminary telegraphic report was not what the Austrian government relied upon in 1914 for judging the guilt of the Serbs. They based their judgment upon the long oral report given by Dr. von Wiesner when he returned to Vienna, which was so full and convincing that it swung Count Tisza around to the support of Berchtold. Still further, the Austrians not only used von Wiesner's report on Sarajevo, but also the contents of a large number of decoded Russo-Balkan telegrams which they had captured in the years previous to 1914. These revealed the Russian intrigues against Austria in the Balkans which were directed by Hartwig, the Russian minister to Serbia, who employed Serbia as the core of the Balkan conspiracy against Austria. Berchtold could not, of course, reveal the existence or contents of these decoded telegrams in 1914. Substantial proof that the Balkan states, especially Serbia, fear the public revelation of the contents of the Austrian archives is afforded in the fact that in the post-War treaties Austria was forbidden to allow the publication by scholars of any documents in the Austrian foreign office dealing with Serbia or any other of the new states which grew in part out of the former Dual Monarchy. Count Berchtold is not even allowed to make use of the private papers he left in the foreign office when he retired as Foreign Secretary. Dr. Boghitschevitch has carefully read all the documents in the Russian archives bearing upon the activity of Hartwig and the Russians in the Balkans from 1912 to 1914 and he has personally informed the present writer that the Austrian charges against Hartwig and the Russians relative to anti-Austrian intrigues in the Balkans are amply confirmed by the Russian sources which he has examined.

If war upon Serbia was necessary, in case Serbia did not submit to the ultimatum, the main point in regard to Austrian guilt in

bringing on the World War relates to the question as to whether Austria proceeded to prepare for a possible war against Serbia in the manner least likely to provoke general hostilities. It can no longer be doubted that Austria took the most elaborate precautions to make possible her execution of a punitive war without at the same time precipitating a European war. Her diplomats, particularly upon the insistence of Count Tisza, rejected the plan of the military party for an immediate invasion of Serbia in favor of a long delayed diplomatic ultimatum which actually gave the Entente the great advantage of time in laying plans as to how to subject the Central Powers to a diplomatic humiliation or the test of arms.[19] The recently published British Documents show how, on July 16th, before the ultimatum was finally shaped, the Austrians sent out two "feelers" to Great Britain implying that Austria was contemplating severe action against Serbia. The English responses were such as led even the Russians to regard them as a distinct encouragement to Austria to go ahead with her plans.[20] Like Germany, Austria then counted upon British neutrality and believed, probably correctly, that Russia and France would not wage war without assurance of British support. In order to try to prevent Poincaré and the Russian firebrands from deciding upon war before Poincaré left St. Petersburg, Austria delayed the submission of her ultimatum to Serbia until after Poincaré had sailed from Russia.[21] On the 27th, before declaring war on Serbia, after Serbia had rejected the essential parts of the Austrian demands, Austria had direct assurance from Grey that he was not averse to an Austrian war on Serbia, provided it did not bring in Russia.[22] On July 22nd, Alfred Dumaine, the French Ambassador in Vienna, called on Count Berchtold and told him that he had just come from a conference with Count Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, and that both Dumaine and Schebeko had agreed that there was little probability that France and Russia would go beyond diplomatic protests with regard to any prospective Austrian action against Serbia. On July 24th, Mr. Theo. Russell, British

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[19] Barnes, *Genesis of the World War*, pp. 178-182.

[20] *British Documents*, Nos. 50, 56, 58.

[21] *Austrian Red Book*, Vol. I, pp. 49-50.

[22] *British Documents*, No. 188.

counsellor of embassy, gave an interview to the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* stating that he had carefully read the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and approved of it in spirit and word. He further assured Austria that England would remember the friendly attitude of Austria in the Boer War and would not intervene on the side of Austria's enemies. Even Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, was very sympathetic with the Austrian cause and indicated to Berchtold that he believed Austria could definitely count on British neutrality. These assurances influenced Berchtold much more than any alleged German incitement.

By all odds the chief fact in favor of Austria and the most damaging to the Entente relates to the assurances which Austria gave, coincident with the submission of the ultimatum to Serbia and again upon the event of her declaration of war on Serbia, that she would not impair the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Serbia. Russia has based her claim to a right to intervene on behalf of Serbia on the ground that she could not stand by and see Serbia destroyed. [23]

As Austria gave full assurance that no destruction of Serbia, either political or territorial, was contemplated, the Russian case for intervention then disappeared. The fear which the war-makers felt in regard to any publicity with respect to this Austrian assurance is well illustrated by the fact that Sazonov concealed from London and Paris these promises which he had received from the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. [24] Further, Count Szécsen, the Austrian Ambassador in Paris in 1914, has told us how the French authorities and Izvolski both refused even to listen to him when he informed them of the Austrian agreement not to dismember Serbia or impair her political independence. [25] Finally, number 223 of the corrected Russian *Orange Book* reveals the fact that the Austrian Ambassadors in Paris and London had announced the Austrian assurances made to Sazonov, and that Poincaré and Izvolski felt it necessary immediately to issue a lying denial in order to save the Franco-Russian

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[23] *German Documents on the Outbreak of the War*, p. 187; *British Documents*, No. 125.

[24] *Austrian Red Book*, Vol. III, pp. 14-15, 17-19; Montgelas, *The Case for the Central Powers*, p. 162.

[25] *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, February, 1926, pp. 66-69.

case before England. In other words, even before the first order for Russian general mobilization, the Russians knew that they did not need to intervene in a military way to protect Serbia from extinction. The genuine and adequate assurances given by Austria to Russia, together with the Russian unwillingness to accept them as valid, are well described in a letter to the present writer by Count Friedrich von Szápáry, the Austrian Ambassador to St. Petersburg in 1914:

> I can assure you most decidedly that, knowing the actual decision of the Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers, all my conversations with Sazonov were conducted in a manner which showed from the beginning that our action against Serbia was not intended as a war of conquest or for the purpose of the establishment of a protectorate, and my German colleague, Count Pourtalès, spoke to him in a similar vein. Fully aware of the importance of this point and knowing exactly the formal decisions of my Government, I laid particular stress on this aspect of the question from the very day of the communication of the ultimatum to Russia, even before I had any formal instruction to do so. I can offer most decisive confirmation that this declaration was given in a manner which could not be surpassed in clearness or definiteness.
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> Sazonov tried from the beginning to diminish the value of these assurances by arguing that the intended action of Austria constituted *in itself* a state of "vassalage" for Serbia, as he expressed himself, and he always recurred to this argument without being able to give a plausible reason for this point of view. It was clear that Russia was to such a degree responsible for Serbia's policy towards Austria-Hungary, and that she had encouraged Serbia in such a decided manner against her neighbor, assuring her of absolute protection in case of whatever consequences of this behavior, that Russian intimidation of Austria-Hungary seemed the only way out of the *impasse* created thereby.
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> Unfortunately, the Western Powers joined Russia in this attempt at intimidation, instead of trying to calm Russia, which, it is my firm conviction, a clear and determined word of Sir Edward Grey would have brought about. This seems to me to be the fundamental reason why war between the Great Powers—which is to be sharply distinguished from war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia—became inevitable.

Finally, on July 31st, Austria agreed to discuss with Russia the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and to consider the British offer of mediation in regard to the Austro-Serbian dispute, a complete abandonment of her original attitude.[26] Though in regard to the latter she insisted upon continuing her military advance into Serbia, it was a great concession on the part of Austria to

[26] *Austrian Red Book*, Vol. III, Nos. 65, 80.

consent to conversations and mediation when directly confronted by the fact of the Russian mobilization against her.

A serious question, of course, arises as to whether the Austrians were wrong in not accepting the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum and in insisting on declaring war. We know that the Kaiser thought the Serbian reply was satisfactory, if supported by adequate guaranties of execution and was opposed to the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia. Yet, when one looks into the Serbian reply very carefully he finds that the Serbian acceptance of the Austrian demands was apparent rather than real. There were many clever qualifications, and the only really important demands, numbers 5 and 6, relating to Austrian collaboration in the punishment of the conspirators in the assassination of the Archduke, were rejected outright. Therefore, in the light of what we now know of Austro-Serbian relations from 1908-1914, we must hold that the Serbian reply to Austria was very inadequate and unsatisfactory and that Austria was justified in rejecting it. The Kaiser's reaction, while important as revealing his non-bellicose attitude, is no criterion of the actual adequacy of the Serbian reply. His view was due either to inadequate knowledge of the Austro-Serbian situation or to a hasty and superficial reading of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum. As regards the Serbian proposal to submit the issue to the Hague Court, no major state ever had or ever has since submitted an issue of such proportions and such a nature to the Hague Court.

As Georges Demartial has well said, the great issue in regard to moral responsibility for the World War is the question of the justice of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, in the same way that the chief issue in military responsibility is the Russian general mobilization. We may now safely hold that Austria was morally justified in making war on Serbia, and that France and Russia were the moral culprits of 1914, because they intervened to protect Serbia and unnecessarily transformed the Austro-Serbian quarrel into a European war.

Austria is often criticized for not having heeded the restraining pressure from Berlin from July 29th to 31st. The writer discussed this matter in detail with Count Berchtold last summer (1927).

Count Berchtold stated that Austria felt that the issues were of such vital importance for the Dual Monarchy that he believed that Austria must determine her own policy as she deemed best, and Austria had been given this right in the German assurances of July 6th. For these reasons he did not take seriously the German pressure. The Austrians did not fear a European war, if England remained neutral, as much as they did Serbian intrigues, and for reasons we have indicated above, Berchtold believed until July 30th that England was sure to remain neutral. When he did back down and consent to the discussions and mediation proposals on the 31st, it was not due to German pressure, but to the ever greater probability that England was coming in on the side of France, Russia and Serbia.

In the light of the above facts, and the further fact that, as Dr. Gooch admits, Austria's action was based upon considerations of self-preservation while Russian intervention was a hypocritical subterfuge in the interest of prestige, [27] we must absolutely abandon the position taken in the *Current History* article of 1924, when we placed Austria first in order of war responsibility. Today, it is certain that she ranks below Serbia, Russia and France in relative guilt, and next to Germany, England and Italy in relative innocence.[27a]

IV. THE GERMAN ATTITUDE IN 1914.

The major facts in regard to Germany and her responsibility in the crisis of 1914 had been cleared up by the beginning of 1924. Indeed, there was not much left to be said as to the facts after the publication of the articles by Professor Fay in the *American Historical Review* for 1920-21. It was then shown that, by the time the crisis became acute after July 26th, Germany cancelled her blank check to Austria and coöperated enthusiastically with England in the effort to restrain Austria and avert a general conflagration.

Once it became evident that Germany could no longer be accused of having deliberately precipitated the War, then the custodians of the war-time epic of the Entente abandoned their defense of Article

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[27] *Cf.* G. P. Gooch, *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*, p. 209.

[27a] The old view of Austrian guilt is still maintained by Professor Fay in his *Origins of the World War.* I agree with his facts but not with his logic.

231 of the Treaty of Versailles and based their indictment of Germany upon the allegation that she had been chiefly responsible for the European system of militarism, nationalism, secret diplomacy and conflicting alliances which made war possible after the assassination of the Archduke in 1914. [28] The complete publication of the German documents on the period from 1870 to 1914 has made this thesis as untenable as the myth of the Potsdam Conference. As the most definitive demolition of the legend that Germany was almost exclusively responsible for the background of the crisis of 1914 we could do no better than to refer the reader back to the summary opinion of Professor Fay, the writer who combines, better than any other living person, impartiality and authority in regard to this particular subject. [29]

As the former Crown Prince of Germany remarked to the writer, unless one assumes that Germany was controlled by idiots in the decade before 1914 Germany would have chosen 1905-6, 1908-9, or, at the latest, 1911, as the date for a European war, if she had been intent upon conquering Europe, instead of waiting until 1914 when the Triple Entente had been well cemented and Franco-Russian military plans were well advanced.

Most of the old myths in the Entente case against Germany had been wiped away by the progress of scholarship up to January, 1924. The great war-time myth was that contained in *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, in which the American Ambassador to Turkey in 1914 assumed to reveal how he had learned from the German Ambassador to Turkey that on July 5, 1914, the Kaiser held a great crown council of Germans and Austrians at the Potsdam Palace and revealed to them his determination to make war on an unsuspecting Europe as soon as Germany could spring. Professor Fay demolished this Potsdam fiction in his articles of 1920, and added a detailed obituary notice on Mr. Morgenthau in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* for May, 1925. The present writer has further learned that *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* was not written by the Ambassador

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[28] *Cf.* Bernadotte Schmitt, in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1926, p. 147; for a passionate version of German responsibility see W. S. Davis, *Europe since Waterloo.*

[29] *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, December, 1926, pp. 901-3. See above pp. 22-24.

himself, but by Mr. Burton J. Hendrick, the extreme Anglophile who later edited the letters of Walter Hines Page. Morgenthau was very friendly to the German Ambassador in Turkey, but it is doubtful if he ever heard of the Potsdam story while in Turkey. Hendrick seems to have invented it on the basis of some German restaurant gossip. Count Montgelas and Fabre-Luce completely disposed of the legend of the Szögyény Telegram of July 27, 1914, which was alleged to prove that Germany's diplomatic proposals of 1914 were not made in good faith.[30] Montgelas and Fay showed that Bethmann-Hollweg's inquiry on July 29th as to what England would do in the event of war was in no sense an indication of a German desire for, or determination upon, war at that date.[31] After this inquiry the Chancellor increased his efforts to promote peace. While Bethmann did not make this inquiry until the 29th, Sazonov had endeavored to force the hand of England as early as the 24th; Izvolski had boasted that war was inevitable on the 27th; and on the 29th Sazonov admitted that he believed war to be inevitable and that everything must be done to align England with France and Russia.[32] The theory that Germany inspired the Austrian policy against Serbia in 1914 was refuted by Fay, Montgelas and von Jagow.[33] The thesis of Renouvin, Fabre-Luce and Poincaré that Germany decided for war on July 30th, before she heard of the Russian general mobilization, has been completely undermined by Ewart, Fay and Montgelas.[34] The view that Germany originated no diplomatic plans for peace in 1914, and turned down all those proposed by other powers was shattered by Loreburn, Montgelas, Ewart and Fay.[35]

Only two new myths of importance with respect to German guilt have been launched recently. The first is the product of the ingenuity

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[30] M. Montgelas, *The Case for the Central Powers*, pp. 211-13; A. Fabre-Luce. *The Limitations of Victory*, pp. 47-49.

[31] Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 143, 145; and Fay, *Origins of the World War*, Chap. XI.

[32] *British Documents*, No. 101; 216; *Russian Orange Book* (Romberg), No. 1551.

[33] Fay in *American Historical Review*, July and October, 1920; Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 113-20, 204-11; G. von Jagow, *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges;* and articles in *Current History*, December, 1927, and July, 1928.

[34] Fay, in *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1925, pp. 628-9; Montgelas, in *Current History*, April, 1927.

[35] J. S. Ewart, *The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918*, Vol. II, pp. 1073ff; Fay, in *American Historical Review*, October, 1920, and especially his *Origins of the War*, Vol. II, Chap. VIII.

of Heinrich Kanner in Austria and of Bernadotte Schmitt in the United States. It is based in considerable part upon an exchange of letters between von Moltke and Conrad von Hötzendorf in 1909 which are revealed in Conrad's memoirs. It is alleged that these constituted the basis of a military convention which secretly superseded the terms of the Triple Alliance and also undermined the pacific diplomacy of Bethmann-Hollweg in 1914.[36] Professor Fay and Count Montgelas almost immediately pounced upon this fiction, showed that it had no foundation in fact, and laid it forever at rest.[37]

The second new myth is one which Professor Schmitt propounded in the *American Historical Review* for July, 1927. He here contended that many influential German leaders in 1914 were against regarding the Russian general mobilization as a *casus belli* and opposed the subsequent German declaration of war on Russia. This preposterous interpretation was exposed by the present writer in the *American Historical Review* for January and July, 1928, on the basis of extended interviews with all the important German leaders of 1914 now alive, and with German scholars who had discussed the matter with the German officials who have died since 1914. It was quickly shown that not a single German leader in the civil government or in the army circles in 1914 failed to believe firmly that the Russian general mobilization was a *casus belli* for Germany. The whole military plan had been formulated on that assumption. There was only a difference of opinion as to whether the Russian mobilization should be followed by a declaration of war or by a defensive invasion of Russia without a formal declaration of war. Tirpitz, Falkenhayn, Pourtalès and some others opposed declaring war on Russia as it would put Germany in the light of being the first to declare war. Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow, however, held that it was necessary to declare war, in order to make it legally justifiable to send the ultimatum to Belgium and to justify the attack on France through Belgium. Moltke was impatient to get his troops moving,

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[36] B. E. Schmitt, *Recent Disclosures concerning the Origins of the World War*, pp. 21-23; H. Kanner, *Der Schlüssel zur Kriegsschuldfrage*.

[37] S. B. Fay, in *American Historical Review*, January, 1927, pp. 317-19; Max Montgelas, in *Current History*, April, 1927, pp. 77-80. Cf. also T. von Schaefer, in *Kriegsschuldfrage*, August, 1926, and June, 1927.

and only desired the government to make up its mind one way or the other, so that he could begin action. Therefore, Professor Schmitt's effort to break down the essential German contention that the Russian general mobilization suspended diplomatic negotiations and provoked the War falls completely to the ground. Some reputable authorities, eager to save some bit of the original case against Germany, hold that there is still one point in the indictment which holds good, namely, that she should have watched Austrian policy more closely and should have insisted upon a more moderate program in Vienna.[38] If, as we have tried to show above, Austrian policy was about what it had to be in the light of the circumstances and was designed to be the least provocative possible of a European war, then this last vestige of the war-time condemnation fades away. The allegation of Schmitt and Kanner that Austria was pushed on into reckless action in 1914 by the telegrams of Moltke to Conrad urging Austrian mobilization was explicitly denied by Count Berchtold last summer in an interview with the present author. He said that the Moltke telegrams in no way modified the Austrian policy or procedure.

The recently published British Documents reveal Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin in 1914, thoroughly convinced that both the German governing group, and the German financial classes were dead against war at the close of July, 1914, and were desirous of maintaining peace.[39] Equally significant is the testimony of the Berlin correspondent of the Paris *Matin* in 1914, certainly not a source of pro-German opinion. Professor J. F. Scott thus summarizes his reports during the July crisis:[40]

> More significant still, the Berlin correspondent of the Paris *Matin* sent home one dispatch after another in which he commented on the desire for peace in Germany. "As for Germany," he telegraphed on July 26, "she does not wish war. Her Government, at least, does not wish it. If Germany mobilizes, she will do so reluctantly. She will do so because Russia has obliged her to. Her Press is not bellicose." On the 27th he repeated his opinion. "Germany certainly does not wish war," he sent word the next day, "her Press to-day clearly expresses this sentiment." On the 29th he asserted emphatically that Germany wished war "less to-day than yesterday,

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[38] A view expressed to me by Dr. Gooch during his visit to this country in 1927.
[39] *British Documents*, No. 677.
[40] J. F. Scott, *Five Weeks*, pp. 148-49.

less yesterday than the day before." He pointed out that the German Empire was enjoying magnificent industrial and commercial prosperity. "Is she going to risk all this," he asked, "because the Serbs have wronged Austria?" On July 30th the *Lokal-Anzeiger* published an incorrect report, quickly denied, that Germany was mobilizing. The *Matin's* correspondent wrote of the impression made by this report on the people in the streets of the German capital: "Sadness and anxiety were on all faces. Not a patriotic cry was uttered, and when, half an hour later, the word was sent forth that the news of mobilization was false, the relief was enormous, the reaction and joy immediate."

Finally, as to the great moral indictment of Germany in 1914, aside from the charge of deliberate war guilt, namely, the invasion of Belgium, there is no longer any legitimate doubt that, if England had promised her neutrality in the event that Germany respected Belgian neutrality, Germany would have been happy to do so. Nor is there much doubt that, if England had given a sharp preliminary warning that she would intervene in the event of the invasion of Belgium, Germany would have changed her plans. Alcide Ebray has shown that treaty violation was a major recreation of European states before 1914. England's conduct on the seas from 1914 to 1919 and her attitude towards Greek neutrality and towards Egypt and Persia during the War place her in a poor light as a defender of international law and the rights of small nations. Herr von Jagow informed the writer in 1927 that the German offer not to invade Belgium if Britain remained neutral was a genuine and authentic one. He held that Lichnowsky's failure to publish this offer in the British press was the most serious blunder in German diplomacy in 1914.

The facts assembled in this section relative to Germany do not in any sense prove her innocent of her share in creating the deplorable and anarchic state of international affairs in Europe in 1914. What they do is to show that, far from being first in the rank of the guilty, Germany stands with England and Italy as one of the three major powers, which, whatever the stupidities in the details of their policy, actually desired to preserve the peace of Europe from 1871 to August, 1914. The facts relative to the crisis of 1914 do not, of course, prove that in a state of international anarchy in Europe Germany can always be trusted to be on the side of peace or that the Entente Powers will always be favorable to war. It so happened that in 1914 France and Russia had, as their leading objectives in

foreign policy, goals which could only be obtained by war, while Germany was in a position to profit by the maintenance of the *status quo*. On the other hand, had Turkey capitulated to Russia in 1911, opened the Straits to Russia, and threatened the Berlin-Bagdad project, it may well be that around 1914 Russia would have been a bulwark of European peace, while Germany would have been willing to fight under favorable circumstances to forward her Near Eastern interests. Finally, it is quite apparent that, while Germany did not desire any kind of European war in 1914, she was not afraid or especially hesitant about a European war if England remained neutral. The German pressure on Austria became prominent chiefly after it was apparent that Italy would stay out and that England would come in. Yet, this in no way upsets the assertion that Germany did work very vigorously for peace after July 27, 1914.

V. THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSIBILITY OF RUSSIA FOR THE WORLD WAR.

The progress of scholarly research into the problem of war responsibility in the last few years has served to show that, however much she may have been encouraged by France and England, Russia was the one great power immediately responsible for precipitating the World War in 1914. It is impossible to read the Russian documents on the period from 1904 to 1914 and doubt that Russia was determined to secure the Straits at any price. By 1913 it had become apparent that this price would be a European war.[41] Even so cautious and informed a writer as G. Lowes Dickinson holds that no one can read the pre-war diplomatic literature and believe that Russia would not have precipitated a European war by 1916 or 1917.[42] We know that Russia would have preferred, all other things being equal, to have waited a year or so after 1914, in order that her preparations for war might be carried to completion.[43] It was generally expected by the Russians that the capital crisis in the Balkans, which would serve as the basis for launching the European war, would come at the death of the Austrian Emperor, Franz Joseph, and they hoped the aged Emperor would "hang on" until the Russian

[41] F. Stieve, *Isvolsky and the World War*, pp. 186-95; 217-46.
[42] *The International Anarchy*, p. 466.
[43] *Clarté*, May, 1925, p. 207.

military plans were perfected. Yet, Russian fear of possible British defection on account of the improving Anglo-German relations in 1914 outweighed the consideration of imperfect armament.[44] In spite of the fact that the blasts of Sukhomlinov in March and June, 1914, were planned in part to aid the French militarists and prevent the French Socialists from rescinding the Three Year Service Act, there is little doubt that these utterances and General Danilov's memoir of March, 1914, actually reflected the confidence of the Russians as to their preparations for a short war.[45] With English adherence they believed it would certainly be a short war, for Sazonov had expressed the belief at the close of December, 1913, that France and Russia alone could defeat Germany and Austria, while with English aid they could destroy Germany [46]

The following elements in the situation must be kept clearly in mind in analyzing the relation of Russia to the outbreak of the War. The Russian objective was the Straits, and it was conceded by the Russians at the close of 1913 that they could only be obtained by war. The tension over the Near East had been greatly increased by the Liman von Sanders episode of 1913, even though Germany had backed down before the Russian protest. The Anglo-German *rapprochement* greatly alarmed the French and Russians and made them feel that the War must not be long delayed, lest England, no longer fearful of Germany, should lose her enthusiasm for war-time coöperation with France and Russia. In the early summer of 1914 Russia was menaced by the prospect of an economic and social revolution more serious than that of 1905. On the day when Poincaré landed in St. Petersburg (July 20th) there were open insurrections. Pan-Slavism had been developed as a patriotic antidote to radicalism in Russia and a Pan-Slavic war had been held in reserve as a trump-card to be played in the event of another revolution. Poincaré greatly encouraged the Russian military clique and left the Russians with not only the impression but an actual promise that France would stand with Russia in whatever action she took regarding Austria and Serbia.

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[44] Barnes, *Genesis of the World War*, pp. 485-90.
[45] References as in footnote 41; and G. Frantz, *Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg.*
[46] Stieve, op. cit., pp. 225-6.

Then we have the personality of Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister. He was a man of excellent personal character, widely different from the utterly venal and unscrupulous, but much abler, Izvolski. Yet, he was a man of a violent personal temper and was completely out of self-control when any of his deeper complexes were seriously disturbed. His dominating complexes were Greek Orthodox Christianity and Pan-Slavism, and the Austrian attitude towards Serbia in 1914 threatened both of these fundamental prejudices. Count Pourtalès has informed the writer as to Sazonov's intense anger when he heard of the Austrian ultimatum, which may account for the immediate beginning of the Russian military preparations for war on the very afternoon of the day (24th) that Sazonov learned of the ultimatum. When Sazonov heard of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, news of which reached St. Petersburg on July 28th, he was, according to Pourtalès, in a state of uncontrollable rage until after the decision had been made to decree the Russian general mobilization. In his memoirs (English edition p. 212) Sazonov himself admits that, after he learned of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, he paid no attention to diplomatic proposals, but worked unremittingly to prepare for immediate war.

The framework of the Russian procedure in the crisis of 1914 was provided by the military protocol of November 8th, 1912, which stated: [47]

> Mobilization does not necessarily mean the immediate beginning of hostilities because it may be of advantage to complete the marshalling of our troops without beginning hostilities, in order that our opponent may not be entirely deprived of the hope that war may still be avoided. Our military measures will then have to be masked by *clever pretended diplomatic negotiations* in order to lull the fears of the enemy as completely as possible. If by such measures we can gain a few days they absolutely must be taken.

This procedure was followed with precision in 1914 from July 24th onward. The minutes of the secret Crown Council of July 24th were recovered and first published in *Current History*, for January, 1926. Serbia was advised to show moderation in her attitude towards Austria and to avoid any precipitate attack, so as not to alienate

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[47] Frantz, op. cit., Anlage 82, reproduced by A. von Wegerer, "The Russian Mobilization of 1914," in *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1928, pp. 226-7.

European opinion. At the same time, extensive military, naval and financial plans were formulated, looking forward to an immediate European war. On the next morning, at another council, Sazonov was authorized to order the mobilization of 1,100,000 men at his discretion. [48] On the afternoon of the same day (25th) Sazonov told Buchanan, the British Ambassador, that, since France "had placed herself unreservedly on Russia's side," Russia was quite prepared to "face all the risks of war." [49] General Dobrorolski, chief of the mobilization section of the Russian army, tells us that, at the Crown Council on the 25th and at a meeting of the Russian general staff that evening, war was decided upon and that all subsequent Russian diplomacy was merely a protective screen for the Russian military measures: [50] "War was already decided upon and the whole flood of telegrams between the Governments of Russia and Germany represented merely the *mise en scène* of an historical drama." [51] These facts are also corroborated by Paléologue, the French Ambassador in Russia in 1914. In his Diary, under an entry of July 25, 1914, he writes: "At seven in the evening I went to the Warsaw station to bid farewell to Isvolsky who was leaving to rejoin his post. Great activity at the terminus, the trains crowded with officers and troops. All this points to mobilization. We hurriedly exchange our views of the situation and both arrive at the same conclusion: 'This time it is war!' " It will, therefore, be very difficult for Professor Schmitt to show that the Russian decision upon war came after the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia on July 28th.[52]

On July 26th the preliminary mobilization measures began and were carried on without interruption. The 28th and 29th were crucial days. The British and German diplomatic proposals seemed likely to prove menacing to the war party in Serbia, Russia and France, while the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia provided an excellent ostensible excuse for decisive Russian action. Accordingly, on the 28th, the decision was made to proceed to the general mobili-

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[48] *British Documents*, No. 125.

[49] Ibid.

[50] S. Dobrorolski, *Die Mobilmachung der Russischen Armee 1914.*

[51] Ibid.

[52] B. Schmitt, in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1926, p. 143.

zation which meant irrevocable European war.[53] The order was obtained from the Tsar on the 29th, and then cancelled late that night because of the Kaiser's pressure on the Tsar. The partial mobilization of 1,100,000 men was ordered in its stead, but this order was never executed. On the afternoon of the 30th the Tsar was finally persuaded to issue the general mobilization order, fully conscious that it meant an inevitable general conflict: "Remember," he said to Sazonov, "it is the question of sending thousands upon thousands to their death."[54] As Dobrorolski puts it:[55] "The thing was irrevocably begun. A change was no longer possible. The prologue of the great drama had commenced!" Further confirmation of Dobrorolski's authoritative statement that Sazonov's diplomatic proposals were bogus and merely a barrage for the military measures which were soon to make all diplomacy hopeless is to be found in the recently published letter of Premier Pashitch of Serbia, written to his chief of staff on July 31, 1914:[56]

> The reports received from our (Serbian) Minister at St. Petersburg state that Russia is now negotiating and is prolonging the negotiations in order to gain time for the mobilization and concentration of her army. When her mobilization is finished she will declare war on Austria.

In his memoirs (English edition, p. 212) Sazonov himself admits that he actually abandoned diplomacy on July 28th, while in form he was recommending a conference at London as late as July 31st! "Cannon thunder prevented the resumption of negotiations to which I had attached a practical importance only during the first stage of the Austro-Serbian conflict. The declaration of war on Serbia and the bombardment of Belgrade deprived them of any real significance, and I lost all interest in them, though for reasons already indicated, I did not refuse to continue them. Negotiations could help nothing now, and there was no more reason for delay." Yet he condemns the Kaiser for not accepting the Tsar's suggestion of the 29th to refer the Austro-Serbian dispute to the Hague. Further, General Palizyn, Russian chief of staff in 1915, later boasted

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[53] Schilling, *How the War Began in 1914*, pp. 15-16.

[54] Barnes, op. cit., pp. 341-49.

[55] Ibid.

[56] *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, November, 1926, pp. 836-7.

as to how the Russians had gained time by deceiving the Austrians and Germans as to the progress of the Russian mobilization plans: [57]

> Just think what would have occurred if the Austrians had thrown their troops solidly against us. Our march to the frontier would not have succeeded, and the Austrians would have inflicted partial defeats upon us. But for a long time they did not believe we would declare war. They devoted all their attention to Serbia in the full conviction that we would not stir. Our mobilization struck them like a thunder-bolt. It was then too late for them. They had become involved with Serbia. The Germans too permitted the first days to elapse without action. Altogether we gained twelve days. Our enemies committed a huge blunder (by crediting Russian diplomatic efforts as sincere) and conceded to us at the same time an incalculable advantage.

As to the question of whether the Russian mobilization meant inevitable war, this is a fact so well settled as to be no longer legitimately debatable. An effort to defend the thesis that it did not mean war was made by Mr. Charles Altschul in *Current History* for June, 1926, and was quickly demolished by Dr. Ernest F. Henderson in the August number of the same journal. [58] On this point we could do no better than to quote the opinion of the Russian military expert, General Gurko, who wrote in 1919: [59]

> Looked at from the German standpoint, the beginning of the Russian mobilization was for Germany synonymous with the necessity to begin military operations immediately. In order to understand and approve this we must draw attention to the fact that the chief condition of success for Germany lay in the possibility of putting her entire mobilized army into the field and breaking into the hostile countries at once, before these States had had time to get ready, and particularly before the Russian mobilization could have been completed.
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> But if, at the beginning of the Russian mobilization, Germany had still wanted to wait for a declaration of war from the Russian side, upon the calculation that Russia would limit herself to a mere mobilization without declaring war, then Germany would have lost this advantage, which in that case would have fallen to Russia. Germany could not incur this hazard, and for that reason Russia's mobilization called forth mechanically as it were, the German mobilization.
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> It is possible that there are people who reach the conclusion that Germany might have restricted herself to a mere mobilization; but such a procedure would have had the same disadvantageous result, though in a slighter degree. The above-mentioned advantage referred not merely to mobilization, but chiefly to the possibility of being able to begin immediately the march

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[57] *Current History*, March, 1927, pp. 855-6.

[58] Loc. cit., Chronicles, pp. viii-x.

[59] *Current History*, March, 1927, pp. 857-8.

into hostile territory. To mobilize her army and then permit her enemies to do the same without molestation, would have been equivalent to throwing away her best trump card—namely, to attack her enemies while they were not yet through with their mobilization. Consequently, the Russian mobilization meant for Germany the necessity of declaring war, without wasting a single day.

There is quite certainly a difference. Germany had to answer the Russian mobilization with a declaration of war; we were able to confine ourselves to a mere mobilization, inasmuch as it lay in our advantage to postpone the time for declaring war, if it should turn out to be necessary.

Not only have the British Documents offered complete confirmation of the early date and indefensible nature of the Russian mobilization, but the documents just published by the Department of State of the United States (*Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1914. Supplement: The World War*, pp. 15ff.) are equally conclusive on this point. We quote below the more relevant telegrams sent to Washington by Mr. Wilson, the American *Chargé d'Affaires* at St. Petersburg in 1914:

Chargé d'Affaires in Russia (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Telegram

American Embassy

St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914, noon.

Minister of War tells me that he considers war between Austria and Russia almost inevitable and same opinion seems generally current in diplomatic and political circles. Russian government has ordered complete army mobilization to begin immediately.

Wilson.

Chargé d'Affaires in Russia (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Telegram

American Embassy

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914, 11 P. M.

[Received 9:55 A. M.]

News of Austrian declaration of war against Servia just been known and causing great excitement and apprehension. Russian mobilization has been going on quietly several days though decree not published officially as reported in Embassy's telegram of July 27 (26) noon. The decree now expected momentarily. Strongest influences in highest circles being brought upon Emperor to declare war and I greatly fear Russian intervention inevitable. Am informed by German Embassy that this move will result in German intervention. It is believed here that England and Italy will not be drawn in unless forced by later complications.

Wilson.

Chargé d'Affaires in Russia (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
Telegram

American Embassy
St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914, 3 P. M.
[Received 1:01 P. M.]

Mobilization order issued. Most embassies and legations are informing their governments that they consider war inevitable and I hold the same opinion. German and Austrian Embassies are packed and ready to leave any moment.

Wilson.

An effort to help Sazonov out of the embarrassments created by his numerous lies and misrepresentations concerning the crisis of 1914 was made by M. T. Florinsky in his article on the Russian mobilization in the *Political Science Quarterly* for June, 1927, but it proved a thankless task as Sazonov provided a veritable anthology of all his earlier deceits and misstatements in his memoirs, which were published in the autumn of 1927. Further, Florinsky's article contained a number of quite untenable points, as Herr von Wegerer pointed out in his magisterial critique of Florinsky in the *Political Science Quarterly* for June, 1928.

All of the above might be true, and yet Russia might stand vindicated if it could be shown that she was determined upon war in a legitimate cause. The excuse set forth by Russia in 1914 was the allegation that Russia was traditionally and morally bound to protect all the Slavic peoples of Europe. In the light of the fact that it had been the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolski, who had suggested the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, and that Russia had offered Turkey an alliance against the Slavic Balkan states in 1911, it can scarcely be held that Russia's title to act as protector of the Serbs can command much respect. On this issue we might offer the opinion of the decidedly anti-German British Ambassador to France in 1914, Sir Francis Bertie. Writing in his diary on July 26th, 1914, he said: [60]

Russia comes forward as the protectress of Serbia: by what title except on the exploded pretensions that she is, by right, the protectress of all Slavs? What rubbish!

On July 27th he wrote to Sir Edward Grey: [61]

[60] *The Diary of Lord Bertie*, 1914-1918, Vol. I, p. 1.
[61] *British Documents*, No. 192; cf. also No. 134.

The French Government . . . should be encouraged to put pressure on the Russian Government not to assume the absurd and obsolete attitude of Russia being the protectress of all Slav States whatever their conduct, for this will lead to war.

Bertie also pointed out to Grey on the 25th that even Bienvenu-Martin, the French acting-Minister for Foreign Affairs, admitted that the Russian protection of Serbia was no adequate ground for French intervention: [62]

I (Bertie) felt sure that public opinion in England would not sanction a war in support of Russia if she, as protector of Slavs, picked a quarrel with Austria over Austro-Serbian difficulty. He (Bienvenu-Martin) admitted, but not as Minister, that it would be difficult to bring French public opinion to fighting point in such a case as present one.

Though Russia took the initiative in precipitating hostilities, France and Great Britain cannot be absolved from their share in the responsibility. As early as July 22nd, Poincaré blocked Grey's plan for avoiding a crisis through direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and throughout the whole crisis he kept Sazonov from wavering in the Franco-Russian program of presenting a solid Franco-Russian front against Germany. [63] Grey, by telling the Russians by implication on the 25th that the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia would justify Russian mobilization; by also telling them on the 25th that Germany would not mobilize if Russia mobilized solely against Austria; and by informing them on the 27th that the continued concentration of the British fleet should be regarded as evidence of British intervention, offered perhaps unconscious but very potent encouragement in all stages of the fatal Russian military measures.[64] Further, there is no doubt that Nicolson's long private letter to Buchanan on July 28th helped to give the Russians confidence in regard to the all-important matter of British intervention, though it did not arrive until after the mobilization had been ordered. [65] Count Pourtalès informed the present writer that it was the almost unanimous opinion in St. Petersburg in 1914 that Grey's communication to Buchanan on the 27th, to the effect that the continuance of

[62] Ibid., No. 129.

[63] Ibid., No. 76; cf., W. L. Langer, in *Saturday Review of Literature*, April 30, 1927, pp. 781-2.

[64] *British Documents*, Nos. 112, 132, 177.

[65] *British Documents*, No. 239.

the concentration of the British fleet should be taken as proof by the Russians that England did not propose to stand aside, was the most important factor in giving Sazonov courage to go ahead with the plans for general mobilization. He then felt that he could count on England.

In his *Genesis of the World War* (second edition pp. 364ff.) the author examined in detail the apologetic writings of Sazonov and showed how they were in reality a most unbelievable collection of misrepresentations of facts, which could be exposed beyond challenge through the simple expedient of comparing them with the documents. In the autumn of 1927, shortly before his death, Sazonov published his formal memoirs, dealing with his career as Foreign Minister of Russia from 1910 to 1916 and entitled *Fateful Years*. It might have been expected that he would have profited by the criticism of his earlier efforts to defend himself. He had at least taken occasion to read the earlier criticism of his writings by the present author. Yet, the work is nothing more than a rehash of the same old falsifications when it comes to the crisis of 1914. He has often failed even to make use of the new documents, but cites the old forgeries and distortions of the war period. We will merely summarize briefly the more notable misrepresentations, which amount to the falsification of almost every vital fact and issue connected with the outbreak of the World War.

Sazonov states that the Austrian mobilization of eight army corps on the evening of July 25th was directed against Russia, when it is completely established that they were mobilized solely against Serbia. He holds that the Austrian general mobilization was ordered on July 28th, whereas it was actually ordered on July 31st at noon. He tries to clear himself in regard to having moved for Russian general mobilization on the 29th by holding that this charge is due to a lie of General Sukhominlov, forgetting apparently that the fact of the original ordering of the Russian mobilization on the 29th has been established by Dobrorolski and Schilling. Sazonov holds that Russia mobilized on July 31st. The facts are that she ordered the general mobilization on the 29th, then countermanded the order on account of a pacific plea by the Kaiser, then issued the order a

second time on the 30th and finally put the order on the telegraph wires at 6 P. M. on the 30th. Sazonov holds that the German proclamation of a state of imminent war came before the Russian decision upon mobilization and was a cause of this decision, whereas it came nearly twenty-four hours after the Russian mobilization order and was an answer to it.

Sazonov, incredible as it may seem, again revives the myth that a leading reason for the decision to order the general mobilization in Russia on July 30th was the fact that, about 2 P. M. on the 30th, news reached him that an article had been published in the Berlin *Lokal-Anzeiger*, falsely announcing the mobilization of the German army. He holds, further, that the telegram of the Russian Ambassador in Berlin denying this was mysteriously delayed. The facts are that, owing to the congestion of the Berlin-St. Petersburg telegraph lines, this telegram about the *Lokal-Anzeiger* article was not dispatched from Berlin until 12:20 (Russian time) on the morning of July 31st. Further, the telegram of the Russian Ambassador denying the authenticity of the article was sent off before the telegram mentioning the article and its contents. What shall we think of a man who will repeat this fiction after its demolition has been called to his attention time and again? Then, he takes much space to condemn the Kaiser for not accepting the Tsar's suggestion on the 29th that the Austro-Serbian dispute should be referred to the Hague, but on the 27th the Tsar had made the same suggestion to Sazonov and the latter completely ignored it. Finally, as we have pointed out in several places above, Sazonov admits that he abandoned diplomacy after July 28th and concentrated on getting ready for imminent war, thus being heedless of diplomatic steps to avert war during the crucial period when Germany, England and Italy were endeavoring to hold up Austria and find a pacific way out of the crisis. Sazonov's memoirs are really an invaluable exhibit for Revisionism, and they have been completely annihilated by Dr. Stieve and Count Montgelas in a learned work, *Russland und der Weltkonflikt*, published shortly after Sazonov's memoirs appeared.

VI. THE FRENCH COLLUSION WITH RUSSIA.

Accumulation of the evidence against France in realistic research during the last few years has paralleled the development of the well-substantiated indictment of Russia. Some years ago it was contended by Entente apologists that there was no evidence whatever that France had envisaged any plan to recover Alsace-Lorraine as a part of the understanding in the objectives of the Franco-Russian Alliance. [66] The publication of Ernest Judet's book on Georges Louis, however, shows that even before 1910 it was fully understood that the Straits and Alsace-Lorraine were inseparably coupled as the corner-stone of the Alliance. As Louis says in his diary: [67]

> In the assumptions of the Franco-Russian Alliance Constantinople and the Straits form the counterpart of Alsace-Lorraine.
>
> It is not thus written down in any formal convention, but it is the supreme object of the Alliance which is taken for granted.
>
> If the Russians should open the question of the Straits in their conversations with us we must respond: "All right, whenever you give us aid with respect to Alsace-Lorraine."
>
> I have found the same conception in the correspondence of Hanotaux with Montebello.

In the documents printed as the appendix to Stieve's *Isvolsky and the World War* it is shown that Delcassé discussed the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine with the Russians on his mission to Russia in 1913, and that when the War broke out France insisted upon adding to this the destruction of the economic power of Germany. This latter suggestion was probably inspired in part by British suggestion. [68]

The case against France has come to be more and more one against Poincaré. As Dupin has pointed out, even Demartial errs in assigning too much responsibility to Viviani. [69] By 1924 we were aware from Paléologue's memoirs that during his visit to Russia on July 20-22nd, 1914, Poincaré had greatly strengthened and encouraged the war party at St. Petersburg. [70] Dr. Stieve obtained

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[66] See Bernadotte Schmitt, *Recent Disclosures*, pp. 14-15, for an expression of this opinion as late as 1926.

[67] E. Judet, *Georges Louis*, p. 143.

[68] Op. cit., pp. 247-9.

[69] G. Dupin, in *The Progressive*, June 1, 1927, pp. 373-5.

[70] M. Paléologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs.*

permission to reproduce from the British documents (now printed as number 101 of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*) full proof that while at St. Petersburg Poincaré had reaffirmed the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance in its most comprehensive form and in direct relation to the impending Austro-Serbian crisis. Baron Schilling's diary of the Russian Foreign Office in 1914 revealed Poincaré's bombastic speeches while at St. Petersburg, which Paléologue informed the Russians were to be regarded as binding diplomatic documents.[71] The full British Documents further reveal the fact that, as early as July 22nd, Poincaré, still at St. Petersburg, vetoed Grey's sagacious proposal to avert any serious tension by direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna. In other words, he insisted upon confronting Germany with the rigid double front of France and Russia and upon forcing the Central Powers either to accept a humiliating diplomatic defeat, or resort to war.[72] More than ever, we may concur with the brilliant French authority, Alfred Fabre-Luce, that, after Poincaré's visit to Russia, "there was very little chance of averting war."[73]

Another very important result of the St. Petersburg visit was the conversion of Viviani from a conciliatory attitude to one of firm bellicosity, equal to that of Poincaré himself. Baron Schoen, during the summer of 1927, explained to the present writer at length the effect of the trip to St. Petersburg upon Viviani. The combined effect of consultation with the Russians and two weeks conversation in isolation with Poincaré completely changed the character of Viviani in regard to diplomatic conciliation and Franco-German relations. Before going to St. Petersburg he had been fairly conciliatory and had coöperated in friendly fashion with Baron Schoen in regard to the proposals to better Franco-German relations. After he returned to Paris he exhibited but the most formal politeness in his contact with Schoen and refused even to discuss with Schoen the issue of French neutrality and an understanding with Germany. In this manner the St. Petersburg visit transformed the only prominent official in the French Cabinet who might have tried to avert war.

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[71] Schilling, *How the War Began in 1914*, pp. 31-2, 113-16.

[72] Langer, in *Saturday Review of Literature*, April 30, 1927; S. B. Fay, in *American Historical Review*, April, 1927, p. 602.

[73] *The Limitations of Victory*, pp. 182-83.

The indictment of Poincaré rests not only upon his conduct while at St. Petersburg, but also upon his actions after his return. Lord Bertie's communications to Grey, now given in full in the British Documents, make it clear that, in spite of Berthelot's distortions of German communications published in the *Echo de Paris,* [74] France was strongly for peace before Poincaré's return, and that he turned the tide for war. [75] As we have pointed out above, even the acting-Foreign Minister of France stated before Poincaré's homecoming that he did not believe France could be brought around to fight for so poor a cause as Russian intervention in behalf of Serbia.

Poincaré's temper and attitude upon his return to France are well revealed by the following anecdote recently revealed by Margueritte, Dupin and Charpentier. As he was leaving his boat at Dunkirk early on July 29th, he was asked by Senator Trystram as to whether he believed that war might be averted. Poincaré replied: "To do so would be a great pity, for we shall never again witness more favorable circumstances." [76] In the fourth volume of his memoirs (French edition, pp. 362ff.), Poincaré denies the authenticity of this episode and prints a letter from Senator Trystram in support of it. The author, during the last summer, investigated the exact source of the story and found that it was reported by a most reputable eye-witness, a Frenchman of the highest integrity who stood only a few feet away when the remark was made. Certainly, the evidence for the accuracy of the report is better than that which Poincaré adduces to refute it. After what we know about Poincaré's own use of false documents with his conscious knowledge there is no reason whatever for giving any credence to Poincaré's personal statements regarding war guilt. In any event, whether this anecdote is true or not, Poincaré's conduct after July 29th was in every respect compatible with its implications. He acted throughout the remainder of the crisis as though he believed war inevitable and desirable, and on the morning of July 30th he told a friend of the Spanish Ambassador in Paris that he believed war was inevitable.

[74] *German Documents on the Outbreak of the World War,* No. 170; J. F. Scott, *Five Weeks,* pp. 19-91; *British Documents,* No. 193.

[75] *British Documents,* Nos. 129, 134, 192, 193, 270, 318, 320.

[76] V. Margueritte, *Les Criminels,* p. 274; A. Charpentier, *Les Responsabilités de M. Poincaré.*

It was well known that Poincaré made his crucial decision for war at a ministerial council on the night of July 29th, when the Russians were told to go ahead with their mobilization plans that meant certain European war.[77] From this time onward, Poincaré's program consisted in stifling opposition to his plans for war and in formulating deceptions and subterfuges, designed to deceive the world, and particularly the publics of France, England and Italy, as to the real intentions and policies of France. The ten kilometer withdrawal order relating to troops on the German frontier was admitted by Viviani and Messimy in 1919 to have been purely a diplomatic ruse, and the new British Documents show that even in July 1914 Paul Cambon told Grey that the order had been given "for the sake of public opinion in England."[78] Pacifist meetings and anti-war demonstrations were rigorously suppressed in France from the 29th onward,[79] and Jaurès' assassination, at the instigation of Izvolski and the Russian secret police, removed from the scene the chief figure in France who might have been powerful enough to oppose Poincaré and reveal his machinations.[80] For similar reasons Poincaré refused to allow the French mobilization order to be issued until after the German declaration of a state of imminent war[81] and declined to declare war on Germany. He particularly feared, in regard to the latter, that someone might insist on debating the obligations of France under the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance,[82] which required French assistance only if Russia was first mobilized against by Germany or Austria.

Even more notorious were the French falsifications of the dates and sequence of the Russian, Austrian, French and German general mobilizations and of the alleged German military aggression on French soil. We now know that the French were minutely and promptly informed as to the actual dates of the several mobilizations,

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[77] *Russian Orange Book* (Romberg), Nos. 208, 210, 212; Fabre-Luce, op. cit., pp. 184-6.

[78] *British Documents*, No. 447.

[79] *Russian Orange Book* (Romberg), Nos. 206, 207.

[80] Jacques Mesnil, editor of *Humanité* has established the complicity of Izvolski in the murder of Jaurès. The assassin was acquitted as a public benefactor of France.

[81] *Russian Orange Book* (Romberg), No. 218.

[82] Ibid., No. 222.

but they falsified these and represented the Russian and French mobilizations as subsequent to the Austrian and German, respectively. They tried, moreover, to prove that the Russian and French mobilizations were ordered as a defense against Austrian and German aggression. In his trenchant exposure of the French official lies of 1914, *L'Évangile du Quai d'Orsay*, Georges Demartial has shown that the French *Yellow Book* of 1914 suppressed the facts about the Russian mobilization in some ten documents and falsified the facts in some twenty others. [83] Sometimes these falsifications were amazing. This can be illustrated by telegram number 118 in the *Yellow Book* sent by Paléologue from St. Petersburg at 10:45 on the morning of July 31st. The original and authentic text of this was the laconic communication from Paléologue: "The general mobilization of the Russian army is ordered." After being properly doctored up by the French official editors it assumed in the *Yellow Book* the following proportions and content:

> As a result of the general mobilization of Austria and of the measures for mobilization taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days, the order for the general mobilization of the Russian army has been given. Russia not being able, without most serious danger, to allow herself to be further outdistanced; really she is only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany.
>
> For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion of her partial mobilization into a general mobilization.

In order to make clear the misrepresentations herein contained, it might be well to give the dates of the successive general mobilizations: Russia, finally ordered about 4 on the afternoon of July 30th (Dobrorolski puts it three hours earlier); Austria, July 31st, 12:23 P.M.; France, August 1st, 3:30 P.M.; Germany, August 1st, 5:00 P. M.; England, the fleet August 2nd, 2:25 A. M.; the army August 4th, 4:00 P. M. Of a piece with these falsifications were the misrepresentations of the state of German military preparedness and of German military activities on the frontier. These were used to influence both the French people and the British Cabinet. [84] The embarrass-

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[83] See the remarkable summary by Montgelas in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* for April, 1927, pp. 376-81.

[84] *British Documents*, No. 319, enclosure, 338; *cf.* Montgelas, in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, February, 1927, pp. 126-8; and Montgelas, *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey*, pp. 98-101.

ment caused by this last group of misrepresentations is revealed in document number 319 of the recently published British Documents.

Another famous scheme of Poincaré to make war both certain and relatively safe for the Entente was his appeal, first to Lord Bertie and then directly to George V., to have England declare her unconditional solidarity with France and Russia, on the ground that this would frighten Germany out of her aggressive plans and preserve peace.[85] He further told the King that France had from the beginning put pressure on Russia for moderation and that Russia had at all stages honored such advice. The direct opposite is, of course, true; namely, that from the first, France had encouraged Russian aggressiveness, and that on the 27th Sazonov had warned both France and England that Russia would tolerate no suggestions of moderation.[86] Likewise, it was Russia which needed restraint at this time if peace was to be preserved. Lord Bertie penetrated this sham with great clarity and precision. In a telegram to Grey on July 30th, he said:[87]

> The French instead of putting pressure on the Russian Government to moderate their zeal expect us to give the Germans to understand that we mean fighting if war breaks out. If we gave an assurance of armed assistance to France and Russia now, Russia would become more exacting and France would follow in her wake.

Being fully informed by Buchanan, Bunsen, Goschen and Bertie as to the facts about the sequence of the mobilizations, Grey was completely aware of the French falsifications and subterfuges in 1914, but this knowledge was not sufficient to dislodge him from his determination to stand with France at all hazards.

Certain students of the problem of war responsibility admit that the above summary of the evidence against Poincaré seems to be in accordance with the facts, but hold that it can be hardly credible, because Poincaré was only the President of France and this officer is but a ceremonial figurehead.[88] This matter has been discussed in

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[85] British Documents, Nos. 318, 320; R. Poincaré, *The Origins of the War*, pp. 238-9, 249-50.

[86] Langer, in *Saturday Review of Literature*, April 30, 1927; M. Morhardt, *Les Preuves*, pp. 117-146, 298-307; *Russian Orange Book* (Romberg) No. 1521.

[87] *British Documents*, No. 320.

[88] See Mack Eastman in *Canadian Forum*, May, 1926, June, 1927.

a scholarly article by Professor Lindsay Rogers in the *Political Science Quarterly* for December, 1925. He shows that the French president has far more power in regard to foreign policy than in domestic politics, and that, if he carries on his policies in secret and has no strong opponents in the Cabinet, he can be almost absolute in foreign policy. "So long as the President works in the dark he can be quite powerful, the degree of his strength depending upon the excellence of his case and the weakness or firmness of ministries. . . So long as the influence is secret, it can only be checked by the independence and strong-mindedness of the cabinet." [89] Secret diplomacy and weak foreign ministers were the dominating characteristics of Poincaré's régime from 1913 to the outbreak of the War. Even more, Professor Rogers holds that the memoirs of Georges Louis and Alexandre Ribot offer reliable evidence that, as President, Poincaré even exceeded these constitutional rights in exercising the power of the executive in foreign relations.[90]

In the autumn of 1927 Poincaré brought out the fourth volume of his memoirs, *Au Service de la France,* this one dealing with the crisis of 1914. Therefore, we have here his final defense. It is a most disappointing affair as a treatment of the history of the summer of 1914 in European diplomacy. There is little of significance in the book which was not contained in his *Lectures on the Origins of the War,* published in 1921. The method is that of the earlier volumes, well described by Fabre-Luce in the following words: "In this last bit of pleading, as in his earlier efforts to clear himself, Poincaré has contented himself with the effort to conceal highly significant omissions under a luxuriant mass of explanations dealing with wholly secondary issues."

In spite of his access to the authentic French Documents in the *Quai d'Orsay,* Poincaré publishes almost no new documentary material of vital importance, except where Demartial and others have proved that the documents he used in his earlier book were false and that he knew they were false when he was citing them in 1921. Particularly relevant here are telegrams number 115 and 118 of

[89] Rogers, loc. cit., p. 551.

[90] Ibid., pp. 551-52.

the French *Yellow Book*, relating to the mobilizations. Demartial proved that these documents, as printed in the *Yellow Book*, were false and that Poincaré had cited them in his earlier book as authentic, while knowing they were false. Now Poincaré cites the authentic texts of these telegrams, but does not anywhere call attention to the fact that he had knowingly used the false documents before, or explain why he cited the false documents as authentic to his hearers and readers. It is quite evident that we can attach no credence whatever to the word of a man who has, consciously and wilfully, cited false documents as true and has not published the authentic French Documents when it has been in his power for years to do so. Poincaré is doubtless an honest and honorable man in his private life, but his word is certainly of no value whatever as such in the war-guilt controversy. He can only vindicate himself, if at all, by a free and full publication of the French Documents and letting them speak for themselves.[90a]

As in his apology, published in *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1925, Poincaré attempts to clear France by continuing the war-time practice of attacking German and Austrian tactics in 1914, instead of carefully examining and refuting the charges made against France. This done, he is ready for the glowing section on "Innocent France."

Most significant of all is the interesting distortion of which Count Montgelas has convicted Poincaré with respect to the telegram of Viviani on July 30, 1914, cited by Poincaré, on pages 385-86 of his book. We have had ample proof that Poincaré sanctioned the falsification of the French Documents when Berthelot edited the grossly forged and mutilated *Yellow Book* of 1914 and that he used these false documents in his books and speeches as long as he dared. In the case under discussion now we find that when a telegram in the *Yellow Book*, which was actually authentic, has become annoying and embarrassing, Poincaré does not hesitate to doctor it up to serve his purposes. In this telegram, sent by Viviani on the morning of July 30th (*Yellow Book*, No. 101), the *Yellow Book* has Viviani advise Russia not to take any step which will afford Germany justification

[90a] For a devastating criticism of Renouvin's estimate of Vol. IV of Poincaré's Memoirs, see below, Part II, Chap. XI.

for either a partial or a general mobilization of her forces. Russia is not advised against mobilization herself, but the suggestion is that she carry on her activities in such a way as not to inform or alarm Germany. In the rendition in *Au Service de la France* Poincaré has Viviani say to the Russians that they shall not contemplate either a partial or a general mobilization of the Russian forces. This is just what Poincaré should have said in 1914, and, if he had said it, his record would have been clear as far as the Russian mobilization is concerned. Montgelas showed, however, in the February (1928) number of the *Kriegsschuldfrage* that the *Yellow Book* must be right and Poincaré's rendering a distortion. Then Pierre Renouvin, Poincaré's official historian of the causes of the War, came forward with the explanation that the mistake in Poincaré's book was due to a printer's error. This seems unlikely, however, as it is the most important passage in the whole book and could scarcely have escaped Poincaré and all of his scholarly assistants. Moreover, Poincaré represents the Russians as mobilizing against his advice, which would scarcely be the case if the passage were a misprint.

It may be safely contended that in four volumes Poincaré has not been able to refute a single one of the major charges of responsibility levelled against him by Guttenoire de Toury, Fabre-Luce, Morhardt, Judet, Margueritte, Demartial, Dupin, Marchand and his other French critics. This means that he never will be able to do so. Nothing could be more ridiculous than the present tendency to hail Poincaré as the savior of the franc, when, but for his bellicose policy in 1914, there would, in all probability, have been no European War and the franc would be at its pre-War level, to say nothing of the French gain in money, life, happiness and prosperity. To praise Poincaré today is not unlike lauding a man who has sunk a boat, for having later been able to swim ashore with the steersman's wheel.

In short, the situation with respect to war responsibility in France presents a striking resemblance to the Dreyfus Case of a generation ago, with Victor Margueritte playing the role of Zola, and Demartial in that of Colonel Picquart. Indeed, Mathias Morhardt, one of the main figures who fought for truth in the Dreyfus conspiracy, is now the president of the chief organization now en-

gaged in the effort to uncover the facts with respect to Poincaré's part in bringing the great calamity of 1914-1918 to the door of France.

VII. ENGLAND AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.

Now that we have the British Documents on the crisis of 1914 in full, we can formulate the facts with respect to British responsibility for the World War with some degree of finality of judgment. It is interesting, incidentally, that they offer an almost complete refutation of the version presented in Lord Grey's memoirs. As regards Grey himself, the impression left is about as before, namely, that he was neither the intellectual colossus and shining angel of light which he is portrayed to be by Gilbert Murray and Bernadotte Schmitt nor the clever and malicious super-Machiavelli which he is pictured as being by many writers, especially nationalistic German critics. If there is anything colossal about Grey it is as an exhibit of well-meaning ignorance and incompetence in a public office for which he was unfitted by temperament, inclination and technical training. [91] The astonishing ignorance of Grey as a Foreign Secretary and a diplomatic historian is well pointed out by the famous British historian, Professor C. Raymond Beazley of the University of Birmingham, in a review of Hermann Lutz's *Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg* in *Foreign Affairs* (English) for October, 1927:—

> An eminent historian has well remarked that although Lord Grey, in his *Twenty-Five Years*, disclaims animosity against Germany, his whole book (to say nothing of his policy) shows that Germany was to him very much of a *terra incognita* (and, indeed, *inimica*). What a distorted picture of German politics and culture he gives us! He believes in a Germany thirsting to become mistress of the world by means of war, and dominated by an all-powerful military party in Berlin. He even repeats the threadbare legend of a war of the pure Liberal West against militaristic, despotic and wicked Germany and Austria, leaving Russia comfortably out of his reckoning. Yet to help Russia, in great measure, Britain and France entered the war; and the Russian alliance was a most vital feature of the Triple Entente and of its struggle with "Mittel Europa." And what about the autocracy and militarism of Russia? Anyone really acquainted with Germany knows that this picture is deeply misleading. Anyone who has with moderate care

[91] By all odds the fairest and most thorough study is the recent monumental work of Hermann Lutz, *Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg*. An English translation has just appeared. More trenchant and critical are the comments of Count Montgelas in the *Kriegsschuldfrage*, May-July, 1926. An extended version of Montgelas' critique has just been published in English under the title *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey*.

studied the evidence (much of which Lord Grey appears entirely to ignore) knows the same.

When Viscount Grey tells us again, that the idea of *révanche* had entirely disappeared in France, and that the political and other leaders in France and Russia desired nothing but peaee and security against German attaek, we know, and we have known all along from our acquaintance with France and Russia before the war that this is not true. And now we have deeper and fuller knowledge of the same from the Russian archives. Lord Grey appears to know little and to care less about this new light. He does not seem to have read any of the Isvolsky correspondence, so abundant and so illuminating. Nor has he, apparently, explored certain other dossiers scarcely less valuable than Isvolsky's. Has he perused the materials given us by Bogichevieh? Has he any adequate aequaintance with the priceless documents of *Die Grosse Politik?* The name of Raymond Poincaré is not mentioned by Lord Grey in his aceount of the origins of the war. Isvolsky is only once named, with the remark that he eould not have had any noteworthy war responsibility, for he had ceased to direct Russian policy years before the war; and it is well known that an ambassador has little influence upon the policy of his government. Could indifference to Continental political fact be more naively expressed? As Erie Brandenburg well asks: "Can Sir Edward have been so simple-minded as he pietures himself?" Lord Grey seems likewise to ignore the attempts of the German Government to draw back Austria-Hungary in the final days of the crisis of July, 1914, as he ignores their efforts to start and develop direct negotiations betwecn Russia and Austria in those final days.

All his utterances show that the historical work of the last few years has left him untouched, and that he still moves entirely within those circles of thought produced by intense national and anti-national obsessions, obsessions which are perfected in war-hypnotism. Entangled in prejudices, entrenched in a resolve not to know or to recognize the ineonvenient, was Sir Edward—is Sir Edward—a safe guide, either as statesman or as historian?

The new facts learned about Grey from the British Documents almost cancel each other with respect to the matter of his responsibility for the outbreak of the War. It was once believed that Grey could be in part excused because he was ignorant of the vital facts of the 1914 crisis and had been grossly deceived by Sazonov and Poincaré. This mitigation can no longer be urged. He was elaborately and promptly informed on all important points by the British Ambassadors in the four leading Continental capitals. On the other hand, the documents show Grey much more loath to enter the conflict than we had supposed, and somewhat less pliant in the hands of Paul Cambon than we had believed. Further, we can no longer accept Benckendorff's verdict that Grey was the leader of the agres-

sive elcment in forcing England into the War. The documents show his responsible subordinates, Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicolson, to have been far more insistent than Grey in urging that England follow France and Russia without hesitation.

The recently published British Documents prove definitely enough that England was not bound to enter the War by any unequivocal and binding treaty obligations with France or Russia. There were in 1914 some Englishmen who held that England was at least bound by a debt of honor to aid France. It is absolutely apparent, however, that the thing which weighed most of all with those members of the British Cabinet who favored war was the same consideration of alleged British interests which had produced the bellicose stand of Britain in the second Morocco crisis and had also led to the Grey-Cambon correspondence of November, 1912. This means, however, that Great Britain was exactly as much bound in fact as though she had been bound by a treaty. The source-material on war-guilt which we now possess proves that it would be rather difficult to imagine a probable situation in international relations where Russia and France could have been presented to England under more repellent circumstances or Austria and Germany under better auspices than in the crisis of 1914. Yet, Grey persisted unhesitatingly in his determination to cast England's lot with France and Russia, once it was evident that these Powers had decided to enter the conflict.

The whole key to British policy in 1914 is most admirably phrased by Crowe and Nicolson in their comments of July 25th, which were appended to Buchanan's communication to Grey on July 24th. It will bc remembered that this was very early in the crisis, being, in fact, beforc the Serbian reply to Austria had bcen delivered. Crowe's appraisal of the international situation at this time follows: [92]

> The moment has passed when it might have been possible to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia.
>
> It is clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown out to them. Whatever we may think of the merits of the Austrian charges against Servia, France and Russia consider that these are the pretexts, and that the bigger cause of Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente is definitely engaged.

[92] *British Documents*, No. 101, Minutes.

I think it would be impolitic, not to say dangerous, for England to attempt to controvert this opinion, or to endeavour to obscure the plain issue, by any representation at St. Petersburg and Paris.

The point that matters is whether Germany is or is not absolutely determined to have this war now.

There is still the chance that she can be made to hesitate, if she can be induced to apprehend that the war will find England by the side of France and Russia.

I can suggest only one effective way of bringing this home to the German Government without absolutely committing us definitely at this stage. If, the moment either Austria or Russia begin to mobilize, His Majesty's Government give orders to put our whole fleet on an immediate war footing this may conceivably make Germany realize the seriousness of the danger to which she would be exposed if England took part in the war.

It would be right, supposing this decision could be taken now, to inform the French and Russian Governments of it, and this again would be the best thing we could do to prevent a very grave situation arising as between England and Russia.

It is difficult not to agree with M. Sazonof that sooner or later England will be dragged into the war if it does come. We shall gain nothing by not making up our minds what we can do in circumstances that may arise to-morrow.

Should the war come, and England stand aside, one of two things must happen:—

(a) Either Germany and Austria win, crush France, and humiliate Russia. With the French fleet gone, Germany in occupation of the Channel, with the willing or unwilling co-operation of Holland and Belgium, what will be the position of a friendless England?

(b) Or France and Russia win. What would then be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?

Our interests are tied up with those of France and Russia in this struggle, which is not for the possession of Servia, but one between Germany aiming at a political dictatorship in Europe and the Powers who desire to retain individual freedom. If we can help to avoid the conflict by showing our naval strength, ready to be instantly used, it would be wrong not to make the effort.

Whatever therefore our ultimate decision, I consider we should decide now to mobilize the fleet as soon as any other Great Power mobilizes, and that we should announce this decision without delay to the French and Russian Governments.

Nicolson added the observation that: "The points raised by Sir Eyre Crowe merit serious consideration, and doubtless the Cabinet will review the situation. Our attitude during the crisis

will be regarded by Russia as a test and we must be careful not to alienate her." The policies outlined above were adhered to resolutely by the British Foreign Office throughout the crisis. This meant that England inevitably became a source of encouragement to Franco-Russian bellicosity and was equally irrevocably bound to enter the War. Her only hope of averting the European War lay in restraining Russia or in declaring her neutrality. Both of these she refused to do. Yet, we cannot say that Crowe and Nicolson wanted war for its own sake. On the 30th, Crowe appended to Document number 318 the following reflections with respect to the French and Russian appeals for a British declaration of unflinching solidarity with these Powers: [93]

> What must weigh with His Majesty's Government is the consideration that they should not, by a declaration of unconditional solidarity with France and Russia *induce* and *determine* these two Powers to choose the path of war. If and when, however, it is certain that France and Russia cannot avoid war, and are going into it, my opinion, for what it is worth, is that in that case our intervention should be immediate and decided.

If it was Izvolski's ambition to secure the Straits which gave a bellicose cast to European diplomacy after 1908, if it was the linkage of the Straits and Alsace-Lorraine which gave that Franco-Russian solidarity which made war possible, and if it was the anger and recklessness of Sazonov, the pressure of the Russian militarists, and the calculating deliberation of Poincaré which precipitated war in 1914, it was equally certainly the Russophilism of Sir Arthur Nicolson which was the chief obstacle to the prevention of war in 1914. He relentlessly opposed putting pressure on Russia, the one British move which certainly would have averted war in 1914.

At the same time that Crowe and Nicolson were endeavoring to influence Grey in the direction of a favorable attitude towards France and Russia, they were also working unceasingly to prejudice him against Germany by an almost incredibly malicious campaign devoted to maligning German acts and policies. Their distortions, in obvious defiance of facts known to both of them, are at times wholly amazing and make the Kaiser's digs at England in his marginal

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[93] *British Documents*, p. 201.

notes on the German Documents seem calm and penetrating analyses by comparison. (See *British Documents*, Nos. 149, 174, 185, 249, 264, 293).

In his general attitude towards the problem of intervention on the side of France and Russia in the event of war, Grey stood shoulder to shoulder with Crowe and Nicolson. He was simply more cautious in the details and method of his procedure. He hesitated because he did not desire to incite France and Russia, because he hated to admit what he had frequently denied in the House of Commons, namely, the existence of secret British understandings with France, and, finally, because he feared an adverse vote in the Cabinet and the House of Commons if he were too hasty. Churchill is revealed in the documents as "rearing to go," and thoroughly with Crowe and Nicolson.

In addition to the considerations of international policy which led Grey to cast his lot with the Entente, it should not be forgotten that there were powerful forces in domestic British politics which strengthened the war party. The Conservatives, led by Bonar Law, felt that a war would delay, if not destroy, the constructive agrarian reforms and financial measures of Lloyd George, while the Ulsterites, under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson, saw in war a real hope of obstructing the introduction of the Irish Home Rule Act. The Northcliffe gang had the journalist's nose for war and its benefits.

As to the anti-war party in the British Cabinet, it has usually been believed that the leaders were John Morley and John Burns, who resigned in protest when it was apparent that England was going into the War. The writer learned in the summer of 1927, however, that, down to the time Morley and Burns resigned, the noisiest and most active member of the anti-War group was David Lloyd George. When it became evident that England was bound to enter the War, Lloyd George was faced with the alternative of shifting his position and continuing his brilliant career in politics or reverting to the brave stand as a protestant against folly which he had taken in the Boer War. This time, Lloyd George decided to be on the popular side, and justified his shift on the ground of the

moral indignation developed in his bosom by the German invasion of Belgium.

How much more competent Burns was than Grey in sizing up the momentous nature of the issue in 1914 may be discerned from the following quotation from Thomas H. Mawson's *Life and Work of an English Landscape Architect* (p. 242):

> Looking back it seems to me that of our political leaders only two really grasped the situation and both left the Cabinet at this crisis.
>
> They were John Morley and John Burns. "My dear Mawson," said the latter one morning at the National Liberal Club, "I want you to write down my prophecy in case this unsettled state of affairs ends in war"; and I wrote as follows:
>
> 1. A war with the Central Powers will last three years.
> 2. It will cost us seven thousand millions sterling.
> 3. We shall lose a million men.
> 4. It will end in world revolution.
>
> At the time I regarded this prophecy as an exaggeration uttered under the pressure of nervous tension. I now regard it as the matured judgment of a remarkable mind. The first three predictions were exceeded; the last is being unfolded, page after page with the Russian debâcle as a commencement, and the nations of Europe and Asia following in its train.

Not only did England utterly fail to attempt any restraint of Russia beyond Buchanan's personal reminder to Sazonov that Russian mobilization would inevitably mean a European war; she actually encouraged Russia in her aggressive policy. Grey's statements of the 25th relative to Russian and Austrian mobilization encouraged Russia in her preliminary military measures. Grey's information of the 27th that the concentration of the British fleet should be taken as evidence of English intervention had a great influence upon the Russian decision to proceed to the fatal general mobilization.[94] Nor did Britain make any effort to bring France to her senses, in spite of the exhortations of Lord Bertie. Grey did not even press his efforts to get the French to consider the German neutrality proposals.[95] The most that Grey did was to adopt a dilatory policy with respect to making any definite commitment to Cambon, and on one occasion, when this evasiveness was especially disconcerting to Cam-

[94] *British Documents*, Nos. 112, 132, 177, 239.

[95] Ibid., Nos. 419, 426, 447, 453, 460.

bon, he permitted the latter to send a false report of Grey's attitude to Paris, in order not to alarm the French authorities. [96]

The full British Documents confirm what was reasonably apparent from the *Blue Book*, namely, that there was nothing which Germany could have done in 1914 which would have kept England out of the War, unless Germany had been willing to stand aside and see Austria attacked by Russia, with the resulting destruction of the Triple Alliance and the complete diplomatic isolation of Germany.

In particular, the complete documents expose with great thoroughness Grey's exploitation of the Belgian subterfuge. We have already made it clear that Grey, Crowe and Nicolson had formulated their general attitude towards the nature of British policy in the crisis by July 25th, and in none of their arguments for British intervention did any consideration for either Serbia or Belgium enter. The slogan of protection for "poor, innocent little nations" emerged only after the decision to intervene had been reached and a high moral issue was deemed essential to attract the support of British opinion. Before Grey addressed his famous question to France and Germany on the 31st, as to what their stand would be on the issue of Belgian neutrality, he knew from Goschen's conversations with Bethmann-Hollweg what Germany's attitude would be. Even more significant, Bourgeois and Pagès have proved from unpublished French material that, on July 31st, before he had received a reply from either France or Germany, Grey told Cambon that he was personally convinced that England should intervene immediately. [97] He did not dare to give any definite promise, however, as he feared an adverse vote in the Cabinet and the House of Commons unless he could hold over their heads the prospect of a German violation of the neutrality of Belgium. It was well known long ago that England was not bound by the Treaty of 1839 to protect Belgian neutrality, that Grey coldly rejected the German proposal to respect Belgian

[96] Ibid., No. 426.

[97] Bourgeois and Pagès, *Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la grande Guerre*, p. 58.

neutrality in the event of a promise of British neutrality, and that Grey teased out of Belgium her appeal to the Entente for armed protection.[98]

No one has better stated the essential facts in regard to Great Britain and the Belgian issue than the brilliant French writer, Fabre-Luce:

> It had been a welcome turn of fortune which came to the rescue of a menaced Government, the medium they employed to show the people the use of a war their leaders considered necessary. It seemed a sufficient reason for an act already decided upon for less good reasons; it assured a political and economic antagonism being reduced to a moral proposition, and thus involved spiritual forces in the war.

In short, if one concedes that it was to the interest of Great Britain to have a European war in 1914 and to fight in this war on the side of the Entente, then the British Documents prove that Grey and his associates played their cards with great skill. If they really desired to avoid a European war, then it must, in all fairness, be stated that they behaved with the utmost—even criminal—stupidity. If England had put the pressure on Russia that Germany put on Austria or had declared her neutrality, there is little probability that there would have been any European war. As it can scarcely be maintained that Grey, Crowe or Nicolson really desired a war, the verdict must probably be that they were so blinded by Francophilism and Germanophobia, to which was added in Nicolson's case an ardent Russo-mania, that they were the victims of a fatal myopia in July, 1914, in regard to the realities of the European situation.

In sharp contrast to the short-sightedness, bias and ineptitude of the members of the British Foreign Office in 1914 were the intelligence, alertness and realism of the British Ambassadors in the chief European capitals. Sir George Buchanan in St. Petersburg recognized at once the dangerous nature of Sazonov's aggressive policies and warned him frequently and sharply until he found that this attitude of restraint was not favored by his home government. Sir Maurice de Bunsen realized the serious nature of the Serbian menace to Austria, was sympathetic with the Austrian cause, and

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[98] Barnes, *Genesis of the World War*, pp. 542ff; Ewart, *Roots and Causes of the Wars*, Chap. XIV. Herr von Jagow has informed the writer that Lichnowsky's proposal to Grey regarding Belgian neutrality was official, and authorized by Berlin.

was fair in his reports on the situation to Grey. Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin was convinced that Germany was opposed to war and provided Grey and his associates with plenty of reassuring information, if they had been capable or entertaining a rational attitude towards German policy. Finally, Sir Francis Bertie in Paris, who had been very anti-German and bellicose in 1911, clearly sized up all the major issues in 1914—the sham in the Russian claim to act as the protector of the southern Slavs, the need of restraining France and Russia rather than Germany, the hypocrisy in Poincaré's appeal for an English declaration of solidarity with France and Russia as a guaranty of peace, and the effect of Poincaré's return from Russia upon the transformation of French psychology. If Grey had been guided by his ambassadors instead of by his vicious underlings in the Foreign Office, the course of European history after 1914 would have been far different and far happier.

In the course of extended interviews with European diplomats in the summers of 1926 and 1927, the one thing which struck the writer most forcibly in regard to the crisis of 1914 was the degree to which the various estimates of the probable British policy affected the decisions of the different potential combatants. With both Germany and Austria it was the feeling of assurance as to British neutrality which made these powers firm and relatively fearless in the early stages of the crisis, while the Austrian concessions were due almost wholly to fear of British intervention. At the same time, it was the uncertainty of British support that made the French and Russians move rather slowly at first, while their growing confidence in British assistance made them more bellicose and aggressive in the later days of the crisis. It was the probability of British intervention which led Berchtold to make his concessions of July 31st, while it was the message about the British fleet on the 27th which was chiefly responsible for Sazonov's decision to mobilize the Russian armies and no longer take cognizance of Austrian assurances and concessions. Grey's dilatory and indecisive manner in the crisis of 1914 was perfectly adapted to encourage both groups of contestants to gamble on the correctness of their interpretation of British

policy. Grey's shilly-shally attitude in 1914, then, helped on the War most notably, perhaps quite against his intentions.

The British Documents veritably constitute the keystone to the arch of Revisionism. It may be stated with absolute assurance that there have been few instances in history where a position, taken on the basis of relatively adequate sources, has been so completely confirmed as has been the case with even a somewhat extreme version of Revisionism through the complete publication of the British Documents on the crisis of 1914. When the French Documents come along, if they ever do, they can do little more than round out and polish off the surface of the structure.

It is frequently held that England, if subservient to her real interests, could not have followed any other course than the one she chose—that neutrality was unthinkable. In the following editorial, the greatest one written in England in the crisis of 1914, A. G. Gardiner of the London *Daily News*, set forth on August 1st, 1914, with unanswerable logic, the basic issues involved and the reasons why neutrality was the only wise and sane course for England to adopt.

Why England Must Not Fight

The Crisis

The greatest calamity in history is upon us—a calamity so vast that our senses are numbed with horror. We hardly dare look into the pit that yawns at our feet and yet any hour, any minute may plunge us in beyond all hope of return. At this moment our fate is being sealed by hands that we know not, by motives alien to our interests, by influences that if we knew we should certainly repudiate. Every step at this hour may be irrevocable. The avalanche trembles on the brink and a touch may send it shattering into the abyss.

The peace of every land, the happiness of every home in Europe, the very bread by which we live, hang at this moment upon the will of one man, the Czar of Russia. It is he whose hand is on the avalanche. It is he who with one stroke of the pen, one word of the mouth, one motion of the head can plunge Europe in a sea of blood and bury all the achievements of our civilization in anarchy. The whole continent is trembling with the tread of armed men. From the Neva to the Rhone, the legions are in motion. A friend of mine came through Prussia two days ago. At the stations, as he passed, he saw the platforms lined with men in private clothes, awaiting their dispatch to an unknown doom on an unknown field—men who have no share in this quarrel of the dynasts, who do not know what it is about, who will slay or be slain without hate and without understanding. And another tells us that as he lay at Dijon three nights ago he heard the tramp

of men and the rumbling of artillery all through the dark hours and that when he came down in the morning there was not a waiter in the hotel. They, too, had gone in the dark to meet their doom.

Waiting on England

And at St. Petersburg, there sits the man who has everyone of these lives and millions more at his mercy, and who at one word can let hell loose upon the face of Europe. Is he a man we can trust with this momentous power? A weak man, superstitious, under the influence now of inhuman philosophers, like Pobiedonostseff or Meshkershtsky, now of mystics and charlatans, like Phillipe and Rasputin, who decorates his Black Hundreds on the morrow of their massacres and holds half Europe in the grip of a medieval despotism—is he the man whom the free peoples of France and England can trust with their destiny? Is he the man for whom we are going to shed our blood and our treasure? Is Russia the type of civilization that we are prepared to bleed ourselves white to make triumphant over Europe and Asia?

The question is for us. For though the Czar has his hand on the avalanche it is we who have our hand on him. It is we who in the last analysis must say whether Europe is to be deluged with blood. Do you doubt it? Turn to your paper this (Friday) morning. There you will see a message from St. Petersburg signed by Reuter. It begins:

"The situation shows, so far, no change in the direction of peace. The sailing of the British fleet from Portland has created an immense impression and, coupled with Japan's assurances, has more than confirmed Russia's determination to stand to her guns."

In that flash we see the situation. We see the Czar with his hand on the avalanche looking toward England for the one assurance that he needs. Let England say, "No, you touch it at your own risk and your own peril," and his hand will drop. Let England falter, temporize, equivocate, and he will plunge us into ruin with the rest.

The Campaign of the Warmongers

We are told that we must be quiet, that we may encourage Germany by making her believe that she has not to reckon with us. But the move is not with Germany. The move is with Russia. It is she whom we encourage or discourage by every word that is said and every action that is done. It is she who has the issues of war and peace in her hands. It is she whom the sailing of our fleet from Portland has "confirmed in her determination to stand to her guns." Quiet? But who is keeping the *Times* and the *Daily Mail* and the rest of these papers which by years of anti-German propaganda have been paving the way to this stupendous catastrophe—who is keeping them quiet? Nay, who is inspiring them? Who is authorizing them to tell Russia that she may start the avalanche with the assurance that we shall be in the abyss with her? They talk of our "obligations to our friends." We have no obligations except the obligation to preserve this country from any share in the crime that threatens to overwhelm Europe. Again and again we have had the assurance of the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey that we are free agents, that our hands are not tied. If this is so,

why are these mischievous declarations about our complicity allowed to pass? Every one of them is a new incitement to Russia, a fresh match applied to the powder magazine of Europe. They are reproduced in Russia to feed the flame of popular passion and to nerve the Czar to the fatal act.

The Assassinations

If we are free—and we know that we are free—what ground is there for involving ourselves in this unspeakable calamity? On the immediate cause of the quarrel we can have no sympathy with Servia. The assassination of the Crown Prince and his wife was a brutal and cold-blooded crime, the fruit of a conspiracy laid with infinite care and deliberation and wholly inspired by Servia. It was a plot so complete, so official, as it were, that there was no possibility of the victims escaping. They were literally enveloped by death from the moment they entered Serajevo. The crime was only the culmination of a long train of events all of which aimed at raising rebellion among the Slavs of Austria-Hungary and its immediate purpose was to destroy the one life which seemed necessary to save Austria from disruption on the old emperor's death. We need not attempt to justify the terms of the ultimatum; but no one denies the provocation, no one suggests that if the two countries could be isolated, Austria would not be justified in exacting severe terms from the criminal.

The War Press

Why is a European war threatened to save Servia from punishment? Because Servia is the instrument of Russia. It was in Belgrade that that most mischievous of Russian diplomatists, M. Hartwig, carried on his machinations throughout the Balkan war. It is through Belgrade that Russia hopes to establish her domination of the Balkan peninsula. Have we any interest in helping her? Will it please the miners of Northumberland and the cotton operatives of Lancashire to know that Europe has waded through blood in order to give Russia the hegemony of the Slav world? Is her rule so beneficent that we can go to war to help her to extend it? I am old enough to remember—it does not seem very long ago—when the music halls of London were ringing with

> "We don't want to fight
> But by jingo if we do
> We've got the ships
> We've got the men
> We've got the money, too.
> We've fought the Bear before
> And while We're Britons true
> The Russians shall not have
> Con — stanti — no — ple."

I hated the jingle then as I hate it now, because it was a detestable appeal to ignorance and passion. But behind that appeal to make war on Russia were all the same vicious influences that are today working to achieve for Russia that very supremacy in the Balkans, that path to Constantinople which they denied her in 1878. Let us recall that fact when we hear the patriotic gramophone—as Lord Northcliffe shouting for war—

as they always shout for war. Let the public remember that with all its affectation of gravity, the voice of *The Times* is the same voice as that which speaks in the *Daily Mail*, the *Evening News* and all the rest of the rabble of Jingo Journalism. It is only the accent which is a little more polite. We saw how the system works yesterday. In *The Times* in the morning, Lord Northcliffe published an article carefully designed to encourage Russia to believe that she may rely on us to back her. In the evening he reproduced it in his *Evening News* for the mob as the voice of the *august Times*. It is thus that he gives the air of public clamor when he alone is speaking through his myriad gramophones.

Germany or Russia

If then, we have neither sympathy with Servia in the quarrel, nor a traditional interest in the aims of her master in the Balkans, why should we go to war? Is it because we wish the Russian civilization to overwhelm the German civilization? There is not a thinking being in this land who, competent to form a judgment, would not repudiate such a monstrous thought. If we crush Germany in the dust and make Russia the dictator of Europe and Asia it will be the greatest disaster that has ever befallen western culture and civilization. It will be a reaction to barbarism—the triumph of blind superstition over the most enlightened intellectual life of the modern world.

The Wrong Horse

And if it is a question of political supremacy, of that vague gibberish that is talked about "the balance of power," can we doubt where our interest lies? For years, under the industrious propaganda of Lord Northcliffe, Mr. Strachey, Mr. Maxse, and the militarists, this country has been preached into an anti-German frame of mind that takes no account of facts. Where in the wide world do our interests clash with those of Germany? Nowhere. With Russia we have potential conflicts over the whole of southeastern Europe and southern Asia. I have recalled the doggerel of forty years ago. It was typical. The whole of the latter half of the last century was dominated by our fear of Russia's designs upon our Indian Empire. Are those designs dead? No; if ever they had reality they are as real today as they were and much more practicable. The insane policy that has driven us into enmity with Germany has led us to sanction Russia's annexation of northern Persia and to listen to a scheme for a Russian railway to the very gates of India—a scheme the mere hint of which would have driven the Jingoes to frenzy twenty years ago. We may help to trample Germany in the dust to exalt Russia, but if we do so we shall not buy one fragment of Russia's aims in the future.

And what if, as the outcome of Armageddon, she makes terms with Germany and divides the sway of Europe? What, then, will the Indian Empire be worth? This is no wild dream. All things are possible if once we are involved in this horror. Remember the swift change in the Balkans that turned the swords of the allies at each other's throats almost in a night.

The Menace at Home

And what price shall we pay at home? The fabric of our finance is shaken. Industry will be paralyzed. Famine will be in our midst. The whole of our hopes of social reform and the betterment of the people will go like a dream in the night—swallowed up in the nightmare of a hideous reality. Does the Czar, sitting with his hand on the avalanche, think of that? Do the preachers of anti-Germanism think of that? They are the same people who have fought with every weapon in their power against our efforts to make the lot of the common people of this land a little better and to lay more firmly the foundations of a free people. Are all these efforts to collapse in ruin? Are we to share the universal anarchy?

For it is anarchy as well as war to which Europe is rushing. No man can tell what will emerge when the whole fabric of society has been shattered. But one thing will not emerge. The dynasts will go with the horror that they have created. The people failed in 1848, but they will not fail in 1914. Whatever miseries they have to face in the future, they may be trusted to sweep the curse of despotism off the face of Europe.

No Weakness

We are told that the day of our "splendid isolation" is over—that we must have "friends," and therefore enemies. It is false. Its falsity is proved by the very situation with which we are faced. It is because England is free that Europe hesitates. It is our neutrality which is the only protection that Europe has against the hideous ruin and combustion on the brink of which it trembles. Let us announce that neutrality to the world. It is the one hope. There is no other. Let us make it clear that unless and until British interests are attacked, we will have no part in this world-insanity, that we will not shed a drop of English blood for Czar or Servia, that our one obligation is the interests and peace of this land, and that we refuse to recognize any other. We can save Europe from war even at the last moment. But we can only save it by telling the Czar that he must fight his own battles and take the consequences of his own action.

If the British government does this, it will do the greatest service to humanity in history. If it does not do it, it will have brought the greatest curse to humanity in history. The youngest of us will not live to see the end of its crime.

The story of how Mr. Gardiner and his fellow Liberals, who opposed the War vigorously, bravely and intelligently in 1914, changed their attitude gradually and came to conceive of the conflict as an unparalleled crusade for great moral principles, the rights of small nations, permanent peace, security, disarmament and world organization is told with humor and inimitable skill by Miss Irene Cooper Willis in her brilliant work, *England's Holy War.*

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WORLD WAR.

As a concise summary of the status of scholarly opinion as to war responsibility perhaps nothing is better than the following quotation from G. Lowes Dickinson's masterly *International Anarchy*: [99]

Little Serbia stood on the verge of satisfying her national ambitions at the cost of the peoples and civilizations of three continents . . . For years the little state of Serbia had been undermining the Austrian Empire . . . What was the Empire to do in self-defense? One can conceive a world in which Austria would not have wished to hold down a nationality against its will. But that would not be the world of history, past or present. Never has an empire resigned before the disruptive forces of nationality. Always it has fought. And I do not believe that there was a state in existence that would not, under similar circumstances, have determined, as Austria did, to finish the menace, once for all, by war . . . With every year that passed the Austrian position would get worse and the Serbian better. So at least the Austrians thought, and not without reason. They took their risk according to the usual canons in such matters. They may be accused of miscalculation, but I do not see that they can be excused of wrong by anyone who accepts now, or who accepted then, the principles which have always dictated the policy of states . . . German diplomacy was cumbrous, stupid and dishonest. Granted, it was! But German policy was such as any state would have adopted in her position. The Powers of the Entente say that the offense was Germany's backing of Austria, Germans say that the offense was Russia's backing of Serbia. On that point, really, the whole controversy turns. To my mind the German position is the more reasonable.

The pertinent question is why was the War not localized, as Austria and Germany intended and desired? There is only one answer to this: Because Russia did not chose to allow it. Why not? . . . The answer is that she wanted Constantinople and the Straits; that she wanted access to the Mediterranean; that she wanted extension of territory and influence; that she had a "historic mission;" that she must make herself secure; in short the whole farrago of superstitions that dominate all states under the conditions of the armed anarchy . . . France entered for the sake of the balance of power and to recover Alsace-Lorraine; and her technical success in waiting till the declaration of war came from Germany does not alter the position. It had been known for at least two years past, it was reaffirmed more than once during the crisis, that if Germany came in against Russia, France would come in against Germany . . . At any rate since 1912 France would have entered when Russia did. And does anyone who has perused the previous chapters, and who realizes the state of Europe, believe that Russia would not have started the war a year or two later? . . . And England? . . . She had military and naval commitments to France which were like a suction-pipe to draw her, whether

[99] Dickinson, op. cit., pp. 429, 463-6.

she would or not, into the war. And that approximation to the other two Powers of the Entente was made for no other reason than the maintenance of the balance of power. We had become more afraid of Germany than of our traditional enemies, France and Russia. After all of our commitments to France it would have been base to desert her. Agreed! But what were the objects for which those commitments were made? Our own power, our own empire, our own security.

In the article in *Current History*, May 1924, the author made an effort to arrange the European powers in a numerical order of responsibility. This is, perhaps, valid procedure, but it is probably better simply to let the matter rest by saying that Serbia, Russia and France were the only states in 1914 that desired a European war and worked to secure it. Austria insisted upon a local punitive war, but ardently hoped that this might be kept from growing into a general conflict. Germany, England and Italy were opposed to any kind of a war after July 26th, but were too short-sighted, stupid, selfish or dilatory to be able to avert the calamity.

In arriving at a clear understanding about the outbreak of the World War it is also necessary to dismiss the thesis of certain writers that the War was the *inevitable* outcome of the European system of international anarchy and conflicting alliances. No one could possibly be more willing than the present writer to concede the fact that a dangerous and menacing situation was created by the European system of 1914, but this system had existed for forty years without any major war. It was unquestionably the specific personalities and policies of 1914 which produced the great cataclysm. This can be proved very definitely simply by reflecting as to what would have been the outcome of the crisis after the murder of the Archduke if Tisza had been in control of Austrian policy, Caillaux in charge of matters in France, Kokovtzov, Foreign Minister of Russia in the place of Sazonov, and Lord Morley or Earl Loreburn in the shoes of Sir Edward Grey. Under such circumstances it is utterly inconceivable that war could have resulted. Indeed, it is highly probable that there would have been no war had there been merely an interchange of one man, namely, if Caillaux had been presiding over the destinies of France instead of the doughty Lorrainer, Raymond Poincaré.

Another illusion in regard to war responsibility which it is necessary to combat is the view expressed by Dr. Cochran in *Current*

History for April, 1927, namely, that Revisionism constitutes an extreme emotional swing of the pendulum away from the war-time fictions, and that ultimately the truth will be found to lie somewhere between the views expressed in William Stearns Davis' *Roots of the War* and those expounded in the present book. This is certainly a benign attitude and, *a priori,* seems sensible. The fact is, however, that we were so blinded by war-time propaganda as to the black devilishness of the Central Powers and the lamb-like innocence of the Entente that we are still unprepared for the extent of the exposure of Serbia, France and Russia which the documents have produced. Almost without exception, all the new material of the last three years has served to bolster up an ever more advanced version of Revisionism, and there is no probability that any important extenuating material will be published hereafter which will aid the cause of the Entente. If such material existed it would have seen light before this. On the other hand, we still have a trump card to be played against the Entente, namely, the French Documents and the secret Russian correspondence with Serbia. Therefore, instead of settling back into any such weak-kneed position as that taken by Professor Schmitt in *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1926, and by Professor Hayes in the *Saturday Review* for June 16, 1928, we can be sure that Revisionism will not have to retreat a step, but will continue to leave the conservative historians breathless for a long time to come.

IX. THE ALLEGED WAR OF GERMAN FRIGHTFULNESS: THE ATROCITIES MYTH.

Next to the contention that Germany wilfully launched the World War, the leading myth in Entente propaganda was the assertion that Germany introduced into her conduct of war the most frightful and savage practices. These were explained by some as being due to the fact that the German race was utterly uncivilized; indeed, was quite incapable of being civilized. Such atrocious conduct was deemed but natural for a nation of "Huns." Others, while not objecting to the thesis of German savagery, held that the German practices were the result of a sinister and studied German program. The Germans had decided to wage a war of frightfulness in order to terrify the enemy and break their morale through fear of resistance. Among the forms of atrocious conduct with which the Germans were

charged, we may mention the crucifixion of French and Belgian soldiers, cutting the hands off numerous Belgian children, the rape of innumerable Belgian women and girls, cutting the breasts off Belgian and Polish women, robbing not only private homes but churches and hospitals, and sinking great numbers of gallant Allied sailors, taking particular delight in picking off those struggling helplessly in the water.

Great Britain was most systematic and efficient in inventing and publishing these tales and she made a great stroke in getting James Bryce to affix his signature to a singularly complete and varied collection of stories of German savagery and rapine in Belgium. This so-called "Bryce Report" was released in the United States shortly after the sinking of the Lusitania, and had a great effect in estranging American opinion from Germany on account of the confidence which the American citizens reposed in Mr. Bryce. The Atrocities Myth was the chief instrument utilized by the British propagandists and the American financial interests in "educating" American opinion up to the point where we were willing to enter the War.

Once any effort was made to investigate the foundations for these lurid tales, they were at once shown to be fantastic. Of course, war is not a pleasant and aesthetic form of recreation and many things happened during its progress which the participants on both sides would be only too glad to forget. At the same time, it can no longer be maintained that the conduct of German soldiers in regard to war methods was a whit worse than that of other combatants, not excluding the soldiers of the United States. Premiers Lloyd George of England and Nitti of Italy authorized an investigation of all cases of alleged atrocities conducted against Belgian civilians which were mentioned with sufficient exactness to allow an investigation to be started. Their investigators were unable to uncover a single case of wilful mutilation, whereas the Bryce Report and similar documents alleged that they existed by the thousand. In the summer of 1927 the German government proposed that the whole question of alleged Belgian "snipers" and German retaliation be investigated and reported upon by an impartial committee. The Belgian government refused the suggestion, and was strongly supported by the Belgian and the French

papers. They feared lest this might cause a complete overhauling of the whole atrocities situation.

Frenchmen interested in the truth have told how, in the French propaganda headquarters, leading French artists manufactured casts of such exhibits as mutilated French and Belgian children which were then photographed and scattered broadcast. Ferdinand Avenarius, in an illuminating and amazing brochure, entitled *How the War Madness was Engineered*, has shown how the Entente obtained many of the alleged authentic pictures of atrocities. Pictures of German officers, with trophies awarded before the World War broke out, were represented as German soldiers gloating over spoil taken from Churches and homes. The pictures of the horrible Russian *pogroms* against the Jews in Poland in 1905 and later years were displayed as literal pictorial records of the German conduct in Poland in 1914-15. General Charteris has recently revealed how he created the myth of the German corpse-factory by exchanging the captions on two pictures—one of a train-load of German soldiers being taken back for burial and the other of a load of dead horses destined for soap and fertilizer plants. He told further of faking a diary to be put in the pocket of a dead German, recounting how this German had been working in such a corpse-factory before coming to the front to be shot. As to the submarine warfare and submarine atrocities, even Admiral Sims admitted that there was but one case of a submarine atrocity on record attributable to German sailors and that in this case the responsible officers were promptly and severely punished. In other words, the whole framework of the contention that the Germans were only a collection of super-gorillas, devoid of human traits, has collapsed no less completely than such war-guilt fictions as the Potsdam Conference. A friend of the writer approached James Bryce about the Bryce Report some time before Mr. Bryce's death, but Bryce refused to attempt any defense beyond the assertion that one must expect almost anything in war-time.

The insincerity of the Entente horror concerning alleged German conduct during the War is well exhibited by the behavior of the French and British since 1918. In Morocco the French bombarded non-combatants frequently from airplanes. In Syria the same thing

was repeated; and for trivial reasons, compared with the excuse for the German invasion of Belgium, the French reduced to ruins the city of Damascus, a city infinitely more precious in the history of art and tradition than Rheims, Amiens, Louvain or any of the cities which the Germans were so severely criticized for shelling. Finally, the conduct of the French, in relation to the behavior of the French negro troops towards German women in the occupied Rhine towns, was far more deplorable than anything which can be proved of the Germans during war-time. In fact, the well demonstrated actualities concerning the "black terror" on the Rhine are nearly as bad as any of the stories of German carnality in Belgium during the war. By far the greatest and most indefensible atrocity which took place after 1914 was the British blockade of Germany for nearly a year after the Armistice, which resulted in the unnecessary starvation of some 800,000 German women and children. This is, perhaps the most staggering example of human brutality in all history. In the face of this, one need hardly mention the notorious Amritsar massacre in India in 1919.

Bibliographic Suggestions.

On the crisis of 1914 the most satisfactory account which has yet appeared is Volume II of Sidney B. Fay's *Origins of the War.* An excellent summary by a great German authority is Montgelas' *The Case for the Central Powers.* The official French summary is contained in Pierre Renouvin's *The Immediate Origins of the War.* The account in Ewart's *Roots and Causes of the Wars* is fair and keenly analytical, but it is now somewhat out of date, owing to the subsequent publication of very important source-material. On the atrocities question one may be referred to Ferdinand Avenarius' *How the War Madness Was Engineered,* and Georges Demartial's *La Guerre de 1914: Comment on mobilisa les consciences* (Second Edition), Part III, Chap. III.

Chapter V

THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE WORLD WAR

THE reasons for the entry of the United States into the World War are many and complex. About the only thing which may be stated clearly and dogmatically is that the resumption of German submarine warfare in 1917 was the occasion and not the reason for our becoming a belligerent.

In the first place, due partly to industrial and commercial rivalry and partly to the pro-British sources of most of our news concerning Germany in the decade prior to 1914, the United States had grown progressively more cool towards Germany. Not only did most American newspapers get much of their news concerning Germany indirectly through the Northcliffe press in England, but they also frequently employed jointly the same representatives in Germany. Particularly notorious here was the influence of Frederick William Wile, German correspondent for both the Northcliffe press in England and leading American papers like the New York *Times* and the Chicago *Tribune*. Wile did his best to poison American opinion in regard to Germany, and he may almost be said to have invented the Zabern Incident of 1913 which was particularly exploited in anti-German newspaper circles. This tendency was helped on after the outbreak of the War through the German invasion of Belgium and the exploitation of this act by the Entente propagandists. Therefore, before our material interests were vitally at stake, we were inclined to sympathize with the Allies, though popular sentiment differed somewhat in the various parts of the country.

It was not long, however, before important American interests were involved. The Entente borrowed enormous sums from the American bankers and began at once to place great orders in the United States for war materials. Germany raised most of her funds by domestic loans and by taxation, and American banking houses

frowned on loans to Germany. Likewise, the British command of the seas and the illegal interference of Britain with neutral trade, prevented Germany from purchasing commercial goods from the United States had she wished to do so. Therefore, our material interests were almost exclusively on the side of the Entente. We were not long in responding to the dictates of those interests. In September, 1914, former-Ambassador Myron T. Herrick, Ambassador William Graves Sharp and Robert Bacon, all closely connected with great American banking houses, told the famous French publicist, Gabriel Hanotaux, that France should keep up courage. Though there was as yet little pro-war sentiment in America, they promised Hanotaux that in due time this country would be brought in on the side of France. Writing in the Anglo-American number of the Manchester *Guardian*, on January 27th, 1920, Mr. Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan and Company, set forth the facts about the attitude of his firm with great candor:

> At the request of certain of the foreign Governments the firm of Messrs. J. P. Morgan and Company undertook to co-ordinate the requirements of the Allies, and then to bring about regularity and promptness in fulfilling those requirements. Those were the days when American citizens were being urged to remain neutral in action, in word, and even in thought. But our firm had never for one moment been neutral; we didn't know how to be. From the very start we did everything we could to contribute to the cause of the Allies. And this particular work had two effects: one in assisting the Allies in the production of goods and munitions in America necessary to the Allies' vigorous prosecution of the war; the other in helping to develop this great and profitable export trade that our country has had.

It need not be assumed that the attitude of the other large banking houses was notably different from that of the greatest.

It is not necessary to accept a naive theory of economic determinism in order to realize that the American press responds very quickly and decisively to the trend of business opinion in the country. Hence, the American papers quickly took up the Entente cause with enthusiasm, though there were a few exceptions, chiefly the lesser papers in Germanic sections of the country. Further, a war is an excellent thing for newspapers, which fact gave them a special interest in favoring intervention. Of the two, however, the business pressure was far the most powerful in swinging the newspapers for

war. The American interests were ably aided by British propagandists in lining up the American press and in educating American opinion. Sir Gilbert Parker, chief of the British propaganda service in the United States, thus describes in Harper's *Magazine* for March, 1918, how England set us straight as to war issues:

Perhaps here I may be permitted to say a few words concerning my own work since the beginning of the war. It is in a way a story by itself, but I feel justified in writing one or two paragraphs about it. Practically since the day war broke out between England and the Central Powers I became responsible for American publicity. I need hardly say that the scope of my department was very extensive and its activities widely ranged. Among the activities was a weekly report to the British Cabinet on the state of American opinion, and constant touch with the permanent correspondents of American newspapers in England. I also frequently arranged for important public men in England to act for us by interviews in American newspapers; and among these distinguished people were Mr. Lloyd George (the present Prime Minister), Viscount Grey, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Sir Edward Carson, Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Walter Runciman, (the Lord Chancellor), Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Lord Cromer, Will Crooks, Lord Curzon, Lord Gladstone, Lord Haldane, Mr. Henry James, Mr. John Redmond, Mr. Selfridge, Mr. Zangwill, Mrs. Humphry Ward, and fully a hundred others.

Among other things, we supplied three hundred and sixty newspapers in the smaller States of the United States with an English newspaper, which gives a weekly review and comment of the affairs of the war. We established connection with the man in the street through cinema pictures of the Army and Navy, as well as through interviews, articles, pamphlets, etc.; and by letters in reply to individual American critics, which were printed in the chief newspaper of the State in which they lived, and were copied in newspapers of other and neighboring States. We advised and stimulated many people to write articles; we utilized the friendly services and assistance of confidential friends; we had reports from important Americans constantly, and established association, by personal correspondence, with influential and eminent people of every profession in the United States, beginning with university and college presidents, professors and scientific men, and running through all the ranges of the population. We asked our friends and correspondents to arrange for speeches, debates, and lectures by American citizens, but we did not encourage Britishers to go to America and preach the doctrine of entrance into the war. Besides an immense private correspondence with individuals, we had our documents and literature sent to great numbers of public libraries, Y. M. C. A. societies, universities, colleges, historical societies, clubs, and newspapers.

It is hardly necessary to say that the work was one of extreme difficulty and delicacy, but I was fortunate in having a wide acquaintance in the United States and in knowing that a great many people had read my books and were not prejudiced against me. . . .

Also, it should be remembered that the Society of Pilgrims, whose work of international unity cannot be overestimated, has played a part in promoting understanding between the two peoples, and the establishment of the American Officers' Club in Lord Leconfield's house in London with H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught as president, has done, and is doing immense good. It should also be remembered that it was the Pilgrims' Society under the fine chairmanship of Mr. Harry Brittain, which took charge of the Hon. James M. Beck when he visited England in 1916, and gave him so good a chance to do great work for the cause of unity between the two nations. I am glad and proud to think that I had something to do with these arrangements which resulted in the Pilgrims taking Mr. Beck into their charge.

The British campaign in converting American opinion to the Entente viewpoint was so rapidly and completely successful that it amazed even Lord Northcliffe. While on a trip to the United States he remarked to a prominent Columbia University professor that only the Chinese equalled the Americans in their gullibility in accepting the Entente version of the causes and issues of the World War.

There is little probability that President Wilson was in any way consciously influenced by America's material interests in the struggle. Down to 1917 he had refused to allow any member of the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company to enter the White House. Mr. Wilson was, however, very pro-British in his cultural sympathies. As Hale and others have shown, he admired British culture and statesmen beyond all others. His great heroes were men like Milton, Burke and Adam Smith. He knew little of Continental literature, statesmen or politics, in spite of the fact that he had once written a college textbook on formal aspects of European government. He really felt that Great Britain and her Allies were fighting for civilization against the brutal tactics of the Germans, and that civilization was actually hanging in the balance. He did not desire to have the United States enter the War if England seemed likely to win without our aid, but as soon as this appeared doubtful he was convinced that we should enter as early as he could persuade Congress and the country to follow him. Wilson's own pro-British proclivities were greatly strengthened by the influence of those two vigorous Anglo-maniacs, Ambassador Page and Secretary Houston. Mr. Wilson's attitude on this point was well summarized by Wilson's Attorney-General, T. W. Gregory, in a letter to the New York *Times* for January 29th,

1925, telling of Wilson's response to Cabinet criticism of Great Britain's violations of our rights as neutrals:

> After patiently listening, Mr. Wilson said, in that quiet way of his, that the ordinary rules of conduct had no application to the situation; that the Allies were standing with their backs to the wall, fighting wild beasts; that he would permit nothing to be done by our country to hinder or embarrass them in the prosecution of the war unless admitted rights were grossly violated, and that this policy must be understood as settled.

Thus did Mr. Wilson live up to his stated ideal that every true American must be neutral in thought as well as in deed!

Later, Mr. Wilson added to his pro-British reasons for desiring to enter the War the conception that unless he was at the Peace Conference he could not act decisively in bringing about a peace of justice and permanence. Shortly before we entered the War in April, 1917, Mr. Wilson confessed this motive to Miss Jane Addams in a conference with her at the White House:

> The President's mood was stern and far from the scholar's detachment as he told us of recent disclosures of German machinations in Mexico and announced the impossibility of any form of adjudication. He still spoke to us, however, as to fellow pacifists to whom he was forced to confess that war had become inevitable. He used one phrase which I had heard Colonel House use so recently that it still stuck firmly in my memory. The phrase was to the effect that, as head of a nation participating in the war, the President of the United States would have a seat at the Peace Table, but that if he remained the representative of a neutral country he could at best only "call through a crack in the door." The appeal he made was, in substance, that the foreign policies which we so extravagantly admired could have a chance if he were there to push and to defend them, but not otherwise. It was as if his heart's desire spoke through his words and dictated his view of the situation. But I found my mind challenging his whole theory of leadership.

The relation of the interests to Mr. Wilson's work in bringing the United States into the War was an indirect one. They had brought the papers around to the Entente position, and Wilson was unquestionably to some extent affected by the newspapers in his gradual conversion to the conviction that the Germans were "wild beasts." Then, when he had decided that we should go into the war, he had an eage and subservient press at his beck and call. Always an intensely vai man, he also realized by 1917 that popularity with the press la on the side of intervention.

It is of little importance to examine the actual legal issues at stake in our entry into the War, as they had slight influence on our decisions. England continually and most extensively violated the long established rights of neutrals with respect to blockade, continuous voyage and contraband, as well as in inflicting innumerable minor humiliations on neutral traders and in using the American flag freely for her vessels. Germany retaliated by submarine warfare, and in this way placed in jeopardy American lives and property. England violated our rights infinitely more extensively than Germany, but less dramatically, especially in that the German procedure threatened American lives. Germany, however, offered to accept Mr. Bryan's proposal that England should obey international law on the seas and that Germany should give up her submarine warfare. England, knowing her Page and Wilson, refused even to discuss such a proposition. In other words, as Mr. Wilson himself admitted, we had two sets of international law, one for Germany and one for Great Britain. Mr. Bryan was too honest to go on in this way, and resigned as Secretary of State.

Many would cite the *Lusitania* case as an example of British rectitude and German depravity and lawlessness, but such an attitude betokens an ignorance of the facts in the case. The Germans made a great tactical blunder in sinking the *Lusitania* but the legal right was all on their side. The *Lusitania* had been armed by Britain before the War, it was in 1915 registered as an auxiliary cruiser in the British navy, it was carrying a heavy cargo of high explosives and other munitions of war, and prospective American passengers had been amply warned by the German government and Mr. Bryan. Therefore, the *Lusitania* lost her status as a merchant vessel and could be legally sunk without warning. Civilians embarked on her at their own risk, and Americans taking passage on the *Lusitania* were, in addition, violating the laws of their own country by accepting passage upon a vessel carrying explosives. Yet, because the Germans sank this ship, Mr. Roosevelt, who, less than a year before had defended the German invasion of Belgium, would have had this country leap into the war on the side of Great Britain.

Finally, it remains to be shown that the United States did not

enter the War because of the resumption of submarine warfare by Germany. Mr. Wilson and Colonel House decided by December, 1915, that the time had come when England needed our active assistance. Hence, Wilson sent House abroad in January, 1916, with a peace plan which embodied German admission of defeat and appropriate penalties. If Germany would not accept this, then the United States would enter on the side of the Allies. The Entente, however, refused to accept Wilson's plan, because it proposed a far more lenient treatment of Germany than the Entente had embodied in the Secret Treaties. Therefore, Colonel House had to wend his way sorrowfully homeward.

Mr. Wilson played his next card at home. One morning early in April, 1916, Mr. Wilson called in conference the Democratic leaders of Congress, Champ Clark, Hal Flood and Claude Kitchin, told them that he felt it was time the United States entered the War, and asked for their support in leading Congress to accept his plan. These men were opposed to war and, hence, rejected his proposals somewhat heatedly. Wilson knew that it was a poor time to split the party just before an election, so he dropped the matter at once and, with Colonel House, mapped out a pacifist platform for the coming campaign. Governor Martin Glynn of New York and Senator Ollie James of Kentucky were sent to the St. Louis convention to make keynote speeches, which were based on the slogan: "He kept us out of war!" The campaign was fought out on this basis and Mr. Wilson was reelected by a narrow margin. Sure of four more years in the White House, Mr. Wilson no longer had to worry about pacifist Democrats, as he could count on the support of bellicose Republicans in his war policies. Before he had been inaugurated a second time, the Germans played directly into his hands by announcing the resumption of submarine warfare. They thus furnished Wilson with as admirable an occasion for putting the United States into the conflict as they had presented Grey with through their invasion of Belgium. It was fortunate for Britain and the bankers that the Germans made this timely blunder, as Great Britain had overdrawn her American credit by some $450,000,000 and the bankers were having trouble in floating more large private loans. It was necessary now to pass on the burden of financing the Entente to the Federal Treasury. We thus

entered the struggle to make the world safe for democracy and to bring about a peace based upon right, justice and generosity.

There can be little doubt that the entry of the United States into the World War was an unmitigated disaster for all concerned. It made it possible for one set of combatants to win a crushing victory, whereas, as Mr. Wilson had once wisely said, the only enduring peace would have to be a peace without victory. There is little probability that Germany could have defeated the Entente decisively if the United States had remained neutral. Therefore, our participation made possible the "smashing defeat" demanded by Lloyd George and the resulting peace of vengeance, thus ruining Europe by a settlement almost as damaging as the War itself. Our participation also severely damaged America. It destroyed the effect of Mr. Wilson's liberal legislation at home, led to unprecedented invasions of American liberties, plunged us into an unparallelled period of political corruption and graft, enormously increased our public debt and taxation, and earned us little but gross ingratitude and hatred from those whom we aided. In due time we learned that we had been played for suckers and used to pull the Entente chestnuts out of the fire, but the damage had been done long since. The best commentary upon the futility of the whole adventure was contained in Mr. Wilson's remark, a few months before his death, to the effect that he would like to see the Germans give the French a good beating and that he would like to meet the French Ambassador and tell him so to his face.

Bibliographic Suggestions.

There is no adequate work on the entry of the United States into the World War. The best books yet written dealing in part with the subject are John Kenneth Turner's *Shall It Be Again?* and Frederick Bausman's *Facing Europe.* Of real value also is Mr. Grattan's article on Walter Hines Page in the *American Mercury* for September, 1925. The American Documents dealing with our diplomatic relations to the World War have just been published by the State Department under the editorship of Professor Joseph V. Fuller. They are entitled *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1914. Supplement: The World War.* There is much of value in *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,* edited by Professor Seymour, to which a reply may be expected in Ray Stannard Baker's edition of the works of President Wilson.

Chapter VI

WAR GUILT AND THE WORLD TODAY

I. BEARING OF WAR GUILT ON EUROPE TODAY.

THE question of war responsibility cannot be regarded as simply an isolated and esoteric matter of historical scholarship. If it were, we might well rest content to allow the historians solemnly to dissect its minute problems in their cloistered alcoves during the next ten generations. It so happens that this question is the most important issue before the public today, still faced as we are by the "international anarchy" of 1914 and by the imminent danger of another European war. The international attitudes in Europe today rest to a very large degree upon the affections and hatreds engendered by the War and the conceptions of responsibility thereunto attached. It is extremely difficult to erect the structure of Locarno upon the foundations of Versailles. The chief political obstacles to peace in Europe—the South Tyrol, Macedonia, the Polish Corridor, Silesia, Bessarabia, dismembered Hungary, Austria forbidden to effect a juncture with Germany, and outlawed Russia—are for the most part the product of a Peace Treaty which was founded upon the most flagrant of war-time lies and hypocrisy. Likewise, a leading source of European financial instability and poverty—the system of reparations—is the financial penalty imposed upon supposedly guilty nations which have been proved to be far less responsible than most of their judges.

Even more important is the bearing of the question of war responsibility upon the problem of putting an end to the menace of war itself. If we can but understand how incredibly we were deceived by the war-time propaganda as to the real facts and issues involved in the events of 1912-18, we ought to be in a position to scrutinize somewhat more closely the propaganda of the next pre-war period. Again, when we discern how pathetically we failed to secure the chief alleged aims of the Entente—the ending of all wars, the abolition of militarism, disarmament, world democracy, idealism and

coöperation in international relations, world organization, and internation security, we should come to understand how futile it is to hope to secure constructive and pacific results through the method of warlike endeavor. Further, the war proved how little gratitude one may expect from allies and how little one can depend upon the stability of international relationships which are created during the stress of war. The net result of the above facts should demonstrate the necessity of meeting the military menace head-on through such devices as the outlawry of war and of doing everything possible to erect some adequate form of international organization to curb ecstatic patriots and bellicose diplomats.

In short, the time has now arrived when the Revisionist historians may be said to have finished their work, as far as establishing the basic facts about war responsibility is concerned. From now on the problems are those for the statesman and diplomat, if we are to expect a settlement or readjustment on any other basis than another test of arms, once a new European alignment can be effected. The historian can do little by himself, but he has already provided information to indicate the hollow mockery of justice embodied in the post-War settlements and he has put Entente statesmanship under a perpetual and overwhelming moral indictment until that time comes when the attempt is made to square the realities of European politics with the actual facts of war responsibility.

II. WAR GUILT, THE POST-WAR TREATIES AND THE PRESENT STATE OF EUROPE

In spite of the fact that Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles states that

> The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of herself and her allies, for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

it has been held by many writers that the post-War treaties are not based upon the thesis of the unique and sole guilt of the Central Powers in bringing on the War. It has been maintained by some of the above writers, as well as by others, that, even if this were so, it would be unwise to continue the war-guilt discussion because it

obstructs the hope of bringing a pacific spirit back to Europe. A conclusive answer to both of these contentions is contained in the following excellent article by Alfred von Wegerer, published in the New York *Nation* for April 27th, 1927:

In countries outside Germany one continually meets with articles, many of them by eminent journalists, expressing the opinion that the pacification of Europe is being thwarted by the continuance of the controversy over the war-guilt question. Some of these journalists think that the time has not yet come for any final judgment on this vexed question and that the eternal discussion of opposing views with regard to it merely hampers the policy of peace which is so essential for Europe's welfare. On the other hand they grant that in spite of all attempts that have been made to smooth over the difficulties that divide Europe the protests against the Versailles view of Germany's responsibilities are being urged with the same emphasis and stubbornness as ever.

Attempts to bring about a Franco-German understanding make so little headway mainly because the great bulk of the French nation still imagines that the Germans systematically planned and prepared the World War and that in 1914 they would have fallen upon France without any action whatever on the part of Poincaré and Isvolski. This belief alone renders it possible for the French Government of today to cling to Poincaré's policy of keeping the French garrisons in the Rhenish occupied provinces despite the Treaty of Locarno and the meeting at Thoiry. At the same time France's own war equipment, which is such a constant menace to Germany is kept almost undiminished. An understanding between the Germans and the French, however, is impossible as long as French soldiers are stationed on the Rhine and the German civilian population is again and again irritated by the verdicts of French military tribunals. Only by getting rid of the prevailing French ideas concerning the outbreak of the war can a new mood be created in that country. Some such change of mood is essential as a preliminary for a withdrawal of the Rhenish garrisons.

A second consideration which makes the revision of the war-guilt dogma necessary is the fact that among the Germans it is now increasingly recognized that the burden laid upon the German nation by the Dawes Plan and the tribute that has to be raised for the most part by the self-sacrifice and hard work of the German laboring classes represent a demand unjustly made upon Germany, a demand moreover which the Germans themselves will eventually not be able to tolerate. There is a very strong sense of right and wrong among the Germans, and when once the masses of the workmen and peasants, as well as the army of unemployed and the lower grades of the proletariat, have really come to understand that the payment of two and a half milliard marks ($500,500,000) which Germany has to raise every year is based upon an unjust award, the consequences may be serious.

In German and foreign intellectual circles there is now a conviction that the Versailles dogma of Germany's sole responsibility for the war is

without scientific foundation. In saying this we must remember that the mistaken verdict of Versailles was itself the result of a scientific investigation undertaken by authorized persons belonging to the Peace Delegation appointed by the Entente. This delegation pronounced its judgment, however, on the basis of material that was incomplete and in part even falsified. The procedure was, in short, as follows:

In 1919 the so-called Preliminary Peace Conference sat in Paris and at full session on January 25 resolved to appoint a committee of fifteen members who among other things had the task of drawing up for the conference a report on the responsibility of those who began the war. On this committee there were representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Rumania, and Serbia. The whole world in fact was represented. Among the Americans Lansing and Scott were conspicuous, while among the English Sir Gordon Hewart and Sir Ernest Pollock may be mentioned; M. Tardieu was one of the French delegates, while Signor Scialoja represented Italy and M. Politis, Greece. The committee presented its report to the Peace Conference on March 29, 1919. In the report itself the committee arrived at the following conclusion:

> The war was premeditated by the Central Powers as well as by their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed with the intention of making it inevitable.
>
> Germany in accord with Austro-Hungary deliberately worked to set aside the numerous conciliatory proposals put forward by the Entente Powers and to bring to naught their repeated efforts to avoid war.

For the conclusions stated in this report the delegates used chiefly the so-called Color Books, published by the European governments in 1914 and containing the diplomatic correspondence that had taken place between the European cabinets before the outbreak of the war. From the Russian documents published since the war by the Soviet Republic it is clear that the Russian Orange Book of 1914 was not only incomplete in every respect but that a great number of its documents were forged. That the documents published by France in 1914 contained considerable gaps and were in part forged is also sufficiently notorious. Another proof of the insufficiency of the Color Books of 1914 is afforded by the recently issued British Documents on the Origins of the War. This collection of documents shows that the Blue Book of 1914 contained only a fragment, a mere quarter of the documents actually available, and that through its omissions and alterations of sequence it could not but lead to conclusions which were in no way in keeping with the actual state of affairs at the outbreak of the war.

The new British documents demonstrate moreover various falsifications of the French Yellow Book that had hitherto remained unnoticed. By means of these falsifications the French aimed at creating the impression that Germany's military preparations shortly before the outbreak of the war were far in advance of the corresponding French measures. In reality the exact contrary was the case. In order to attain their end the publishers of the French Yellow Book did not hesitate to employ the crudest form of falsification by altering certain dates in their own favor.

From this brief statement of the facts it will be clear that the committee appointed in 1919 by the Entente to examine the question of war re-

sponsibility drew up its report on the basis of an insufficient, incomplete, and falsified mass of material.

It goes without saying that no reproach is to be made against the members of the committee for this state of affairs. At the time the members could not doubt the official material placed at their disposal for the purpose of their investigation. The members of the committee themselves had no opportunity of checking the genuineness and completeness of the documents by consulting the archives of the various governments. The blame therefore rests not upon the members of the committee but upon the governments concerned.

The practical question now arises: What is to be done in order to make good this glaring injustice? In our opinion there are two alternatives.

As it is impossible to doubt the good faith of the members of the committee, it is to be expected that as soon as they are informed of the facts as cited above they will notify their governments that they can no longer identify themselves with the report in question.

Should, however, the members of the committee not take this view, a strong appeal should be made to the public in the countries in question with the object of getting the governments concerned to recognize the necessity of revising the verdict as to Germany's war guilt and of annulling the report as early as possible. This argument gains added weight when we consider that Germany up to the present has loyally fulfilled all the obligations forced upon it by the Treaty of Versailles.

III. ENTENTE TREACHERY: THE WRECK OF THE "FOURTEEN POINTS."

Many uninformed persons assume that the post-War treaties were formulated in complete agreement with Mr. Wilson's noble program, embodied in his "Fourteen Points." In his great Armistice Day Speech of November 11th, 1924, the famous American lawyer and publicist, Mr. Samuel Untermeyer, thus demonstrates that the treaties of Peace violated Mr. Wilson's platform, upon which the Armistice was concluded, quite as much as they did the facts concerning the outbreak of the War:

> The commemoration of the day when this unprecedented, barbaric world-slaughter came to an end is in itself a commendable celebration. If its purpose were to commemorate a peace with honor to ourselves or to any of the other nations concerned it would indeed be an occasion for grateful remembrance. The tragedy of it all is that we are today celebrating not only the betrayal of the vanquished but of America. The day should be to us one of sackcloth and ashes, of fasting and atonement rather than of joy and thanksgiving.
>
> Our martyred President (for he was as surely a martyr to his faith in the Allies as though he had been struck down on the battle-field) induced the Central Powers to lay down their arms in reliance upon a peace

based upon the 14 points of which he was the author and to which the Allies gave their full and formal assent (with two exceptions affecting the freedom of the seas and reparations with which we are not here concerned) agreeing that the Armistice Terms would in all other respects adhere to the spirit of that agreement.

Again, when he was literally forced to agree to the terms of the Armistice by the state of helplessness to which the prostrate foe had been reduced by their surrender in reliance upon the acceptance of the 14 points by the Allies, although contrary to the terms of capitulation, he still had the right to believe that the formal Treaties of Peace would at least rectify the cruel conditions of the Armistice. At each step his confidence was violated.

When the agreement for the League of Nations, which was to crown the one great ambition of his life and to have been the instrument to restore peace and good will on earth—to which he had dedicated all that was in him—was formulated it was found to be an agreement to perpetuate, by the combined force of arms of the great Nations of the earth, the most brutal, despotic and war-breeding 'peace' in the annals of time. Then and then only did we learn that our dear country which, under the guise of 'a peace without victory' that was to make the world forever thereafter 'safe for democracy,' had been made the pawn in the most treacherous game ever played in history. We, whose participation had changed defeat into success for the Allies, were repaid by a Treaty that violated every promise made by us and which cannot but perpetuate hatreds for generations to come.

The fundamental particulars in which these three documents differ from one another, the oppressive and destructive exactions that were added from step to step, have been so frequently analyzed and discussed that the outstanding facts are now well known to all students of the subject. Prefacing them by a brief chronological table, they may be summarized as follows:

Negotiations Preceding the Armistice

Oct. 5, 1918. German Note to the President, accepting the 14 Points laid down in his Address to Congress of Jan. 8, 1918.

Oct. 8, 1918. President asks if he was to understand definitely that the German Government accepted the terms laid down in the 14 points and his subsequent Addresses and that nothing would be left except to discuss the practical details of their application.

Oct. 12, 1918. The German Government returned an unconditional affirmative to this question.

Oct. 14, 1918. Further communications from the President concerning submarine warfare and guarantees of the representative character of the German Government.

Oct. 20, 1918. Such assurances were given in the German Note of that date.

Oct. 23, 1918. The President announced that having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address of January 8, 1918

and the principles of settlement announced in his subsequent addresses, particularly in the address of September 27, 1918, he has communicated the correspondence to the Allied Powers with the suggestion that they ask their military advisers to draw up Armistice Terms.

Nov. 5, 1918. The President transmitted to the German Government the reply of the Allied Governments declaring their willingness to make peace on the terms laid down in the President's address of January 8, 1918 and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses—with two qualifications,—the one concerning the freedom of the seas and the other relating to reparations.

The peace agreed to by Austria-Hungary with General Diaz in Padua was based on the same terms and principles contained in President Wilson's Addresses above referred to.

In What Respects These Terms Were Violated.

Time will permit of only the briefest summary:

1. The first of the 14 Points relates to "Open Covenants, Openly Arrived at and Open Diplomacy."

This was violated by the Treaty of Trianon concluded with Hungary. The allotment of territory to Roumania, including all of Transylvania and a large piece of territory across the River Tisza with over 5,000,000 inhabitants, was based on the secret Treaty between the Quintuple Entente—that is, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and Roumania, concluded in August, 1916. The allotments to Serbia and Czecho-Slovakia were based on the secret pacts of Corfu, Cleveland and Pittsburg respectively.

2. The 3rd point concerns the "Removal of Economic Barriers and the assurances of Equality of Trade." This was violated in every particular.

Germany and her Allies were required to obligate themselves by the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain-en-Laye and Trianon both with respect to imports and exports as regards tariffs, regulations and prohibitions for five years to accord "most favored nations" treatment to the Allies and their associated states, without reciprocity; for five years Alsace-Lorraine was made free to export into Germany without payment of customs duties—up to the average amount that had been sent into Germany from 1911 to 1913. No such treatment was accorded German exports into Alsace-Lorraine. For three years Polish exports to Germany and for five years Luxembourg's exports to Germany were given similar treatment under the Treaty, without reciprocity. Luxembourg was permanently excluded from the German Customs Union. For six months after the Treaty came into force Germany was prohibited and again without reciprocity, from imposing duties on many imports from the Allies and associated states higher than the "most favored nation" duties prevailing before the war.

This prohibition was continued for a further period of two and one-half years beyond the six months on such commodities as wines, vegetable oils, artificial silk and washed or scoured wools, which means that Germany is threatened by the Treaty with a deluge of articles of luxury or semi-luxury from Allied countries that will exhaust or diminish her small supply of foreign exchange.

The Allies also reserved special treatment on the left bank of the Rhine, under cover of which the French have tried to establish an independent Republic under French clerical auspices.

The provisions relating to railways as affecting goods shipped from Allied countries into Germany and in transit through Germany stipulate a one-sided and "most favored nation" treatment in respect to rail freight-rates, etc.

The Treaty has given over the administration of the Elbe, the Oder, the Danube and the Rhine to International commissions. There were similar one-sided stipulations in the Treaties of Trianon and St. Germain-en-Laye.

3. "Reduction of Armaments Guaranteed."

This covenant has likewise been flagrantly violated by the Treaties. Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria have been disarmed and left to the "tender mercies" of the Allies whilst the states of the Allied Powers have greatly increased their armaments.

On November 1st, 1918, Czechia (which at that time had not been allowed to annex Slovakia) had 70,000 men under arms, Yugoslavia 60,000 and Roumania 127,000. Today, about five years after the peace, their actual military forces are at least twice as large as at the time of the Armistice.

The Hungarian army, on the other hand, has been converted into a voluntary body and limited to 35,000, consisting of about 7 mixed battalions. Czecho-Slovakia's military force has 12 Infantry Corps, 3 Cavalry and 4 Artillery battalions and 2 Mountain batteries. Yugoslavia's army includes 16 Infantry Corps, 2 Cavalry Corps and 8 heavy artillery regiments. Roumania commands 14 Infantry Corps, 2 Corps de chasseurs, 1 mountain corps, 3 chasseur battalions, 2 battalions of guards and 7 mounted, 7 sanitary and 7 reserve corps.

The 3½ Hungarian Corps are in the proportion of 1 to 17 compared to the 59 Corps of the Little Entente. Hungary's 525 machine guns are faced by 3200 of Czecho-Slovakia and 560 of Yugoslavia and the 4870 of Roumania. This means that Czecho-Slovakia possesses 6 times as many machine guns as Hungary, and Roumania 9 times as many. As to cannon, Czecho-Slovakia has 800 pieces of ordnance, Yugoslavia 722 and Roumania 1822, while 105 is the total of Hungary. Thus Czecho-Slovakia has 8 times, Yugoslavia 7 times and Roumania 15 times more of these arms than Hungary.

The Hungarian army is prohibited from having any flying-machines, whilst Czecho-Slovakia is now in command of 1400 aeroplanes as a result of the completion of the 1922 program. Yugoslavia has 70 and Roumania has 80 flying machines.

Hungary is not allowed to mobilize. Czecho-Slovakia, according to the 1920 Army Act, recruits to a total of 2-3,000,000 men. Yugoslavia with her 32 categories accounts for 1,600,000. Roumania with her 27 categories represents a total of 2,500,000. That is a total of 6,400,000 men to be let loose on the comparatively defenseless population of Hungary.

The Allied countries are allowed compulsory military service whilst the former Central Powers are permitted only voluntary service.

As to the 5th Point, concerning the "Impartial adjustment of Colonial Claims." This was completely disregarded. All former German colonies have been taken without compensation. Austria-Hungary has lost its former settlements in China, without compensation.

4. The 9th Point, which assured the adjustment of Italy's boundaries according to nationality, was also flagrantly disregarded. Millions of Germans and Austrians have been included in the territory ceded to Italy by Austria (including Bozen), and without plebescites.

5. As to the 10th Point, promising autonomy to the people of Austria-Hungary: This, too, was violated in every particular. Instead of autonomy millions of people have been wrested from their mother country without a plebescite and against their will. Hungary lost about 14,000,000 out of a total of 21,000,000. With the exception of western Hungary no plebescite was held anywhere. Here the population voted almost 2 to 1 in favor of retaining Hungarian rule, although the inhabitants are chiefly of German origin.

The violation of this promise has caused untold misery and has been more arbitrary than anything in the history of the world. The plea of the Little Entente that there has been a self-determination is not true. In Hungary, the Magyar and non-Magyar population taken from Hungary was never asked whether they were willing to be transferred to alien rule. This includes more than 3,500,000 Magyars, over 2,000,000 Slovaks, 1,500,000 Germans and 500,000 Ruthenians who are being denationalized by the Czechs. It includes also the Slovaks, who are to be transferred into Czechs or Czecho-Slovaks, although the Czechs are totally different from the Slovaks in language, custom, religion, history, etc.; 100,000 Bunyevacz, about 1,700,000 Crotians and about 100,000 Wends.

6. The 11th Point provided that Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated and the occupied territories restored.

Montenegro was swallowed up by Serbia and ceased to exist. Serbia, now known as Yugoslavia, has been enormously enlarged at the expense of Hungary, Bulgaria, Crotia and Bosnia. Historical allegiance and nationality were ruthlessly disregarded. This is true also as to Macedonia and Herzegovina—which latter province has never belonged to Serbia. Crotia never belonged to Serbia and wants to be autonomous.

7. The 13th Point, providing for an independent Polish state, has been disregarded in the partition of Upper Silesia, the cession of eastern Prussia to Poland and the establishment of Dantzig as a free city.

Referring now to the principles laid down in President Wilson's Addresses: On February 11, 1918, he said:

> "There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages."

Under the Peace Treaties there have been wholesale annexations. Leaving aside Alsace-Lorraine, which it was always understood would go to France, there were annexed Moresnet, Eupen and Malmedy by Belgium; part of Silesia by Czecho-Slovakia; Eastern and Western Prussia (partly) together with Posnania by Poland; Upper Silesia partly by Poland; North Schleswig by Denmark; all the colonies of Germany by the Allied Powers.

All German territory west of the Rhine is to be occupied for at least 15 years. It remains to be seen how much longer this occupation or annexation will last.

Two-thirds of Hungary has been fradulently taken by Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia; Fiume by Italy (leaving Hungary without a port or access to the sea); Macedonia by Serbia; the Dobrudja by Roumania; Bessarabia, Bukovina by Roumania; parts of Tyrol, Trieste, the Austrian seacoast and the Hungarian littoral by Italy.

The American Delegate to the Peace Conference, Mr. John Foster Dulles, vigorously protested against contributions and punitive damages from Germany. He particularly objected to the payment of military pensions, which is the biggest item of the reparations payment. Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, another American delegate, declared that not one legal expert of the American Delegation advised the inclusion of pensions in the reparations.

In the address of February 11, 1918, above referred to, the President also declared:

> "Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril * * * Every territorial settlement involved in this War must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims of rival states."

Except in Eastern Prussia, Upper Silesia and Western Hungary there was no plebiscite and no self-determination. The peoples have simply been transferred to alien rule without being consulted.

The dominating influence of France in bringing about the consummation of this crime of the ages and the final act of fettering the helpless enemy by conditions that must have been known to all to have been impossible of performance, leave little room for doubt that the real purpose of France was to bankrupt and dismember the German Empire as the proud Austro-Hungarian Empire had been shattered and destroyed. But for the cry of rage and shame that went up from the entire civilized world, when the first step was attempted by the further occupation of the Rhineland, upon the most flimsy of pretexts, this purpose would have been fully accomplished. France simply dared not carry through this outrage to the extent contemplated and face the moral ostracism of the world. In making the attempt it had no more regard for the letter or spirit of the terms of the abominable Treaty that it had forced upon the Central Powers than it is now evidencing for its obligation to repay to the United States the billions of money we advanced her to save her from destruction. In all these years it has not even made a gesture toward paying so much as an installment on account of the interest.

If the War had terminated in the defeat and surrender of the armies of the Central Powers the Allies might well have claimed that under the ancient brutal rules of war whereby "to the victors belong the spoils" they were entitled to absolutely dictate the terms of peace, however destructive to the future peace of the world. But this war was not supposed to have been so terminated. Each side (except the United States) was almost as

near the point of exhaustion and enforced surrender as was the other. Hostilities were suspended by common consent and upon assurances that were flagrantly violated at every step. The dismemberment of Austro-Hungary and the taking of a vast part of the territory of Russia, the former ally of the Allies, were accomplished because their resistance-power was exhausted.

The revolting procedure connected with the formulation and execution of the Treaties was characteristic and in every way worthy of the studied, callous indifference to the promises on which peace was secured. The Central Powers were excluded from all participation. They were not even permitted to know the terms until they were called in to sign "on the dotted line." Some were graciously allowed to file written objections, which were for the most part disregarded. The case had been determined before the hearing.

Hungary, which was being stripped of two-thirds of its people and territory, was granted a few hours oral hearing to voice its vain protest. The German delegates were made virtual prisoners in the quarters to which they were assigned on their arrival in Paris, until they were brought forth and forced to sign. And to crown the shame and ignominy of it all, these delegates and the great country they represented were subjected to the unspeakable humiliation of being compelled, over their signatures, to admit the criminal responsibility of Germany for the War, which they have continued stoutly to deny. There is nothing in world history to equal the barbarity of this performance.

The time is near at hand when the responsibility for the War will be calmly investigated and judicially determined. Meanwhile there is nothing reliable on which to base a judgment. I believe there already has been a violent reaction, brought about largely by the cruel injustices that have been perpetrated by the Allies connected with the Peace Treaty and that we Americans, who have an inherent hatred of injustice and worship fair play, are ready to suspend judgment on this question of responsibility for the War until the historians have placed the facts and documents before us.

It matters not, however, what may be the finding, the popular revulsion against the methods by which the signatures to these Treaties were secured has been, I believe, in itself sufficient to produce in every fair mind a violent reaction against the carrying out of the bargain brought about in that way.

France is today almost as much the military master of the new states, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia, that were taken largely from her ally, Russia, and from Austro-Hungary, as though they were her territory. We have substituted French militarism for German militarism, but in a more aggravated form.

The League of Nations, that was to correct past wrongs and aggressions and to perpetuate a just peace has proved an iridescent dream. It was beautiful in its abstract conception but was wrecked and converted into a weapon of injustice and oppression before it took form. The treacherous and obnoxious character of the peace that it was finally pledged to assure, more even than the requirements of Articles X and XII of the Covenant, made it impossible for America to become a party to that iniquitous bargain.

Every venture that we make into the realm of diplomacy proves anew

that we are mere children in that art. The play upon our idealism is as easy as taking candy from children. It is the indoor sport of European statesmen. A trade with the United States is an easy diversion in which we are sure to come off in the rear. In the Spanish War, after having easily beaten the poor, weak, impoverished enemy with its antiquated navy, we paid $20,000,000 for the privilege of winning the war and of relieving Spain of a liability that had hung like a millstone around her neck and assumed the role of colonial development of subject peoples for which we are not fitted, which is foreign to our conceptions of free government and into which we have poured and will continue for generations to pour untold wealth.

In the World War the result is far worse. Here we have succeeded in sowing the seeds of future wars by our impotent, amateur diplomacy, whilst the Allies have bagged the spoils in power, territory and reparations. Our role has been that of the Lady Bountiful who after supplying manpower, armaments, and the billions of money that made victory possible, found ourselves at the end without indemnity for our sacrifices and without real participation or influence to make good our promises, based upon the assurances made by the Allies to us, in the carrying out of the terms of peace on which we induced the enemy to lay down their arms.

IV. "UNCLE SHYLOCK" AND THE ENTENTE CAMPAIGN FOR REDUCTION OR CANCELLATION OF DEBTS.

In the light of their consciousness of having grossly deceived the United States as to the causes and issues of the World War, by which deception we were brought in to aid the Allies, and in the light of their success in having defeated Mr. Wilson and ignored his "Fourteen Points," at Paris, it might have been supposed that the Entente statesmen would have been quite satisfied to let well enough alone and avoid any incentive for a re-examination of their claims to having saved the world from barbarism in 1914-1918. One would have thought that they would have been only too glad to pay up their indebtedness to this country one hundred cents on the dollar, in the light of the fact that the United States spent more than twice as much as it loaned to the Allies in financing our own military efforts in a conflict concerning which the Entente maliciously and wilfully misled us. It might have been expected that the Allies would have been so grateful to the United States for our indispensable aid in defeating the Central Powers and for our forbearance in allowing the Entente to grab the spoils of war in defiance of justice at Paris, that they would have done their best to meet with enthusiasm the relatively slight material obligations which they had incurred during the war.

Quite the opposite of the above has, however, actually taken

place. The Entente Powers have failed to recognize the value of our aid in finishing the War and giving them the victory. They have been unwilling, in different degrees, to recognize their financial obligations to the United States, though this charge applies with far less force to Great Britain than it does to the other Entente Powers. After we reduced the original indebtedness to an almost unbelievable degree and offered a generous time limit for payment, the French, for example, requested still further reductions, while many Frenchmen demanded complete cancellation of the French indebtedness to the United States. In spite of the fact that the French public debt was increased nearly four-fold from January, 1919 to January, 1926, chiefly as a result of the enormous expenditures for arming France and the Little Entente to the teeth, and in spite of great Italian expenditures for armaments under the Fascist régime, these countries had the audacity to base their claim for reduction or cancellation on the ground of actual incapacity to pay.

Astonishing as it might seem, the European cancellationists even secured support for their campaign in the United States. One misguided patriot, Mr. Frederick Peabody of Ashburnham, Massachusetts, went so far as to launch an organization devoted to the cause of cancellation and to distributing propaganda in behalf of cancellation. [1]

In order to forward this campaign for cancellation, the leaders organized a propaganda against the United States, which has been represented as an avaricious and grasping nation, bent upon its last pound of flesh. "Uncle Sam" has been rechristened "Uncle Shylock" and our really unbounded generosity to our former Allies has been represented as financial extortion, justified only by our possession of superior financial force. As a result of this campaign of anti-American sentiment, a most amazing situation has developed in Europe. We are more cordially disliked by our former Allies than by our former enemies. As an illustration, we may quote from an article contributed to the American press during the summer of 1926, not by a Bolshevik or an internationalist, but by Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt, a member of one of our oldest and most patriotic families:

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[1] Read, for example, his silly pamphlet, "A Square Deal to Our War Partners."

For the first time since the war, the eyes of Americans are seeing how Europeans really regard them. For the past few weeks newspapers have been filled with reports of American tourists being hissed and hooted in Paris and other European centres. The fall of the franc and the depreciation of other continental currency are charged directly to America. The famous American war slogan, "Lafayette, we are here" is long since forgotten. George Washington is sneered at, monuments commemorating the deeds of American troops are befouled and defaced, and an American citizen becomes the target for contumely.

I saw evidence of this on every hand in the past few weeks. The anti-American feeling in evidence in England, France and other countries was and is so strong that its intensity cannot be realized unless witnessed at first hand. One hears it said by apologists for France that the demonstrations in Paris are engineered by small groups and do not represent real French opinion. In other words, the French peasant and the man in the street are said to be still as profoundly grateful to the American doughboy as they were when he arrived so valiantly to save France and her allies from destruction.

Sneers for General Pershing.

And yet, here is an incident the writer witnessed on June 19, in Normandy. General Pershing paused briefly en route to Paris to pay his respects and breathe a silent prayer before a battle monument in a village square. Visualize the picture. Pershing, the great commander himself, the man who in 1917 was received with tears of joy as the savior of France—on this lovely June day standing with bowed head. A few yards away a peasant woman engaged in washing clothes at the trough in the village square. She looks up and sees the distinguished looking foreigner standing before the monument. It matters not that she fails to recognize the former commander of "Les Americains;" she only sees a foreigner, undoubtedly an American, and she sneers.

She left her washing and strolled over to a respectful distance behind the General. Then she spat contemptuously once, twice, three times, shrugged her shoulders, turned and, muttering imprecations, returned to her washing. This peasant woman expressed the attitude of the great majority of her compatriots toward America today. Pershing did not see the incident, but it was not lost on the members of his party.

The first re-action that an ex-service man gets in France is of chagrin that he had once been so willing and eager to brave death as a volunteer ally of France. One does not exactly feel angry; one feels a sense of futility. In Italy a high-ranking government official bluntly asked the writer what the American army ever did in France, anyway? These are only isolated cases, but they reflect public opinion.

Millions for Militarism

The proposed convention of the American Legion in Paris next year, in my opinion, will be a commercialized farce. In fact, it may have very serious consequences. There is grave doubt in my mind whether it should be held there. When thousands of ex-doughboys return to France expecting a

reception only slightly less warm than they received as members of the A. E. F., their doughboy perceptions are due for a severe jolt.

I do not feel that anything will be gained in helping Franco-American relations by holding the Legion convention in Paris. The French people are resentful of all reminders of American military prestige. Incidentally, there should be no more monuments erected in France to the prowess of American troops. France does not care to have it emphasized that anyone else fought the war, side by side, with the "poilu."

There is plenty of money in France. What becomes of it?

Tourists are spending millions. French fiscal reports deal with billions of francs. Where does the money go? The answer is: French politics.

The report of the Agent General of Reparations, issued on June 15, shows that Germany paid to France 461,730,000 gold marks, equivalent at that time to 4,054,870,000 francs. Of this amount France spent almost immediately 88 per cent on her military forces, their upkeep and care. The other 12 per cent she used "miscellaneously," what ever that means. As against this the United States received but 13,577,000 gold marks, equivalent then to about $2,500,000.

And though on the verge of bankruptcy the French Naval budget for 1926 was voted quietly the other day, and seemingly escaped notice, because it came at the same time that Caillaux, then Minister of Finance, was endeavoring to establish a virtual dictatorship and was proclaiming the necessity for retrenchment. Nevertheless, the French Chamber of Deputies lost no time in voting a project calling for immediate construction of one cruiser, three destroyers, four torpedo boats, one submarine chaser, one submarine, one mine-laying submarine, a mother ship for submarines, two colliers and oil carriers and a school ship, as well as for the rebuilding of an airplane carrier, and the modernization of four capital ships and two fast cruisers.

Political Graft

Tourist agencies filing their estimates of expenditures of Americans in France in 1925 state that a minimum of $320,000,000 and a maximum of $600,000,000 was left there last year, about 21,000,000,000 francs.

Yet shortly thereafter the French Cabinet stated that less than 60,000,000 francs remained in its Treasury, and that France could not collect, for the people were unable to pay taxes, not having been prosperous during the year.

A prominent diplomat told this writer that less than 30 per cent of taxes collectible in France ever reached her Treasury, and added that there was in France today more organized political graft than could ever be realized in any other country in the world. At the same time figures compiled by foreign commercial agencies show that but 2,000,000,000 out of 9,000,000,000 francs voted ever reach the Treasury.

While France was offering every adroit reason for not being able to pay her debt, Stephan Lausanne, editor of the Matin, one of Paris' great newspapers, made public on June 26 a number of official documents showing that in 1917 and 1918 the French Government issued debt certificates to the American Treasury the corresponding obligations being payable at sight or

at maturity, within a period of thirty years, with interest at 3½ to 5 per cent, from the date of issue.

"These obligations," said Lausanne, "are held by the American Treasury, which in virtue of the terms on which they were issued would have every right to exact here and now the payment of the greater part of them. The United States, however, has been lenient with France; and the United States is still lenient, regardless of the animosity which is shown toward America in continental Europe today."

Lenient to France

On June 25, had France desired it, she could have instituted a financial and political dictatorship which might have resulted in the stabilizing of her currency once and for all. For on that night many of her great men, Briand, then Premier; Foch and Guillaumat, of army fame; Caillaux and Berenger, the latter Ambassador to the United States and chief of the debt commission; Doumer, and even Cavrien, met secretly. Five days later the Chamber was to convene to listen to Briand's ministerial declaration regarding the policies of the new Cabinet. A vote was to be taken and were it not possible to whip all the delegates into line, it had been decided to secure the vote of confidence through force.

The French Chamber comprises 571 persons. To the right of the rostrum one finds the conservative parties; to the left the radical, Socialist and Third International. Had Leon Blum, chief of the Socialist group, and Cachin, his Communist lieutenant, been ignorant of the plans of the right wing they might have given the expected vote of "no confidence." If this had occurred it had been arranged to surround the Chamber of Deputies with troops.

Rule of Force

At a given signal a cavalry officer would have entered and ordered the room cleared. He was to say that he had received his orders from the Minister of War, and that if the Chamber were not cleared at once he would bring his troops in with drawn sabres to effect a "clearance."

It will be remembered that in 1803-04 Napoleon virtually accomplished the same thing, and in 1852 Napoleon III. emptied the Chamber by order of a captain of the guard within four minutes time, thereupon establishing himself as the self-appointed President and later Emperor of France. Though there was no thought of an empire the other day in Paris, there was a strong indication that this method might have been pursued in order to make Caillaux fiscal dictator as the means of re-establishing the credit of the nation.

But the Socialist wing, through its system of espionage, learned of the secret meeting and, it is said, gave an ultimatum of threatened revolution such as to cause the Briand element to think twice before attempting to force the military upon the people of France again.

Today France is the foremost military power on the Continent. Her huge standing army is maintained at enormous cost. She has to be reckoned with by every European nation in political and military alliances. One scheme close to the French heart is an economic agreement with Germany, a political one with Italy and a military one with Poland.

The state of affairs in France and the Continent today cannot but fail to impress the most ardent American advocates of the League of Nations or the World Court that the United States will do well to keep out of such a mess. France and her Allies got our men and our money once to fight their war. They try to intrigue us into the league to get our men and our money again to fight their future wars.

Every intelligent American must begin to realize now what thanks we get—nothing but jeers and hatred for the aid we so voluntarily and self-sacrificingly rendered to save them from annihilation.

Equally cogent upon this point is the following excerpt from a speech delivered by George Washington Ochs-Oakes, Editor of the New York *Times Current History Magazine*, before the New York Women's Overseas Service League on April 15, 1928:

What of dear old U. S. A.? It's a tale that fills us with pride. A plague upon the sour-faced critics with eternal grouches, who are continually snarling, bewailing, pointing with fear, backbiting, cavilling, scolding or vituperating their own country with hypercritical abuse. Over eleven years ago we went into the war and we saved the Allies from defeat and possible annihilation. We sent two millions of our men, women and girls to do the saving; tens of thousands gave their lives; more tens of thousands are blind or crippled or permanently invalided; more tens of thousands were suddenly dislocated from their vocations, and with the return of peace had to seek afresh new threads to weave out a livelihood. We sent them our ships, we sent them food, we saved them from disease, from starvation; we loaned them over ten thousand million dollars on their promise to pay, when their backs were to the wall, when their credit was exhausted and when their situation was so desperate that no banker would lend them another dollar; we asked no collateral, we asked no endorsement, we lent them the ten billion during the war and after the Armistice on their simple oral promise to pay it back with interest. And how did we find this colossal sum to lend them? Uncle Sam didn't have ten billion dollars in his vaults; he didn't have ten cents he could take out of his vaults to lend them. Not at all. He went to the American people and told them that the Allies were in dire straits; that they needed money for food, for munitions, and unless it was forthcoming, they were lost. And the American people took Uncle Sam at his word, they responded to his call and dug deep into their pockets. They emptied their old tin cans, unwrapped their stockings, and gave Uncle Sam the ten billions. And when he took it, he said to us: "I'll pay you 3½%, 4%, 4½% interest on all this money so long as I owe it, and I'll return it, 100%, to you in 25 years." We accepted this promise and the money poured forth in a golden torrent, and forthwith it was turned over to the Allies.

With that money and our soldiers and our ships and nurses, and our munitions, they beat the enemy, won the war, saved their independent existence as nations, and escaped the thralldom of slavery under a relentless conqueror.

Within the years since 1917, omitting the ten billion dollars, loaned the Governments, the people of America have poured billions additional into Europe for philanthropic purposes, an example of lavish benevolence of unparalleled magnitude. America, moreover, loaned to Europe for economic rehabilitation within that period over $3,500,000,000 and is now continuing these loans at the rate of fully $500,000,000 a year to restore the industrial and economic equilibrium of the Old World. In fact, it was America that saved them from pestilence, anarchy and starvation with her unexampled philanthropy; it was America that revived their drooping industry, gave to idle millions remunerative employment; in fact, American capital arched their desolate lands with the rainbow of hope, and restored the languishing energy of a despairing people. Yet for all our country did and gave, we asked not one penny of reparation, not one foot of territory.

And now, ten years thereafter, when pay day came, what do we find? Did the spirit of gratitude which fell with such eloquence from their spokesmen when the funds were delivered, again gush from lips trembling with emotions of profound and tender appreciation? Not by any means. Instead of blessings, we found beratings; instead of remembrance, we received revilings; instead of courtesy, we received curses; and our U. S. was lampooned as "Uncle Shylock"; our services in the war contemptuously belittled. And all this notwithstanding the fact that we settled with Italy at about 27 cents on the dollar, with France at 44 cents, and with England at about 82 cents on the dollar, giving them 62 years to pay a debt which Uncle Sam must redeem to his people in 25 years. Is it small wonder that after such experience some of us should not regret that we held aloof from the League of Nations, which indeed is a benign blessing for the peoples of Europe, and reserved complete independence in our proposed adhesion to the World Court?

But let me not be misunderstood. The League of Nations, which Woodrow Wilson created, and in defense of which he gave his life, is the beacon of hope to the countries of the Old World. It has justified itself in all respects as the stabilizing influence among the nations whose conflicting interests, jealousies, misunderstandings arising from the attrition of boundaries, national dislikes, territorial aspirations and colonial rivalries created continual perils to peace, and it is certainly our duty, which we have very fully performed in the past, and which I hope we will generously continue to perform in the future, to give it our wholehearted support and fullest co-operation.

To assist in their campaign, the cancellationists, in the summer of 1926, induced Georges Clemenceau, the war-time Premier of France, to address a letter to President Coolidge, which was partially an appeal and partially a threat, but which in no sense admitted the French indebtedness to America. We quote some of the more relevant passages from this letter:

If nations were but business houses, bankers' accounts would settle the fate of the world. . . . You know, as we do, that our Treasury is empty.

In such a case the debtor must sign promissory notes, and that is just what you are asking us to do . . . It is an open secret that in this affair there are only imaginary dates of payment, which will lead up to a loan with solid security in the shape of our territorial possessions, as was the case for Turkey. Such a thing, Mr. President, I am bound to tell you, we shall never accept.

France is not for sale, even to her friends. Independent she came to us; independent we shall leave her. Ask yourself whether, according to President Monroe, you would feel otherwise about the American continent . . .

Wherein have we failed to fulfill all the demands of duty? Ought we to have surrendered our fortresses to Germany when she demanded them from us under penalty of a declaration of war? . . . Does Verdun prove we have fought badly?

Yes, we have thrown everything into the abyss—blood and money—as England and the United States did on their side, but it was France's territory that was devastated scientifically. For three deadly years we waited this declaration from America, "France is the frontier of liberty"—three years of blood and money oozing from every pore.

Come to our villages and read the endless list of their dead and make comparisons, if you will. Was this not a "bank account," the loss of this vital force of youth?

As Russia did at Brest-Litovsk, America has made a separate peace with Germany without even the slightest suggestion of an adjustment with her comrades in arms.

That was the blood truce with the common enemy. To-day a money peace between the Allied and Associated Powers is being devised.

How is it we failed to foresee what is now happening? Why did we not halt under the shells and convoke a board meeting of profiteers to decide the question whether it would allow us to continue in defense of the finest conquest in the finest histories? Must the myth of German reparations lead up to American cash collections?

President Coolidge did not reply officially to Clemenceau's blast, but Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, sent M. Clemenceau a resounding and statesmanlike answer, the most cogent paragraphs from which we reproduce:

The statement that we are trying to undermine the independence of France, or that somebody wants to buy France, approaches the absurd. If they want to cancel their debts let them include all debts and all reparations and show that the benefit of the cancellations will go to humanity and to betterment of the masses of Europe and not to the benefit of the imperialistic schemes which are now crushing the life out of people who are in no way responsible for this war. This constant charge of injustice and usury on the part of the United States is simply not only unfounded in fact, but dishonest in purpose. . . .

We have been charged with being rapacious and usurious, but when the history of the world war is written the generosity of the United States will have no parallel in the history of the world. . . .

While no one desires to diminish the heroic efforts of the allies prior to our entrance, the fact remains that without the American boy the nations now criticising us so severely would be the defeated rather than the victor nations."

Gradually, American business men are awakening to the facts in a realistic fashion. We quote below from the *Business Conditions Weekly* of the Alexander Hamilton Institute of New York City for December 25, 1926, an organ of great financial interests. This article not only speaks for this organization, but also quotes a relevant communication from the Editor of the Wall Street *Journal*:

Nobody of intelligence and intellectual honesty believes that America really had a common cause with any of the Allies. Mr. C. W. Barron has discussed this fallacy and a number of others very interestingly as follows:

"We were not responsible for European diplomacy, European alliances, European trade rivalries, or European ambitions. We were not responsible for the invasion of Belgium, or the treaty between France and Russia.

"If we had kept out of the war, there is no power in the world that could have assessed and collected against the United States any expense of the European War.

"To picture Germany with a conquered and a hostile Europe on her hands attacking the United States to collect the cost of the war is the wildest dream. If Western Europe was fighting a battle for the United States of America, it was emphatically fighting a battle in defense of Spain and Portugal and all South America.

"Is Spain to be assessed for defense because she did not come into the war? Is the United States to be assessed because she was forced into the war? Should the assessment date from the invasion of Belgium, the German declaration of war, or the date of our declaration of war, or the date of our military entry upon European soil?

"The debt cancellation debaters are entering highly dangerous ground. They do not see the result to flow from their logic. They are justifying the politicians of Belgium who declare that as Belgium fought in the defense of the United States, the rich United States should pay all the damage in Belgium, all her war debt, and all the Belgian war pensions. If these debaters are right, the United States is in slavery to Belgium and her allies to support Western Europe forever."

By all odds the most comprehensive and devastating criticism of the cancellationist propaganda which has thus far appeared was contained in an article by the distinguished American historian and political scientist, Charles Austin Beard, published in the *American*

Mercury for July, 1927. This absolutely riddles the whole contention that the Entente saved the United States from becoming a vassal of the Hun and that the Entente should have its debts forgiven because they have no money with which to make payment:

Finally there are the defenders of grace, remission, absolution and oblivion, at home and abroad, who rest their case on the mythology of the Red, Green, Orange, Yellow, and other rainbow books issued by the Entente belligerents, containing as we know now falsified and garbled dispatches, for the purpose of gulling gudgeons. According to this argument, which may spring from abstract ethics or the emotions above catalogued, the Germans were solely responsible for starting the war and the Entente Allies were really defending the United States from the beginning. Mr. Wilson's government, instead of springing heroically to the defence of American rights in August, 1914, delayed nearly three years, causing great damage, suffering, and distress to the defendants in this debt case; and therefore, Q.E.D., any part of the bill paid by the United States would fall far short of justice. In other words, runs this plea, the debts should be cancelled in full and with a contrite heart.

If the major premise of this contention be granted, the conclusion is inexorable; but the major premise is now shot so full of holes by horny-handed historical scholarship that it looks more like a scarecrow than a Greek statue. Can anyone read the writings of Gooch, Fay, Fabre-Luce, and a host of American, French, and English scholars, to say nothing of Mr. Barnes' powerful book (in spite of its argumentative tone), and then stand up in court and declare on oath that the Entente war mythology deserves the credence of intelligent men and women? The advocate of debt cancellation, foreign and domestic, might as well learn once for all that the American people are not all boobs in matters of European history; that in magazines, newspapers, scholastic journals, class-rooms, shops, railway trains, and fields the question of war responsibility is being debated with understanding and zeal; that while some lean one way and some another, no one can revive the stinking corpse of War Propaganda; that nobody who has read the new diplomatic materials believes that England, France and Russia were innocent in the long preparations which led up to this war or in the negotiations which precipitated it; that the names of the parties who grabbed the spoils at the council table at Versailles are well known; that to ask the United States to pay one penny more on the score of sacrificial obligation is nothing short of laughable.

Now that the War for Democracy is over, the situation is not essentially changed. More money is spent for munitions in Europe today than in 1914. For every one of the old hatreds another has appeared. Gentlemen of the same old mental and moral outlook govern the powers of the Old World. Another storm is brewing—and without respectful reference to the sensibilities of American Pilgrims and Poignants. Nobody pretends that the United States will benefit from the next calamity any more than it did from the last, and it is highly probable that, given the same dangers to the balance of power, America will be drawn into the new bloody shambles as into the latest adventure in madness.

Such being the circumstances for the consideration of the indebtedness of our late Associates, why should the people of this country pay one penny more on a war which they did not start, and from which they took no imperial loot? Why should they pay the German reparations? Why should they transfer money from their pockets to the treasuries of European governments for disbursement in the next excursion in lunacy? If it is true that the debts cannot be paid, then let the nations which default stand honorably confessed of decent repudiation. If Italy can borrow money through Morgan's house, pay 7% on it, and spend cash for imperial undertakings headed in the direction of another war, then why under Heaven should Italy appear at the back door of the United States as a beggar asking for and receiving from the pliant administration in Washington a reduction of what she owes from $2,150,150,000 to $528,192,000? Just why the taxpayers of America should relieve the cheering Black Shirts of the New Rome passes the understanding of denizens of the fresh water districts.

In addition to the generosity of the United States with respect to reducing the debts of the European states, there should be mentioned the fact that we have never started action to collect the half billion dollars or more which England and France owe us as damages due us for the violation of our neutral rights at sea between 1914 and 1917. Our right to such damages is infinitely clearer and more definite than our claims in connection with the Alabama award after the Civil War. The State Department has not made a move to collect these damages, in spite of solemn promises to American shippers that it would do so at the close of the War. A suggestion a year or so ago by Senator Borah that these claims be collected almost started a panic in Great Britain and aroused a storm of protest. Yet, there is in every way more ground for collecting this bill than for levying reparations against Germany for having launched the World War.

V. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT?

We have set forth rather thoroughly a realistic picture of the European attitude towards the United States and of the campaign to escape the European obligations to this country, in spite of the indispensable services which this country rendered to the Entente. A real understanding of these facts is desirable to constitute a corrective to the war-time sentimentality and to the slush which Mr. Peabody and his ilk are distributing for the consumption of simple-minded Americans. Yet, we do not in any sense desire to arouse American

hatred against our European neighbors, however ungrateful a lot of them may seem just now. It is highly desirable to escape from a childish naiveté in regard to our European neighbors, but it is also equally essential to remember that we must continue to live with them, and must do all we can to promote a spirit of coöperation and good-will. At the same time, it is well to let our European neighbors know full well that any American concessions are the product of our desire to forward world peace, and are not made because we believe that Europe is morally or materially entitled to any further generosity from our country.

As the whole European international policy is still based upon the assumption of unique German responsibility for the war, it is evident that the facts require the repudiation of this program and the adoption of a more fair and constructive policy. The Dawes Plan, and any current American and European agreements as to its enforcement, while immensely better than the Poincaré policy, are comparable to efforts to reduce the living expenses of the wife of a man, known by all to be innocent, whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment. What we need to do is to adopt a broad, constructive and far-sighted policy. The guilt for the World War having been distributed, the expense of indemnifying the sufferers should likewise be distributed. The United States might well use its financial power to compel France and England (the latter would probably gladly welcome the proposal) to forego all notion of any reparations from Germany, and to adopt the program of a mutual sharing of the burdens of reconstruction and rehabilitation. The United States could with great propriety indicate its good will and intentions in the circumstances by cancelling the debts of the European powers on the above conditions. Once England and France gave some such evidence of international honesty and decency one of the chief obstacles and objections would be removed to our joining the League of Nations. We may agree with Fabre-Luce that, though the wartime slogan that America and the Entente entered into the war solely for the purpose of ending all war was at the time pure hypocrisy, yet we shall have lost both the war and the peace if we do not now take steps to make this constructive slogan an achieved reality.

The beginning of any such move must be found in an apprehension of the facts concerning the origins of the World War.

Up to the present any discussion of the desirability of linking up settlement of debts with a revision of the Treaty of Versailles and the solution of German reparations, in the hope of building a sound and pacific world-order, has seemed purely idealistic and utopian. It is not such, by any means. In the *New Republic* for December 7, 1927, Mr. S. O. Levinson, a leading American attorney and the chief sponsor of the program to outlaw war, submits a wholly practicable scheme, which involves a financial program infinitely less exacting than that which the United States undertook in 1917-18 to help bring Europe into indescribable chaos. The question, of course, is as to whether the nations of the world are willing to pay for peace any significant fraction of what they have enthusiastically squandered for war. Mr. Levinson's plan is of such vast import that we reproduce it in full herewith:

A FINANCIAL PATH TO PEACE

This is an attempt to suggest a comprehensive plan of readjustment for the vexing questions of German reparations, Allied and inter-Allied government debts, European appeasement and peace.

Many excellent suggestions of readjustment have been made, but, so far as the writer knows, they deal respectively with only one phase of the European situation. Sometimes it is with the settlement and disposition of German reparations; sometimes with the resettlement or cancellation of the Allied debts owing the United States; sometimes the emphasis is put upon the necessity for revising the Treaty of Versailles; and, of course, many plans deal purely with the question of world peace. *The central idea of this proposal is to consider all of these acute questions and problems together;* in other words, to handle them as is done, generally speaking, in the case of a reorganization of a distressed railroad or industrial corporation. In reorganizations, *all* interests are considered in one complete scheme of rehabilitation and adjustment. The analogy may not be complete, but it is sufficiently so for the purpose. When every nation sees what all other nations are to receive, how it is to be treated, and what the general result will be, criticism and distrust are disarmed, and general confidence and harmony are attainable. This is the "open diplomacy" of reorganizations.

Settlements have been made by our governments with practically all our European debtors except France, which has not ratified the agreement. This article does not discuss the wisdom of these settlements, but takes them as facts in the economic problem. However, it may not be amiss to say that the writer never has been in sympathy with the view that the Great War was originally our war, that we were military partners with the Allies

throughout, and that our loans to them during and after the War were mere contributions to a common cause. Nor has the writer ever considered the effort to fix the "capacity to pay" of a nation over a period of sixty-two years anything short of a wild guess. But the settlements are closed incidents, and we start from them as a base. Suffice it to say that the United States has been liberal in these adjustments, although we have apparently received little or no credit for generosity or even leniency.

In 1917 we entered the World War, not only in good faith but enthusiastically, "to end war," that is, to establish durable world peace. While we materially aided in victory for the Allied cause, the vision of world peace is still distant.

The purposes of the proposed plan may be summarized as follows:

1. To get a reasonable compromise in cash of the United States of the "present worth" of the debt settlements, which will furnish immediate and substantial relief to our taxpayers who are bearing the whole brunt of the American cost of the War.

2. To have the German reparations fixed at a definite amount and paid, the amount to be financed by a world consortium of bankers in coöperation with the governments involved, so that Germany may pay adequate reparations and also be able to work out the economic salvation of her people.

3. To use the proceeds of the financed fixation of German reparations to pay all the sums needed under the proposed plan to bring about the settlement and discharge of all the Allied and inter-Allied government debts; for stabilization of currencies; for equitable adjustments with those European nations having specific claims to German reparations, and for the necessary cost of the loan.

4. The nations involved to sign a treaty of peace, open to all other civilized nations, wherein there will be substituted for the sixty-two years of debt instalment payments by our European debtors a sixty-two year experiment in world peace, by the renunciation for that period of the use of war for the settlement of international disputes. In other words, to get also from this adjustment the ideal for which we fought in the War—the ending of war by international agreement.

5. To make such modifications of the Treaty of Versailles as are compatible with the terms and purposes of this proposal.

The position taken by President Wilson, that the question of Allied debts should not be considered in conjunction with German reparations, was sound. This view was approved and adopted by the Harding and Coolidge administrations. At the time this subject was originally broached, it meant two things—first, the making of all payments by the Allies to the United States conditional on the payment to them of reparations by Germany; and, secondly, and more important, the United States was asked to take, in payment of the Allied debts, German "C" bonds, third mortgage bonds, all subordinated to the bonds to be given the Allies. This would have put the United States in the position of military collector of reparations from Germany, in order to protect our third mortgage bonds, as we would have released the Allies. The proposal herein contained is free from these objections. In fact, the plan provides a complete settlement, wherein the

United States would be paid a fair "present worth" compromise of the debt settlements in cash, the reparations would be adjusted and discharged, and the whole network of Allied and inter-Allied indebtedness would be disentangled and ended.

The principal of the Allied debts owing the United States was about ten billion dollars, which, with accumulated interest, amounted to about twelve billion dollars. By the lenient settlements made by our debt-funding commission and approved by Congress (including the unratified French settlement), between six and seven billion dollars were, in effect, cancelled, through the omission and reduction of interest over the period of sixty-two years. The "present worth" of the debts owing the United States under the settlements (that is, the present cash value an expert accountant would give them, assuming that all the instalments will be paid for the sixty-two years), is, roughly, five billion dollars. The cancellation of six to seven billion dollars, plus the "present worth" of about five billion dollars, epitomizes the present Allied debt situation so far as the United States is concerned. Of course, it requires considerable optimism to believe that all these countries will continue to pay their instalments to us over the sixty-two-year period.

Even if the nations actually and punctually pay all their installments, the present generation of our taxpayers will get an almost negligible benefit. For, under these settlements, the instalment payments, and most of the interest rates, do not begin to be substantial until about twenty-five years from now. But it has been computed that, at the present rate of progress, our own eighteen billion dollars of government debt will all be paid off within twenty-five years. Therefore, the next generation, that will get the benefit of the increased instalment payments and interest rates, will be a generation that nationally is practically free from debt. In other words, American taxpayers will get relief when they do not need relief. There is no good reason why the present generation should stand *all* the burden of our participation in the War. The proposed plan offers immediate and partial relief to present taxpayers, and, even so, will accelerate by many years the day when our national war debt will be entirely paid off.

In addition to the debt settlements, the United States has a claim of two hundred and fifty million dollars, arising out of our contribution to the Army of Occupation immediately following the Armistice. We were to have a first lien for these advances, but, for some reason or other, we have not been paid, so far as the writer knows, anything either on principal or interest. As the other governments contributing to the Army of Occupation have been paid, it seems reasonable to propose that this expense of the United States, which was incurred for the benefit of the Allies, and after the War, should be repaid.

While, as above stated, the United States happily kept itself free from participation in or collection of German reparations, nevertheless, in any "reorganization" of Europe, we must all agree that the center and crux are the German reparations. This is obviously true so far as any financial adjustment is concerned, and it is almost equally true with regard to European appeasement and peace. Accordingly, this plan proposes that the German reparations be fixed at the amount of six billion dollars, and that this amount be financed and paid in cash in a lump sum. This would

supersede the present method of instalment payments by Germany without knowledge or fixation of the total amount of reparations, and, as the annual payments under the Dawes Plan are rapidly increasing, would obviate the danger of default and consequent serious complications. The effect of the cash settlement of the reparations would be to terminate the quasi-receivership now afflicting Germany, and she would owe six billion dollars under a well secured loan, handled by a world banking consortium working in concert with the governments involved, on a sound and economic basis. As the loan would be a first mortgage on all the national assets and revenues of Germany, the interest rate should be, say, 5½ percent, per annum, with a sinking fund of an additional 1½ percent per annum, or at a total annual cost of 7 percent. This sinking fund of 1½ percent, kept alive, would, as banking tables show, automatically pay off the entire principal of the loan in about twenty-eight years.

Such a loan would, as stated, have to be undertaken by an international banking group in coöperation with the governments involved. Our American bankers would, doubtless, be willing to underwrite and distribute a proper and proportionate share of the loan. The financial task would, of course, be colossal, but far from impossible, with the momentum of public approval and consequent investment. It would, indeed, be a reassuring revelation if a loan of such magnitude, easily possible in war-time, when loans are necessarily precarious, could be negotiated in peace-time, for constructive purposes, when the safety of the loan is beyond question.

Under the proposed plan, the United States government would receive in cash, out of the proceeds of the new German loan, four billion two hundred and fifty million dollars. The four billion dollars represent the "present worth" cash compromise of the Allied debt settlements. Otherwise stated, we would accept in compromise of the five billion dollars, which is the estimated "present worth" of the debt settlements, 80 percent thereof in immediate cash—a discount of 20 percent. The two hundrd and fifty million dollars would be repayment of the principal of our contribution to the Army of Occupation. The four billion dollars of cash could be used immediately in reduction of our own national debt, and, by the time of its consummation, would probably mean a reduction of 25 percent thereof. This large reduction in our national debt, quite independently of surpluses, would justify an immediate and substantial reduction in our federal taxes. The two hundred and fifty million dollars could be utilized, if so desired, by Congress, in whole or in part, as an appropriation for farm relief under satisfactory legislation.

The plan also provides that there be a general cleaning up and discharge of the Allied and inter-Allied war debt all around. The United States is the only clear creditor, we having paid our way as we went along in the War. Great Britain is a creditor as to her other Allies, but is a debtor to the United States in the sum of about four and a half billion dollars. As a part of this proposal, Great Britain would be called upon to cancel the debts owing to her by her Allies—about seven billion dollars. In turn, she would receive a release from the United States as to her own debts. This, in effect, Great Britain has heretofore offered to do.

Under this proposal, there would be no need of continued friction or even conference about the French debt settlement. All the debts would be

settled and discharged, including France's. Disregarding the effect of the settlements, France owes us over four billion dollars, including four hundred million dollars for materials purchased after the War, and she owes nearly three billion dollars to Great Britain; Italy owes us over two billion dollars, and a similar amount to Great Britain; Belgium owes us four hundred and twenty millions; Rumania, forty-five millions; Czechoslovakia, one hundred and fifteen millions; Latvia, six millions; Finland, nine millions; Poland, one hundred and seventy-eight millions; Greece, about twenty millions; Esthonia, fourteen millions; and Lithuania, six millions. And these latter countries also owe similarly large amounts to Great Britain. Thus most of the countries in Europe would have a direct financial stake in this general adjustment.[1]

The two hundred million dollars borrowed by Germany to inaugurate the Dawes Plan should be paid off out of the six billion dollars, so that the new loan would be an absolute first mortgage on all of Germany's national property. This would leave a balance of five billion eight hundred million dollars. The payment to the United States of four billion two hundred and fifty million dollars would leave a balance of one billion five hundred and fifty million dollars. This balance would be available, as far as needed, for stabilization of currencies, for equitable adjustments with those European nations having specific claims to German reparations, and for the necessary cost of the loan. The unused portion, if any, of the one billion five hundred and fifty million dollars to be applied in reduction of the loan.

As a part of the general appeasement, the European nations involved, as well as the United States, are to sign a general treaty in which the use of war for the settlement of international disputes would be renounced for the next sixty-two years, as an international experiment in world peace. The other civilized nations to be invited to join in this treaty, so that for the period of sixty-two years the institution of war as a method of settling the disputes of the nations may be outlawed, and a judicial system set up in place of the destructive war system which has brought Europe to its present plight. Thus the European nations, instead of enduring sixty-two years of "financial servitude," would enjoy sixty-two years of voluntary peace, during which time their economic rehabilitation could be effected and made secure. If, toward the end of the sixty-two-year period, the experiment in peace proves distasteful to the civilized nations, and they hunger for military power, they could revive the war system by refusing to extend the term of the peace treaty beyond the sixty-two years.

Such a treaty would make possible and desirable the provision of this plan, which calls for a world conference on the reduction of armaments, both on land and sea, to signalize the general renunciation of war. For so long as the institution of war is retained by the nations as their lawful and paramount "court of last resort," all hopes of disarmament are doomed to disappointment. But, with war renounced for sixty-two years, all obstacles to drastic disarmament would be removed, and the economic convalescence

[1] For obvious reasons, the writer has left out all consideration of the Russian debts. Personally, he would like to see them incorporated, if it can be done without friction and, therefore, without endangering the proposal.

and rehabilitation of the countries of Europe would ensue by leaps and bounds.

It is obvious that, in order to carry out the foregoing plan, changes would have to be made in the Treaty of Versailles in accordance therewith, and such other changes as may be agreed upon, in harmony with the spirit and compact of the nations to live together in amity and peace and to devote themselves to the progress and welfare of their respective peoples.

This proposal is not submitted as a finality nor as having the magic of an Aladdin's lamp. The writer will be both surprised and disappointed if many important and beneficent suggestions and amendments are not forthcoming; and he will be abundantly repaid if this proposal stimulates or aids, in any way, a better plan of European adjustment and peace.

The following is a summary of this plan:

SUMMARY

World Loan to Germany		$6,000,000,000
Interest rate 5½ percent per annum		
Sinking fund 1½ percent per annum		
(Sinking fund, kept alive, will pay off entire principal in twenty-eight years.)		
Pay off lien of Dawes Plan reparation loan		200,000,000
		$5,800,000,000
Pay U. S. in compromise and discharge of all war debts owing to her	$4,000,000,000	
Pay U. S. in repayment of cost of American Army of Occupation 1919 and 1920	250,000,000	
		$4,250,000,000
Balance		$1,550,000,000

This balance of $1,550,000,000 to be used for stabilization of currencies, for equitable adjustments with European nations having specific claims to German reparations, and for the necessary cost of the loan. The unused balance, if any, to be applied in reduction of the loan.

Great Britain to cancel all debts owing to her by her allies, amounting to about seven billion dollars, so that all Allied and inter-Allied government debts will be wiped out.

The nations to sign a general treaty renouncing war as a method of settling their disputes for the next sixty-two years, and agreeing to set up a judicial system to supplant the outworn and destructive war system, as an epoch-making experiment in world peace.

Drastic limitation of armaments, both land and sea, through a conference of all nations based on the sixty-two-year treaty outlawing war.

Treaty of Versailles to be modified in accordance with the needs and spirit of the foregoing proposal.

Mr. Levison's plan will doubtless be criticized by many on the ground that it is too favorable to Germany, but it is actually even

extremely generous to the Entente. There is no logical or moral ground why the Entente should escape one cent of its debts to the United States or why Germany should pay one cent of reparations beyond that necessary for the reconstruction of Belgium, which she has long since paid in full and has never attempted to evade.

The success of any plan for international justice and decency depends, of course, upon the appearance of a changed spirit, and this transformed attitude can only be hoped for when the leaders and citizens of all countries begin to recognize the actual facts concerning the history of Europe from 1870 to 1928. As evidence of such a transformation we may close this section of the book with quotations from a great British scholar and protagonist of peace and from the outstanding American statesman in international relations.

In the London *Daily Mirror* for January 12, 1928, Professor C. Raymond Beazley makes the following plea for British leadership in forwarding world peace:

> Should Britain turn her back on the Continent? Until the sixteenth and even until the mid-eighteenth century (when dazzled by the glamour of colonial development in Chatham's age) most of our leaders would surely not have sanctioned such desertion?
>
> When the spirit of splendid isolation was strongest, in Gladstonian days, after the disappointments of the Crimean adventure, Europeanism, Continentalism, still had a powerful hold upon our people.
>
> In the time of the new Imperialism, in the age of expansion by Rhodes, we heard on every hand of Colonialism, the self-sufficing Empire, and all-British Zollverein.
>
> But even by January, 1898, the policy of Continental alliance was once more reviving. Almost instantly it became a touchstone of Imperialist thought and effort. It produced ably-conducted and zealous attempts—more than once renewed—to cement an Anglo-German alliance or understanding.
>
> When foiled in this direction by the unwisdom of Potsdam and the Wilhelmstrasse, it finally brought about the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian ententes, between 1901 and 1908.
>
> That entente policy we have pursued, very faithfully, pretty exclusively, sometimes even with passionate ardour, for many years.
>
> For more than a quarter of a century it has really dominated our international outlook, our world relations. It was declared to be vital to our safety and to the balance of European power.
>
> But of late it has been widely felt among us that, if patriotism is not enough, then certainly these balance of power policies, however natural at one time, are not enough either. Locarno was a result of this feeling.

We retain the warmest feelings towards France, but perhaps we begin to realise once more that there are other interests which belong to civilisation and to progress.

Certain exaggerations, misconceptions and injustices of the peace treaties of 1919 still exist.

Is it not necessary, for her own sake and for the sake of Europe as a whole, that Britain should do her best to right these wrongs and to help towards a better world?

Why should we not, for once, play the part of reconcilers, bridge-builders, physicians, Samaritans of charity, in this torn and bleeding and distracted Europe?

Why not try a generous and informed internationalism—friendly to all, courteous to all, in close relations with all, in binding and exclusive political entanglements with none?

Did not Britain happily and prosperously depart from the tradition of watchful jealously and pursue wise and useful friendship with the chief Continental Powers between 1866 and 1890?

No Peace, cried the generous heart of Napoleon III. No Peace, *save in the satisfied wishes of the Nations.* Justice is the fixed and constant purpose of giving to everyone his due.

Did Versailles and the other settlements of 1919 satisfy this ideal? Are we not rather aghast, now, at the mutilated face of this justice?

There was one Alsace-Lorraine before 1914; there are now several. One Polish question then—now another. A ramshackle but vacuum-filling, lightning-conducting dual monarchy in the Danube world, and now a Balkanised Danubia.

We have helped to Balkanise a great part of Europe. And Balkanisation is not love, joy and peace, long-suffering, meekness and temperance.

Some of our former anxieties have disappeared, to be succeeded by fresh ones. Is Britain absolutely happy, prosperous and secure at home, now that we have lived through the *war that was to end war?*

And on what kind of world does Britain now look? Is it peace?

Yet we need peace, not a sword. Another war in the heart of civilisation, with all the newly-added blessing of destructive science, and where should we be?

Why should not the mission of our statesmanship be to mediate, to establish, to strengthen, and to settle? We must try to reconcile French and German, German and Slav, Magyar and Slav, Russian and Pole.

Locarno showed the beginnings of such a tendency. All honour to Locarno. But the scars of bitterness have not been healed, the cancers of Europe have hardly been touched. No peace, except in the reasonable satisfaction of the Nations. No peace except in reconciliation.

On December 24, 1926, Senator Borah sent the following Christmas Message to the German people, a first step, we may hope, in the

process of compensation for their betrayal in the Treaty of Versailles:

News reaches us in America that Germany is coming back in splendid fashion. Germany has had able leaders, and her people have displayed great patience, initiative and courage, the results of which are now being gathered. I sincerely hope that her growth and development will continue unabated, and I believe that to be the wish of the American people.

I am not unaware, of course, of the great burden which she still has to carry and of the obstacles which she must overcome. But the achievements of the past give assurances for the future.

The most conspicuous moral obliquity in the Versailles treaty is that which fastens upon Germany alone responsibility for the World War. Few believed it at the time it was written into the treaty, and fewer still believe it now. I hope the time is not far distant when this signally unjust charge will be reversed and rejected once and for all.

Bibliographic Suggestions.

The most relevant and important books on the subject-matter of this chapter are Alcide Ebray's *A Frenchman Looks at Peace;* Frederick Bausman's *Facing Europe;* Herbert Fisher's *Alias Uncle Shylock;* John Bakeless' *Origins of the Next War;* H. K. Norton's *Back of War;* Charles Clayton Morrison's *The Outlawry of War;* Herman Stegeman's *The Mirage of Versailles;* and Alfred Fabre-Luce's *Locarno: a Dispassionate View.*

PART II

The Struggle For Truth in Regard to War Guilt

WHAT WE STARTED WITH

I. INTRODUCTORY

HAVING now presented the essential facts in regard to the causes of the World War and the bearing of these facts upon contemporary international relations, we shall, in the second part of this book, present the leading controversies in which the writer has engaged with exponents of the "bitter-ender" and "straw-clutching" positions. This will have a double value: (1) it will make available a record of the progress of controversy and discussion in this field from the time when Revisionism was scarcely thought of to the day when the "bitter-enders," upholding the war-time views, are either entirely silenced or make themselves incredibly ridiculous when they emerge from cover; (2) it will afford the reader the opportunity to learn the utmost which can be advanced against the Revisionist point of view and to discern how easily the arguments of the opposition can be met and shattered.

In the same way that the first part of the book is devoted to an historical review of the responsibility for the World War, the second part is primarily an historical summary of the controversy over the facts of war responsibility and a sketch of the campaign of education designed to give the interested public some indication of the actual state of fact and opinion in this vitally important arena of discussion.

The logical point of departure for a survey of the progress which has been made in the controversy over responsibility for the World War is an investigation of the state of historical opinion during and at the close of the World War. It is only by comprehending clearly how the leading historians in this country regarded the problem of war guilt before the publication of the documentary materials and the monographic writings which followed that we can understand the enormous advance which has already been made beyond the hysteria of a decade ago.

For the purpose of orientation with respect to the background of the development of reliable scholarship in the problem of war responsibility we have at our disposal an extraordinary article by Mr. C. Hartley Grattan, author of the famous exposure of the Walter Hines Page Myth, in the *American Mercury* for September, 1925. In the *American Mercury for August*, 1927, Mr. Grattan published an article entitled: "The Historians Cut Loose." It is a painstaking and brilliantly written revelation of the manner in which the great majority of the American historians capitulated to Entente, especially British, propaganda between 1914 and 1918. This article we forthwith reproduce in full to give readers of the book a decisive impression of the state of opinion among historians when Revisionism was first launched by Professor Fay in the summer of 1920.

II. THE HISTORIANS CUT LOOSE [1]

By C. Hartley Grattan

The memorable event of June 28, 1914, put a heavy strain upon the academic historians of this great Republic. For a century before that fatal day, following their German tutors, they had been poring over professional manuals which exhorted every disciple of Clio to purge himself of all the passions of his race and time, and to lift himself to a lofty objectivity in dealing with all human records. Dire warnings were sounded against every variety of bias and prejudice, racial, national, or partisan. Elaborate guide-books on methodology, from the ponderous Bernheim to the thin but cogent epitome of H. B. George, were provided to safeguard the beginning professors from the awful abyss of special pleading. Precise and formidable laws of historical evidence were drawn up, and emphasis was laid upon the indispensability of adequate, impartial, and credible evidence. Particularly it was specified that the historian must reserve his judgment on every moot point until all of the relevant documentary material was available.

Of all the perilous forms of potential seduction for him, war was pictured in every erudite *Grundriss der historischen Methode* as the most deadly. Mars was represented as the one wooer to whom Clio could offer no effective resistance, once he had got her by the neck. Graduate students were made to see with horror just how the Father of History had distorted his account of the Persian Wars, how Livy had erred in representing the gods as ever solicitous for the Roman arms, how Villehardouin and Joinville had misrepresented the Infidel, how Froissart had exaggerated the prowess of the English, how Clarendon had elevated the Royalists and debased the Roundheads, how Napier had flattered Wellington, and how Sybel had erected a colossal and highly dubious Bismarckian epic. A considerable group of progressive American historians, led by Robinson, Shotwell, Beard,

[1] From the *American Mercury*, August, 1927.

Becker and Dodd, were going further: they were recommending eloquently that less space be given to wars in the history books, and more to the achievements of peace through industry, science and art.

Next to war, and closely associated with it in its ravages upon historical objectivity, was placed racial and national bias. Droysen and Raynouard, Sybel and Martin, Kipling and Henry Cabot Lodge were exhibited as horrible examples of what must be avoided by the aspiring practitioner. The Aryan Myth was scornfully laid at rest, and there was general agreement that patriotism was the most vulgar malady to which a learned man could be subject. There was, in those days, great respect in American academic halls for the heavy and minute German variety of historical scholarship, with its penchant for a multitude of footnotes and voluminous bibliographies. A majority of the more venerable American historians, indeed, had been trained in Germany, and the subsequent generations had been instructed mainly in the schools of history established in this country by those two indefatigable Germanists, Herbert Baxter Adams and John William Burgess. Not even Harvard, Chicago and Cornell were without the taint of Teutonic erudition in their historical faculties.

The etiquette prevailing among American historians was no less exquisite than their professional ideals. Sober decorum and immaculate taste pervaded the historical circle and were always on display at the annual pow-wows of the American Historical Association. Here, in fact, there prevailed a gravity not surpassed at a national meeting of the W. C. T. U. or the Gideon Society. Not a ribald snort had disturbed the unruffled calm of this God-fearing aggregation for a generation. There was an unwritten law that no historian still living should be subjected to discussion, and contemporary events were scarcely admitted to be historical. The distinguished professor of modern European history at Columbia, who always wound up his course sharply with midnight of December 31, 1869, was by no means unique. Frank and plain talk between members of the association was unthinkable. A Rotary Club session was a congress of hyenas compared to its business meetings and sectional dinners.

Once a few timid observations of a mildly insurgent group in the association, such as would have been regarded as almost encomiums among business partners, precipitated a session filled with blank amazement and smothered indignation. Voices choked and tears flowed before an emotional discharge compounded of astonishment and an outraged sense of decency. Had Brother Latané then launched against the Brahmin clique such an anathema as that hurled against the Teuton two years later by Brothers Thayer and Hazen, the assembled professors would have committed harikari unanimously in sheer professional shame.

From the seminars and libraries of these placid pedants there flowed a steady stream of doctoral dissertations upon the strategy of Alcibiades, the statecraft of Louis the Fat, the historiography of Lambert of Hersfeld, the regimen of Gregory VII, the statesmanship of Oxenstiern, and the diplomacy of Wolsey. Others, equally earnest and full of piety, labored mightily upon editions of Parliamentary debates or the dispatches of Kaunitz. That Colonel House was even then as important a figure for historians as Sir John Finch would have been conceded by none; that the historian should

take an active part in practical political life was deemed scandalous and professionally suicidal. Indeed, the earlier American historians, such as Motley, Bancroft and Andrew D. White, who had been distinguished in public affairs, were looked down upon with scorn. The classic description of Mr. Coolidge by Frank R. Kent: "To the end of the row, sincere, sound, solemn and ineffectual," admirably describes the imperturbable host which did homage to Thucydides, Polybius, Blondus, Mabillon, Ranke, Waitz, Monod, Stubbs, Adams and Burgess in the year of Our Lord, 1914.

And then, out of a cloudless and smiling sky, came the deluge. Bang! went Princip's pistol at Sarajevo, and bang! went all the professors. By the end of July they were restive and fuming; by the end of August they were in violent eruption. And thereafter, for five long years, the word objectivity was abolished from their vocabularies. They harangued Kiwanis, they wrote letters to the newspapers, they preaches in churches, they invaded the movie-parlors, they roared like lions. And in 1917 they submitted themselves, eagerly and almost unanimously, to the high uses of the Creel Press Bureau.

II.

There were, of course, a few who held back, but they were quickly suspect. I recall, at random, Professor Sill of Cornell, Professors Schevill and Thompson of Chicago, Professor W. R. Shepherd of Columbia, and Professor Preserved Smith, then unattached. There were, too, Professors John William Burgess and William Milligan Sloane; both of them spoke out boldly for a reasonable consideration of the German case. But the first group could make no headway against the storm, and the last two were soon overwhelmed, for were they not former Roosevelt exchange professors at Berlin, and wasn't that enough to damn them? The rest all swallowed the official theory of the causes and nature of the war that came from Lord Northcliffe, Mr. Headlam-Morley and M. Tardieu. Many soon began to embellish it with contributions of their own—often mere gossip. For instance, Dr. E. E. Sperry added force to an argument by declaring, "The other day a man told me that a month before the ultimatum to Serbia he saw Turkish troops under German officers marching up and down the streets of Jerusalem." The culminating example of this sort of thing was the Potsdam Conference story, unloaded on the world by Mr. Morgenthau and Burton J. Hendrick, and swallowed by practically all the professors. Almost as absurd was the unanimous acceptance of the Pan-German nonsense of André Cheradame and Professor Roland G. Usher, and of the Tardieu version of affairs in Morocco.

It must not be presumed that only the smaller fry fell for these absurdities. Practically all the fish were landed in the same net, and probably the most astonishing nonsense of all was written by the eminent William Roscoe Thayer, A.B., A.M., LL.D., Litt.D., L.H.D., Knight of the Order of the Crown of Italy, and of the Order of Saints Maurizio and Lazarro, now of consecrated memory. The National Security League enlisted the enthusiastic support, among others, of Professors Albert Bushnell Hart and Robert McNutt McElroy, official biographer of Grover Cleveland, lately appointed to the Harmsworth professorship of American history at Oxford; Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, Member of the Common Room

of Queen's College, Oxford, and First Chinese Exchange Professor. And the organizer of the National Board for Historical Service, designed to line up all the historians in the Allied cause, was none other than the learned Professor James T. Shotwell, once described by a severe critic of orthodox historians thus:

"He has been one of the leaders in the development of an interest in the history of thought and culture; his philosophic grasp is so well recognized that one of his colleagues once remarked that his greatest service lay in keeping the department in touch with the cosmic processes; he is almost unrivaled among historians in his knowledge of the social sciences as a group; and he has been second only to Professor James Harvey Robinson as a protagonist of the newer history in this country."

Thus, with the world aflame, the learned professors slid down the pole, and before long they had put the case of God and virtue into the following scientific propositions:

1. The growth of Germany was predicated on fraud and diabolical ambition, and her hellish prophets were Frederick the Great, Nietzsche, Treitschke, and von Bernhardi.

2. Since 1870 Germany had been carefully preparing for war on land and sea. She was *the* militaristic power in Europe, and the active and conscious source of the next war. The Pan-German writers gave expression to her actual aims. Her eventful purpose was world dominion: first conquer France and Russia, then England, then the United States. The rest of the world would fall as a matter of course.

3. Germany held Austria under her thumb and, when the Serajevo crisis developed she seized upon it as an excuse to bathe Europe in blood and realize her ambitions.

4. The final decision to take this course was made at a meeting held at Potsdam, July 5, 1914.

5. After that date Germany resolutely opposed any move that would necessitate retreat, and consequently frustrated the pacific efforts of Lord Grey, and the attempts at conciliation made by Russia.

6. Therefore, the World War was the product of Germany's ambition, and the entire guilt of starting it rested on her shoulders.

This was the basic text, but many of the more talented historians, of course, developed elaborate variations upon it. One of the most industrious in this scientific work was the Thayer aforesaid, for two years president of the American Historical Association. Two books issued from his laboratory in those days: "Volleys From a Non-Combatant" and "Germany vs. Civilization," the latter bearing the subtitle of "Notes on the Atrocious War." This last was appropriately dedicated to Professor Charles Downer Hazen of Columbia, of whom more anon. It carried the pertinent motto on its title-page: "And he will be a wild man; his hand will be against every man, and every man's hands against him.—Genesis, xvi, 12." The wild man, it was quickly apparent, was Wilhelm II. But all Germans were equally bad, and it was the moral duty of every American, it appeared, to help exterminate them from the earth. Thus Dr. Thayer stated his own purpose:

"To prevent the total pollution of our people by the letting loose of the Prussian moral sewers—which, apparently, no one in authority did anything to check—I deemed it the duty of everyone of us who saw this danger and who recognized above all our national contribution to Freedom, to force the United States to join the Allies."

Naturally enough, in those days of "neutrality," Dr. Thayer's hatred of Woodrow Wilson was intense, and a bit later, in the *North American Review*, he printed one of the most virulent diatribes against Wilson ever written. For example:

"I make no specious claim to neutrality. Only a moral eunuch could be neutral in the sense implied by the malefic dictum of the President of the United States. . . . I have noticed in the crisis that the men who boasted of being "impartial" were either pro-German, or they had no hearts to beat faster, although the fate of mankind hung in the balance."

All German statements, to Dr. Thayer, were lies, and all the documents circulated by the Germans fraudulent. The Kaiser, he noted, always "protests to his Hunnish hearers," and all else came from the "German monster." The Germans, of course, were not Christians:

"Nietzsche freed Germany from the last trammels of Christian tradition. . . . The deity who presides over their religion is the Gott with whom William II is in partnership. . . . This war sprang as naturally from the German heart and will as a vulture springs from its nest. . . . The desire and will to conquer were in the hearts of the Germans. . . . The will to attack dwelt in the Kaiser and his military chiefs. Their sole concern was to choose the propitious moment."

The causes of the war were crystal-clear to Dr. Thayer:

"When 1914 came, William determined to wait no longer. He planned that Austria should be his cat's-paw. . . . The unreadiness of his enemies persuaded him. . . . Although he knew of Austria's offer to "converse" he frustrated this eleventh hour hesitation, and saw to it that war should come. . . . Though the Prussian dynasty were to reign from now till Doomsday, on the brow of each Hohenzollern despot, as he mounts the throne, invisible hands will stamp the name "Belgium" as the brand of Cain. . . . The pretense that the French armies were straining at the leash to attack Germany is utterly false."

He was also privy to all the secrets of German-American relations:

"The Kaiser pursued (after 1899) a double policy towards the United States: in public, professing effusive friendship; in secret chafing against the Monroe Doctrine. . . . . (After the war began) . . . . it became evident that the Kaiser's agents (in the United States) had a double purpose. They worked not only to propitiate American public opinion, but also to organize the German-Americans in this country. . . . . Some of the most exuberant of them seem to have had a vision of a German imperial prince sitting in the White House as Viceroy of the Kaiser."

These high and judicious words quickly got their reward: the professors elected Dr. Thayer president of the American Historical Association soon after the United States entered the war. So far as I can recall, only

Professors Sill and Schevill rose to protest, and they were at once put down. More, God Himself presently took a hand in the business, for at the time of the next annual meeting of the association, called to assemble in Cleveland, the influenza was raging, and so President Thayer had to be continued in office another year. He showed his appreciation by delivering two presidential addresses upon the same subject; both were devastating blasts against the Hun.

That this double dose was not sufficient to bring the excited historians to their senses is eloquently attested by the fact that they then proceeded to elect Professor Charles Homer Haskins, brilliant medievalist, but obsessed Francophile and largely responsible for the absurd arrangements in regard to the Saar Valley in the Treaty of Versailles, and then Ambassador Jusserand, the charming and subtle Gallic propagandist, and then the martyred Woodrow himself!

III

Next to Dr. Thayer in prompt and scientific appreciation of the issues raised by the Armageddon of 1914 came Professor Charles Downer Hazen, A.B., Ph.D., LL.D., L.H.D., Litt.D., Chevalier of the Legion of Honor, and Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, to whom, as we have seen, Dr. Thayer had dedicated his "Germany vs. Civilization," an honor later gallantly reciprocated when Hazen prepared an edition of the letters and posthumous fragments of Dr. Thayer. For twenty years before 1914, Chevalier Hazen had been the delight and despair of the students at Smith College as head of the department of history in that charming institution. With his colleague, John Spencer Bassett, he was among the star graduates of the Teutonized seminar of Herbert Baxter Adams at the Johns Hopkins University. During the War he was called to a greater sphere of usefulness as recipient of the mantle of William Milligan Sloane in the professorship of modern European history at Columbia.

Chevalier Hazen, in the gaudy days of 1914-18, did not waste himself upon sporadic magazine articles. He buckled down in earnest fashion and put the cream of his scholarship where it would do the most good, namely, before the young intellects of America. He began logically with the rape of France in 1870. He contended that the fundamental purpose of the World War was to right that atrocious wrong—concerning which Napoleon III had said in 1871: "I acknowledge we were the aggressors," and of which Clemenceau had said in 1914: "In 1870 Napoleon III, in a moment of folly, declared war upon Germany without even having the excuse of military preparedness. No true Frenchman has ever hesitated to admit that the wrongs of that day were committed by our side. Dearly have we paid for them." Dr. Hazen hastened to correct this grievous misunderstanding of the facts and their implications. In 1917 there appeared his most resonant clarion-call, "Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule." Thus he got down to business:

"It should be a source of pride to Americans to know that they may aid in the vindication of right and justice, of liberty and humanity. Alsace-Lorraine is a symbol as well as a fact. She represents the cause of the oppressed everywhere. She has come to personify the momentous

controversy which has been going on in the world for the past hundred and forty years since the American and French Revolutions challenged the principle of force as the authoritative arbiter in human affairs and asserted that the people have the right to determine their allegiance, that they must be consulted and obeyed by the governments, that they are no longer chattels to be passed from hand to hand as the results of battles and campaigns. . . . . It was as appropriate as it was inevitable, that, unless the people of the United States were to be recreant to their country's ideals and indifferent to its interests, they should have a place in the present stage of this epochal controversy as they had in its beginning in the Eighteenth Century. As our soldiers and our sailors steam down the harbor of New York on their way to the field of battle they pass the statue of Liberty Enlightening the World, the work of a gifted son of Alsace, Auguste Bartholdi, of Colmar. Under that prophetic and inspiriting sign they go forth to fight the good fight for freedom."

The essentials thus eloquently set forth were adapted to the comprehension of high-school students in the Chevalier's "Modern European History," which also appeared in 1917. And the same account was again embodied in "Fifty Years of Europe," prepared, though a little too late, for the embattled S.A.T.C. I quote from the former work:

"The responsibility for this tragic, monstrous, unnecessary crime against civilization, against humanity, was lightly assumed. . . . . The opinion of the outside world as to where that responsibility lies has been overwhelmingly expressed. . . . . The world was stunned by the criminal levity with which Austria-Hungary and Germany had created this hideous situation. The sinister and brutal challenge was, however, accepted immediately, and with iron resolution by those who had done their utmost during those twelve days to avert the catastrophe, and not only the Great Powers, like France and England, but small ones like Belgium and Serbia, never hesitated, but resolved to do or die. . . . . We entered the war because Germany forced us in, because she rendered it absolutely impossible for us to stay out unless we were the most craven and pigeon-hearted people on the earth."

Lest the morale of the Republic might be weakened by German peace offers or rumors of German liberal reforms, Dr. Hazen was delegated by Mr. Creel, early in 1918, to bring out in high relief the cloven-hoof in German *Realpolitik*, and to show the complete unreliability of each and every Hunnish promise. This led to the production of his erudite monograph on "The Government of Germany." Here the spine of the vacillating patriot was subjected to the following reassuring chiropractic:

"Let us not be hoodwinked by Easter messages from William II, or by cloudy and ambiguous utterances of his spokesman, as presaging the forthcoming liberalization of Germany. Prussian kings have shown that not only are treaties scraps of paper, but that constitutions are scraps of paper when their provisions annoy the monarch. And Prussian monarchs have never been squeamish about perjury. The famous Easter "promises" of this year will not be a greater hindrance to imperial and royal volition than previous celebrated promises to Belgium and the United States have been. . . . All this parade of constitutional reforms must not beeloud

the issue. The constitutions of Germany are paper constitutions. Long before it was the custom to treat solemn international agreements as mere scraps of paper the Imperial and the Prussian constitutions were ignored and flagrantly infringed with impunity by the governing authorities."

After the War, Chevalier Hazen was fittingly rewarded by being made exchange professor at Strasbourg. He has never informed us how it affected him to discover the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine even less happy under French rule than under German.

Scarcely less powerful and scientific than the Chevalier, in those heroic days, was Professor Munroe Smith, A.B., A.M., LL.B., LL.D., J.U.D., J.D., Professor of Roman Law and Comparative Jurisprudence and Bryce Professor of Legal History at Columbia University. Thus, out of his wide historical knowledge, he described the ambitions of the Potsdam Gang:

"In the German mind there gradually developed a vision of a German world empire based on an expanded Fatherland with a rapidly increasing population of states that was to extend from Scandinavia to Asia Minor, holding overseas possessions of all sorts in eastern Asia, in Africa, in Latin America and in the islands of all the oceans."

In his "Militarism and Statecraft" he elaborated on this theme as follows:

"In no other nation . . . . has national ambition been so rapidly and so widely diffused as in Germany; in no other nation have the accompanying and fostering illusions become equally prevalent; and in no other nation can we find an equally general unscrupulousness in the approval of all means adopted to reach the ends desired."

He then attempted an excursion into social psychology. His reward was

". . . . a conviction that there are fundamental differences between the Germans and the people of most other countries in their attitude towards sentiment, whether personal or general; and in the view of the relation between ideals and the practical conduct of life. . . . . Natural human feelings, the instinctive reactions of sentiment and of conscience, are considered only as personal emotions which the military officer must repress because they tend to impair his efficiency."

These matters being disposed of, the war guilt question was attacked. Austria and Germany, it at once appeared, were the aggressors. Serbia, Russia, France, and Belgium were completely innocent. Germany did want peace with Great Britain and was attacked by her, but Britain's ground was unimpeachable: the violation of Belgian neutrality. Naturally enough. Professor Smith was in favor of the British blockade. Thus he defended it in the *Political Science Quarterly* for December, 1916:

"It has seemed sufficient to file our protests as a basis for subsequent claims. After the war the British government may concede that its measures were irregular; and the rules of international law will then be vindicated. Great Britain may be the readier to do this because in the future it may need these rules for the protection of its own trade."

Dr. Smith swept away the German case with an easy gesture. Thus:

"In addition to the fact that the Central Empires could not draw military supplies from us, were we not entitled and bound to consider the fact that they stood in no such need of arms and munitions as did the Entente Allies?"

IV.

The case of Professor Albert Bushnell Hart, Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D., of Harvard, differed somewhat from that of the learned men just discussed. In 1914 he wrote a book called "The War in Europe," in which he discussed very calmly some of the causes of the conflict: obscure national hatreds, military rivalries, commercial rivalries, transportation rivalries (particularly the Berlin-Bagdad Railway), colonial rivalries and race antagonisms. With regard to the precipitation of the war he said he believed that Germany had a tacit understanding with Austria that Serbia should be roundly punished at the first opportunity, but that this was not to go as far as provoking a world war. When the latter contingency loomed up the Kaiser sought a way out:

"This correspondence (between the Kaiser and the Czar) is replete with sincerity and clearly shows the German Emperor trying to hold back the tide until Austria and Russia should be able to agree upon a form of accommodation."

But he was frustrated, and by the Russians:

"It is proved that Emperor William would have held his hand for a few days if Russian mobilization had not seemed to him a warlike act directed at Germany."

Dr. Hart also noted that the French had
"been ready for war with Germany for forty years, and the whole nation as one mass accepted the opportunity when it came without hesitation and with very little effort to avert it. France could not fight without Russia. Together they hoped to be two jaws of the vise with which to crush both Germany and Austria-Hungary. . . . . We are accustomed to think of Germany as saturated with militarism, but it is the same in every European country, down to Montenegro."

Furthermore he noted, apropos the violation of Belgian neutrality:

"Nothing but a conviction of imperious and military necessity would have driven Germany to an act which was bound to create consternation among small powers and surprise among neutrals throughout the world. . . . . (It) might be justified under the law of natural existence if necessary to save Germany from destruction."

He concluded that
"the United States as a nation is sympathetic with all of the contestants; we have nothing to give any of them; whichever group is successful, that group has nothing to give which the United States desires."

But that was in 1914. In the years following, his scientific researches caused him to see the light, and by 1917 he was writing the following in the *Yale Review*:

"The first impression that the Kaiser and his entourage flung the brand

into the pyre has since been confirmed by the revelation of the Italian statesmen and especially by Lichnowsky. If Germany could make war on a pretext for secret and ulterior aims of conquest in Europe and Asia, the time would come when similar temptations of rich lands in weak hands would draw her to South America and the Panama Canal. . . . The frightful military despotism set up in Belgium was simply a warning of what might happen to New Jersey and Rhode Island if they should ever become 'occupied conquests'."

After that Professor Hart was one of the most violent of the warlocks. Entering the service of the celebrated National Security League (along with Professor A. O. Lovejoy, the patriot-philosopher), he was presently writing such books as "America at War: a Handbook of Patriotic Education," replete with denunciations of Frederick the Great, Nietzsche, Treitschke, and von Bernhardi, authentic information about the "murders on the *Lusitania*," Belgian atrocities, quotations from alleged German diaries and a learned treatise on Pan-Germanism. His collapse was complete, and he has not recovered to this day. Perhaps his noblest contribution to scientific history was printed in the form of a commentary on Dr. Harry E. Barnes' article on the war guilt question, in *Current History* for May, 1924. Here he conceded that, if one accepted documentary evidence, Professor Barnes seemed to be right in his demolition of the Entente Epic, but he offered the original suggestion that the subjective emotions of war time were more trustworthy than the contents of archives:

"The subject is too involved, the underlying race and language antipathies are too strong, the confusion of relations in Eastern Europe too complex to make any review of printed testimony a safe basis for changing an opinion which was forged by the fires of war."

This sentence will probably take its place in the manuals of historical methodology alongside James Anthony Froude's classic description of Adelaide. But perhaps the most humorous aspect of Professor Hart's strenuous exertions to keep the Huns out of Rhode Island is to be found in the fact that due to some jocosity, oversight or imbecility on the part of an unknown functionary, his name was included, along with those of Scott Nearing, Rose Pastor Stokes *et al.*, in the list of "undesirables" published by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department in the Spring of 1919. The learned professor had to board a train and go puffing to Washington to get himself officially reinstated among the elect under Stanwood Menken's wing. He got a somewhat incomplete solace by being inducted into the Loyal Order of Moose as an honorary member in recognition of his patriotic services. There was much speechifying.

Another case with humor in it was that of Professor George Lincoln Burr, LL.D., Litt.D., of Cornell, before the war the chief exponent of tolerance among American historians, and perhaps the world's leading authority on the history of tolerance. In fact, when the war broke out he had just read his presidential address before the American Historical Association on "The Freedom of History," *i.e.*, from bias and prejudice. But as soon as the bugles sounded, the amiable "Daddy" Burr, with his five feet four, his sixty years and his unrivalled erudition, insisted upon donning a uniform and drilling with the khaki-clad youths on the Cornell campus. He lived for two years

in fear lest a German periscope suddenly part the waters of the upper Cayuga or the Hunnish hosts pour over the hills of Tompkins county to put his precious Andrew D. White Library to the torch. Even when the war was over Dr. Burr suffered a considerable hang-over, and so wasted two years adjusting war-risk insurance when he might have been giving his time and skill to the histories of witchcraft and the freedom of thought that no other living historian could aspire to execute so well. His behavior was perhaps the closest American analogue to Anatole France's famous enlistment gesture. He wrote nothing silly, but his case proves how little scholarship and devotion to intellectual freedom really mean when Mars in in the field.

Relatively few of the blood-sweating historians operated independently. Most of them were enlisted by one or another of the current spy-hunting and Hun-chewing societies, and by far the greater number by the celebrated Committee on Public Information, more widely known as the Creel Press Bureau. Mr. Creel has told the story of his official war propaganda in "How We Advertised America." The writing of the pamphlets that he published was largely done by the embattled historians. To head his production department he sought "a university man, a practiced historian, a writer skilled in investigation, one who knew America and Europe equally well." He found him in Professor Guy Stanton Ford, Ph.D., head of the history department at the University of Minnesota. Creel read one of this learned gentleman's inspired patriotic pamphlets and then:

"I wired him that he was 'drafted' and to report immediately. Here again the value of quick decision was proved, for I would have wasted months in search without finding anyone so admirably fitted by temperament and training for the important position to which Professor Ford was called."

The corps of assistants gathered about Dr. Ford included many eminent and even illustrious men. The roll-call follows:

Professor A. C. McLaughlin, LL.D., of the University of Chicago
Professor E. V. Green, Ph.D., of the University of Illinois
Professor Carl Lotus Becker, B.Litt., of Cornell
Professor Wallace Notestein, Litt.D., Ph.D., of the University of Minn.
Professor Elmer E. Stoll, Ph.D., of the University of Minnesota (a professor of English, not of history)
Professor D. C. Munro, A.M., L.H.D., of Princeton.
Professor G. C. Sellery, Ph.D., LL.D., of the University of Wisconsin
Professor E. E. Sperry, Ph.D., of Syracuse
Professor J. J. Coss, Ph. D., of Columbia
Professor James Gutmann, Ph.D., of Columbia
Professor S. B. Harding, Ph.D., of the University of Indiana
Professor F. L. Paxson, Ph.D., of the University of Wisconsin
Professor E. S. Corwin, Ph.D., of Princeton
Professor William Stearns Davis, Ph.D., of the University of Minnesota
Professor G. W. Scott, LL.B., Ph.D., of Columbia
Professor J. W. Garner, Ph.M., Ph.D., of the University of Illinois
Professor J. J. Pettijohn, of the University of Indiana
Professor T. F. Moran, Ph.D., of Purdue
Professor F. W. McReynolds, LL.B., of Dartmouth
Professor Charles E. Merriam, Ph.D., LL.D., of Chicago

Professor W. R. Shepherd, Ph.D., L.H.D., of Columbia
Professor Jerome Davis, Ph.D., now of the Yale Divinity School
Professor W. F. Russell, Ph.D., then of the State University of Iowa and now of Teachers College, Columbia.

In preparing the war pamphlets Dr. Creel followed a definite system:

"When the pamphlet was decided upon in conferences, the next question was the proper man or men to handle its preparation, and these men were then telegraphed a request to come to Washington. In no case was there a refusal to serve, and not only is it my privilege to pay a high tribute to the devotion of individuals, but also to the patriotism of the universities, who loaned members of their faculties generously and wholeheartedly. The writers were given only one simple direction, and that was to do their work so that they would not be ashamed of it twenty years later. When the pamphlet was finished it was submitted to a general examination and then referred to the various divisions of government for checking, and it is my pride to be able to say that in all the mass of matter issued by Professor Ford's division, only one public charge of misstatement was ever voiced and this was followed by an apology."

V

It is hardly necessary to clutter up these pages with quotations from the learned and highly accurate literature thus produced. Most readers will remember it. The first pamphlet of the Bureau was written by Arthur Bullard, E. G. Sisson, Mr. Creel and Professor Ford. It was put into popular form by Ernest Poole, and Professors Shotwell of Columbia and Becker of Cornell "shaped up certain points more sharply and judiciously." The result was read and approved by Secretary Lansing and President Wilson. It was entitled "How the War Came to America" and circulated to the extent of 5,428,048 copies. Mr. Creel believes that "in authoritative judgment it stands today as the most moderate, reasoned and permanent pamphlet put out by any government engaged in the war." Those who have been following the progress of revisionist scholarship should dust off their copies and peruse it. Other choice bits that went over the million mark were:

Conquest and Kultur, by Notestein and Stoll—1,203,607
German War Practices, by Munro, Sellery and Krey—1,592,801
The War Message and the Facts Behind It, with notes by W. S. Davis—2,499,903
The Great War, by A. C. McLaughlin—1,581,903

Hardly a single issue failed to reach six figures:

The German War Code, by Scott and Garner—514,452
The German Treatment of Conquered Territory, by Munro, Sellery and Krey—720,848
The War Cyclopedia, by Harding, Paxson and Corwin—195,231

The usefulness of the historians, of course, was not limited to composing these voluptuous pamphlets. There were other services they could perform quite as well. Dr. Jerome Davis, then in the service of the Y. M. C. A., successfully engineered the distribution of American propaganda in

Germany via Russia. Dr. W. R. Shepherd, assisted by the novelist, Robert Herrick, directed propaganda in favor of American idealism in the Allied countries. Professor Charles Edward Merriam, then a captain in the army, in association with John Healey, Italian correspondent of the United Press, directed the propaganda in Italy:

"They distributed 4,500,500 postcards bearing American war pictures; American flag bow-pins, Italo-American ribbons and buttons, 154,854; President Wilson posters. 68,574; assorted American war posters, 66,640; American flags in paper, 200,000; American flags in cloth, 30; sheet music, 'The Star-Spangled Banner,' 33,300; booklets containing American war statistics and other information, 364,235; United States maps, 200; President Wilson photographs, 500; President Wilson engravings, 35."

It is not necessary, of course, to assume that all of the eminent historians enlisted under Mr. Creel's banner volunteered with much enthusiasm or approved of all the nonsense compiled. One cannot imagine the gentle Evarts Greene fired with any desire to mutilate the Kaiser, and one suspects that the detached and cynical Carl L. Becker must have "pointed up" the pamphlet on "How the War Came to America" with certain philosophical reservations. But no dissent from the official buncombe was heard at the time, and many professors, unable to get service under Dr. Creel—who once boasted that he had no less than 2,500 head of historians on his list—went to work for other patriotic agencies. There was, for example, the National Board for Historical Service, headed by Professor James T. Shotwell. It was, in the words of Dr. Creel, the means by "which the historians of the country organized more effectively than any similar group of scholars." The roll-call included, beside Dr. Shotwell:

Professor E. V. Green, Ph. D., of the University of Illinois
Professor J. F. Jameson, Ph.D., LL.D., editor of the *American Historical Review*
Professor D. C. Munro, L.H.D., of Princeton
Professor W. G. Leland, A. B., secretary of the American Historical Association
Professor A. C. Coolidge, Ph.D., LL.D., of Harvard
Professor F. J. Turner, Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D., of Harvard
Professor J. Schaefer, Ph.D., of Oregon
Professor Henry Johnson, B.L., A.M., of Teachers College, Columbia
Professor W. E. Lingelbach, Ph.D., of Pennsylvania
Professor C. H. Hull, Ph.D., of Cornell
Professor W. E. Dodd, B.S., Ph.D., LL.D., of Chicago
Professor C. R. Fish, Ph.D., of Wisconsin
Professor C. D. Hazen, Ph.D., L.H.D., Litt.D., of Columbia
Professor R. D. W. Connor, Ph.B., of North Carolina
Professor W. Notestein, Litt.D., Ph.D., of Minnesota
Professor S. B. Harding, Ph.D., of Indiana.

Effective linkage between the Creel Press Bureau and the unattached pedagogues was provided by the professional historical periodicals. Dr. Jameson was able to keep the *American Historical Review* from anything approaching a collapse of its former dignity and trustworthiness, but the *History Teacher's Magazine*, edited by Albert E. McKinley, literally threw itself into

the arms of the Creel Bureau and the National Board, and its files from 1917 to 1919 are rich with clinical material for the historical pathologist. The article on "Annexationist Germany," by Professor Bernadotte Schmitt, Ph.D., (May, 1918) was almost worthy to rank with the pamphlets issued by the American Defense Society. This periodical also issued a syllabus on the causes and issues of the war which was an able guide to the resources of the Creel Bureau.

Unluckily, not every learned organization of those trying days was as helpful to Dr. Creel as the Board for Historical Service. Some of them were downright nuisances. As he later put it:

"Another handicap in the fight for national unity soon presented itself in the form of those volunteer patriotic societies that sprang up over the land like mushrooms, all sincere and loyal enough, but demoralizing often by virtue of this very eagerness. These organizations collected their funds by public appeal, and as obvious justification of existence was furnished by publicity, their activities inevitably took such form as could earn the largest amount of newspaper space. As a consequence, their patriotism was a thing of screams, violence, and extremes; they outjingoed the worst of the jingoes, and their constant practice of extreme statement left a trail of anger, irritation and resentment."

Worse, even some of the chosen leaders of the recognized organizations often went beyond the bounds of a sound discretion. There was, for example, the case of Professor McElroy, of the National Security League. But let Dr. Creel tell it:

"Professor McElroy, returning from a three weeks' tour in the West, gave out a statement in which he said that he had known what it was 'to face large bodies of young men clad in the uniform of the American army beneath which were concealed the souls of Prussians.' Later, in the New York *Tribune*, he gave the University of Wisconsin as the place where he had encountered disloyalty. The basis of the charge was the inattention of the audience throughout his speech, shuffling feet, snapping of rifle triggers, etc., and he told how finally, to test the audience, he leaned forward and deliberately insulted them as 'a bunch of damned traitors'; how, to his amazement, there was no resentment whatever of this or of his later reference to a 'Prussian audience.' 'I hesitate to accuse an entire university of disloyalty,' he said, 'but to my mind that episode stands out as one of the most disgraceful things I have encountered'."

"Dr. Charles R. Van Hise, president of the university, John Bradley Winslow, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and E. A. Birge, of the College of Science and Letters, were appointed as a committee of protest, and their report asserted that the address had been long; that the audience included a cadet regiment—students—who had marched two and one-half miles in the rain and were wet and cold; that, being present under orders and unable to withdraw, they merely indicated their desire for an end to the long speech; that Professor McElroy's reflections on their loyalty were made in a tone so low that persons within twenty feet of him did not hear the words at all.

"Thus, then, by reason of a speaker who failed to hold an audience of

boys throughout two hours, the loyalty of a State was impugned, and the patriotism of a great university was besmirched."

The unfortunate Dr. McElroy was burned in effigy by the students. He was, amusingly enough, Director of Education for the National Security League. But his conception of education did not include any training in placidity and tolerance. In his pamphlet, "The Ideals of Our War," one finds him tracing the genealogy of German morals. First comes Frederick the Great, who practiced the "gospel of force and fraud;" then Nietzsche, who dignified the practice into a philosophy, "but Nietzsche died mad;" next we have Treitschke, "breathing this gospel of force and fraud into the very soul of Prussia, and, through her, of all Germany;" and finally von Bernhardi, "soldier, strategist and shameless expounder of this ancient doctrine of force and fraud." Consequently, "Germany is a menace to civilization." His particular concern was to demonstrate that while democracy was originally developed in the forests of Germany (now, alas, an exploded idea), it was later crushed by the Prussians and developed by the English and Americans. The war was thus an effort to force the Germans to accept what they had originally let loose upon the world.

Professors McElroy and Hart were not the only star performers for the League. Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes, now the leader of the war guilt revisionists, contributed a pamphlet. Dr. Claude Halstead Van Tyne, head of the department of history at the University of Michigan, fellow of the Royal Historical Society and himself trained at Heidelberg and Leipzig, wrote a complaint that German training had led our historians to pervert our history texts, and argued that we needed more stress placed on our cultural debt to England. Not all of the professors committed their thoughts to print. The following lectured under the auspices of the League:

Professor Franklin H. Giddings, Ph.D., LL.D., of Columbia
Professor William Bennett Munro, Ph.D., LL.D., of Harvard
Professor William Henry Schofield, Ph.D., of Harvard
Professor Walter P. Hall, Ph.D., of Princeton
Professor Melanchthon F. Libby, Ph.D., of Colorado
Professor Ephraim D. Adams, Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D., of Stanford.

Professor Giddings, turning aside from teaching the history of civilization at Columbia, did yeoman service against William the Damned. Bowled over by letters from former French students telling of the dismemberment of Belgians and Frenchmen by the Huns, he was the most upstanding opponent of Kaiserdom on Morningside Heights for many months before our entry into the Great Crusade. He thundered against the black hosts of iniquity to crowded classes in Kent Hall. In the Spring of 1918, he expressed himself in a memorable address at Philadelphia as doubting the very capacity of the Germans for civilization. His editorials in the *Independent* rivaled those of Brother Lyman Abbott. The good professor, a valiant protagonist of cold statistical measurements in the social sciences, was at times moved to poetry by the depth of his feelings.

VI

Much efficient supplementary service was rendered by the so-called university War Books, proudly issued by Columbia, Chicago, Illinois, North Carolina, Wisconsin and Princeton. They varied considerably in content, quality and interest. That issued by Columbia dealt severely with technical problems of production, transportation, finance and the like. Likewise that issued by Chicago was rather mild and benign, although President Harry Pratt Judson, A.M., LL.D., did spread the usual muck in "The Threat of German World Politics." Most of the contributors did not profess history. The prize exhibits in this division were the War Books of Princeton and Wisconsin. That of Princeton was written by members of the Department of history and politics. It was designed to give a "more accurate understanding of the reasons for the entry of the United States into the European War," and to set forth the "proved facts of German political policy and ambition." Among the "proved facts" was one cited by Professor Henry van Dyke, D.C.L. (Oxon.): "The offense of choosing, forcing and beginning it (the war)." Professor E. S. Corwin, Ph.D., LL.D., assumed a more magisterial tone and argued the thesis that "while it is Germany's violations of international law that have brought us into the war, it is what these violations imply that must keep us there until Germany is defeated, since they spring from ideas which make any rational hope of good order in the world of nations a permanent impossibility." Germany was dangerous, it appeared, because of her ambitions, and Dr. Corwin discovered these in the judicious and measured books of Cheradame and Usher. Professor Clifton R. Hall confined himself to congratulations on the "Anglo-Saxon family reunion," but Professor Philip Marshall Brown, M.A., closed the volume with a series of whoops:

"First we tried the anæmic variety of neutrality, the paralysis of moral and intellectual powers. Then we more or less unconsciously assumed the impossible rôle of the benevolent neutral, hoping for the success of the Entente Allies. And finally we resorted to the dubious expedient of armed, malevolent neutrality. . . .

"It is a war on a false ideal. We are wrestling with a grossly materialistic conception of human relations; with a pagan idea of legal rights and obligations that recognizes no other necessities than those of Germany . . . . a sublime cause."

The University of Wisconsin volume followed the same general lines. All of the faculties contributed, a professor of English writing up the celebrated though mythical Potsdam Conference. Professor Frederick A. Ogg, Ph.D., writing under the title of "Germany's Ambition for World Power," set forth the usual canned stuff about Pan-Germanism, and opened his discussion with an assertion of Germany's sole guilt in starting the war. Professor G. C. Sellery went over the same ground in "Why Russia, France and Britain Entered the War." "Germany," he said, "attacked Russia. . . . France was convinced that Russia was not the aggressor and therefore resolved to help her. . . ." Did France try to prevent the war? "The answer is an emphatic yes." Britain went into it to support Belgian neutrality, though "not bound by the Entente to support France in a war with Germany." Professor Carl

Russell Fish applied himself to the subject of "German Submarines and the British Blockade," and concluded that the British blockade was strictly legal, and that when it wasn't, it violated only property rights, which could be the subject of adjustment following the war. But Germany's blockade was not legal—was, in fact, outlaw—for it sometimes destroyed lives.

Professor W. L. Westermann, Ph.D. (Berlin), was perhaps the most eloquent of these Wisconsin savants. He chose as his subject "The World Must Be Made Safe for Democracy," and painted a heart-rending picture of autocratic Germany and Austria crushing democratic Belgium—and Serbia. A German victory would result in the crushing of all democracy:

"Should the plans of militaristic Prussia be successful, all democracies of the world, including our own, would be in grave danger. The programme of the German militarists was, and still is, to break forever the power of our sister democracy, France. France must be "bled white!" Then England, that "nation of shop-keepers" with its liberal institutions, must be made subservient to German autocratic ideals. It must be removed forever from the pathway of the expansion and spread of the German rule. Indirectly, the success of autocracy in Europe would, by the glamour of its achievement, force all the freedom-loving people of the world to adopt the methods of military autocracy. The menace of German autocratic power would compel us to enter upon an indefinite, constantly increasing programme of military armament. . . . The South American republics would be the first to meet the onslaught of militaristic autocracy. German imperialistic policy has aimed for twenty years or more at the control of the South American republics—and then our turn was to come."

In those heroic days every German professor in America was considered an agent of the Kaiser. I have noted how Professor Van Tyne, trained at Heidelberg and Leipzig, lamented that German education had perverted the writing of American history. But by far the most earnest writings in this field were those of Dr. Earl Evelyn Sperry, professor of history at Syracuse University. It was he who invented the phrase, "the tentacles of the German octopus," and used it as the title of a pamphlet issued by the National Security League. Dr. Sperry concentrated his indignation on such organizations as the *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland*, and upon German newspapers, German professors and all teachers of the German language. His argument was summed up as follows:

"The curious idea is frequently expressed in German publications that men can be loyal and honorable citizens of the country in which they live and at the same time members of a foreign nationality, sharing its spirit, affections and aspirations. How singular it is that the profound German intellect should not perceive that there might be a conflict between duty to the state to which political allegiance is sworn and service to that foreign nationality which claims the heart and spirit of the citizen. Or did the Germans in fact perceive the possible conflict, forsee that nationality would win the day and for this very reason urge so persistently that it be preserved and cultivated, while all the time pretending in words of smug and greasy cant that millions of American citizens could be German in thought and spirit without prejudice to their American citizenship?"

The effort to keep the ties between German immigrants and the homeland alive, was according to Dr. Sperry, a part of the Pan-German idea. Thus:

"Pan-Germanism was the chief cause of the present war. It was not, as some believe, the sole cause. Its aggressive annexationist policy, however, adopted by the German government, was the decisive factor in producing the world's greatest catastrophe. . . . There is no possibility that any foreign government can acquire territory within the limits of the United States, but the Pan-Germans and the German government, nevertheless, have a plan for our future. It is that there shall be on the soil of the United States a branch of the German nation consisting of the people of German descent who dwell here. An organized and systematic effort has been made by many societies in the German Empire, acting with the approval of the German government, to teach the German-Americans that they are members of the German rather than the American nation, that although American citizens, they owe their first allegiance and affection not to the United States but to Germany. They are to have a German nationality distinct and apart from their American citizenship."

A matter upon which there was complete agreement of opinion among the historians was that of the diabolism of the Kaiser. He was depicted uniformly as a monster of untruthfulness and a beast in morals. So far as I can make out only two historians dissented. One was Professor Burgess, of Columbia, who said:

"I know that the two things which are giving him (the Kaiser) the deepest pain in this world catastrophe, excepting only the sufferings of his own kindred and people, are the enmity of Great Britain and the misunderstanding of his character, feelings and purposes in America. . . . I firmly believe him to be a man of peace. I am absolutely sure that he has entered upon this war only under the firm conviction that Great Britain, France and Russia have conspired to destroy Germany as a world power."

The other was Professor William M. Sloane:

"The American masses dislike the sound of 'supreme war lord,' but gladly admit their own Chief Magistrate to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. To our ears the three German words are offensive, for in the treacherous literal translation they are a wilful perversion, but the much stronger English words are a delight to our democracy."

Otherwise the record is blank. The Crown Prince suffered similarly. It is instructive and somewhat amusing to contrast two statements by Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, of Smith College. The first was written in June, 1917: ". . . the extreme Pan-Germanic junker party—allied itself to the semi-imbecilic Crown Prince." The second appeared in the *Nation* for August 11, 1926, in the course of a review of the Crown Prince's book, "Ich suche die Wahrheit:"

"During the World War we became so habituated to reproduction of the German Crown Prince as a rabbit-faced imbecile with an IQ of 20 that few Americans were capable of imagining him as possessed of the slightest cerebration or literacy. He was deemed competent only for guinea-pig amorosities with opera stars safe behind the lines. . . . It was with great astonishment, then, that we were forced to find in his memoirs perhaps the

most attractive and plausible apology which emerged from the German official class after the war. . . . (As for his "Ich suche die Wahrheit") no other official apology can in any way compare with it for evidence of scholarship and the mastery of a vast mass of relevant documents."

Most of this fustian showed plain signs of English origin. The English newspapers, and especially the Northcliffe papers, had been belaboring the Crown Prince for years, and many of the American professors seem to have picked up their notion of him from that scource. In general, they displayed a very naïve attitude toward English war propaganda, and the whole rumble-bumble of the hands-across-the-sea press-agents. As Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt, M.A. (Oxon.), so innocently said in his "England and Germany, 1740-1914" (1918 edition), "A beneficiary of the Rhodes Trust, I was imbued with the idea of Anglo-Saxon solidarity." This idea of solidarity, to be sure, was accepted by many professors of undoubted competence and dignity, and on plausible logical grounds. One of them was Professor George Louis Beer, whose "The English-Speaking Peoples" was a frank and open plea for understanding. But such scholarly arguments did not suffice. The temper of the times demanded a more violent attack upon the Irish and other villains who were suspicious of the Motherland.

This yearning finally manifested itself in a monograph called "Anglo-American Concords and Discords," issued under the auspices of the mysterious History Circle. The actual Circle was, however, far from ethereal and ghostly. The leading members were Sinclair Kennedy, author of "The Pan-Angles" and a cultured, affable and sincere Anglomaniac; Hermann Hagedorn, of the heroic Vigilantes; W. B. Chapman, a New York engineer and brother of the redoubtable John Jay Chapman, and W. H. Gardiner, a wealthy bullet manufacturer. The trend of Mr. Gardiner's mind may be discovered in two pamphlets he prepared for the American Defense Society: "Germany's War Plans," and "America's Peace Essentials." In them he contended that there could be no safe peace until the aspiration of the "stinking Prussians" to conquer North and South America had been frustrated. Clio's interests were first represented in this brave band by Professor Shotwell, and Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, then an instuctor at Columbia, was engaged to rewrite the history of Anglo-American relations in such a manner as to offset the old antipathies to England contained in the conventional textbooks. After a few meetings with the Circle, Professor Shotwell adroitly excused himself on the ground of business in Washington, and Professor Barnes' material, later published in part as Chapters ix and xii of his "History and Social Intelligence," was discovered to be devoid of virile ardor. More sympathetic historical advisers were found in Professor Dr. Edgar Dawson, Ph.D. (Leipzig), of the combined departments of history, politics, economics, social economy, sociology and jurisprudence at Hunter College, and Matthew Page Andrews, A.M., author of "The Biggest Book in the World." The Circle then set to in real earnest under the joint direction of Messrs. Andrews, Gardiner and Dawson. The result was the above-mentioned memoir, brought out under the ægis of the publishing house presided over by the venerable grand master of American Anglomaniacs, George Haven Putnam. Another important effort to promote amorous embraces between the eagle and the lion was Charles

Altschul's "The American Revolution in Our School Textbooks," edited by Professor Barnes and graced by an eloquent introduction by Professor Shotwell.

VII

But the work that really gave a final form to the scientific heat of the embattled historians was "The Roots of the War," by Professor William Stearns Davis, Ph.D., of the University of Minnesota. Dr. Davis had some assistance from two other savants, Dr. William Anderson and Dr. Mason W. Tyler. His book did not appear until 1918, and so it may be accepted as representing the settled and sober conviction of the learned men of the time. So recently as March, 1927, its publishers advertised it in these terms:

"Dr. Davis' "Roots of the War" has been one of the most widely read non-fiction books of many years. In it he disclosed a rare coördination of scholarly authority with pictorial imagination. He revivifies history. He makes it live—as history did live while it was being enacted."

The main thesis of the work is thus stated in the introduction:

"In the opinion of the writers of this book there were three dominant factors in the international relations of the last forty years that enabled the Pan-Germanic conspirators to bring on the great calamity in the precise form in which it finally inflicted itself upon the world. These were:

"1. The old hate between France and Germany, nourished by the unhealed and unforgetable Alsace-Lorraine question.

"2. The newer hate between Britain and Germany, caused partly by commercial rivalry, but much more by the overweening jealousy of the Pan-Germans of the British colonial empire, and by the antipathy inevitable between two great nations, one essentially liberal and non-militaristic, the other precisely the reverse.

"3. The eternal Balkan question, the problem of the disposition of the dying Turkish Empire and the straining anxiety of Russia on the one hand and Germany and Austria on the other to become the preferred heirs to the Sick Man of Europe.

"These three factors came to play simultaneously into the hands of the Pan-German schemers, master-financiers and manufacturers, doctrinaire professors, irresponsible journalists, highly-titled officers, princely and royal 'Serenities' and 'Highnesses' and above these finally, it would seem, the 'All-Highest' himself, in their deliberate conspiracy to achieve at one or, at most, two or three ruthless and gigantic strokes of the sword, the establishment of a world empire, an Empire of Teutonia, indescribably vaster, richer, more irresistible, more universal than that of imperial Rome.

"This book undertakes to outline the circumstances that made this inconceivably daring attempt seem possible."

It is not necessary to give a complete résumé of the book in this place. All six of the points against Kaiserdom enumerated in an earlier section of this article are embodied in the work, and most of the quotations cited from other professors can be matched in the text. The methodology is of the familiar type. There is a free use of gossip, and the "revelations" of

the Creel Bureau are aeeepted as definitive truth. Professor Davis and his assoeiates are devotees of "spiritual" history, and spurn all "materialistie" interpretations. A great number of pages are devoted to denouneing Norman Angell's "The Great Illusion," whieh is alleged to be "eharged with a Sadduecan materialism, with half-truths and with evasions of patent spiritual faets." Here are some of Dr. Davis' own spiritual faets:

"Until the German government shall open its private arehives, it is impossible to traee the details of events between June 29 and July 23, 1914. But there seems to be absolutely reliable evidenee that early in July a great state eouneil was held at whieh it was determined to preeipitate war as soon as possible, or else to infliet upon Russia sueh a diplomatie humiliation as would shake her whole prestige and position as a Great Power, and as a result establish the Teutonie Empires as the resistless dominators of the Balkans. Shortly after the outbreak of aetual hostilities, Baron Wangenheim, the German Ambassador at Constantinople, in an outburst of enthusiasm over the early sueeesses of his country, made a statement to his eolleague, Mr. Morgenthau, the Ameriean Ambassador to Turkey: "The German Ambassador informed me (Morgenthau) that a eonferenee had been held in the early part of July (1914) at whieh the date of the war was fixed. This eonferenee was presided over by the Kaiser. . . . All were asked if they were ready for war. All replied in the affirmative exeept the finaneiers, who insisted that they must have two weeks in whieh to sell seeurities and arrange their loans." His Exeellency the Baron seems to have told the same story also to his eolleague, the Italian Ambassador to Constantinople. There is not the least reason to doubt that this tale is substantially true."

To substantiate all this Dr. Davis appends the following note:

"Statement was received as having offieial aeeuraey by the United States Government Committee of Publie Information, whieh reprinted it in its offieial pamphlet, 'Conquest and Kultur.' "

To eontinue:

"On the night of August 4, the last of the terrible Twelve Days, eame the end of that era in European history whieh hegan that fateful night in 1870 when Otto von Bismarek rewrote the Ems dispateh from King William. This epoeh had been ushered in by a deed whieh, if it had failed, would have been hranded as an aet of outrageous depravity; but whieh, sinee it sueeeeded, was to be lauded as the master stroke of genius. It was to end with the Chaneellor of the German Empire calling a most solemn international treaty a "serap of paper" when the Ambassador of a great power talked of truth, justiee and faithfulness between nation and nation. The dawn of this epoeh had seen the eonsolidation of the German states under the domination of Prussia into the formidable German Empire. It found its sunset when, disregarding all established sanetions, eovenants and moral proeesses, the rulers of this new Empire surrendered themselves to sehemes of world eonquest, whieh would take them straight along the paths of imperial Rome. Manifestly, therefore, for years there eould be no more peaee in the world."

Dr. Davis, after ten years, stieks resolutely to his guns—a fidelity to idealism not eneountered in certain of his eolleagues of the war days. The

revelations that have come from the national archives of the warring countries since 1918 he denounces as "the affirmations and arrangements of certain ultra-pacifists (French, English and German) who have tried to rewrite the history of 1914." Among the men so characterized are G. P. Gooch, the Englishman; Pierre Renouvin, the Frenchman; and Count Max Montgelas, the German, none of them exactly a pacifist! The scientific resolution of Dr. Davis is well revealed in his latest work, "Europe Since Waterloo" (1926), in which all the old stuff is once more trotted forth. The section on the World War is still entitled "Armageddon," and the chapter titles run: "The Last Months in the Fool's Paradise," "Before the Tempest," "Sowing the Wind," "Reaping the Whirlwind," "In the Path of the Storm," "The Nemesis of Militarism," "The Ides of November."

VIII

The unexpected collapse of the German war machine in November, 1918, was not only a reflection upon the prophetic talents of the historians, but a sad blow to their economic opportunities. At the start of their holy crusade their endeavors to prevent the United States from absorption in *Gross-Deutschland* were rewarded with little more than travelling and living expenses. In the Autumn of 1918, however, there hovered on the horizon the veritable rainbow's end, offering a glorious opportunity to cash in. The War Department decided to prepare trained leaders for the *Landwehr* in the form of college-bred second lieutenants. So it organized the famous S. A. T. C. (Student's Army Training Corps). Here the adolescent field marshals were to be instructed, not only in the manipulation of hand-grenades and gas-bombs, but also in all the subtleties of official history. This meant that hundreds of thousands must be supplied with manuals suitable for the purpose—and there were few if any of the proper flavor available, with the exception of the virile tomes of Chevalier Hazen. Forthwith, and at once, scissors flashed, paste-pots flowed freely, and printing-presses groaned in anticipation of glutted sales. Many a prospective author of a *Grundriss* on the *Aussenpolitik der Gegenwart* risked a sneaking glance at the Stutz display window as he clattered past in his 1914 Ford. Then, as in the twinkling of an eye, Prince Max accepted the Fourteen Points, and the heavens fell. A few savants, more hopeful than the rest, went through with their handbooks, but they may now be purchased for twenty-five cents at any second-hand bookstore.

Unfortunately, the influence of the patriotic historians did not end with the Armistice. The grossly biased text-books which were a product of the war hysteria were bad enough, but they were bound to be ephemeral. The world was to suffer something far worse, for the historians, released from their literary duties, were ordered in great swarms to Paris, and so got their fingers into the pie of Versailles. The famous House Commission was made up chiefly of historians; they were told off to gather the facts concerning the historic boundaries and aspirations of the various states of Europe and so enable Dr. Wilson and his colleagues to direct the territorial pilfering and the geographical and economic chastisement of the Central Powers with ample resources in the way of erudite rationalizations. Much of the personnel of the House Commission was thus recruited from the historians

of the Creel Bureau and the National Board for Historical Service. They gathered barrels of notes on the history of Europe since the Merovingians, conceived in the spirit of "How the War Came to America," and, just after Thanksgiving, 1918, migrated with their filing-cabinets to the Hotel Crillon. Here they wielded a powerful influence in Balkanizing Europe and setting back the clock of political and economic progress for half a century. Some of the most vicious and imbecilic schemes adopted at Versailles, such as the Saar settlement, the Polish corridor through East Prussia, the Polish steals in upper Silesia, and the award of the Austrian Tyrol to Italy are primarily attributable to the influence exerted by American professors serving the House Commission. Therefore, not only the files of the Creel Bureau and the National Security League, but also "the new map of Europe" bears eloquent and enduring testimony to the results of Clio's debauch in the arms of Uncle Sam.

The effects of that debauch upon the historians themselves have not yet worn off. True enough, there is a minority among them that has begun to give critical reconsideration to the naïve myth that the Potsdam hell-cats were solely responsible for the war, but it is still very small; the majority of professors continue to assure their students and one another that the imbecilities circulated in 1917 and 1918 by the Creel Press Bureau, including even the celebrated atrocity stories, were gospel truth. The first savant to revolt against the official buncombe was Professor Sidney B. Fay, Ph.D., of Smith College, who printed his disquieting conclusions in the *American Historical Review* for July and October, 1920, and January, 1921. He continued with a notable series of articles in *Current History* on the Serajevo crime, regarding which orthodox academic opinion is to the double effect (a) that the Archduke was justly butchered for his schemes against Serbia, and (b) that Serbia had nothing to do with his assassination. At the Richmond meeting of the American Historical Association in 1924, Professor William E. Lingelbach, once a chaste crusader under the banners of Professor Shotwell's National Board for Historical Service, supplemented the work of Professor Fay by calling to the attention of his amazed and indignant fellow-members of the Association the existence of the damaging Izvolski correspondence, which altered the case in regard to our understanding of Franco-Russian responsibility as greatly as Professor Fay's articles had transformed opinion with respect to Germany and Austria. Dr. Fay was presently joined by Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, Ph.D., his colleague at Smith, who was orthodox so late as 1918, but later began to have doubts about the chastity of the Allies, and is now commonly believed, by his fellow members of the American Historical Association, to be in receipt of a retainer of $100,000 a year from the ex-Kaiser. Dr. Barnes called Chevalier Hazen to account in the *New Republic* for March 19, April 9 and May 7, 1924, and has since written a great deal about the origins of the war, including a formidable book, "The Genesis of the World War." But this tome has been violently berated by most of the other professional historians of the Republic. Their opinion was well expressed by Professor Hart in a review of one of Dr. Barnes' subversive monographs. "If Barnes is right," he said, "then Roosevelt was wrong, Wilson was wrong, Elihu Root was wrong, Ambassador Page was wrong, everybody was wrong." From this logic the national leaders of historical science refuse to retreat.

CHAPTER II.

VIVE LA FRANCE: CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN'S VIEWS ON WAR GUILT, 1924.

THE public discussion of the newer views with respect to the responsibility for the World War began chiefly as an outgrowth of a long review article published by the present writer in the *New Republic* for March 19, 1924, treating of the conceptions of war guilt embodied in the work of Professor Charles Downer Hazen, *Europe Since 1815*, brought out in a new edition at the close of 1923, some five years after the close of the War. In the *New Republic* for May 7, 1924, Professor Hazen replied to this review, and in the same issue the present writer commented upon Professor Hazen's communication.

I. SEVEN BOOKS OF HISTORY AGAINST THE GERMANS [1]

While other goddesses and muses have doubtless wilfully and brazenly enjoyed more voluntary amorous achievements and episodes than Clio, it will hardly be denied that the latter has been compelled to bestow her favors unwillingly and under protest far more frequently than any of her more fortunate sisters. Her purity has been sacrificed innumerable times in the interest of state, party, religion and family throughout the ages since the Hebrew Jahvists of the ninth century before Christ performed the obstetric services that secured her parturition from folk-lore and mythology. Her fair form has been ravished by compensatory Jewish exaggerators of the wealth and prestige of ancient Israel, by Greeks boasting of their superiority over oriental "barbarians," by patriotic protagonists of the Roman republic, and soured critics of imperial developments and policies, by pious but prevaricating Church Fathers, by apologists of Guelphs and proponents of Ghibellines, by Papist and Lutheran, by Prussian and Gallican, by Anglo-Saxon and Hibernian, by Whig and Tory, Republican and Democrat. No race, state, party, creed or sect has failed to avail itself of her helpless condition and defenseless situation. But she has weathered these indignities of millenniums, gathered an ever-increasing body of more worthy devotees, and, at the opening of the twentieth century, appeared far more coy and seductive than when, in short dresses, she was ogled by the Greek *logographoi* of the seventh century before our era. While the World War caused her to fall from grace and indulge in the dizziest and wildest debauch of her entire career, she gradually gave evidence of penitence and contrition,

[1] *New Republic*, March 19, 1924.

regained poise and respectability, and seems now well on the way to secure the devoted and untiring attention of the most ardent and competent group of admirers of whom she has ever boasted, most of them determined that hereafter her amours shall be only voluntarily bestowed solely on those whose offerings at her shrine merit her attention and gratitude.

Of all the influences which have assailed Clio's integrity and diverted her from the path of rectitude the most powerful has been war. The classic examples usually selected by teachers of historical method to illustrate the prejudices and biases of historians have been the accounts of the great conflicts of the ages. Herd impulse in the face of a crisis appears to have been the most potent of all unbalancing factors. The enormous progress of historical scholarship and objectivity between the Franco-Prussian War and 1914, however, inclined many to the hope that in the event of another calamity of this sort, the historian's poise, professional serenity and pride would triumph over state, nation and party. This aspiration and supposition was cruelly and roughly wrecked by the onset of the World War. In every country the greatest of historians behaved like clerks or shopmen in the capitulation to herd pressure and hysteria. The example was set by Eduard Meyer, by common consent the greatest of living historians, but he had a great flock of worthy imitators in every modern state.[1]

Still many hoped that with a cessation of hostilities objectivity would return, and their aspirations have in some degree been realized. A number of historians have shown a laudable desire to know the truth about the origins of the War and have made real progress in this direction, aided by the unprecedentedly rapid revelation and publication of the pertinent documents. But the progress in making the facts known to any large body of readers through general manuals summarizing the conclusions of technical monographs has been slow. Until success in this matter is achieved, however, we shall continue to harbor the myths and delusions that were current in 1917-18, will fail to recognize the futility and needlessness of the horrible tragedy of 1914-18, and will be fatally handicapped in any specific and intelligent effort to prevent a recurrence of such a cataclysm. Hence the historian who essays to inform his countrymen concerning the origins of the War assumes a heavy and serious responsibility of the highest educative and moral significance. The dangers inherent in a failure can perhaps best be realized by an analysis of a concrete example, and we are fortunate in having just been presented with the most pretentious manual on modern European history which has yet been published in English, one which is bound to be accorded a wide and varied acceptance and adoption, and will doubtless help to shape the historical opinions of several hundred thousand citizens of the United States concerning the most absorbing, if gruesome, topic in modern history, and the new order which is beginning to arise out of it.

The author of this work[2] is the successor of William Milligan Sloane in the chair of Modern European History at Columbia University, a *Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur*, and Professor in the University of Strasbourg

[1] See C. Hartley Grattan, "The Historians Cut Loose," in *American Mercury*, August, 1927.

[2] *Europe Since 1815*. By Charles Downer Hazen, Ph.D., two volumes. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

in 1920-22. He has been a notable producer of books in his field. In 1897 he brought out an interesting and suggestive work on *Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution.* Twelve years later appeared his most important work, *Europe Since 1815,* a comprehensive college textbook. This was condensed and an introductory section on the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era prefixed to constitute his *Modern European History,* which was published in 1917. The introductory portion also appeared separately this same year in an edition de luxe as *The French Revolution and Napoleon.* He also brought out in 1917 a snappy little volume on *Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule.* In 1919 he published the sections in his *Modern European History* on the period since 1870, together with an additional chapter on the World War, as *Fifty Years of Europe.* This chapter on the War was later appended to the *Modern European History,* which, with some other minor additions, appeared in 1920 as *Modern Europe.* The present work is an extension of the original edition of the *Europe Since 1815* to include the material from the *Modern Europe* on the period from 1909 to 1919, and much additional information on Europe since 1919, which is far the most notable phase of the revision. In addition to these works, Professor Hazen has edited several valuable compilations including one on the *Kaiser versus Bismarck.* While dealing with all the major states of modern Europe, Professor Hazen's chief interest has been in the history of England and France, particularly the latter. So warmly has Professor Hazen espoused the cause of France that one commentator has remarked that his series might well be called, reminiscent of Orosius, *Historiarum Adversum Germanos Libri Septem.*

Of these books the *Europe Since 1815* has been much the most significant and serviceable. It combined a discriminating selection of material, previously available in English only in such voluminous and somewhat tedious manuals as those by Fyffe, Seignobos, Andrews and Rose, with clarity and an easy familiarity of expression, and constituted a well-nigh ideal textbook on the internal political history of Europe during the last century. Written fifteen years ago, when respectable historians in Europe and America stated explicitly or implied by the organization of courses in their departments that pertinent, relevant and reliable European history ceased upon the landing of Napoleon at St. Helena, the book was something of a pioneer and a salutary historical therapeutic. It proved an unmitigated blessing to the few original and independent history teachers who quite rightly perceived that, for an understanding of contemporary European politics, the history of Europe since Waterloo is more significant than the record of events from Sargon of Agade to the Duke of Wellington. It was, of course, almost wholly narrative political history, and since 1909 the synthetic tendency and the interest in economic, social and intellectual history, as evidenced in this field by Beard, Fueter, Hayes, Ogg, Schapiro, and others, have rendered Professor Hazen's outlook somewhat antiquated. But there will always remain a place for political history, and there is no evidence that Professor Hazen's book is likely to be displaced as a text in this field on the period before 1914 by anything now available or on the horizon.

We shall not attempt a detailed summarization and estimate of the contents of the original book, which is itself now a matter of history, but some brief comment may be made on the nature of the revision. Professor

Hazen gives evidence of the effect of infection from contagious contact with Professors Shotwell, Beard and Hayes of Columbia, and of a recognition of the general shift of historical interests in the last generation, by adding new chapters on the Industrial Revolution and the development of modern social reform programs. There is, however, little attempt to work out a synthesis of economic, social and political factors and influences, and the book still remains primarily a treatment of political and diplomatic history rather than a synthetic effort like that of his colleague, Professor Hayes. Beyond bringing the material down to 1923, there is little change in the chapters as originally published in 1909. The chief alterations consist in making somewhat more evident, *ex post facto*, the German menace to the world from 1890 to 1914. He has made use of his crisp pamphlet prepared for the Creel Committee on Public Information to emphasize the undemocratic nature of the German government before the War, which aroused the unbounded enthusiasm of not a few American college presidents and exchange professors. German naval ambition, foreign policy, colonial expansion and business methods are presented as bent upon world domination, and a threat to all free and self-respecting peoples. All of these were rendered the more dangerous because of the eccentric, egoistic and domineering character of the Kaiser. Perhaps the most novel paragraph is that in which the co-operation between the German government and German business is stigmatized as disruptive of world peace. "The German will to conquer, by fair means or by foul, could only in the end arouse the determination of other peoples to defend themselves. The latter would not be willing permanently to acquiesce without a struggle, and in an attitude of impotence and resignation, in their own strangulation by a power bent on Germanizing the world."

The reader's interest and curiosity will, quite naturally, be centered upon Professor Hazen's treatment of the period since 1914, and, in particular, upon his analysis of the origins of the War, the Peace Treaty, reparations and the Russian Bolshevik revolution and social and economic régime —in other words those episodes, issues and movements which best test the accuracy and objectivity of the historian. Professor Hazen's first discussion of the origins of the World War appeared in his *Modern European History*, the preface of which is dated January, 1917. Here, as might be expected, the story is the familiar one credited by the great majority of historical scholars at that time. Germany, the bully of Russia in 1908, with her eye on the domination of the Near East and Mesopotamia, encouraged Austrian aggression in the Balkans, which, planned for 1913 but mysteriously postponed, drove the Serbians to the border of desperation and led to the murder of the Archduke in June, 1914. In the subsequent relations between Austria and Serbia Germany "backed Austria from start to finish," if, indeed, she did not instigate the Austrian policy, the details of which were known from the start and warmly approved by the Kaiser and his ministers. Austria forthwith proceeded to attempt an unprecedented bullying of a weak and peaceful state, presuming, as in 1908, upon Russian cowardice or hesitation. Russia, however, this time refused to be bluffed out of playing the benevolent and disinterested part of big brother to her tiny Slavic kinsmen. Thereupon Germany precipitately declared war upon Russia, thus necessitating participation by a hesitant, peace-loving and defenseless

France, which was led to intervene more in the interest of the preservation of European civilization than because of binding obligation. The Entente was not an alliance but only a courteous understanding among gentlemen, though there is implicit recognition of the force of the Franco-Russian alliance. England, however, was fettered by no agreement whatever with either France or Russia; she was perfectly free to act as she might choose. Her entry was brought about by the dastardly invasion of Belgium, a crime against international decency and honor which could never have been contemplated, much less executed, by any state save Germany. The cause and the issues were so clear that the overwhelming judgment of the world was immediately expressed as to the primary and sole responsibility of Germany and Austria for the terrible cataclysm, and this verdict was rendered permanent and irrefragable by the action of Italy. This state, hitherto thoroughly enamoured of Germany and Austria, refused to sell her honor by joining with her allies of the Triple Alliance in a war of spoil and territorial aggrandizement; later she entered the crusade of the righteous wholly free from material ambitions.

This epic may well be forgiven, for we possessed in 1916 but the most incomplete knowledge concerning the outbreak of the War, and even the Postdam Conference was accepted by the majority of historians, though as early as 1914 it was known that England was morally bound to join France and would have done so irrespective of the invasion of Belgium. Indeed, the writer in the summer of 1917, at the instigation of several historians of international reputation, aided a bullet manufacturer in preparing for the National Security League almost as absurd and misleading an account of the background of the War as that which appears in Professor Hazen's text. The same version of the coming of the great conflict was repeated almost without the slightest verbal change in his *Fifty Years of Europe*, where there is added a brief survey of the course of the War, which, as he tells us, was finished "on the day the Armistice was accepted and which therefore represents only incomplete knowledge and hurried impressions of a mighty moment in history." This modest apology was apparently intended to apply only to the history of the War and not to the account of its origins, as the same narrative appears for a third time in the *Modern Europe*, which was published in 1920. In the interval of two years there had appeared, among other significant material, the published *Secret Treaties of the Entente*, the *Kautsky Documents*, Goos' important work on Austrian policy and the origins of the War and his voluminous Austrian *Red Book*, Pribram's *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, and a flood of controversial works containing much illuminating information. Professor Sidney B. Fay was also beginning his epoch-making series of articles, which for the first time made available for English and American readers the implications of the above material.

Still, one could find cause for a good-natured tolerance towards Professor Hazen. He could allege that his book was intended for high school students and college freshmen and that he had not yet been able to find time to sift the new evidence. His friends expectantly awaited the revision of his *Europe Since 1815* to discover a carefully digested and impartial analysis of the onset of the War, in the first detailed manual on modern European history written by a professor of established position and leisure, and late

enough to allow the production of a perfectly definitive judgment and exposition. Their hopes were badly, if not fatally, chilled through a review by Professor Hazen of Schevill's *Political History of Modern Europe*, which appeared in the *Political Science Quarterly* for June, 1922. Professor Schevill had made good use of Fay's articles, and his account of the genesis of the War is one of the fairest and clearest to be found in the same number of pages in any book which had thus far appeared in our language. Of this admirable summary Professor Hazen wrote "It would have been better had the three new chapters never been written, for they present a view of the causes of the war which would be much more appreciated in the schools of Germany than in those of the United States" Professor Hazen is apparently determined to be "appreciated" in the schools of his country, for, in spite of another year of grace and the advantages of European travel and study, the reader of the revised *Europe Since 1815* discovers to his dismay, if not to his astonishment, that he is presented with the fiction of 1916 as dispensed in the *Modern European History*, with scarcely a change of word or punctuation. The only noticeable alterations are the inclusion of the substance of his review of Schevill's book and the change of a "v" to "b" in the spelling of Serbia.

This is not the place for a summary of the historiography of the World War since 1920, but even a brief enumeration of the more important work done will indicate the enormity of Professor Hazen's offense in submitting in an advanced manual an account of the origins of the War based solely on materials available in 1916. Friedjung has revealed by using the secret unpublished documents how preposterous a misconception we formerly entertained concerning the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908. Instead of being frightened off by an arrogant German Kaiser in "shining armor," Russia took part through Izvolski in the negotiations over the annexation, giving her consent in return for the promise of Austro-German pressure on Turkey for the opening of the Straits to the Russian navy. And not only did Izvolski take part in the negotiations; it was he who put the idea in the Austrians' minds by suggesting that they annex these provinces. And Germany averted an Austrian attack on Serbia in 1913. Fay proved very clearly that Austria had been the aggressor towards Serbia in 1914, that Germany had been only very meagerly informed concerning the terms of the Austrian ultimatum before its delivery, that Bethmann and Jagow when they read its contents thought it too strong, and that the Kaiser and his Chancellor regarded the Serbian reply as satisfactory, and did everything possible to localize the conflict. He also proved that the Russians took the ultimatum to Serbia as a declaration of war, and began preparatory mobilization measures against both Germany and Austria. Gooch goes even further and contends that the Tsar's order to suspend mobilization, in answer to the Kaiser's request, was intercepted by the Russian militarists, though this is still a disputed point. Much more material has since come out on the Austro-Serbian situation. Hötzendorf has frankly admitted the long standing and ill-concealed ambitions of the Austrian general staff for a war with Serbia. Most astonishing of all, a Serbian scholar, Stanojevitch, has recently revealed the fact that the assassination of the Archduke was planned under the direction of the chief of the intelligence bureau of the Serbian general staff, a fact apparently

not known to Berchtold in July, 1914. Not a few impartial historians have admitted that the integrity of the Dual Monarchy depended upon a firm and vigorous attitude towards Serbia in 1914. We certainly made war on Spain, and intervened in Mexico on far slighter pretexts.

With respect to Russia, the *Siebert Documents*, Paléologue's *Memoirs*, Marchand's *Livre Noir*, and the recently published analysis of the *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, present an overwhelming indictment of Russian imperialism, aggression, and zeal for war in 1914. They further make it clear that Russia took the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia as a declaration of war, and that the war was really *on* from that moment. The Russian attitude rendered futile any attempt at delay and arbitration. These documents also reveal the close collusion between the Russian militarists and the French group led by Poincaré. Izvolski admits the Russian bribery of the French press, the sordid details of which have recently been revealed in *L'Humanité*, in the *New Republic* and in the *Nation* for February 6, 1924. In regard to England, the *Siebert Documents* have shown her involvements with France and Russia, particularly with the latter in the Near East, and her conversations with Russia in regard to naval union and action against Germany. Grey has confessed his agreement to intervene to protect the coast of France irrespective of the German invasion of Belgium; Haldane has boasted that plans for landing English troops on the continent had been worked out and settled during the decade prior to 1914; and Churchill has admitted that from 1912 onward the navy began to prepare for a war with Germany in both a psychological and material way. Finally, the Belgian archives reveal conversations regarding the possibility of landing English troops on Belgian soil in event of a war with Germany, and one of Sazonov's reports to the Tsar contains a promise from the English king that England would sink every German merchant ship she could lay her hands on in the event of war. For France one does not need to turn to Bausman's demonstration of the persistent French military tradition, to Gouttenoire de Toury's indictment of the French war party, commended by Charles Seignobos, to Pevet's damaging examination of the evidence for aggressive French policy in regard to the origins of the War or to Poincaré's weak apology. Ample material to eliminate once and for all the myth of a helpless, terrified and reluctant France, as far as those in control of her policy are concerned, is available in such sober collections of documents as the *Siebert Documents*, the revelations in regard to the falsification of the Russian *Orange Book*, and, above all, in Marchand's *Livre Noir*. They prove Poincaré and his group willing by 1913 to risk a general European war in order to recover Alsace and Lorraine. Further, Demartial has described the manner in which the French war party deluded the majority and induced them to accept the fiction of a defensive war. France was unquestionably an alert partner in the Franco-Russian alliance in the years from 1909 to 1914, probably the more aggressive of the two after 1912. Finally there are ample Belgian documents proving that Belgium feared an invasion by France quite as much as by Germany in the case of a European war, and France had apparently considered this eventuality in her military plans.

Little information has subsequently come out regarding Germany designed to alter seriously the interpretation worked out by Professor Fay

on the basis of the *Kautsky Documents*, though there has been plenty to corroborate it in the works of Valentin, Haller, Hammann, Montgelas and others. The fact of the autocratic government, militaristic tradition and imposing armament on land and sea remains unimpaired, something we are often in danger of forgetting in the midst of absorbing interest in the newly revealed documents, but the thesis of a deliberate German plot against the peace of the world in the summer of 1914 does not have the slightest support, though there is evidence that the German leaders were thoroughly worried in May and June of 1914 over the Anglo-Russian naval discussion and the tightening of Franco-Russian encirclement, and recognized the necessity of prompt action in the event of an impending attack. Finally, the case for Italy's entry into the War in the sole interest of cosmic justice was set tottering by the publication of the Secret Treaties, and has been pulverized by the recent revelation of the documents in the Russian archives bearing on the Italian dickering with the Entente from July, 1914, to her entry into the conflict. The fact that Italy had made a secret treaty with France in 1902 not to engage in any war upon the latter greatly reduces the validity of Italy's non-participation in 1914 on the side of the other members of the Triple Alliance as a test of her judgment of the guilt of Germany and Austria. Germany, England and Italy appear to have been the only states honestly desirous of peace in 1914, though Austria certainly did not want a general European war.

Much of the above material was sifted and analyzed by Professor Charles A. Beard in the introduction to his *Cross-Currents in Europe Today*, and a magisterial synthesis of the whole literature, forecast in his admirable brochure on the diplomatic revelations, has appeared in the recent history by Professor G. P. Gooch, which is declared by no less an authority than Archibald Cary Coolidge to be far the best work on the diplomatic background of the war that has appeared in any language up to the present moment. On the basis of these revelations the arrogance and insolence of Mr. Asquith's recent work is no less than appalling—almost as amazing as the discovery that Professor Hazen lists many of the above collections and monographs in the bibliography appended to his chapter on the War without having acquainted himself in the slightest degree with their contents.

It is in the light of the above researches and disclosures that one can best comprehend the grotesquely misleading nature of such a statement as the following:

"The responsibility for this tragic, monstrous, unnecessary crime against civilization, against humanity, was lightly assumed. . . . The opinion of the outside world as to where that responsibility lies has been overwhelmingly expressed. . . . The world was stunned by the criminal levity with which Austria-Hungary and Germany had created this hideous situation. The sinister and brutal challenge was, however, accepted immediately and with iron resolution by those who had done their utmost during those twelve days to avert the catastrophe, and not only great powers like France and England, but small ones like Belgium and Serbia, never hesitated, but resolved to do or die. That the contest was not merely a material one, but that the most precious moral and spiritual interests were involved, was clearly seen and stated at the very beginning of the war by the responsible

statesmen of France and England. In those early days, Mr. Asquith, prime minister of Great Britain, expressed the common resolution of the western powers when he declared: 'We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.' A cause dedicated to such aims as those was worthy of the supreme sacrifice it would pitilessly exact. . . .

"Had England rendered no other service than this of making the seas safe for freedom and dangerous for despotism, the debt of humanity to her would be incalculable. But she was doing far more than this. The utterances of her statesmen, like those of France, from the first of August, 1914, defined the issues at stake, and set forth adequately the appalling gravity of the crisis. Not only were those utterances profoundly educative but they were veritable trumpet blasts, summoning to action, in the interest of all that men in Western Europe and in America had long held most precious. In the darkest hours, and there were many such during those first three years, there was no faltering in high places, no talk of compromise of right with wrong, no weakening of resolution, no abatement of effort. It must never be forgotten that the leaders of France and England, and the nations they represent were constant and valorous defenders of the New World, as of the Old, that it was their heroism and their immeasurable spirit of sacrifice that barred the way of a mighty and conscienceless military power toward universal domination. Never did men die in a holier cause. And they died in enormous numbers, literally by the million."

As might be expected, Professor Hazen has little patience with those who advocated objectivity on the part of America in the face of this cosmic dualism—who counseled hesitation in our joining the forces of Ormuzd against the devilish hosts of Ahriman:

"In such a contest as that the United States belonged, body and soul. If she was to preserve a shred of self-respect, if she was to maintain inviolate the honor of the American name, if she was to safe-guard the elementary rights of American citizens, if she was bound in any sense to be her brother's helper in the defense of freedom in the world, then she must take her stand shoulder to shoulder with the hosts of freemen in Europe who were giving and had long been giving the last full measure of devotion to that cause, then she must spend her manhood and her wealth freely and without complaint, as France and England and Belgium and Serbia had done.

"From very early in the war there were Americans who endeavored to arouse their country to a sense of its danger and its duty, to persuade it to prepare, to fire it with the resolve to keep the nation's 'scutcheon clean. Among those who, by their quick and intelligent appreciation of the situation, by their courage and activity, rendered invaluable service in the campaign of national education were ex-President Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood. Many Americans enlisted in foreign legions.

"From August, 1914, to April, 1917, America passed through a painful,

humiliating, and dangerous experience. Her declaration of war was the expression of the wisdom she distilled from that experience. Her entrance into the war was the most important event of the year 1917, though not immediately the most important, for the collapse of Russia, occurring also in that year, had a quicker and more direct bearing upon the military situation. But in the end, if America kept the faith, she could tip the scales decisively.

"We entered the war finally because Germany forced us in, because she rendered it absolutely impossible for us to stay out unless we were the most craven and pigeon-hearted people on the earth. Any one who counted on that being the case, was entertaining a notion for which he could certainly cite no evidence in our previous history."

Professor Hazen can at least claim the virtue of consistency. He carries the epic through with logical thoroughness. The 1917 stories of German frightfulness and submarine atrocities are repeated in full and without the slightest qualification. Admiral Sims is apparently regarded as untrustworthy. God's rebuke to the Kaiser and Ludendorff was no less apparent and certain than it was to Sennacherib before Jerusalem. The Peace of Versailles left little or nothing to be desired as an instrument of absolute and impartial justice and constructive international statesmanship. "The place chosen for the Peace Conference was appropriately Paris, which Meredith once called 'the goddess of the lightning brain,' 'valiant unto death for a principle' and which had been the nerve center of the Allied cause, the throbbing heart of the coalition, from the first day to the last of the racking struggle." The offspring was like unto the place of parturition. Not even the reparations as originally determined come in for a mild word of doubt or disapproval—except for a protest later on in regard to German failure to pay them in full. There is no sympathy for Germany, or suggestion of injustice or inconsistency in regard to the Fourteen Points. "Time has brought complete revenge" for Prussian aggression in 1870. "The drastic provisions, if executed, will destroy that German militarism which has cost the world so intolerable a price." "By the Treaty she accepts the responsibility of herself and her associates for all the loss and damage to the Allied governments and Allied peoples caused by the war. But as the payment of so monstrous a sum (the actual war loss, not the stated reparations) is quite beyond her and their resources, she is to escape from a large part of what would be only a just penalty." One will obtain from his pages no intimation whatever that the very question of reparations from Germany is now as anachronistic as witchcraft or astrology in the light of the well established facts concerning the origins of the War. Even Poincaré has admitted that proof of divided responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict would carry with it inevitably the acceptance of the principle of the division of the costs of the war among all participants. The objective, unbiased and disinterested opinion of Lloyd George is introduced as a final and definitive proof of the justice of the Peace Covenant! (pp. 760-61).

Unfortunately, some of the parents of this beautiful child refused to accept the responsibility for her maintenance. Petty politics in the United States and sordid materialism in England have prevented her from being nourished into robust youth. This has forced France into other policies to compensate her for the loss of the support of the United States and England. "Guarantees of a military nature France must have, and this was her

most poignant pre-occupation at the Conference of Paris; and reparations, too, have an obvious connection with national security." She has attempted to gain compensation and security by alliances with the new powers of central and eastern Europe. "The international influence of the Republic is stronger and more commanding than it has been in a long while. The power and prestige of her eastern neighbor no longer overshadow her. The most authoritative voices in the councils of Europe are those of France and England. France is the most active and powerful defender of the treaties upon which the new order of the world rests, and as such she is the natural ally of the states of central and eastern Europe who find their title deeds in those very treaties. One of the members of the Great Entente, her connections with the Little Entente are close and are likely to become still closer. French diplomacy has a wider field than ever for constructive achievement. German models and methods are destined to enjoy a lesser vogue, and a renewed radiation of French influence has begun." The occupation of the Ruhr as an example of this "radiation" is heartily approved. "What the French did was to seize the most valuable single asset of the defiant and slippery debtor." It will be noted that he has made no attempt to draw the parallel between French atrocities in the Ruhr and German atrocities in Belgium. Nor is anything said about corruption and graft in the French private claims for reparation funds.

However misleading Professor Hazen's book may be with respect to war origins and war guilt, it will undoubtedly forward the progress of scientific historical writing in another respect. When the Bernheims, Georges, and Langlois and Seignobos of the future are preparing their illustrative anthologies of national and class bias Hazen may well succeed to the place now occupied by James Anthony Froude in the critical works on the historiography of the present day.

The Bolsheviks naturally offend and repel one with Hazen's aristocratic and refined associations, and the chapter on Russia is literally pure diatribe rather than history. It could appropriately be circulated in pamphlet form by the Better America Federation of Los Angeles. There is no effort to portray the deep-seated and complicated background of the Russian upheaval or to present the Bolshevik régime as the logical outcome of the historic circumstances in the case, however little one may approve of their system of economic and political life. While Hazen is violently repelled by the dictatorship and "lawlessness" of Lenin and his associates, he is equally enamoured of the mild, sweet-mannered and law-respecting Mussolini who saved Italy from Bolshevism. Even his talents as a chauffeur are warmly commended as proof of his adaptation to the peculiar requirements of the contemporary Italian political system. Military precautions, secret diplomacy and non-fulfillment of agreements and obligations on the part of Germany are sharply condemned, and praised with equal fervor with respect to her enemies. In his enthusiasm for the new territorial creations which have grown out of the Allied victory, Hazen fails to make clear the notable defects in the Polish *Politik* or the backward and primitive political life of the Balkan states which will continue to threaten the peace and civilization of Europe for generations to come.

Many reflections are suggested by this book and its methods. Professor

Hazen can be forgiven for his pro-French attitude. The writer shares this bias, at least as regards the traditional and semi-mythical France, which is the France of Hazen. Those things for which France is supposed to stand: tolerance, contempt for sordid and compensatory Puritanism, an appreciation of the æsthetic, cultural pluralism and diversity, antipathy to regimentation, and resistance to mechanical industrialism and unbounded fecundity attract me as much as I am repelled by the mass production, quantitative standards, bigotry, superficiality, regimentation, insistence upon conformity, and the worship of a dizzy birth-rate, which characterize the typically industrial and *bourgeois* civilizations, such as those of Germany and the United States. Yet one's subjective estimate of cultural and psychological values is no adequate basis for the rejection of historical facts. Again, while it is difficult for a writer to be certain of the spiritual advantage or desirability of subordinating a great moral passion to the exigencies and requirements of prosaic facts, yet the growing disposition to do this is what has constituted the progress of historical method and scholarship from the time of the composition of the Book of Chronicles to the work of Sorel and Gooch. And when a reputable historian refuses absolutely to take cognizance of a vast mass of first-hand source material which has completely revolutionized our knowledge of what he himself regards as the greatest crisis and episode in human history, we clearly have a case of "criminal levity" which is beyond the scope or competence of the historical critic, and must be referred to the psychiatrist with his proficiency in dealing with such mechanisms and complexes as the flight from reality, compensation, projection, defense-mechanisms, the Jehovah complex, and the fixed idea.

Perhaps the most astonishing thing about the book is that it appeared under the editorship, and, hence, with the apparent approval, of Dean Charles Homer Haskins of Harvard University. Now concerning the scholarship of Professor Hazen there are differences of opinion, with neither extreme of which would the writer care to align himself, but with regard to Professor Haskins there has been no question as to erudition and scholarship. It is no exaggeration to say that no historian has yet lived who has been better prepared technically for the study of history, who has given evidence of a more keen, discriminating and objective scholarship, or who has been more uniformly rigorous in applying scientific historical methods in his own monographic researches. Yet the reviewer can say from personal knowledge that if a candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in Harvard University had submitted in Professor Haskins' course on historiography a paper on the causes of the Hundred Years' War, which ignored the sources as thoroughly as does Professor Hazen's account of the origins of the World War, this student would not only have been dropped from the class but also from the graduate school. And when we reflect that even the most scholarly of historians have to depend for source material upon contemporary authorities who were invariably less adequately trained than Professor Hazen and often more subjective, we are almost driven to the conclusion that there was no little validity in the dictum of the wizard of the flivver concerning the nature and utility of history.

One fact and recommendation is beyond cavil, namely, that the publishers are under a moral obligation to arrange for a thorough-going revision of the second volume by some such person as Professor Coolidge, Professor

Langer, Professor Seymour or Professor Schmitt ere it misinforms and perverts the historical judgment of thousands of college students and general readers in the present and coming generations. In a general work of a popular sort, unsponsored by professional historians, the dictates of a free press would probably require the granting of poetic license even to a writer on historical subjects, but there is a greater moral obligation to approximate candor and truth in a book designed to instruct the citizenry of a democratic republic. A textbook is no place for a violent partisan polemic, however exalted the spirit of the author. Of course, some might urge in extenuation liberty of interpretation, but there are certainly limits to this concept and process, and Professor Hazen cannot take refuge here unless he is willing to share his retreat with Orosius and Carlyle, and to grant the validity of the allegorical method in historical literature.

The absolute immunity of a respectable and aristocratic historian, however serious his offense, is well exemplified by the experience of Professor Hazen since publishing the above revised edition of his book. He has been elected a member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters, and made chairman of the nominating committee of the American Historical Association. Most gratifying, if least astonishing, of all, his book was reviewed for the *American Historical Review* by Frank Maloy Anderson.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

II. PROFESSOR HAZEN ON THE CAUSES OF THE WAR[1]

Sir: The articles which have recently appeared in your issues of March 19th and April 9th containing an extensive discussion of my books on European history and particularly expressing unqualified condemnation of my treatment of the causes of the late war prompt me to make a few remarks pertinent to the general subject. I realize, of course, that a writer of something "worse than bunk," a person who fails to make "a decent and respectable effort to tell the truth," a man who is brazen enough to present "the fiction of 1916" in a manual bearing the date of 1923, (to refer to some of Professor Barnes' urbane, if severe, characterizations), is at a disadvantage in asking for a hearing from any serious person. Without attempting to point out several misrepresentations that occur in the indictment or to reply in kind to the personalities distributed throughout Professor Barnes' pages, I shall address myself as briefly as I can, to the central charge.

"The one major, significant and damaging demonstration in my review," says Professor Barnes, in your issue of April 9th, "was that the account of the origins of the war in Professor Hazen's 1923 work was actually written in 1916, when he could not possibly have had access to a single definitive work dealing with the outbreak of the great conflict, and that his listing of the more recent material in the bibliography of this chapter was but the most flagrant subterfuge and outrageous stratagem." In the review itself of March 19th, Professor Barnes says: "And when a reputable historian refuses absolutely to take cognizance of a vast mass of first-hand source material which has completely revolutionized our knowledge of what

[1] *New Republic*, May 7, 1924.

he himself regards as the greatest crisis and episode in human history, we clearly have a case of 'criminal levity' which is beyond the scope and competence of the historical critic and must be referred to the psychiatrist with his proficiency in dealing with such mechanisms and complexes as the flight from reality, compensation, projection, defense-mechanisms, the Jehovah complex and the fixed idea." In his letter Professor Barnes refers to me as "innocent of the sources."

I suppose in general that one who belongs in the psychiatric ward is not considered a proper witness in any case of historical, or other dispute. I do not see how Professor Barnes could be persuaded that I know anything about the historical sources in question. However, incredible as it may seem, I have studied this new material and have followed with interest and to the best of my ability the discussion to which it has given rise. Indeed, in reprinting in 1923 my account of 1916 I assumed, perhaps fatuously, that my colleagues in the profession would infer, not that I had neglected to take the usual precautions of endeavoring to inform myself on the subject on which I was pretending to speak, but that, if I did not change my narrative, it was because I saw no reason for changing it in the light of the new revelations. I can see now that perhaps I made a mistake in not stating that fact explicitly in my new edition.

I was publishing a brief account, of some ten or twelve pages, of the immediate causes of the war, not an elaborate study of all the incidents and the literature pertaining to them. Necessarily, as it seems to me, I was restricted to the main features and could not go into the details, however interesting. It might have been better had I undertaken to write on a very different scale, but I did not. If I presented the main features correctly I considered that I had discharged my task. In my narrative I ascribe the immediate and an important responsibility to Austria, the major responsibility to Germany, and I do not hold either Russia or France or England responsible for the outbreak of the world conflict and I censure those who cut negotiations short, by actually declaring war, after those negotiations had been going on for only a very few days, and who thus rendered a possible peaceful issue impossible. This is the "epic," the "fiction," the "story" of 1916, which seems to me still to possess validity. I do not believe now, with Professor Barnes, nor did I believe when I sent my new edition to press, that the new material "has completely revolutionized our knowledge" of how the war came about, nor do I believe with him that "Germany and England appear to have been the only states honestly desirous of peace in 1914," nor do I share his belief that "the very question of reparations from Germany is now as anachronistic as witchcraft or astrology in the light of the well-established facts concerning the origins of the war."

I should despair of trying to convince Professor Barnes of the correctness of my judgment of the origins of the war, or of my competence to have an honest or informed opinion, but fortunately he and I still have a common meeting-ground—in our appreciation of the work of Professor Fay, which we both respect. Professor Barnes speaks of Mr. Fay's articles as "epoch-making," he says that "little information has subsequently come out regarding Germany designed to alter seriously the interpretation worked

out by Professor Fay on the basis of the Kautsky Documents," and he declares that Professor Turner's chapter on The Causes of the Great War—(and he associates Professor Turner with me in attempting to foist upon the public "the Turnerian-Hazenian epic")—"presents a picture of the situation almost diametrically opposed to Fay on all major points."

It is interesting with this sharply defined standard in mind, to turn to Professor Fay and to see what he says concerning these major points. The closing paragraph in Professor Fay's second article (*American Historical Review*, October 1920, pages 52-53) reads as follows: "In a wider sense, however, these new documents do not in any way relieve Germany of the main responsibility. She is responsible for her negligence in giving Austria a free hand on July 5th, and in not attempting earlier and more vigorously to reassert her control at Vienna. She is responsible—and here the responsibility rests especially on the Kaiser—in deliberately blocking several peace proposals which, though they might have turned to the disadvantage of Austria, and to the diminution of her own prestige, would have been as nothing in comparison with what was to take place. One would be more inclined to listen to her assertion that she was fighting a war of self-defense if she had not sent so precipitately her ultimatums to Russia and France and insisted on adhering to her principle that mobilization inevitably must be followed by war. In a still wider sense, also, Germany is responsible, because one may say that militarism was one of the great causes of the war. It was militarism which was largely responsible for the campaign of lies and national hatred in the jingo press of all Continental Europe which had been poisoning public opinion for years. When the crisis arose, not a little of the direction which diplomacy took in Berlin, Vienna, and Petrograd was due to the pressure of so-called public opinion. It was militarism, too, which placed in power such men without scruple as Moltke and Tirpitz, or Sukhomlinov and Janushkevitch. It is always at a time of diplomatic crisis, precisely when it is most difficult for diplomats to keep their heads clear and their hands free, that the influence of militarism makes itself felt by hastening decisions for war, or even by getting the upper hand altogether. And for the growth of militarism in Europe, no country was so much responsible as Germany."

And in the issue of the *American Historical Review* for January, 1921, Professor Fay says, after a close study of the policy of the Russian government during the critical days and particularly of the Russian militarists' manoeuvres and ambitions, and the final issuance of the order of general mobilization: "If the German government, on July 31st, had really desired peace, it would have been possible for it simply to answer Russian mobilization by German mobilization, and stand on the defensive. But the German militarists insisted that mobilization meant war and therefore Bethmann despatched the ultimatum to Russia and to France, to which but one answer was possible on their part" (page 251). And Professor Fay also says: "As to France, however much she may have encouraged the Russian militarists, in the months preceding the crisis, by her adoption of the three-year term of military service, by her exchange of military and diplomatic visits (Joffre, Grand Duke Nicholas, Poincaré), by her naval convention, by her jingo press, and by her close relations with England, and however much

by these same measures she may have aroused the suspicions of Germany, there can be no doubt that when the crisis came, she sincerely did her best to avert it" (pp. 252-253). As for Belgium, Professor Fay says that she was the innocent victim of the German militarists," and he evidently does not regard England as causing the war, although he criticizes certain features of Grey's diplomacy.

After all, to a mere candidate for, or occupant of, the psychiatric ward, it would seem that Professor Fay was not a star witness for Professor Barnes and for his theory that the new post-war source material has "completely revolutionized our knowledge" of the crisis of July and August 1914.

Professor Barnes has, however, by his attack accomplished one good thing, for which I am frankly grateful. He has caused me to re-read my account of the causes of the war and to look over again some of the important literature. The result has been to convince me that I was wrong when I stated that Germany made no efforts at any time during the crisis to hold Austria back and find a feasible solution. It is true that, as Professor Fay shows, these efforts were "belated," of the "eleventh hour," and that, in making them, Bethmann "did not find adequate support from his own War-Lord and in Vienna." It is clear, however, that I have overstated this matter in my text and I shall, of course, endeavor to make the proper rectification in the next printing of my book. Despite the apparent conviction of Professor Barnes I really have no rooted, inveterate desire to have errors in my writings.

Professor Barnes closes his letter of April 9th by calling out the reserves and by inviting a number of excellent scholars "to come forward and either drive me into deserved oblivion by proving that I have misrepresented and misstated the revisionist position with respect to the origins of the war, or to accept the challenge of Professors Turner and Hazen and bring them to judgment before the bar of professional historical opinion." This is placing the issue upon a high plane, that of the Greek drama, which, I believe, had the mission of purifying the soul by terror. But it may be that some of those thus summoned will decline to take the matter *au grand tragique* and may prove quite indifferent to Professor Barnes' fate and to mine. In that case the joys of martyrdom may be denied us both.

CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN.

III. A REPLY FROM PROFESSOR BARNES.[1]

Sir: Those honestly and seriously interested in the merits of the controversy between Professors Hazen, Turner and myself over the responsibility for the World War will find my conclusions on this matter set forth more fully in the May number of the New York *Times Current History Magazine*, where it has been possible to make extended references to the documentary evidence and the monographic researches which have appeared since 1918. Hence, it will not be necessary in this regard further to intrude upon the space which you have so generously put at the disposal of those who believe that the inevitable but disastrous mythology of 1914-17 should be dispelled. My modest and imperfect effort to state the revisionist case must stand

[1] *New Republic*, May 7, 1924.

or fall with the contents of that article, though I am glad to say that the same general position is to be found in the abler and more scholarly article by Professor Schmitt in the April number of the *American Historical Review*. This latter article, incidentally, answers quite adequately the question which Professor Hazen raises in his book, namely, why the clashing imperialisms met in mortal combat in 1914.

Professor Hazen protests, by satirical implication, against my epithetical historical style. This is, however, primarily an aesthetic rather than an historical problem, and may be passed over with little comment. It will be diversely judged according to the canons of taste of the readers. I may frankly admit, however, that it widely differs from the Rotarian urbanity, affability and optimism which characterizes the public conduct and expression of the majority of eminent and respectable American historians. If I had conformed to their standards of professional courtesy, I would have violently cursed the book privately among intimate friends, and then maintained a dignified and immaculate silence in public. It was doubtless his expectancy of a complete prevalence of this attitude, together with the foreknowledge of the fact that his book would not ordinarily be seriously reviewed in the *American Historical Review*, the *Political Science Quarterly*, or any leading general periodical, which encouraged Professor Hazen to take the gambler's chance that he would escape serious and widespread public criticism for his offence against objective historical scholarship. And he apparently only missed being correct and safe in this regard by the narrowest possible margin. My psychiatric diagnosis of Professor Hazen as a war casualty due to historiographical shell-shock is only confirmed by his statement in his present letter that he saw no reason for changing his 1916 conclusions after having gone through all the new documentary evidence. But it can at least be granted that Professor Hazen has the "courage of his emotions."

Professor Hazen complains that I have niggardly directed my criticism chiefly against only a portion of the last volume of his work. No one could have honestly praised the excellent features of Professor Hazen's earlier work more warmly than I did in the review in question. My criticism was, however, more generously comprehensive than that which was actually published—a section being eliminated on account of limitations of space. I believe it is not unfair to state that, throughout the second volume, wherever there was an opportunity to exhibit bias and prejudice Professor Hazen registered close to hundred percent efficiency, especially in his treatment of Ireland and Russia. If more error and nonsense have ever been packed into twenty pages of a recently compiled work on history than may be found in his chapter on Russia, I am not aware of the fact. If the editor of the *New Republic* considered the matter one of sufficient importance to turn over several complete issues for the purpose, I should be happy to criticize in reasonably adequate fashion the whole of the second volume.

I wrote advisedly and upon full consideration of phraseology when I intimated that treatments of the background and origins of the war, such as those to be found in the books of Professors Hazen and Turner were "worse than bunk." Books like those by Turner and Hazen will pervert the information and stultify the intelligence of many thousands of the best young

minds in the country. It was just this sort of historical writing on the part of French and German authors from 1870 to 1914 that did as much as anything to create the mutual hatred.

As to the question of Professor Fay's researches, apparently differently interpreted by Professor Hazen and myself, it is manifestly unfair to exploit his articles, written in 1919-1920, without bearing in mind the much fuller information we now possess. It is a well known fact that practically all of the evidence damaging to the French and Russian cases has been published since that time, whereas the material on the Austro-German relations was available in 1919. It is upon this latter matter that Professor Fay in his illuminating articles was and still is a "star witness." What I specifically said was that little had appeared since 1920 to challenge, and much to corroborate, Professor Fay's account of the attitude of the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg concerning the relation of Germany to Austria in July 1914, as set forth in the articles which he published in July and October, 1920. I am willing to reaffirm my belief in the accuracy of this statement without qualification, though I feel that Fay's conclusion as quoted was over cautious and restrained in the light of the body of the article. As all competent students realize, the *Laloy Documents*, the *Livre Noir* and the *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, all of which have come out since 1919, necessitate a complete modification of the view of German responsibility for the European War which Professor Hazen cites from pages 52-53 of the October article. The determination of war-guilt as distributed among all the nations involved is a quite different and more general problem from that mentioned in the passage in Fay, and has to be judged in the light of the above revelations of Franco-Russian negotiations in July and August, 1914, which were not published at the time Professor Fay wrote his articles. It is quite obvious that an opinion on relative German war-guilt made independent of and prior to our documentary knowledge of the Franco-Russian conduct in the joint circumstances would possess no inherent and final value whatever. "These new documents," referred to by Professor Fay in the citation selected by Professor Hazen are, of course, the *Kautsky Documents* and the Austrian *Red Book*, and not the whole of the new evidence which would include the three important collections of Franco-Russian negotiations mentioned by title above. It is highly probable that, as a conscientious and alert historian, Professor Fay has since altered his judgment on this point in keeping with the appearance and nature of the new evidence. The same reasoning applies with even greater cogency to the citation of Fay's statement that the Germans should have answered Russian mobilization solely by counter-mobilization and defensive waiting. Moreover, Professor Hazen, before writing the above letter, personally knew through listening to a lecture by Professor Fay that he had changed his opinion in regard to this question of German counter-mobilization—a fact which reflects seriously upon Professor Hazen's good faith in citing this reference from the articles. And most exceptionable of all is his citation of Fay's opinion upon the French attitude and conduct in late July and August, 1914. Surely Professor Hazen should know that most of our pertinent evidence on this subject has been brought out since 1919. Professor Fay, in 1919-20, was little better off in this respect than he would have been if writing in 1914. And I did not even by implication cite Professor Fay's articles as at the present time

an authority on this phase of the subject, which would have been quite unfair to him. Professor Hazen's references to Belgium and England are not properly subject to controversy here, as what he says about them in his letter is exactly what I said in my review. I should certainly hope that no reader would suspect me of claiming immunity for German or Austrian militarists.

I have no desire to promote a Sophoclean heroic drama about the controversy over the origins of the war. In the concluding paragraph of the letter answering Professor Turner's, I suggested that the whole matter should be lifted from the plane of emotion and personalities, and threshed out on the basis of the methods and responsibilities of the historian. But none of the great Greek tragedians ever suggested more vividly a loftier or nobler theme for spiritual exaltation or executed more splendid cosmic gestures than did Professor Hazen in the classic passages in his work dealing with the outbreak of the conflict of 1914, some of which were cited in my review. I am not averse to a test of knowledge and wits with Professor Hazen in the fields of contemporary diplomacy on historical methodology, but in the dramatic arena I confess complete and ignominious defeat without even the suggestion of a contest. But after all, the matter is not one for jest, as the whole set of "astrological" premises underlying the Dawes report make clear. The future peace and happiness of Europe, and to some extent of the world, depend in large part upon the triumph of fact and candor over fancy and emotion concerning the responsibility for the World War.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

Chapter III

VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE HISTORIANS ON THE WRITER'S ARTICLE, "ASSESSING BLAME FOR THE WORLD WAR," IN *CURRENT HISTORY*, May, 1924.

THE discussion concerning war responsibility aroused by the review of Professor Hazen's book induced the editor of the New York *Times Current History Magazine*, Mr. George W. Ochs-Oakes, to invite the writer to set forth the first comprehensive statement of Revisionism in that magazine for May, 1924. The article is obviously too long to be reproduced, but we may offer the reaction of a number of representative American historians and international lawyers to the article, chiefly as a cross-section of American opinion on the subject in the summer of 1924. This symposium appeared in *Current History* for June, 1924, and the writer submitted a brief commentary, published in *Current History* for July, 1924.

I. ASSESSING THE BLAME FOR THE WORLD WAR.[1]

A Symposium

May *Current History Magazine* contained an article by Harry E. Barnes, Professor of Historical Sociology, Smith College, analyzing from the latest available records the relative responsibility of the different powers for the World War; the article was comprehensive, containing ninety-seven citations of official records, documents, treatises and histories by recognized authorities. Professor Barnes assayed the relative responsibility for the war as follows: Austria first, Russia second, France third, Germany fourth, England fifth.

The Editor of *Current History Magazine* submitted the article for review to a number of professors at leading American universities, choosing such scholars as heretofore had not commited themselves to any definite conclusions on this question in published works. The Editor had no information regarding the individual views entertained by any one of these professors. The list was selected primarily to embrace Professors of History at the chief American universities, all of whom are recognized as qualified experts, and in each instance their views were requested as "impartial historians."

[1] *Current History*, June, 1924.

YALE UNIVERSITY

The most important conclusions drawn by Professor Barnes, if I understand correctly his study of documents relating to the outbreak of the World War, are two. He believes that "the scapegoat theory of complete, sole and unique guilt on the part of Germany or any other single State can no longer be supported." In the second place, he is insistent that the disaster resulted not so much from the plans of any one power or group of powers, but rather from the existence in Europe of two armed camps, each suspicious of the other, impelled by fear quite as much as by motives of aggression.

With these two conclusions, which are by no means revolutionary, I am heartily in accord. No sober historian has ever believed that Germany was solely responsible for the war. All who have studied carefully the recently published documents reject the theory that the civil leaders in any country, with the possible exception of Austria, deliberately plotted the World War. Professor Barnes emphasizes the emptiness of this theory in the case of Germany; he might well, I think, have laid more stress upon the fact that the documents indicate a corresponding freedom from aggressive guilt in Russia and France, so far as the civilians are concerned. The poignancy of the tragedy of 1914 lies in the fact that the responsible civil leaders in each State desired earnestly to avoid the general war, but because of the diplomatic organization, or rather lack of organization in Europe, and because of conflicting influences in their own Governments, were unable to give effect to their desires. Had it not been for the existence of the two hostile groups, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, the Austrian attack upon Serbia would not have led to the general war.

When Professor Barnes comes to assign relative responsibility to the different States, I find it more difficult to accept his conclusions. It is always a temptation for every American to grade in order of merit or demerit; the process is of value for track meets and necessary for undergraduate courses. Whether it is possible or valuable in history seems to me less certain. Thus most of us will agree with Professor Barnes that upon Berchtold and the clique that controlled him must rest the chief responsibility for the crisis of 1914 that led to the general war. But how much does this mean if, as he intimates, there existed other factors which may raise the question as to whether Austrian aggressiveness may not be interpreted as a defensive measure? Professor Barnes assigns less war-guilt to Germany than to Russia. But this can be done only if we assume that the civil leaders, Bethmann and von Jagow, who desired peace, represented Germany, and the Russian militarists, rather than Sazonov, represented Russia. One cannot speak of "Germany" or "Russia" as political entities. There was anarchy in each State, as well as in the international organization of Europe. While Bethmann was pressing the button for peace Falkenhayn was taking steps that made war impossible to avoid. The available evidence shows that if Sukhomlinov felt that the moment had come for war, the Czar and Sazonov sought sincerely for peace. The indictment should be made not against the "Russia" or the "Germany" of 1914, but against the system which permitted the military group in each State to hamper the pacific efforts of the civil leaders.

If chief guilt is to be attributed to the system, then it seems to me that Professor Barnes has not considered with sufficient care the responsibility which German statesmen must carry for pointing the way to the system of alliances that led to the existence of two diplomatic groups standing face to face and the system of armed peace that led to the existence of militarist cliques in each State. "Deeper than any national guilt," says Professor Barnes, "is the responsibility of the wrong-headed and savage European system of nationalism, secret diplomacy and militarism which sprang into full bloom from 1870-1914." With this I agree fully, but I should assign to German leaders during this period not by any means all, but a major share of, responsibility for this system.

CHARLES SEYMOUR,
Professor of History, Yale University.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

It seems impossible for any fair-minded person who reads Mr. Barnes' article and compares it with similar studies by Professors Fay, Schmitt and Gooch, to dissent from the unanimous opinion of these scholars that the responsibility for the World War must be divided between Germany and the Allies. This opinion would seem to be as fully accepted by qualified historians today as is the doctrine of evolution by scientists. After reading the story of duplicity, jealousy, dishonesty, selfishness and hypocrisy which marked the conduct of the European Foreign Offices in the weeks preceding the war, the conclusion is inevitable that the peoples of Europe would never have gone to war if they had been fully aware of the motives and the methods of their rulers. As far as the control of foreign affairs is concerned, the peoples of the world are still in the Dark Ages. And before this control can be democratized, the abolition of secret diplomacy is absolutely essential.

While accepting the main conclusion of Mr. Barnes' article, dissent may be made from certain particulars. It seems unlikely that France would have ever gone to war merely for the purpose of winning back Alsace-Lorraine from Germany. And whatever motives may have inspired the withdrawal of French troops ten kilometers from the German border, it is impossible to accept Mr. Barnes' statement that this was of "no military importance." Before the war the Allies had a combined annual capacity of 22,500,000 tons of iron, as against 21,500,000 for the Central Powers. But as a result of the French withdrawal and the German occupation of Belgium, great mines and factories fell into the hands of Germany which increased her iron capacity to 27,500,000 tons and decreased allied capacity to 16,500,000. The French withdrawal was almost a fatal blunder from which the Allies were saved only by the entrance of the United States into the war.

I cannot accept the conclusion that the reparation provisions of the treaty are based on the assumption that Germany was solely responsible for the war. Article 231 simply holds Germany responsible for causing the *losses* to the Allies, resulting from a war imposed upon them by the *aggression* of Germany. While the Allies may have been as much to blame

as Germany in the diplomatic negotiations leading up to the war, the fact remains that Germany actually *invaded* France and Belgium, devastating territory and committing crimes against the civilian populations from which the Germans at home were exempt. That the victors should exact compensation for the damage caused by the physical aggression of Germany was absolutely inevitable.

As Mr. Barnes points out, the real causes of the last war lay far back of the diplomatic negotiations of July, 1914. The designs of Russia on the Far and Middle East and on the Balkans, France's policy of the closed door in her colonies, the refusal of Russia and Japan to neutralize Manchuria, and Britain's refusal to internationalize the Bagdad railway as Germany originally suggested, show conclusively that the Allies were as much responsible for the fundamental conflicts of European diplomacy as the Central Powers.

Disillusioned as to the responsibility for the war, many people now spend their time in fulminating against the "wickedness" of the Allies. Such an attitude is worse than useless. The diplomatic notes leading to the outbreak of the war are now ancient history. The true indictment cannot be drawn against one power or group of powers, but against the old system into which every power had been drawn, and into which the United States may be drawn, if it persists in a policy of "isolation." The true lesson to be drawn from this history is the absolute necessity of wiping out the old system by organized international cooperation—not the spasmodic, "unofficial," hide-and-seek, torpid "cooperation" to which the United States is now pledged, but a continuous, active and sympathetic endeavor of all nations to remove the causes of war, which are rooted in peace-time policies, together with a firm and unequivocal declaration to punish any nation which dares to take the law into her own hands in defiance of the organized sentiment of the world.

RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL,
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The article by Professor Barnes on "Assessing the Blame for the World War" raises so many debatable questions that I am not willing, in the narrow limits here prescribed, to declare myself categorically for this or that phase of his study. The difficulty lies not only in the impossibility of securing adequate detachment in a problem so recent and still so tragically with us, and in the extreme complexity of the origins and causes of the World War, but also to a very large degree, with the evidence in the case. The very extent of the materials constitutes a problem of no small dimensions. But more serious still is the fact that, voluminous as the materials are, they are defective because England, France and Italy still keep the records of their pre-war diplomatic agreements and negotiations under lock and key. Till they are published or we are allowed access to them, our conclusions will necessarily be more or less provisional.

Notwithstanding this, however, I am convinced, from a considerable study of the new materials that are available, both in print and in the archives abroad, that many of the conventionally accepted views of the origins

and antecedents of the war should be subjected to thorough revision. On this point the evidence is both adequate and conclusive. Professor Hart's statement that, "This tremendous question cannot be settled by Russian dispatches secretly copied by a subordinate in the Russian Embassy in London any more than by the published memoirs of the former Kaiser," is true, but when by implication it suggests that it is upon sources of this kind that Fay, Gooch, Pribram, Goos and now Barnes, base their studies, he gives an altogether erroneous and unfair impression.

The revision can now rest on precisely the kind of historical evidence upon which good histories of diplomacy depend. We have official and private documents such as have in the past been kept jealously secret for at least two generations after the events which have been made accessible through the changes in government in Russia, Austria and Germany. Treaties, conventions, instructions to diplomats, memoirs, reports, official and unofficial correspondence which will always furnish the substantial basis for the history of international relations, are now available. To these is being added a constantly increasing body of autobiographical matter of an interesting though much more ephemeral character.

Upon the outbreak of the war the astonishing speed and strength of Germany's offensive quickly destroyed all faith in her claims that the war had been forced on her and that her diplomacy in the years leading up to the war had been directed toward the maintenance of peace. The violation of Belgium neutrality, the terrific onslaught on France, the ruthless warfare on land and sea followed by the arrogant and stupid diplomacy of the Central Powers all helped to create the belief in the war-guilt of Germany. Subsequent events, up to the entry of our country into the war, intensified this opinion. To modify or surrender in any way these strong convictions is disagreeable and, to most of us, disconcerting. Nor is it possible for the average person to dissociate the events of the war from those antecedent to August 4th, 1914. On the other hand objectivity and discrimination are the first requisites of the historian.

This does not mean, however, that we are to accept the particular revision Professor Barnes has made. The revelation of the extensive deception practiced by Russia in falsifying her official publication, the Orange Book, issued early in the war, has, it is true, discredited all the so-called "colored books," but they still remain as important evidence in the case. These, together with the new materials, are now so voluminous that there is and will be room for much difference of opinion. But revise and re-write we must. And if the powers most interested refuse to open their archives, we must make use of what is at hand without the corrective facts they would supply.

During a conference of historians in London in 1922, I heard the opinion pretty freely expressed that the publication of the secret war archives at Petrograd, Vienna and Berlin would ultimately lead to similar action at London and Paris, if for no other reason than that of self-defense. Perhaps Ramsay MacDonald is holding this possibility as a trump card at this very moment. To throw open the archival secrets of the Foreign Office and of the Quai D'Orsay would in itself be an expression of confidence and good faith.

In the meantime it is the duty of historians not only to make full use of the available materials, but to subject it to searching analysis, applying to it even more than the usual caution imposed by the canons of historical criticism. If the facts established by this method call for a revision favorable to Germany, it is also axiomatic with the historical fraternity that, provisionally, at least, they be accepted.

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Beyond a very skillful use of new material, the main interest in the article by Professor Barnes lies, of course, in his attempt to clear Germany in a very large measure from the guilt of the World War. It is difficult to see how anybody but a German would be satisfied or convinced by this account.

In the first place, in the case of Austria, Russia and France, we are presented with much space, many arguments and a wealth of documentary facts, while Germany is treated more like one of the minor countries.

Much is said of the militaristic spirit rampant in most of Europe while we are led to infer that Germany was inhabited largely by pacifists. The imperialistic designs of the great nations are set forth in detail save in Germany. Nowhere are we told that Germany, since the Bismarckian era, was more and more bludgeoning her way to domination in Europe. Those who, as students, were in Germany in the seventies and who did not return there until after 1900 testify that the change in the spirit of Germany was as amazing as it was revolting.

The history of Europe since the development of nationalities has been a struggle to prevent one nation from dominating the rest. To that end even Popes made treaties with Protestants. Germany with her satellite, Austria, having raised her army to a pitch of pre-eminence and having built a navy which challenged the greatest, was, in the eyes of the world, perilously near achieving that position. Such a menace was Germany that nations, incompatible in aims and temperament and those bitterly hostile for ages, were driven into amity and alliance. Did Germany use her power for pacific ends? Outside of Germany the answer is well-nigh unanimous. What more brutal or unforgivable insult has been offered to a proud nation than Germany's demand that France should choose between war and Delcassé! What would this nation say if Japan demanded the resignation of an American Secretary of State?

Nowhere do we find any reference to Germany's wanton threat to England and to the peace of the world, by the upbuilding of her navy to a degree perfectly unnecessary, save for one and only one purpose. Of still greater significance was Germany's refusal to meet England for the purpose of limiting naval armament.

France needs no defense. To regain Alsace and Lorraine was the natural and national duty of patriotic Frenchmen. Let any American ask himself what his attitude would be if Mexico retook California and Texas and

proceeded to act the brute as Germany did. If the above were true, most of us would be convinced that feelings of "revanche" were our Christian duty.

With the attempt to picture Germany as the innocent and all-trusted dupe of the Machiavellian machinations of Austria, few would agree. When Germany gave Austria *carte blanche* on July 5th, war was practically declared by Germany. The picture of that nation being dragged hopeless and helpless, prostrate but protesting, into war, will appear absurd to most. Only in the kingdom of the willful blind can the cart pull the horse.

After all what carried conviction to most neutrals, and still does, was and is the damning fact that at the eleventh hour, when Sir Edward Grey had succeeded in persuading the nations to agree to a Congress, a device which had prevented war in the past, it was Germany and Germany alone who refused. Thus Germany had in her hand the fate of the world. What the decision was is history.

The article gives the general impression of the clever marshaling of a large number of facts for a very definite purpose. It fails to convince. To call attention to the spots on the kettles does not remove the smut on the pot.

One emphatic dissent must be made against a perfectly gratuitous assumption. It is stated (p. 194) that "Probably the majority of competent students would assign Germany a position of fourth in the scale of the relative responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities." One would like to know where these remarkable statistics were found. Outside of Germany these "competent students" have not stood up and been counted. Evidently in this country one is a majority with the Teutonic Deity.

A. E. Morse,
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CORNELL UNIVERSITY

The article by Professor Barnes in *Current History* for May seems to me an admirable exposition of the immediate circumstances that led up to the war of 1914. We do not seriously disagree, I think, on any material point. If I hesitate to say that Austria was chiefly "responsible" for the war, it is not because I disagree with Professor Barnes on that point, but rather because the term "responsible for the war" means less than nothing unless it is very carefully qualified. Still, if any one insists in saying dogmatically "Germany was responsible for the war," I am willing to reply, "No, Austria was responsible." The latter statement is truer than the former, I think; but I also think that either statement has little to support it except a kind of subjective buoyancy.

Either statement is nonsense, for example, if it is taken to mean (as most readers are likely to take it) that the German people, or the Austrian people, were responsible for the war. The inveterate habit of personifying nations, of thinking of them as actuated by definite, conscious motives, which we can pronounce good or bad, is one of the most fruitful sources of confusion in political and historical writing. The notion is indeed a convenient one, especially in connection with a war like the last one; for it enables the people of each country to think of themselves as having been heroic

defenders of right and justice against some or other gang of criminal conspirators. However convenient, the notion is nevertheless remote from reality; and while it serves to ease our consciences in respect to the last war, it does nothing (and less than nothing) to prevent the next one. Nothing seems to me more absurd than to say that "Germany (in the sense of the German nation) was responsible for the war," unless indeed it would be to say that "Austria (a hodge-podge of conflicting nations) was responsible for the war."

Of course Professor Barnes does not mean to say anything of the sort; he means to say, and does say, that the Austrian Government was more responsible than the German Government. That has at least some meaning. But I hesitate to say even that. Why not say the Serbian Government was responsible for the war, since, by accepting the Austrian ultimatum without reservation, it might have prevented the war? You will reply, "Ah, but the Serbian Government was *justified* in doing what it did." Thus the notion of "responsibility for the war" becomes at once transformed into a quite different notion—that of justifiable conduct on the part of sovereign States. What is justifiable conduct on the part of sovereign States? Heaven preserve me from answering a question which great men have vainly disputed for 2,000 years! A good case could be made, and has been made, for the idea that a sovereign State is justified in doing anything it thinks it expedient to do. A good case could be made, and has been made, for the idea that the systematic massacre called war is never justifiable.

But in either case the Austrian Government was at least not less "responsible" than other States. Who was the Austrian Government? Was it Francis Joseph, or Berchtold? Berchtold was at least as responsible as any man, let us say. Shall we then lay the chief responsibility on Berchtold? We may safely do that, since he has no friends. But I confess that to make foolish fellows like Berchtold responsible for the sins of the world, seems to me to push the business of vicarious atonement rather far. I refuse to take politicians as seriously as all that. The juster view seems to be that politicians, not being responsible for their acts, should be treated for dementia instead of being punished for crime. Useless, at all events, to regard the Berchtolds and the Pichons as conscious and sinister conspirators. No more than other people did they undermine their self-respect by consciously engaging in evil practices. Their state of mind was that of honorable gentlemen, who convinced themselves that it was their duty to wage war for the safety of their own countries, in order thereby to promote the welfare of the human race. The creature called Man is like that!

Can Berchtold and Company be held responsible (in any useful sense of the term) for the war which they did not foresee and did not intend, when they acted (however mistakenly in the event) from motives and with purposes approved as right and honorable in every country in the world? Professor Barnes evidently thinks not, after all.

"But who will say that any of the other States, if placed in Austria's position, would not have done much as she did?" Oh, many people will say so, many patriots and good historians, honorable men all, will say so; and will continue to say so until the next war, which, like the last war, and like all previous wars will be unlike any previous war—including the

last one! Sixty years after the French Revolution, Cobden wrote a long pamphlet proving that, contrary to the accepted opinion among his countrymen, England rather than France was "responsible" for the war of 1793. Every one who was already of Cobden's opinion judged his pamphlet to be a masterly performance. I am sure Professor Barnes' article will be as widely acclaimed in this country.

CARL BECKER.
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UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The facts which Professor Barnes summarizes on the basis of documents published since the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany are important and undoubtedly make necessary a reconsideration of conclusions based on previous evidence. It appears that Germany made much more genuine efforts to dissuade Austria from aggression against Serbia and that France and Russia were much less anxious to avoid war than people of allied countries have been accustomed to believe.

In an effort finally to allocate the relative responsibility of the powers, however, a definite agreement upon the meaning of responsibility seems to be necessary. The notion is an artificial one, dependent upon a particular ethical theory, if we speak of moral responsibility, or upon a particular system of law, if we speak of legal responsibility.

So far as objective science is concerned, the term responsibility, as usually understood, has no meaning. Scientists deal with "correlation" or "causation," not with responsibility. As ordinarily used, the term responsibility implies activity by a free moral agent, but scientific method proceeds on the assumption of universal determinism, which ignores the existence of free moral agents. To determine by scientific method the relative importance of the various events which contributed during the past fifty years or more to bringing on the World War is difficult if not impossible, because of their multiplicity and interrelations, their insusceptibility to quantitative measurement, and the lack of a similar situation for comparison.

We may, however, apply certain recognized tests of responsibility, first, that of international law. In the absence of express treaty, international law does not impose any liability for beginning a war. This was expressly recognized by the Peace Conference Committee on Responsibilities for the War (see Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 68th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. 106, pp. 329, 330), but not by the peace treaty itself. (See Arts. 227 and 231 and Minnesota Law Review, vol. 5, pp. 518, 537.) It does, however, furnish a simple rule for determining who begins it, namely, priority, not in diplomatic threats or in mobilization, but in declaration or act of war. By the latter is meant overt attack upon the territory or public forces of the enemy.

Furthermore, international law seems to hold such acts legally justifiable if undertaken (1) for self-defense in the presence of "an instant and overwhelming necessity," (2) to prevent an impending violation of a fundamental principle of international law, (3) in pursuance of an express treaty

ratified by the State attacked. (See Hyde, International Law, vol. 1, pp. 106-133, vol. 2, pp. 195-201.)

This would make Austria primarily responsible for beginning the war through her declaration against Serbia on July 28, 1914. Any danger to her integrity arising from Serbian machinations was not of the immediate character described above. Germany would be next in responsibility through her declaration against Russia on August 1 unless she could prove, as Gooch apparently believes she could (see *Current History*, May, 1924, p. 187), that the Russian mobilization constituted "an instant and overwhelming" danger. Germany seems responsible for the war on the western front because of her invasion of Belgium on August 2 prior to any act of war by Belgium or France and also in defiance of express treaty provisions.

It will doubtless be said that this test is purely formal and does not get at the real merits of the case. Yet it may be answered that the law was known to all and that if Austria and Germany had been as anxious as the Allies to avoid the appearance of responsibility, they could have waited until their prospective enemies had acted. Possibly if they had done so there would have been no war. At any rate, whatever strategic loss they might have suffered would have been outweighed by their moral gain.

To allocate moral responsibility for the war, acts prior to those which actually began the war would have to be considered, but the significance to be attached to such acts would depend upon the ethical theory adopted.

The Peace Conference Committee on Responsibility for the War placed responsibility "wholly upon the powers which declared war in pursuance of a policy of aggression" and in view of the facts before them held that "the war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable." (Hearings, supra, pp. 316, 321.) The recently published documents, however, indicate that no belligerent really had such a policy. All of them were primarily interested in security, but unfortunately, none of them knew how to get it.

If we modify this formula and attempt to allocate responsibility by answering the question: Which belligerent objected to war the least? I am inclined to think Professor Barnes has made a good case. Russia and France, as a matter of deliberate policy, seem to have been less anxious to avoid war than Germany.

On the other hand, we may judge by answering the question: Which belligerent, in view of the situation, used the information and diplomatic power at its disposal least effectively to prevent war? This criterion would resemble the standard of liability which, according to Dean Roscoe Pound, modern systems of private law tend to enforce. "The law," he writes, "enforces reasonable expectations rising out of conduct, relations and situations," rather than willed consequences or declared intentions. (See Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 1922.) With this criterion, Germany would seem to have a very heavy responsibility. Austria and Russia were both acting under high emotional tension, where rational conduct was hardly to be expected. Germany had the opportunity and the diplomatic power to prevent war by holding back Austria from the beginning. The Kaiser's telegram of July 6, however much he and his advisers may later have regretted

it, seems to have been the impetus which set Austria on her fatal course. It is possible, that even after Austria had begun operations against Serbia, France might have restrained her ally, but I should judge from the evidence that Germany had more influence at Vienna than did France at Petrograd. It does not appear that England's diplomatic weight was of a character to have been effective in any case. Her responsibility arises, if at all, from conduct long before the crisis of 1914, the consequences of which could hardly have been realized. Belgium, I agree with Professor Barnes, gets a clean bill of health.

QUINCY WRIGHT.
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VASSAR COLLEGE

How far "the scapegoat theory of complete, sole and unique guilt on the part of Germany, or any other single State," in bringing on the World War can now be accepted is the question raised by Professor Barnes. He answers it by saying that, in view of the evidence in hand, this theory is no longer tenable. But the conclusion reached by him involves, in its turn, the question of the nature of the evidence used and the method of dealing with it. For in spite of opinions expressed to the contrary, it is the process rather than the product that is of supreme interest to the general reader, as well as to the student of history. [1]

The process of historical inquiry is very definite, especially so in the case of wars, and a knowledge of the canons that have been worked out is available to every one. [2] They are based on the natural order in which the reports of wars are received by the public, and also in which they are given ultimate form.

The unofficial reports are the first to be received, and they include the letters of newspaper correspondents, the diaries of volunteer troops and the observations of the regular soldiers. Later, come the official reports, and these include telegrams of officers—one class written for public consumption, where the object is to conceal the truth, and another class, of much greater intrinsic value but labeled "confidential." Official dispatches follow. These comprise reports to superior officers at home; but they must be taken with the traditional grain of salt, since the officer in command has sometimes been instructed to prepare two sets, one for public use and one for Cabinet discussion. Other forms of official communications succeed these in regular order.

The steps taken in dealing with this mass of material are also clearly recognized. The first form in which it is received by the public is that of the newspaper correspondence that appears as literature. This is later developed into magazine and review articles. The next stage is that of the monographs of serious scholars. Still later come the carefully prepared

[1] Apology is made for this general statement, but the evidence is sufficient to justify it to the mind of the writer, although it cannot be presented here.

[2] See, e. g., A British Officer, "The Literature of the South African War" and "The Literature of the Russo-Japanese War," I-II., American Historical Review, January, 1907, 12:299-321; April, 1911, 16:508-528; July, 1911, 16:736-750. These articles are the basis of the summary given.

histories based on these monographs and on critical studies of source materials.

But it must not be forgotten that all these legitimate forms have been accompanied by the work of flying scouts who, from newspaper clippings, have prepared with scissors and pastepots profusely illustrated "histories," with the object of "fanning a healthy spirit of patriotism." One such "History of the Great War, to be completed in five volumes," was offered for sale in the Spring of 1915. This type of pseudo-history, like the King, never dies.

This definite illustration of the process involved in the collection and treatment of the materials demanded for the history of war is applicable to the treatment of pre-war and post-war conditions. These often seem far more complex than do those of actual war itself. In the World War, especially, its international aspects have called for particular consideration of all official documents, and political revolutions have made them already available. Corruption of the press in some countries and censorship of the press in all often discounted the reliability of the newspaper. The value of many of the personal records of the World War seems as yet largely negligible.

These and other classes of material have been analyzed by Professor Barnes. An examination of his method, and the testing of that method by the recognized canons of historical criticism, place him, in the opinion of the writer, in the front rank of historical students. The conclusions he reaches may give pain to many eminent personages, since they, like humbler folk, often "feel the pain of a new idea," and they may disconcert the upholders of Chauvinism; but the truth assuredly lies in the direction pointed out by Professor Barnes.

LUCY M. SALMON.
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CLARK UNIVERSITY

In addition to the brilliant analysis of the causes of the World War, by Professor Barnes, those interested in the problem would do well to read the similar works by the other American and British scholars who have recently undertaken this same task, especially Professors Fay, Beard, Schmitt and Gooch. It will then be apparent that Professor Barnes and the others are in substantial agreement upon certain fundamental propositions:

1. No government and no responsible statesman in Europe—in distinction from certain military circles—willed or worked to bring about a general European war.

2. The fundamental causes of the war were: Rival alliances; competition for territory, economic concessions and prestige; mounting militarism; increased armaments, and international suspicion and fear.

3. The immediate cause was Austria's insistence upon waging war upon Serbia when it was recognized that the step might precipitate a general European conflict.

The main facts are reasonably clear. Before the World War all the great powers, not Germany alone, were heaping up the powder which made

the Europe of 1914 so dangerous. The Russians, in their almost constant efforts to dominate the Balkans and control the Straits, and the French, in their seizure of Morocco, were threatening the status quo and adding to the accumulation of international explosives. When the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated by Austrian Serbs, the German Government agreed to support Austria in any measures it deemed necessary to take, believing that Russia would keep hands off; Austria determined to force a war upon Serbia; Germany attempted at first to "localize the conflict" by inducing other powers not to interfere; later, when a general war was imminent, the German Chancellor and Foreign Office, July 27 to August 1, made earnest efforts to restrain Vienna, although they would not accept the British proposal for mediation; at the same time, however, the German General Staff, as we now know from General Hötzendorf's "Aus meiner Dienstzeit," was exciting Austria to war; as the crisis increased, the control in Germany and Russia passed into the hands of the soldiers; "the military timetable," as Mr. Philip Kerr expressed it at Williamstown, precipitated the world conflict, and the two great alliances, unwillingly, as Lloyd George has said, "staggered and stumbled" into war.

A correct analysis of the causes of the World War is important not only in the interest of historical accuracy, but even more in order to diagnose correctly the present international malady in Europe and to prescribe adequate national and international remedies. The history of the origin of the war proves that peace cannot be maintained permanently by rival alliances and competitive armaments, and that the world's necessary task today is to develop agencies of adequate international coöperation.

The fact that Germany does not bear sole guilt for starting the world conflict can scarcely affect the justice of America's entrance into the war three years later. The United States took up arms against Germany because of what Germany did after the war began. In 1914, August and September, President Wilson was insistent upon absolute neutrality and Mr. Roosevelt was unwilling to suggest any other course.

While there is general agreement among the recent critics that the war guilt does not rest entirely upon any single nation or group of nations, there is, however, considerable divergence of opinion as to the relative measure of responsibility resting upon each of them. This divergence in judgment is due to the different evaluation of the same historical facts, just as there exists today a divergence in judgment among American scholars as to the relative responsibility of England and France in bringing about the regrettable friction between these countries during the past four years.

As to the decade or so before the war, although various factors contributed in varying degrees to make the international situation dangerous, Professor Fay believes that one of the most important was the spirit of militarism, "and for the growth of militarism in Europe," he says, "no country was so much responsible as Germany." This estimate was doubtless held by the majority of Americans who lived or studied in Germany before the war. As to the immediate outbreak of the war, while some of the recent scholars emphasize the responsibility of Russia, because of her mobilization, and of

France, because of Poincaré's aggressive pre-war policy, Professors Gooch[1], Fay[2] and Schmitt[3] still maintain that Germany, with, or next to, Austria, bears the largest part of the general guilt.

But into this phase of the issue, in this brief review, it is not possible to enter.

G. H. Blakeslee.

Professor of History and International Relations, Clark University.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Professor Barnes' article is seriously misleading and, like numerous other articles of the same sort now being put before the American public, is likely to exercise an unfortunate influence.

Let there be no misunderstanding about my position. I do not wish, out of patriotic or any other motives, to suppress or extenuate disagreeable truths. I believe that the truth should always be told in regard to history, whatever the consequences. The great evil in the article by Professor Barnes is that it gives a distorted and erroneous impression in regard to the origin of the war, and in doing so is likely to contribute not a little to encourage the Germans to believe themselves a bitterly wronged people, and at the same time to deprive the families of those who fell while fighting against Germany of the consoling belief that their sacrifices were made for a worthy cause, putting in its place the heartbreaking fear that their loved ones were the victims of foolish and selfish national ambitions.

In another recently published article Professor Barnes has acknowledged that during the war he fell into the war hysteria to such an extent that he collaborated in the preparation of a historical manual which distorted history against the Germans. It seems to me that now he has fallen a victim to the hysteria of the reaction against the war, which is raging as virulently in certain quarters as ever the war hysteria raged anywhere.

It is impossible in the few words I am permitted to write to refute or even make a list of the numerous instances in which it seems to me that Professor Barnes has misinterpreted the testimony he cites, or disregarded the well-established rules of evidence, or produced an erroneous impression by the omission of material facts. It is possible only to say that a close and critical reading of his article will show that several of the capital points of his thesis are refuted by the admissions he is obliged to make so that he may not lay himself open too much to the charge of unfairness. It is much to be feared, however, that for most of his readers the significance of these admissions will be lost, since they are usually dropped into the footnotes

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[1] "By encouraging Austria to take action which was almost certain to plunge Europe into war, the German Government incurred a share in the guilt of the catastrophe scarcely less than that of Austria herself." The Cambridge History of Modern British Policy, III., p. 486.

[2] "Germany did not will the war. * * * In a wider sense, however, these new documents do not in any way relieve Germany of the main responsibility." New Light Upon the Origins of the World War, American Historical Review, October, 1920, p. 52.

[3] "It was the refusal of Germany to follow this lead (Grey's mediation proposal), before the diplomatic situation had been overtaken by military measures, which * * * precipitated the war." Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, in American Historical Review. April, 1924, p. 473.

and half smothered among the titles of books cited or are put in the text in a very few lines, and only after the view which Professor Barnes wishes to have accepted has been set forth at length. Considerable knowledge of the whole subject under discussion is also necessary for an understanding of the real significance of these admissions. In general I agree with the comment made by Professor Hart. I would put in even stronger terms my dissent from Professor Barnes' estimate of the rôle played by France. It shows either a strong anti-French bias or an amazing failure to understand the French.

The whole problem of the origin of the World War is at once highly complicated and relatively simple. In one sense it can be satisfactorily elucidated only by a very long and detailed discussion. In another sense the essence of the matter can be put into a few words.

As with all great wars, there were deep underlying causes going back many years and having an almost infinite number of ramifications. Responsibility in these matters was widely distributed, and there is room for much difference of opinion as to the share which fairly belongs to each of the great powers. The war, however, was not inevitable. It came because of what was done between July 23 and August 1, 1914. The guilt or innocence of each of the great powers in that period must be determined chiefly by the answers which the evidence shows ought to be made to the following seven questions:

1. Was Austria, with the consent of Germany, warranted in sending to Serbia an ultimatum which was bound to produce war or inflict on Russia a humiliation which it could be expected to endure only if afraid to go to war?

2. Was Austria justified, two days later, in refusing to accept, even as the basis for negotiation, the surprisingly compliant answer of Serbia and in breaking off diplomatic relations?

3. Was Austria justified, after an interval of only three days and while the other great powers were trying in frantic haste to devise some means of preserving peace, in declaring war against Serbia?

4. Was Germany warranted in asserting that a war of that sort was an affair that concerned Austria and Serbia alone, and in refusing as she did, until it was too late, to lend any effective support to the efforts of Sir Edward Grey to bring about a mediation by the four less interested powers?

5. Did Germany during those critical days, when there was still a chance that peace might be preserved, exert as prompt and as strong pressure in favor of peace at Vienna as might reasonably be expected?

6. Was Russia justified in ordering a general mobilization on July 30?

7. Was Germany justified in immediately declaring war on Russia when Russia refused to stop this mobilization?

All but one of these, the sixth, has to do with some action or failure to act on the part of Germany or Austria or both. On all six of them the

answer, I believe, if the evidence is fairly weighed, must be against the Central Powers. If Russia was at fault in ordering a general mobilization on July 30—and there is room for much difference of opinion on that point—it seems to me absurd to lay on her for that act all the blame for the war, as the Germans generally do, or even a larger share than on Germany, as Professor Barnes does. Her action must be viewed in the light of the earlier and unjustified acts of both Austria and Germany. Even on the assumption that Russia was grievously at fault in ordering her mobilization, if Germany really desired to preserve the peace there was no necessity for an immediate declaration of war against Russia. Mobilization alone would have sufficed to protect both herself and her ally against any irreparable damage from a possible Russian attack.

In the light of these considerations I hold that responsibility for the outbreak of the war rests almost altogether upon the Central Powers. The evidence which has come out since 1918 shows that the apportionment of the blame as between Germany and Austria was not precisely that which was supposed in 1914, but it does not remove any considerable measure of responsibility from them and transfer it to Russia and France.

FRANK MALOY ANDERSON.
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WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

In his article on "Assessing the Blame for the World War" in the May issue of *Current History* Professor Harry Elmer Barnes does me the honor of quoting so extensively from a recent article of mine that it may seem ungracious to enter into controversy with him. But in view of his statement that "a critical reading" of his article before publication by Professor Langer and myself had "aided much to the general interpretation" and saved him "from many slips in matters of detail," and in view of the editor's note that Professor Barnes' opinions are "his personal conclusions reached in collaboration with American historians," the impression may be left that those persons who have had the pleasure of working or corresponding with Professor Barnes accept his conclusions. Speaking for myself only, I feel called upon to say that I believe several of Professor Barnes' interpretations to be inaccurate, and that I dissent from some of his judgments.

First, as to the points of detail. With regard to the annexation of Bosnia by Austria in 1908, he argues that "the pressure which she (Germany) applied to Russia was very slight" (p. 178, column 1), his authority being a remark of an official in the Russian Foreign Office, which is taken from the *apologia* of Jagow, later German Foreign Minister, that really Germany had rendered a great service to Russia. But Schoen, who was German Foreign Minister at the time, although he did not write the note sent to Russia, being ill at the moment, declares that the language used was "very forcible" (Schoen, *Erlebtes*, p. 79), and the published text of the note confirms this view. For Germany informed Russia that if the latter continued to oppose the annexation Germany would "let things take their course." The point of the remark was that Austria had by that time decided to declare

war on Serbia unless the annexation was unconditionally recognized; so that Russia was called upon to yield or to allow Serbia to be invaded. To call this "very slight" pressure is, I submit, to give to words a meaning that they do not usually have.

In the discussion of the crisis of July, 1914, Professor Barnes says that "Russia was determined upon war" from July 29 on (p. 183, column 1), and that "nothing but a complete repudiation by Austria of her demands upon Serbia could have held the Russians in check" (p. 186, note 62.) In my opinion, both statements are too strong. I think that the first requires this qualification: "Unless Austria was willing to make some concessions about Serbia." It is clear enough that the Russian general staff regarded war as inevitable, but Sazonov's telegram No. 1592, of July 31, expressing his "satisfaction" that Austria had at last agreed to "enter into an exchange of views regarding the contents of the ultimatum of Serbia" and proposing that the negotiations be conducted in London under the direction of Grey, would seem to show that the Russian Foreign Minister was not committed to war. Professor Barnes' own remark that "Sazonov's part in urging the Czar to order general mobilization may be explained on the ground that he believed that it would frighten Austria into a resumption of conversations" (p. 186, note 58) is, to my mind, the correct interpretation of the situation. Apparently, though the matter is unfortunately not very clear, the mobilization had precisely that effect, and therefore had to be maintained until the conversations with Austria had produced satisfactory results. For Professor Barnes' second statement that Russia would require Austria to forego all her demands on Serbia, there is not, so far as I am aware, any evidence. On the contrary, Sazonov recognized that Austria was entitled to some satisfaction from Serbia, and was ready to negotiate on the basis of the Serbian reply, which had accepted most of the points of the ultimatum.

My disagreement with Professor Barnes is not so much about points of detail, important as they are, for the complexity of the evidence makes legitimate differences of opinion unavoidable, as with his attitude toward the Balkan ambitions of the rival powers. Although he says in one place (p. 185, column 2) that "it is difficult to understand how any fair-minded historian can fail to see why Russia felt justified in contemplating forcible intervention against Austria," yet he does not conceal his antipathy for Russian ambitions in the Balkans and at Constantinople, which he considers to have been "not wholly defensible and commendable" (p. 187, column 2.) Agreed, and even stronger language would be merited. But what of German and Austrian ambitions? Professor Barnes speaks of "an Austro-German hegemony in the Balkans as the first link in the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad scheme" (p. 175, column 1), but nowhere does he condemn such a hegemony, and the reader is likely to get the impression that all Austria desired was the maintenance of her integrity against Serbian intrigues; which, as I have tried to show in my own article, was hardly the case. What difference was there between the Russian plan to control the Balkans and open the Straits and the Austro-German Berlin-to-Bagdad vision? Surely, each was equally dangerous to the peace of Europe. Probably Professor Barnes will agree with this, but he does not say so, and, without intending to do so, comes perilously near conveying the opposite impression. No more, in his

analysis of the Austro-Serbian quarrel, does he refer to the legitimate grievances of the Serbs against their mighty neighbor, to the "pig war," the use of forged documents to incriminate Serbia, or the Prochaska incident of 1912. I hold no brief for the Serbs, whose conduct was often irritating in the extreme, but Austria herself had much to answer for.

Similarly, when we turn to the examination of Franco-German relations, we find all the emphasis upon *revanche,* French preparations for war, French incitement of Russia. My own opinion is that Professor Barnes' interpretation of the Russian documents which reveal French policy is in some cases exaggerated, but that is one of the matters about which students of the evidence are bound to disagree. What I miss is some account of the German threat of war in the Spring of 1905, the Casablanca incident of 1908, Agadir (1911), or the language of the German press in 1913. I am not defending the policy of France in Morocco, for it savored of rank imperialism; but the German objections to it were dictated by the determination that France should not get something without paying Germany for it. In other words, if France's attitude was not so pacific as is commonly believed, Germany was quite willing to use force against France to gain her ends, and the picture as it were, of injured innocence which Professor Barnes holds up of Germany, is, I believe, much overdrawn.

In his final paragraph Professor Barnes says: "None of the Entente States can make too much capital out of the free hand given to Austria by Germany. This was exactly what France really extended to Russia in 1912" (p. 194, column 2). The latter sentence is much qualified by Professor Barnes himself on p. 184, column 1. I should prefer to put the thought a little differently. If it was proper for Germany to support Austria in her Balkan policy, in which "she was naturally encouraged by her ally" (p. 175, column 1), why was it improper for France to support Russia? The Austro-German and the Franco-Russian alliances were engaged in a desperate struggle for ascendency in Europe, which would be determined by the alignment of the Balkan States, and I cannot see that it was any more dangerous or provocative for France to aid and abet Russia than it was for Germany to stand by Austria. What was wrong was the alliance system rather than the bellicose ambitions of a particular power.

Finally, I am not willing to "assign the relative responsibilities for the outbreak of hositilities in about the following order: Austria, Russia, France, Germany and England" (p. 194, column 2). Austria would come first by all means. But why? Only because of the promise of German support, which Berlin did not withdraw until Russia, to compel Austria to negotiate, had mobilized. Therefore I should put Germany second in the list. Probably Russia would not have mobilized without assurances from France; so they tie for third place. And England last of all, though her refusal to commit herself probably encouraged each of the rival Continental groups.

BERNARDOTTE E. SCHMITT,
Professor of History, Western Reserve University.

II. "ASSESSING THE BLAME FOR THE WORLD WAR." [1]

Professor Harry Elmer Barnes of Smith College, whose artiele, "Assessing the Blame for the World War," in the May *Current History*, has excited such widespread interest and discussion, writes in regard to the symposium published in the June issue of this magazine:

The general agreement of the majority of the contributors to the symposium on war origins with the revisionists' viewpoint makes it unnecessary for me to set down my eomments in the shape of a formal artiele of reply or rebuttal. There are only a few matters of minor significance whieh call for brief remark.

In regard, first of all, to the letter of Professor Pinto, published elsewhere in the same issue, with respeet to German knowledge of the contents of the Austrian ultimatum, he evidently failed to read my footnotes, where all that he alleges is quite frankly eonceded. It is quite possible that Tschirschky knew the general eontents of the ultimatum to Serbia, but the exact terms were not eommunicated to Berlin until July 22. The important point in this matter is that we now know that Berlin did not dietate the terms of the ultimatum, which was what was alleged in the eonventional theory of German responsibility, and speeifieally in the myth of the Potsdam Conferenee. As a whole the issues in this eontroversy are not so very signifieant, since it is quite evident that Germany was not interested in restraining Austria until the Austro-Serbian episode seemed likely to provoke a general European war. It is also true, however, that France made no effort whatever to restrain Russia, even after it was evident that Russian aggression would produce a world war.

With Professor Seymour's sagaeious and judicious discussion I find nothing to quarrel about and much to eommend. I would qualify somewhat his view that the German statesmen were largely responsible for the European anarchy from 1870 to 1914. I think that for most of the time from 1890 to 1906 this was distinctly the ease, but from 1906 to 1914 it seems to me that France and Russia beeame progressively more aggressive, and by 1912-14 had gone beyond Germany in this direetion. But the discussion of this matter seems rather futile as one views the history of Europe sinee 1750. From 1750 to 1789 probably Prussia, Russia and England were more responsible than any other eountries for military praetices and traditions; from 1789 to 1800 Austria and England were the most aggressive eountries; from 1800-1815 France set the standards of militarism; from 1815 to 1848 Austria again took the lead; from 1850 to 1870 France and Russia once more became the most feared military states, a position whieh Franee has again assumed since 1918. The European system, then, stands eondemned rather than any single State, whether we examine European history from 1750 to 1924 or from June 28 to Aug. 4, 1914.

As to Professor Buell's eontention that Germany should repair the damage done to Belgium, I would dissent in no way whatever. I would also agree that she should contribute liberally toward the repair of physieal damage done to France, but that is a quite different matter from what is

[1] *Current History*, July, 1924.

contemplated in the reparation clauses of the treaty. Germany has never declined to accept the obligation specified by Professor Buell.

With Professor Lingelbach's view that we shall be greatly aided by a frank revelation of the contents of the British and French archives I am in entire agreement, but I doubt if the self-defense motive will prove very effective unless the case for these countries would be improved by the exposure of the secret documents, a dubious assumption which still remains to be proved correct. An acquaintance who has examined the unpublished Siebert documents for July and August, 1914, gives me information that would seem to indicate the opposite. The cause of the pacifistic group in Great Britain might, however, be aided, and we may hope that Ramsay MacDonald will take advantage of the opportunity, now that he has been able to cut loose from Poincaré's apron strings.

Professor Morse has not in any way raised issues of fact or discussed any of the specific evidence brought forward in my article, so that no reply is possible. In regard to German policy toward Delcassé he has forgotten, apparently, the attitude of the United States toward several presidents of Latin American States whose policies have not pleased us. His allegation that I treated Germany too briefly proves no desire to extenuate her. I conceded at the outset all the claims for German militarism and international aggression that any sane person would demand. There was little reason to take up valuable space to prove what everybody knows and has had presented to them to a most excessive degree for the last decade. My only object in the section dealing with Germany was to refute such nonsense as the Potsdam Conference, German responsibility for Austrian policies toward Serbia and the obligation of Germany to content herself with countermobilization against Russia. If I gave more space to France than to Germany it was due solely to the fact that American readers need more education on the matter of French militarism and aggression, a topic on which there has been great obscuration and "pussy-footing" in America. But an appropriate analysis of the policies of Poincaré, Delcassé, the Cambons and Tardieu does not whitewash Tirpitz, Holstein, and Moltke. Professor Morse has evidently not read of Tirpitz's acceptance in 1913 of Churchill's 16:10 arrangement with respect to naval increases.

Professor Becker's contribution calls for no comment, beyond my conviction that his broad philosophical discussion of the issues is probably more vital and fruitful than technical analysis of documents. It gives evidence of a mental attitude which is, unfortunately, distressingly rare among contemporary historians.

Nor do I find anything in Professor Wright's objective remarks with which I should desire to take issue.

It may seem ungracious for me to disclaim fitness to receive the flattering estimate of my historical scholarship bestowed by Professor Salmon. I regard the *Current History* article as less of a criterion in this regard than almost any other serious contribution which I have published. The most illuminating fact about the whole matter is that the credit for giving publicity to the revisionist viewpoint went by default to a disinclined outsider rather than to some one of a half-dozen eminent authorities on contemporary European diplomacy who should have performed the task many months

ago. Why they did not do it will remain an interesting problem with respect to the public obligations of the historical expert, and to contemporary American standards of professional courtesy and departmental discretion among historians.

In Professor Blakeslee's constructive letter I would find fault chiefly with the first two of the footnotes with which he closes his discussion. One would not gather that Gooch places Russian responsibility for the precipitation of the war ahead of that of either Austria or Germany (*Modern Europe*, p. 547). Further, the "new documents" referred to by Professor Fay are merely the German and Austrian publications, and not the Russian, upon which the case against France and Russia has been erected since Professor Fay wrote. Professor Blakeslee also overlooks the fact that Germany (on July 28th) and Austria (on July 31st) both accepted the British plan of mediation of the Austro-Serbian dispute.

I wish that I might agree with Professor Anderson's benign, if original, contribution to historical methodology—namely, that historians should write primarily to offer cheer and consolation to the widows and orphans of past wars. Unfortunately, this procedure has characterized much historical writing in the past and has ultimately done much to cause subsequent wars and to create a new crop of widows and orphans to be comforted. It would seem desirable to sacrifice the feelings of one generation of widows and orphans in the interest of the truth, so that we may contribute to the protection of many subsequent generations from bereavement. Professor Anderson's attitude toward French foreign policy and militarism appears to have been based upon such material as "Lafayette, we are here!" sentiment, rather than upon a study of the Siebert documents and the Livre Noir. The prescription indicated in his case is the allopathic dose of Bausman, which is useful in such extreme cases of Francophilism. Professor Anderson puts the seven following interrogations to me:

1. Was Austria, with the consent of Germany, warranted in sending to Serbia an ultimatum which was bound to produce war or inflict on Russia a humiliation which it could be expected to endure only if afraid to go to war?

2. Was Austria justified, two days later, in refusing to accept, even as the basis for negotiation, the surprisingly compliant answer of Serbia and in breaking off diplomatic relations?

3. Was Austria justified, after an interval of only three days and while the other great powers were trying in frantic haste to devise some means of preserving peace, in declaring war against Serbia?

4. Was Germany warranted in asserting that a war of that sort was an affair that concerned Austria and Serbia alone, and in refusing as she did, until it was too late, to lend any effective support to the efforts of Sir Edward Grey to bring about a mediation by the four less interested powers?

5. Did Germany during those critical days, when there was still a chance that peace might be preserved, exert as prompt and as strong pressure in favor of peace at Vienna as might reasonably be expected?

6. Was Russia justified in ordering a general mobilization on July 30?

7. Was Germany justified in immediately declaring war on Russia when Russia refused to stop this mobilization?

I would answer all these questions by a distinct negative if I could assume an atmosphere of pacifism and candor in European diplomacy in 1914, but in the light of existing facts and methods at the time, the candid historian would probably feel bound to answer the last four in an affirmative fashion, and some would even insist upon answering all but numbers two and three in such a way.[1]

In my footnote of acknowledgment in the May *Current History* I had not intended to hold Professor Schmitt responsible for any of the weakness of my article, but rather to give him credit for much of whatever merit it possessed. With respect to his qualifications and reservations I need say little more than that they refer to matters on which there may be a legitimate difference of opinion after one has studied the documents. They were all raised in his letter to me before the publication of the article and given serious consideration by me at the time. His only serious error, it seems to me, is the assumption that Austrian aggression in the Serbian circumstances was produced by the German *carte blanche*. I believe that Austria was determined to humiliate Serbia at all costs, and would have done so irrespective of the Kaiser's attitude on July 5 and 6, 1914. If Germany had refused the *carte blanche* and deserted Austria there would probably have been no European war, but Professor Schmitt's own article is the best proof to date of the fact that Germany simply could not have deserted Austria at this time, given the contemporary alignments and governmental practices. Professor Schmitt's statement that Sazonov's approval of a Conference on July 31st proves the Russian Foreign Minister a friend of peace must be rejected. This was a day after the Russian general mobilization had been ordered, and Sazonov knew that this action had made a European war inevitable. Indeed, General Dobrorolski has told us that the Russians decided on war on July 25th and that Russian diplomacy in July, 1914, was only the barrage for Russian military preparations.

It appears to me preposterous that I should be called upon to disclaim pro-Germanism. Any one technically proficient in the circumstances knows that my article would be extremely distasteful to the German nationalist who still believes in complete German innocence and puts Great Britain first in responsibility for the war. The great lesson of the whole matter is that, in the words of Professor Knight, "we must liquidate our war illusions."

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

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[1] In the light of our knowledge today (1928) an affirmative answer would probably be justified in regard to all of Professor Anderson's questions, except number six.

Chapter IV.

PEDANTRY AND POMPOSITY AMONG THE BITTER-ENDERS: EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER UPHOLDS THE SCHOLARLY IDEAL.

A DEFENDER of the Entente faith who was not especially prominent in propaganda during the War but has emerged as one of the most earnest and devoted exponents of the old Epic, is Professor Edward Raymond Turner of the Universities of Michigan, Yale and Johns Hopkins. Professor Turner differs widely in spirit from Professor Hazen. The latter makes no pretense to exacting scholarship and rigorous objectivity. He has, as one of his amiable acquaintances in the profession once remarked, "the courage of his emotions." Hence, while one may deplore the effect of some of his prejudices upon the minds of the youth who occupy themselves with his manuals, one cannot avoid a certain amount of affection for him as a gallant warrior in the service of *La Belle France*. Professor Turner, on the other hand, parades himself proudly before the land as a matchless practitioner of the art of esoteric historical scholarship—a man who has even improved upon the technique of Ranke, Waitz, Monod, Luchaire, Stubbs and Maitland. He offers no extenuating plea of emotional favoritism, but submits his works as remarkable examples of historical chastity—even frigidity. Therefore, they require judgment according to the exacting standards to which the author of such tomes pretends.

The exchange of pleasantries with Professor Turner began through my review of his "Europe Since 1870" in the *New Republic* for January 18, 1922. Professor Turner published a belated reply, incidental to the Hazen controversy, in the *New Republic* for April 9, 1924, and the present writer answered this communication in the same issue. Professor Turner next burst into the arena by a letter in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, December 11, 1926, protesting against the favorable review of the writer's *Genesis of the World War*

by the eminent British publicist, Henry W. Nevinson. An answer to this letter is appended. Not content, Professor Turner volunteered another gratuitous assault in the New York *Times* for January 2, 1927, to which the writer replied through the same journal.

If one desires to obtain some indication of Professor Turner's prowess as an historian of international relations, we refer such a reader to Professor Turner's article on war guilt in *Current History* for February, 1927. This article may be profitably compared with any standard book on the outbreak of the World War based upon the new documentary sources. While the author devotes considerable space to proving himself of respectable lineage, he does not find space for footnotes, but names some collections of sources which he asks the readers to believe that he has used.

Professor Turner, it will be observed, lays great stress on the unerring wisdom of British reviewers of historical books. Therefore, it is with pleasure that we refer readers to the authoritative English opinion of Professor Turner's monograph on the Privy Council in the London *Times Literary Supplement* for October 6, 1927, p. 691, which we reproduce at the close of the present chapter. Special hilarity attaches to this caustic English assessment of Professor Turner's scholarship, because, shortly before this review appeared, Professor Turner blithely informed his students at Johns Hopkins that they might discount reviews of his book by Americans, as being of no particular standing in scholarship in English historical problems. He urged them to be especially on the lookout for the review in the London *Times*, which could be depended upon to render a properly touching tribute to his scholarly prowess.

I. EUROPE SINCE 1870.[1]

Europe Since 1870[2] offers a very attractive task to a synthetic historian interested in generalizing the experiences of the past in the hope of guiding the conduct of men in the present or the future. Particularly is this true for one privileged to write nearly three years after the signing of the armistice. Only within certain limits has Professor Turner succeeded in rendering the important service to the American public of giving them an intelligent, objective, candid and well-measured account of the factors that have metamorphosed the modern political and international order and threatened modern civilization itself.

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[1] *New Republic*, January 18, 1922.

[2] *Europe Since* 1870, *by Edward Raymond Turner. Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Company.* $3.00.

At the outset it is fair to point out that the work is designed to serve as a commercially successful text-book. As such, it could not well express the candid judgment of the author on many important subjects which have been given a warm emotional content by their absorption into the general complex known as the "war hysteria," unless his opinions may be assumed to be those of the "man of the street." The excellencies of the work are not a few. The typographical technique and the maps are not approached by any other comparable text-book. The author has an attractive style, which is, perhaps, more uniformly lively and pleasing than that which is exhibited in any competing work on modern history. The story is extremely well told. The arrangement and proportion of the book are well conceived and executed. After a few excellent introductory chapters, setting forth the chief trends in nineteenth century history, the main portion of the work treats of the culmination of nationalism with the unification of Germany, the clash of national interests after 1870, the resulting tangle of conflicting alliances, the development of national imperialism, the outbreak of the World War, and its course and aftermath. Decent space is given to social and economic forces and institutions. A healthy liberalism characterizes the treatment of social and intellectual history. Radical social reform programs are fairly analyzed, and critical and scientific thought given proper credit for its great services to modern society. Particularly pleasing is the specific designation of obscurantism and its frank condemnation. All in all, the book is a creditable illustration of the interests represented by the so-called "new history."

Inasmuch as the work is avowedly oriented towards the World War, as "the culmination of modern history," it is only fair to examine the manner in which Professor Turner has handled the causes of the war, as they were rooted in the developments of the last fifty years. When this is made the criterion for judging the book, the conclusion seems inevitable that the author narrowly, but certainly, missed the opportunity to produce a fairly definitive interpretation of contemporary history, which would have possessed very great value for both the college student and the general reader.

The admirable clarity, with which the main trends in national and diplomatic history are analyzed, is to a large degree nullified by a surprising retention of the wartime dualism and diabolism, in treating the part played by Germany in the period since 1870. Such an attitude might be excused in manuals prepared for S. A. T. C. classes in 1918, but it cannot be justified in a book prepared three years after the close of the war, and with the disillusionment of the Peace Conference as the immediate background against which it was written.

The antecedents of the Franco-Prussian War are not fairly handled. One would infer that Bismarck and Prussia were chiefly at fault and were the aggressors, and no intimation is given of the fact that the sentiment of the world was with Prussia in this conflict and approved the terms of the Treaty of Frankfort. The statement that "France was to crouch in fear before an all-powerful and arrogant Germany for the next forty years," is but the most absurd drivel in the light of the machinations of Déroulède, Barrès and the League of Patriots, and of the whole propaganda and ceremonial of

Revanche. In analyzing the development of the great alliances, which were supposed to provide a European equilibrium through a balance of power, the author either implies or specifically states throughout his discussion that chauvinism, imperialism, navalism and militarism were purely German products, reluctantly acquiesced in by the other powers from a fear of German aggression. The vital fact that they were the outgrowth of an anachronistic and wrong-headed European system, of which Germany was at the worst no more than the most conspicuous expression, is thereby fatally obscured. The treatment of French domestic and foreign policy approaches a panegyric. French diplomacy was everywhere benevolent and defensive.

No increase in objectivity is to be observed in the treatment of the immediate antecedents of the World War. Germany was the sole and willing tool of Beelzebub. This attitude is, perhaps, best illustrated in the statement that the chief underlying cause of the war was "the character, the ambitions, the ideals, the purposes of the German people (sic!) which made war seem desirable to them; a good thing not to be shunned." In a long and eloquent passage (pp. 436-39) the German theorics of race superiority, Machtpolitik, and Realpolitik are justly condemned, but nothing appears with respect to Déroulède, Barrès, Lord Roberts, Wyatt, Cramb, Maude, Maxse, Lea, D'Annunzio, Crispi, Pobiedonostsev, Von Plehve, Roosevelt, Mahan, Gardner or Maxim.

While German writers are vigorously denounced for warlike utterances and an advocacy of Machtpolitik, Norman Angell's *Great Illusion* is denounced as "a book which was the cause of considerable misleading and delusion." We may express the pious wish that Professor Turner will stumble upon *The Fruits of Victory*. In discussing the failure of the disarmament proposal at the Hague Conferences nothing is said of the obstacle imposed by British refusal to consider naval reductions or the French opposition to land disarmament. In describing the immediate outbreak of hostilities the basic blame is put primarily upon Germany, though the authoritative analysis of the latest documents by Professor Fay puts the responsibility squarely upon Austria and Russia. Professor Turner states in his bibliography that Fay's account is the best and latest interpretation, but about the only indication that he has availed himself of the results of Fay's studies is that we are in part spared the Potsdam Conference. Naturally, the German atrocities are properly mentioned, but there is no statement of similar conduct by Allied countries, particularly Russia.

In dealing with the Peace Conference the author is fair to the League of Nations, but in no way discloses a recognition of the disastrous absurdities of the German reparations or the inconsistency and violation of the principle of national self-determination in preventing Austria from joining Germany. Indeed, Keynes' work is dismissed as "a brilliant but specious attack on the economic conditions of the Treaty." We may suggest a cultivation of Mr. Keynes' *The Revision of the Treaty*. Nor does he protest the treatment of Bulgaria or Hungary. No student would draw from the chapter the all-important generalization that the Allies met their only crushing defeat at the Paris Conference and in the United States Senate.

One may turn to the last chapter, that on the Russian Revolution,

wondering if the current obsessions on that subject will have marred the author's judgment, but he will find little to criticize and much to commend in the brief analysis of that movement. The author's generally dominant liberalism saves him from introducing any significant amount of dualistic eschatology into this chapter. The Bolsheviki appear as the natural, if temporary, product of Russian social and economic conditions.

In the light of the general excellence of most of the work, it is to be hoped that in a second edition one may discover a rewriting of some twenty or thirty pages, which reflect the excitement and heightened emotions of a period of active warfare and not the constructive moderation and the calm reflection and reconsideration which must come to dominate the post-war period if the "fruits of victory" are to be other than universal misery and preparation for another conflict. It is not any "Pro-German" complex which prompts this hope, but a profound conviction that the persistence of this primitive "scape-goat" psychology in our interpretations of contemporary European history is the most fatal obstacle to any sane appraisal and solution of the world situation today. It may well be that Professor Turner would be the first to admit the justice of the above criticism, and he might well retort that the public must pay the price of expecting to meet "discretion" rather than "candor" in its text-books, as long as it is willing to tolerate a degree of educational degradation, such as is reflected in the appointment of a municipal accountant to pass upon the accuracy and objectivity of the historical text-books used in the metropolis of the world.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

II. PROFESSOR TURNER ON THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR.[1]

Sir: In your issue of March 19 Professor H. E. Barnes declares that my treatment of the causes of the Great War, in two volumes on recent European history, has been a great disappointment to him. Inasmuch as he includes me thus to some extent in a very sweeping condemnation of Professor Hazen's new edition of *Europe Since 1915*, and since in your issue of January 18, 1922, there appeared—at a time when I was abroad—the same reviewer's strictures on my *Europe Since 1870*, perhaps you will give me space for the following.

At present many influences and many publications strive to show that ideas held four years ago about the causes of the war were wrong, the result of hysteria and passion; that revised and more accurate opinion would not affix particular guilt upon Germany, but would derive the war altogether from general causes, and would, in short, condemn no nation more than another. There was undoubtedly much foolish and ignorant writing by ill-informed people during the war. At present, it seems to me, there is danger of some hysteria in another direction.

In the past two or three years a vast amount of new information has been published about the causes of the war. I wonder whether your reviewer has in any sense mastered this material. To some extent he knows it,

[1] *New Republic*, April 9, 1924.

and he easily quotes from it pertinent things to substantiate some contention or in seeming to overwhelm an opponent. But neither his substance nor his manner convinces me that he has had time to go over it sufficiently to understand the addition in proper relation to the whole mass. If he undertook the task of writing a summary or manual himself I think this would be more apparent than it is when he is indulging in such fluent and unmeasured diatribe as he does now against Professor Hazen. His method seems largely one of allusion, general terms, denunciation, affected pity and contempt.

My own opinions about the development of German policy were not derived from the midst of the war. They were never based wholly upon documents and books, but were at first largely formed during residence abroad in several years before 1914. In the midst of the struggle itself I wrote little. My two volumes on modern European history, published in 1921 and 1922, were an honest attempt to tell the truth fairly on the basis of such information as one could then use. Much since revealed was unknown at that time. Some expressions I have already changed, and in future editions doubtless I shall have to make many alterations and additions. I greatly wish to wrong neither Germans nor any others through any of my writings. If competent historical scholars care to point out specific errors in my books I am most willing to consider such criticism and avow mistakes of which I am convinced. It may be that Professor Barnes and some others now know the whole truth where many historians remain still in error. But I venture the prediction that ultimately, despite many modifications of detail, historians will hold that the Great War was begun by Germany, and that while it arose from large general causes, and though all the participants were in some sense to blame, yet Germany was the principal immediate factor that made the war not to be avoided. That is all that I have asserted in my writings, and generally speaking that is what historians maintain.

You note the reviewer's connection with *Foreign Affairs*. I wonder whether such a thing as you have published could appear in *Foreign Affairs*. Any new statement in favor of the Germans and discreditable to the Allies, whether from Russian revolutionary sources or German spies, is at once accepted with undiscriminating enthusiasm and pleasure, and given with the impression that it refutes all held before. The doings of the war party in Russia or in France are put vividly forward. The existence of the great German war machine and German military thinking are nearly lost in the background.

In his review of my own book Professor Barnes implied that I wrote as I did to further the sale of my volume, even though I probably knew better. Can it be that he, however generous and honest, is somewhat emotional and rash? He says that in 1917 he wrote an "absurd and misleading" account of the causes of the war. In my opinion he show signs now of going equally far on the other side. He may, if he proceeds as he presently does, have another recantation to make five years from now.

RAYMOND TURNER.

III. A REPLY FROM PROFESSOR BARNES.[1]

Sir: In my review of Professor Edward Raymond Turner's *Europe Since 1870* in the *New Republic* for January 18, 1922, I pointed out what seemed to me to be the shortcomings of that book, and have since learned nothing which would incline me to soften my judgment in the slightest. Almost without exception, the new evidence which has appeared since 1922 relating to the origin of the World War has served to render more and more preposterous the 1914-18 epics which are continued in the books by such writers as Professors Hazen and Turner. I may, therefore, devote my comment entirely to the issues raised in Professor Turner's letter.

In the first place, let me explain why I seemingly "dragged" Professor Turner's books into a review of Professor Hazen's work. In my effort to check up closely on the views of the causes of the war which I had drawn from my reading I talked with or wrote to at least a dozen of the eminent historians of the country telling them of my proposed review. Each and every one expressed himself as regretting the fact that Hazen was to bear the whole brunt of the attack when they felt that Turner had been equally blameworthy. While I do not believe that he has been so to any such degree, yet it did seem that it would be justifiable and illuminating to mention his works as an example of our disappointment at the failure of historians to use indispensable source-material when it is readily available.

Professor Turner designates the revision of our ideas concerning the origins of the war as hysterical historiography, but we may retort that if the work of Gooch, Fay, Schmitt, Pribram, Coolidge, Langer, Beard, Valentin, Montgelas and others of their type is "hysteria," then, like General Grant's whiskey, it is something which we should have in much greater abundance. Further, it is not true that the "revisionists" do not blame one nation more than another. There is practical unanimity that the immediate responsibility rests primarily upon Hötzendorf and the war party in Austria, and Grand Duke Nicholas, Sukhomlinov and the military group in Russia. There is also rather general agreement that England, Germany and Italy were the three countries really desirous of avoiding war in 1914. I am personally inclined to follow the late Baron Korff in holding Poincaré more culpable than any other single individual, but I did not press this debatable point at all in the review of Hazen because it is not generally accepted. How a historian could read the sources and then come to Professor Turner's conclusion that "the Great War was begun by Germany . . . and Germany was the principal immediate factor that made the war not to be avoided," I cannot in the slightest understand as a student of history, though I do get some little light from an incidental knowledge of clinical psychiatry. I most certainly did not lose sight of "the great German war machine and military thinking;" rather I took special pains to point out that we must not forget these facts in our exuberance over the recently published materials. And Professor Turner misses entirely the point of my "fluent and unmeasured diatribe against Professor Hazen." I did not denounce him because he, after carefully reading and digesting the documents and monographs published since 1919, came

[1] *New Republic*, April 9, 1924.

to a conclusion different from myself. The one major, significant and damaging demonstration in my review was that the account of the origins of the war in Professor Hazen's 1923 work was actually written in 1916, when he could not possibly have had access to a single definitive work dealing with the outbreak of the great conflict and that his listing of the more recent material in the bibliography of this chapter was but the most flagrant subterfuge and outrageous stratagem.

Professor Turner raises the point of our relative competence as historians in general and in regard to the origins of the war in particular. While I do not feel distressed or humiliated at his raising of the former issue, it is not at all relevant in the present situation. Nor is the second, to any significant degree. It may frankly be admitted that the history of modern diplomacy is not my main professional interest, but the accidents of my career in the last four years have forced me to acquire some acquaintance with this literature. In 1920-21 I attended Professor Blakeslee's graduate seminar, where we discussed in detail most of the literature published on the origins of the war in all modern languages. From 1921 onward, as one of the editors of the *Journal of International Relations* and bibliographic editor of *Foreign Affairs*, I have been required to keep abreast of the new publications. It need not be pointed out that I have also gained greatly from the courteous bibliographic assistance and advice of much abler and better informed historians. But even assuming for the moment that I am as innocent of the sources as Professor Hazen, this has no pertinence in the present premises. Before the review was set in type it was read by three of the five best informed historians in the United States on the subject of the origins of the war, and all of their suggestions as to revision in matters of fact heeded. Whatever my own feeble competence, these men are separated from Professor Turner by an abysmal and apparently unbridgeable gulf in their knowledge of contemporary European diplomacy. It was also my privilege early in the winter to discuss at length the problem of war guilt with the man who is probably the best informed of living historians with respect to the progress of scholarship in that field.

Professor Turner refers to the great difficulty and the vast amount of labor necessary to arrive at a clear elementary presentation of the major facts concerning the origins of the war. The task of digesting all the documents and monographs is enormous, and we may praise without measure the energy of men like Gooch, Fay, Beard, Valentin and Monteglas who have done this, but unless we are willing to question their scholarship and honesty and are hence unwilling to accept their analysis of the sources, it is a comparatively easy task to discover and state the obvious and significant facts as to the major problems and outlines of the subject. Forty-eight hours of intensive work should fit anyone to write better sections on this subject than appear in the works of either Hazen or Turner, provided the investigator started with a competent grasp of historical criticism, and honesty and sincerity of purpose. Professor Turner asserts that his *Europe Since 1870* was an "honest attempt to tell the truth fairly on the basis of such information as one could then use," but I am dubious regarding the propriety of his adjectives and adverbs when I find on page 448 the statement that all of the significant documents and monographs have been digested by Professor

Fay in the "best and most recent account" (of the origins of the War), and then discover that his own chapter on "The Causes of the Great War" presents a picture of the situation almost diametrically opposed to Fay on all major points. Professor Turner further assails me for suggesting that his account was due to the exigencies of the textbook market rather than to lack of real understanding on his part. To me this seemed by far the most generous possible interpretation. The thing which I most hesitate to impugn in a fellow historian is his intelligence; and I am not unfamiliar with the heart-rending and soul-searing experiences of the textbook writer. But if Professor Turner prefers the other alternative it shall be his to claim.

Professor Turner quite correctly points out my tenuous connection with *Foreign Affairs*. I have never attempted to make any capital out of this, and pressure of other duties will probably make it necessary for me soon to retire entirely from any connection with it, but it so happens that my particular duty since its appearance involves a greater necessity of keeping abreast of the current literature in modern international relations than would be required of the managing editor. As to whether such a review as mine would be allowed to appear in it is a question which Professor Coolidge would have to answer. I am glad to say, however, that he has never shown any unwillingness to have a book listed which disrupted the current illusions, and some of those most destructive to the Turnerian-Hazenian epic have been included by me at his suggestion. And my language was certainly not more vigorous than that employed by Ernest Boyd in the December issue of *Foreign Affairs*, (1923) in flaying an historian fully as respectable as Professor Hazen, namely, Professor W. Alison Phillips. I may well need to revise my views five years hence, and shall be happy to do so, but all evidence now available would indicate that if I am compelled to do this the necessity will probably be to declare my 1924 revision of the 1917-18 mythology quite incomplete and inadequate in the light of the materials of 1930. [1]

But the issues involved are quite beyond any frail and transient personalities in the case. I have for Professors Turner and Hazen and their publishers but the kindest of personal sentiments. The question is one of the responsibility of the historian and the purpose of history. Shall we require historians to make a decent and respectable effort to tell the truth, so that we may rely upon them for indispensable material in the guidance of intelligent public thinking, or shall we have to admit that history is, in varying degree, but disguised personal, partisan, religious or national prejudice and bias, and come to the conclusion that it is worse than "bunk?" If history is to be "mere literature," then we should dispense with professional historians and call in the novelists. I have exposed myself to the probability of all kinds of direct and indirect persecution for the next decade in order to throw this question open in relation to the most important practical issue now before historians, and I invite such men as Professors Coolidge, Shotwell, Fay, Schmitt, Hayes, Beard, Schevill, Kerner, Blakeslee, Earle, Fuller, Langer, Rogers and Lybyer to come forward and either drive

[1] For a confirmation of this prophecy see my article in *Current History*, August, 1927.

me into deserved oblivion by proving that I have misrepresented and misstated the revisionist position with respect to the origins of the war, or accept the challenge of Professors Turner and Hazen and bring them to judgment before the bar of professional historical opinion. There will never be a clearer issue or a more fruitful opportunity than the present. I speak less in the interest of a personality than in the name of a cause.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

IV. BARNES AS HISTORIAN.[1]

To the Editor of *The Saturday Review*:

SIR:

In your issue of November 20, 1926, under caption of "The Great Revision," appeared an account of Mr. H. W. Nevinson of Professor H. E. Barnes' *The Genesis of the World War*. In the interests of historical criticism and study it is desirable for those of your readers who may not be acquainted with Mr. Nevinson's work to realize that he is an elderly and amiable journalist, somewhat radical, and generally sentimental, and that he is in no sense an historian or a critical scholar.

Mr. Nevinson's incapacity to deal with a book of this kind is shown in statements asserting that Professor Barnes' volume is "fully documented and supplied with accurate references to a vast body of evidence" and that it is a "carefully written book."

On the contrary, the author shows every indication of having written without care or sufficient preparation, perhaps very largely on the basis of second-hand radical and partisan accounts, the author, it would seem, being mostly innocent of the contents of the documents and the sources themselves. This was noted by the reviewer in the *Times Literary Supplement* (September 30, 1926). A high authority and most capable judge, Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley—one of the editors of the official documents on the origins of the war which the British government is publishing at present, writing in the *Observer* under the heading "Disservice to the Truth," declared: "There is no work on this subject . . . which is so completely unreliable, in which elementary facts are so constantly misstated, and in which every fact incompatible with this (Barnes') theory is so consistently ignored."

Among the scholars whom I know in this country I find no one who regards Professor Barnes as an historian of standing with respect to this subject; and avowedly, I believe, he attempts to be a sociologist, not an historian. It appears to me that he is primarily a journalist, with strong tendency towards sensationalism. If he were able to overcome certain temperamental defects and resist the temptation to write hastily and rashly on so many and such various subjects, it would still be necessary, I think, before he could give anything of worth on the causes of the War, for him to devote several years to study of the documents and the sources, something that I conceive he has not yet had opportunity or inclination to do.

RAYMOND TURNER.

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[1] From the *Saturday Review of Literature*, December 11, 1926.

V. RAYMOND TURNER AS HISTORICAL CRITIC.[1]

To the *Editor of the Saturday Review*:

While I do not desire to enter into any controversy here over war origins initiated by your courageous presentation of the review of my *Genesis of the World War*, you carried in your issue of December 11th a letter by Professor Edward Raymond Turner which was so false, unjust and misleading as to call for at least a mild rebuke.

We shall not waste any time over Mr. Turner's characterization of Mr. Nevinson as "an elderly, amiable and somewhat radical journalist," though these epithets will to many scarcely seem more damaging than to designate a person as "an elderly, crabbed and somewhat conservative journalist." Yet Mr. Turner seems to trust implicity Mr. Headlam-Morley who strictly conforms to the latter description. We shall pass on to Mr. Turner's characterization of my traits as an historian, bringing to mind the interesting exchange of courtesies between Turner and myself in the *New Republic* for April 9, 1924, and the fact that while Mr. Turner protested to the Editor of the *Christian Century* concerning my articles on war guilt, he ingloriously declined the editor's personal invitation to refute them.

As to Mr. Turner's allegation that I am not adequately trained as an historian, this is so patently silly that any partisan of mine and foe of Mr. Turner could wish for nothing so much as that Mr. Turner's remarks on this subject in his letter should be given the widest possible publicity. Any interested person can satisfy himself on this point by examining my academic history and professional writings, and it might be further suggested that he compare these results with a perusal of comparable facts with respect to Mr. Turner's career. The statement that I have written on many subjects is no adequate indictment unless it can be shown that in any of these fields with which I have dealt I have acquitted myself less worthily than has Mr. Turner in his few narrow specialties. If, as an active and effective exponent of the new history and its methodology in this country, I have been compelled to dispense my wares chiefly in the field of sociology, this is a matter which will probably embarrass American historians as a class more than myself when it comes to digging up an adequate explanation. Further, it may be doubted if my studies in sociology—particularly in criminology—have been any handicap in preparing me to study the causes of the World War. This methodology, particularly as relates to criminal psychology and the credibility of witnesses, might well prove more cogent in the circumstances than Mr. Turner's researches into the background of the Rump Parliament.

Mr. Turner not only assails my general competence as an historian, but also particularly attacks my proficiency in the study of modern diplomatic history. He fails to remember that for three years I was the bibliographic editor of the world's foremost journal on contemporary diplomatic history, edited by America's most exacting historian in this field, and that I left this work voluntarily, with the regret of the editor and with a high testimonial from the editor as to my efficient service in this field.

[1] A briefer version of this letter was actually published as the editor was pressed for space.

If Mr. Turner will examine the list of books covered in *Foreign Affairs* from 1922-1925 he will recognize that the monographs and documents on war responsibility are not strangers to me. Mr. Turner also contends that my book is written in a rash, hasty and sensational manner, but it would seem that the chief basis of this allegation is the sensational nature of facts well sustained by evidence. This is not a case against me, but a measure of the degree to which we were deceived by the conventional Entente Epic. If any one will take the trouble to compare my *Genesis of the World War* with Mr. Turner's *Europe*, 1789-1920 he will have to admit that with respect to the treatment of contemporary diplomatic history and war guilt my work seems calm, measured and academic by the side of Mr. Turner's heroic prose.

Mr. Turner alleges that my book is not well documented, and contends that he does not know of any historian who regards it as a competent work. Let us look at some representative opinions. In his review of the book in the New York Times *Current History Magazine* for August, 1926, Dr. Charles A. Beard, who shares with Professor Fay the honor of having been the first American scholar to analyze the new collections of documentary facts with respect to war origins, says: "Professor Barnes is thoroughly familiar with the huge accumulation of diplomatic materials bearing on the origins of the World War and he has mastered the views of the great array of students and publicists who have written on the theme. Having subdued the data of the subject to his mind, Mr. Barnes formulates the problems of war origins in terms that admit of no misunderstanding, and he marches up to them in full panoply under a noon-day sun. . . Before his powerful argument, buttressed with relevant facts, the Sunday School theory of war origins is utterly demolished." Professor Ferdinand Schevill, who holds the chair of modern history at the University of Chicago, states in the *Christian Century* for June 17, 1926, that Mr. Barnes' book is "The first full narrative account by an American studied from the sources. His case must in all its essential features be held as proved." Professor G. P. Gooch, England's foremost authority on war responsibility, writes of my book in the *Contemporary Review* for October, 1926, that it is "a well-documented book," and he states further that "Professor Barnes brings a formidable array of facts, quotations and arguments to the support of his views." He says of my position in the war guilt controversy: "No other American scholar has done so much to familiarize his countrymen with the new evidence which has been rapidly accumulating during the last few years, or to compel them to revise their wartime judgments in the light of this new material." Professor W. L. Langer, one of the three leading American authorities on war responsibility, writes of my book that "The case could not be more successfully presented at the present stage of our historical knowledge." Professor Carl Becker characterizes the book as "A marvelously straight, swift, cogent presentation of facts and conclusions." Professor Elliott of Harvard University, reviewing the book in the *Christian Science Monitor*, contends that "The whole effect is cumulative and powerful enough to shake any but the blindest from the dogmatic attitude of belief in the wartime myths." Herbert Adams Gibbons, certainly much more of an expert on contemporary diplomatic history than Mr. Turner, states in his review in the New York *Sun* that "Mr. Barnes has written here a volume which will in time enhance his reputation.

He is frank, honest and sober in his statements. He has studied the evidence with care; and he has presented his case in the temper of an historian rather than of a lawyer. We must pay attention to books like this." Miss Edith Durham comparing my book with Mr. Seton-Watson's *Sarajevo* in the London *Foreign Affairs*, says: "Professor Seton-Watson makes a theory and searches for facts to support it. Professor Barnes analyzes a mass of facts and then makes a theory. He has put together the available material in compact form." Count Max Montgelas, recognized by war guilt specialists as the world's chief authority on the documentary basis of the crisis of 1914 and the only German to command the respect and admiration of William Stearns Davis, states that my *Genesis of the World War* is "The most comprehensive book on the subject of war guilt, and must be considered the standard work on the subject." Two authoritative French reviewers of the book, Grillot de Girvy and Alcide Ebray (*Evolution* and *Revue de Hongrie*) have been as favorable as Montgelas. Grillot says that the book is "The best general survey which has yet been written on the origins of the war," and Ebray holds that "The book is one of the best and most complete published on the subject of the responsibility for the World War." This list of commendations could be continued extensively. Indeed, the only person rating as a specialist on diplomatic history who has attacked the book as a whole is Mr. Bernadotte Schmitt (*Foreign Affairs*, October, 1926) and, whatever one may think of my taste in the procedure, few will contend that Mr. Schmitt has not been adequately answered in a factual sense in *The Progressive* for December 1, 1926.

Mr. Turner, nevertheless, holds that among his historical acquaintances he knows of no one who regards my recent book as a competent performance. We suggest that he attend the American Historical Association meetings and get acquainted with his colleagues in the profession, and a European trip might be prescribed with even greater assurance and enthusiasm.

As the one person who really discerns my incompetence, Mr. Turner produces Mr. Headlam-Morley. He fails, however, to inform his readers that during the World War Mr. Headlam-Morley occupied much the same position that Mr. George Creel maintained in this country in the war days. Certainly, he could not be held to be more objective in regard to war origins than the American historians who served Mr. Creel in time of stress.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

VI. CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR.[1]

To the Editor of The New York Times:

Since 1919 publication of many diplomatic documents, besides numerous reminiscences, apologies and papers, has thrown new light on European relations and events prior to the great war. Besides affording much new information with respect to details this material generally confirms the thesis held by most scholars from the first, that in respect of immediate causes Germany was responsible for the war in 1914.

During all this time, as many people know, ceaseless and increasing propaganda has been carried on by some Germans and many advocates of

[1] From New York *Times*, January 2, 1927.

Germany to establish a contrary judgment. A number of individuals with bias stronger than attainments, various radical publications, and certain monthlies and wecklies have asserted repeatedly that the Treaty of Versailles was foolish and unjust, and that Germany was not as responsible for the war as were Russia, France and Great Britain. They have said again and again that opponents suffer from "war hysteria," that new evidence demolishes earlier contentions which the Allies spread about through suppression of evidence and misrepresentation. Also they say that the United States was deceived into joining the Allies.

In this country the most vociferous advocate of these absurdities is H. E. Barnes, "Professor of Historical Sociology." His seeming inability to deal with evidence is equaled by capacity for going to extremes and constantly and rapidly writing something more. In 1924 he published an article on responsibility for the war in which he gave Germany very little blame. Professor S. B. Fay, also of Smith College, though leaning to the side of the Germans wherever he can, is respected for careful investigation and patient research; he has not yet published his expected book concerning the causes of the war. Professor Barnes writes and speaks with slight intermission on this and various subjects.

In 1926, he asserted publicly that in three weeks an industrious person could read and digest all the sources that have to do with the genesis of the war. The same year he published a large book to show that the war resulted from plots of Russia and France. About this book one of the principal authorities and a most capable judge, J. W. Headlam-Morley, an editor of the official documents about the causes of the war which the British Government is publising at present, writing in the London *Observer*, said: "There is no work on this subject . . . which is so completely unreliable, in which elementary facts are so constantly misstated, and in which every fact incompatible with this (that is, Barnes') theory is so consistently ignored." Lowes Dickinson declared the book "Counter-propaganda."

This volume was also reviewed by Professor B. E. Schmitt of the University of Chicago, serenely, but with the reserve and moderation that a gentleman and scholar employs. In a periodical entitled, *The Progressive*, apparently published by Germans or German-Americans for some Germans and some German-Americans—Professor Barnes has rejoined in thirty-one columns of vehement personalities. He has never, I believe, written anything briefly, calmly and well. Yet, because historians generally think his vagaries unworthy of notice, he thinks he is unanswered and triumphant. His opponents, perhaps, have in mind what Dante said so long ago, "Non ragionam di lor."

Professor Barnes avers himself an exponent of a "New History," of which he is about to explain the essentials. Some will think the newness a certain naïveté and resulting novelty in his own mind. Many will feel sure that essentials of "Old History" and, perhaps, of any "New History," are sound scholarship, adequate work, ability to use evidence and draw deductions fairly and well.

RAYMOND TURNER.

VII. WHAT IS WORRYING RAYMOND TURNER? [1]

To the Editor of the New York Times:

I note in your issue of January 2nd an earnest contribution to the "Kriegsschuldfrage," by Edward Raymond Turner of Johns Hopkins University. I shall limit myself to comment on the specific points raised in his letter:

(1) He contends that the documents and research on the question of war guilt since 1918 fully confirm the wartime theory that "in respect of immediate causes Germany was responsible for the war in 1914." I have expressed myself in another place as believing that "there is no competent and informed historian in any country who has studied the problem of the genesis of the World War in a thorough fashion who does not regard the theory of war guilt held in articles 227 and 231 of the Versailles Treaty to be wholly false, misleading and unjust." I complacently leave to history and historians the verdict as to which of us is right. Mr. Turner and I threshed out our conflicting theories of war guilt in the *New Republic* for April 9, 1924, and the reader who is interested may be referred to that correspondence. The most that even the conservative revisionists ask to have conceded to them today is that Germany was no less responsible than France, Russia and England.

(2) Mr. Turner contends that because I happen to have written on a number of subjects, it is evident without any examination of my writings that they must be illiterate, inaccurate and worthless. I appear never to have "written anything briefly, calmly and well." It may be suggested that the proof of the pudding here is in the eating. Those interested can easily procure my modest collection of writings and arrive at their own judgment on this matter. It does not seem to me that what I have written need cause any astonishment as to either volume or variety. Had I been as free from other duties as Mr. Turner, and had I been blessed by as light a teaching burden as Mr. Turner it is barely possible that I might have produced enough work to have justified Mr. Turner's angry amazement.

Mr. Turner has stated that I am not even an historian by profession, alleging in support of this the fact that I have written on sociology, and on criminology in particular. Now here the test is the length and adequacy of my academic preparation in history. The relevant facts in this matter are available to all who care to inform themselves. If it turns out that I have taken much more extensive and varied work in history in both college and graduate school than Mr. Turner, the fact that I have also acquainted myself with sociology, criminology, anthropology, psychology, etc., in no way makes me less of an historian. Indeed, as a preparation for specific work on war guilt, researches in criminology and criminal law might be alleged to be more valuable and cogent than the work which Mr. Turner has done on the achievements of the Privy Council. Mr. Turner should remember that it is dangerous to judge others by one's own talents and capacities. For example, judged by my own difficulties in linguistic studies the ability in the field possessed by a man like Edward Sapir seems wholly incredible and apocryphal.

[1] From the New York *Times*, January 9, 1927.

(3) I did say that any industrious person could read and digest the *Kautsky Documents*, the corrected Russian Orange Book, and the Austrian *Red Book* in three weeks. I now repeat that statement with assurance, and I would add to the list, now that it is available, the volume of British documents just published. There should even be some time left for rather copious note-taking. Of course, if one were to master the diplomacy of 1870 to 1914 he would need more than three *years*. The forty volumes of the Grosse Politik would present a good mouthful to start upon. Perhaps there may be something in the following sentence taken from a recent letter to me by a distinguished American diplomatic historian who may have felt that I was plunged in gloom because of the attacks to which I have been subjected in recent months by Messrs. Ghent, Schmitt, Headlam-Morley, Seton-Watson, W. S. Davis and Turner: "You must really forgive the more conservative revisionists for being jealous of your ability to get up a case in readable and winning form while they are verifying the spelling of Slavic names."

(4) Mr. Turner is particularly fond of citing against me the review by Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley, whom Mr. Turner designates as "a principal authority and a most capable judge." To give the readers of the *Times* some basis for judging as to the achievements which Mr. Turner regards as essential to qualify for these titles he bestows upon Mr. Headlam-Morley, it may be pointed out that Headlam-Morley held the position in England as official propagandist during most of the war, comparable to that occupied by Mr. George Creel in this country. Further, Mr. Headlam-Morley will have some difficulty in justifying several of the explanations he has offered for the modification and misdating of some of the documents in the British Blue Book.

As at least a mitigation of the opinion of Mr. Headlam-Morley, we may put the verdict of Professor Gooch in the *Contemporary Review* for October, 1926: "No other American scholar has done so much as Professor Barnes to familiarize his countrymen with the new evidence which has rapidly accumulated during the last few years, and to compel them to revise their war-time judgments in the light of this new material." Further, Professor Gooch's qualifications and his good counsel as to a little more caution represent the truly judicious critique of my book by an informed revisionist of the conservative camp. It is the sort of review which friend and foe can only admire for its fair but pointed statement of both the useful qualities and the possible limitations of my book. Those who have regarded Professor Schmitt's review as an ideal example of balanced judgment from the conservatives would do well to compare it with Professor Gooch's.

(5) With respect to Mr. Turner's remarks upon my reply to Professor Schmitt in the *Progressive* for December 1st, I would say that I used the *Progressive* as a medium because Professor Coolidge point-blankly refused to publish an answer of brevity and utterly devoid of personal references. It may be frankly conceded that Professor Coolidge is within his rights in refusing on principle to publish rejoiners, but, if so, he should not publish controversial reviews, unless he is willing to let his excellent journal be used for purposes of an ambuscade. My reply was scarcely more personal than Professor Schmitt's review. The chief difference was that he disposed of me with a few magnificent flourishes at the outset, for which he did not offer proof, while I submitted detailed documentary evidence for every

charge which I made. The ultimate verdict upon the wisdom and accuracy of my reply to Mr. Schmitt will not be based upon the canons of taste formulated by Mr. Turner or the more sartorially exclusive circles of the American Historical Association, but upon whether the reply was a real service to the cause of truth in regard to the problem of war responsibility. For this final estimate of later years I can well afford to wait.

(6) Mr. Turner says that "historians generally consider my vagaries unworthy of notice," and leave them to fall by their own pitiful weaknesses. If so, why has Mr. Turner been so solicitous of late, and written very earnest letters to the *Saturday Review* (December 11, 1926) and to the *Times* (January 2, 1927), warning readers not to waste their time on my writings? If he believes what he says, why not encourage people in the largest possible number to consult my books and trust them to turn away promptly and speedily, full of nausea and disgust? This would be the best possible cure for potential devotees to my cult. The answer can scarcely be that Mr. Turner does not consider himself an historian. If Mr. Turner really desired to take up his pen in the cause of truth in the "Kriegsschuldfrage," why did he not accept the invitation of the *Christian Century* to refute my articles last winter, instead of declining the offer with a haughty and disdainful private telegram? Here was a real chance to go to the mat with me on essentials.

(7) I agree wholly with Mr. Turner that the foundations of both the "Old" and the "New" History are: "sound scholarship, adequate work. ability to use evidence and draw deductions fairly and well." I would invite any interested person to read the works of Mr. Turner and myself and then reflect upon certain remarks made approximately two thousand years ago by one of the world's greatest religious teachers concerning the optical therapy necessitated by the proverbial beam and mote.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

VIII. HOW BRITISH SCHOLARSHIP REGARDS RAYMOND TURNER.[1]

It will have been noted in the above communications from Professor Turner that he stresses his ideals and achievements in the field of exact historical scholarship, and emphasizes leisure as one of the chief requisites of precise and definitive historical work. It will have also been discerned that he has been fond of citing adverse British reviews of my book as though British views, even when colored by national bias, were final and overwhelmingly convincing. Professor Turner's chief work, that upon which he bases his whole claim to reputation as an exacting historical scholar, is his history of the British Privy Council. Therefore, we take pleasure in reprinting without change the review of the first volume of this

[1] From the London *Times Literary Supplement*, October 6, 1927, p. 691.

work by an eminent British historian which appeared in the Literary Supplement of the London *Times* for October 6, 1927:

This is the first volume [1] of a series which promises to be monumental. It carries Professor Turner's account of the Privy Council down to Sir William Temple's scheme of 1679, and a second volume is in the press continuing it apparently to 1784. But there is to follow "the second part" —"The Cabinet Council in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," also in two volumes—which "is completely written and awaits a publisher—difficult to find for a large work of this sort. The concluding part, 'King, Ministers, and Parliament in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries' is partly written and is designed for publication in the future."

The author then proposes to go back to the sixteenth century: "it may be that in the future he will deal fully with the Tudor Star Chamber and council," a study which, he says, has never been made, "though increasing pre-occupation with modern European questions"—he is professor of European History—"make (sic) that uncertain."

The opening chapters of the book, which deal summarily with the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century, would therefore call for little notice, were it not for Mr. Turner's promise for the future and the conviction he has already reached that predecessors, not engaged on a parergon or a preface, have generally gone astray. Considering that he only pretends to "exhaustive research" (p. 16) in the seventeenth and later centuries, there is an astonishing number of things in the sixteenth for which Mr. Turner can assert that "there is no evidence whatever" or denounce as mere conjecture because he has not seen it (pp. 22 *bis*, 33, 54*n*, 59, 65). The adventurousness of these assertions may be illustrated by one or two examples. "For the reign of Elizabeth" we are told (p. 33) "there are, unfortunately, for the most part no lists of the members of the council," yet, of the seventeen MS. volumes of its register for that period, nine, *viz.*, vols. vi-xii, xiv and xv, have complete lists of members prefixed to them, of which Mr. Turner has only found one, and there is a tenth in B.M. Add. MS. 11,404. Again, Mr. Turner asserts that proof of the statement that other counsellors, such as counsel learned in the law, "ordinary" counsellors, and counsellors "at large," exceeded the number of the Privy Council "could be obtained only from some list of members of the council which does not exist:" he has forgotten that the King had his councils in the North, in Wales and its Marches, in the West, in Ireland, Calais, Boulogne, and elsewhere, and that lists of their members exist which make up a total many times greater than that of the Privy Council. It should, however, be noted that Mr. Turner is frequently engaged in controverting statements which no one has made; he assumes, for instance (p. 46) that the description, in Henry VII's Patent Rolls, of over a hundred individuals as "King's counsellors" means that "the counsel contained probably a hundred members." It is only the references and not the reasoning of others that Mr. Turner assimilates with any ease; and his ascriptions of opinions and even of statements cannot be safely accepted without verification.

[1] *The Privy Council of England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 1603-1784.* By Edward Raymond Turner. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1927.

Mr. Turner, indeed, ignores at every turn Maitland's warning that we miss a great deal if we always put "council" where "counsel" is meant. He labours under the impression that medieval English and Latin words had a fixed meaning and attempts to deduce his history therefrom. Thus, if a King or any one else takes "secret counsel" it is proof that he has a Privy Council; and he quite fails to understand what Englishmen meant by *curia Regis*, the Crown, and "lords" of the Privy Council. This is a natural difficulty for an American historian, but Mr. Turner accentuates it by his reliance on words and his unfamiliarity with the personnel of English administration, the general history, and the language of this period. He calls Chamberlayne's "Notitia" a "year-book;" and the fact that the Privy Council often called itself the Council leads him to deny the differentiation which took place in the first half of the sixteenth century. He thinks that Henry VIII did not in his will discriminate between those who were and those who were not to be at once his executors and his son's council; and he is quite impervious to the existence (though it is set out in detail in authorities to which he refers) of the entirely distinct series of clerks to the two councils with different salaries and functions.

"All Boards," remarked a wit when refusing to join one, "are made of wood;" and Mr. Turner's Privy Council is the most wooden Board in historiography. He has a rooted aversion to personality; "a certain one" is his favourite substitute for the proper names, often of eminent persons, and he makes two out of one on p. 30, where, if he had given the proper name, he would have found that both were one Robert Bolson. So, while professing to give the "names" of Elizabeth's Privy Council in 1598, he cuts them out from his record and gives us only "Earl Marshal" for Essex and "lord high butler" for Buckhurst (p. 34); and in 1529, when the MS. has "Fitzjames, C(apitalis) de B(anco) R(egis)" and "Brudenell, C(apitalis) de C(ommuni) B(anco)," Mr. Turner, while citing the MS. as his authority, really puts Miss Scofield's "the two chief justices" into apparently documentary form without any names or distinction of office and misdates the document. This lack of discrimination leads to much more than error in detail. It is rather absurd, for instance, to deal with Henry VI's Council and his "impotence" without any reference to the fact that he was nine months old at the time of his accession, and to comment on the "disappearance" of names from the council in 1543-5 without reference to the deaths which caused it. We can, however, understand Mr. Turner's lament that, while "attendance lists" for Elizabeth's Privy Council "exist in abundance," there is an (imaginary) absence of lists of members. For he conceives a council as something apart from councillors, and attendance as unimportant compared with membership; he can see the wood but he cannot discern the trees of which it is made.

But the wood itself is opaque, and if Mr. Turner had more penetration we should be less bored. The work of the Court of Requests, which he thinks Henry VII instituted, was, he says, "essentially like that done in the Star Chamber" (p. 14), the distinction between civil and criminal jurisdiction being too insignificant for notice! The Act of 1504 providing alternative recourse to the Star Chamber, the Court of King's Bench, and the inchoate Privy Council is cited (p. 61) as "pointing to the substantial

identity of the two (*sic*) bodies;" and Burghley's clear and emphatic discrimination between the Star Chamber and the Privy Council is turned to the same confusion, apparently on the ground that foreigners sometimes called the latter a Council of State. Mr. Turner is constrained, however, to admit some distinction, but it was, he thinks, "no more than difference of function or procedure." Well, function and procedure make the main difference between Ministers to-day when they sit in the Cabinet or in Parliament; but that hardly "points to the substantial identity of the two bodies."

Mr. Turner's object in identifying the Privy Council with the Star Chamber is apparently to show that the Tudors were just like the Stuarts; but oddly enough, in spite of the identity, he practically ignores the work of the Council in the Star Chamber during the Stuart period and confines his attention to the Council Board. We are given, indeed, the psycho-analytical diagnosis that "the Council had constant relations with the Star Chamber, which was, indeed, its other self in respect of which, however, a formal distinction was preserved" (pp. 192-3); but Mr. Turner makes no reference to original sources such as Hawarde's "Reports" and S. R. Gardiner's cases in the Camden Society, or even to Professor Holdsworth's monumental work; and there is no attempt to discriminate between the nature of the jurisdiction which was exercised at the Council Board and those in the Court of Star Chamber and in Chancery, still less to define the relations of these jurisdictions to the common law, or to estimate the vast influence which was thereby exerted upon English legal development. It was easier to deal with the political and administrative work of the Privy Council, the voluminous and regular register of which provides a ready quarry for as much detail as one can wish. Mr. Turner's method is to take in succession the Privy Council, 1603-1645, the various councils of State under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, and the restored Privy Council of 1660-79, to ascertain their *personnel*, and then enumerate and illustrate their activities. There is some repetition that is inherent in this scheme, but a great deal more that is not: in five pages (275-80) Mr. Turner repeats five times the statement that the council dealt with matters referred to it by Parliament; we are told half-a-dozen times that "the council dealt with many things relating to foreign affairs," that "it was occupied with matters that concerned administration of the Navy," and that it "had much to do with the procuring of revenue," and with local affairs. Constant repetition of the obvious is the staple of these pages: "at the time of the Gunpowder Plot a certain Catholic was examined by the Council" (p. 171), "at the time of the Gunpowder Plot the bailiffs and the citizens of Worcester sent information to the Council about what was happening in their neighborhood" (p. 173), "during the military operations of 1650 and 1651 there was great activity in the council of state" (p. 289), "when Charles II and the Scots invaded England during the campaign that culminated in the Battle of Worcester, there was great activity in the council of state" (p. 290), are fair samples of the way in which the book has been compiled without any selective power.

Mr. Turner says in his preface that he "has taken whatever assistance he could get from the writings of others, but mostly he has gone his way alone," and his only reference, we think, to Sir Charles Firth is in a note (p. 311),

in which he attempts an insignificant and dubious correction. On the other hand the "exhaustive research," which he claims for himself, has not saved him from making Attorney-General Noy into a Lord-Keeper and fathering on him remarks which his authority, Clarendon, ascribes to the real Lord-Keeper Finch (p. 200), nor from the truly astonishing statement that by the second Cromwellian constitution "the office of Lord Protector was made hereditary" (p. 310). "If," writes Mr. Turner, "the author were to write the history of admiralty, treasury, and the others on the same scale that he has employed, the execution would require, perhaps another twenty years" (p. xi). When the author is oblivious of the fact, it becomes the critic's duty to remark that other qualifications besides leisure are requisite in a historian; and when so much is being done on English constitutional history by Americans with true scholarship and real modesty, it is to be regretted that a slur should be indirectly cast on their work by one who possesses less of either.

Chapter V.

THE "BEAUTY OF THE PURPLE": MR. WILLIAM STEARNS DAVIS REPELS THE HUNS

DURING the World War Mr. William Stearns Davis divided with Charles Downer Hazen and William Roscoe Thayer the honor of being one of the most alert and outspoken devotees of Clio who poured out the best that was in them to prevent the United States from meeting the fate of Alsace-Lorraine and becoming an appendage of the Mark of Brandenburg. In addition to having composed a number of respectable and conventional historical works, Mr. Davis is America's ablest historical novelist. Therefore, he commands resources of style which made his philippics against William Hohenzollern unusually pungent and effective stimulants to the faltering patriot. His *Roots of the War* was the most spirited synthesis of the whole body of fairy-tales which flitted forth concerning the groves of Potsdam where, on that fateful 5th of July, 1914, the Kaiser revealed his determination to deliver the world to the flames.

The writer's first clash with Mr. Davis grew out of a protest against Mr. Davis' attack upon the brave English exponent of truth and international decency, E. D. Morel, which he published in the Springfield *Republican* for February 5, 1925. The writer answered this in the Weekly *Republican* for February 26, 1925, and Professor Davis offered his comments in the same issue. Herein he promised a definitive treatment of the war guilt question on the basis of the new documents. This appeared in his *Europe Since Waterloo,* published at the end of 1926. The writer published a review of this in *Evolution* for March, 1928, no leading American weekly regarding the book as of sufficient merit to be willing to publish an extensive notice of its contents. Mr. Davis' services as an embattled historian during 1914-1918 are admirably described by Mr. Grattan in the *American Mercury* for August, 1927 (see above Part II, chap. I).

I. PART OF GERMANY IN PRECIPITATING WAR.[1]

PROF. DAVIS SETS FORTH THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN HISTORICAL SCHOLARS TOWARD THE QUESTION

To the Editor of The Republican:

The Republican has lately carried an extended notice and eulogy by a correspondent of the English pacifist, Edmund D. Morel. I have no desire to question the personal tribute paid to an individual who with courage and energy, even if not with equal judgment, devoted himself to the service of his fellow men. But I wish very respectfully but clearly to state that it is by no means true, as is suggested here, as sometimes elsewhere, that scholars at large have dropped the notion that Germany was the main culprit in precipitating the World War, and that "sometime this knowlege now possessed by scholars will percolate down to the masses."

It is true that historical scholars no longer find it necessary to execrate every turn of German policy while they discuss it. It is true that certain professors who have otherwise committed themselves to ultra-radical economic and social theories have endeavored to excuse the Potsdam diplomacy as merely part of the general outgrowth of capitalistic society. It is still more true that every pacifist who for prudential reasons was compelled to silence during the actual war has endeavored to atone for his timidity since by defending German action in July, 1914, by every means possible. It is also a fact that all the resources of German ingenuity have of late been mobilized to show that France should be compelled to ease up on the indemnity question, because Paris was as guilty in 1914 as was Berlin. All this is true, but it is also true that responsible investigators have recognized the source and the animus of the propaganda, and are assessing it at its actual value.

Senator Owen's address, quoted as proving the pacifist position, is not, of course, the statement of a trained historical scholar. In the opinion of many Americans, he was the victim of a line of European propaganda conducted recently for a very obvious end, and often pressed so clumsily as to defeat its own purpose. For example, as is well known, within a year the ex-premier of a great European country sent personal letters to a group of about twenty American historical professors urging on them, as a direct means of forcing the revision of the Treaty of Versailles in favor of his own country, and equally to the detriment of France, an "impartial investigation" of the causes of the war by a committee of American experts. The writer was one of the professors thus favored. He did not reply to the request. Certain other historical professors of far greater distinction did; and I understand that their answers to this suggestion were classic examples of pungent and unmistakable English.

Through all this pacifist criticism there runs, sometimes on the surface, sometimes fairly skillfully concealed, a passionate and implacable hatred of France, a hatred which I am sure was not made less because France since 1917 has given so little comfort to the cruder forms of radicalism.

It is dangerous to assume what will be the verdict of impartial history

[1] Springfield *Republican*, February 5, 1925.

upon any great and tragic event in the receding ages. So far as present evidence can go, the standing attitude of American historical scholars as to war responsibility is likely to be this:

1. In 1914 Europe was full of diplomatic combustibles likely to cause a great conflagration. Of these combustibles Germany had contributed the greatest, though not the only, share.

2. The match was applied to this mass of dry timber by Austria with the full consent of her German allies, under circumstances when Austria would have been helpless without German promise of support. If German statesmen did not know what they were doing in 1914, theirs is the familiar defense of a criminal action by the plea of complete insanity.

We need no longer hold the helpless German people responsible as persons for the sins of their rulers, but national responsibility for the acts of a government can never be thrown off under a workable international system.

As for the alleged culpability of the foes of Germany it is proper still to recall a little of very ancient history:

Russia did not send the infamous "Serbian note" to Belgrade.

France did not demand the surrender of fortresses as the pledge of neutrality, as Germany was absolutely prepared to demand Verdun and Toul from France.

Britain did not violate her solemn treaty in regard to Belgium.

America and Germany are now at peace. We desire ardently to heal all the wounds of the war. But historic truth is truth and its statement is not to be warped merely because we are sorry for the German people, and desire to see them at peace with France and launched upon a prosperous future.

WILLIAM STEARNS DAVIS.

II. SHARP DIFFERENCES AS TO ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR BETWEEN PROFESSORS. [1]

I. Prof. Barnes' Reply to Prof. Davis
His 14 Points Summarizing Historical Evidence

To the Editor of The Republican:

Your issue of February 5 carries an astonishingly inaccurate and misleading letter by William Stearns Davis which no informed and self-respecting historical scholar can allow to pass unchallenged and not properly branded. Judging from the recent work of Professor Hazen, the contributions of Professors Morse and Anderson in the June *Current History*, and Prof. Davis' letter, one may fear that "the standing attitude of American historical scholars as to war responsibility" is likely to remain attached to the grotesque mythology of the Allied propaganda and the Wilson epic of 1917. But that does not mean that it is the correct opinion in any sense whatever, and it is not shared by a single historical expert on the subject in

[1] Springfield *Weekly Republican*, February 26, 1925.

Europe or America, whether one selects Renouvin, Fabre-Luce, Gooch, Fay, Coolidge, Seymour, Schmitt, Montgelas, Barbagallo or H. Lutz.

It is amusing to find Davis rehashing the war illusions, when during the past summer the two best French books which have yet appeared on war origins unhesitatingly agree in assigning to Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg in July, 1914, the chief positive influence in precipitating the World War. But however "American historical scholars" stand, some of us propose to make their wilful footing on the shifting sands of error as embarrassing, and their presumptive arrogance as conspicuous, as possible.

While the results cannot be expected to be in proportion to the efforts, they cannot be negligible. Even Professors Hazen and Turner have been compelled to revise their textbook chapters on war origins due to the controversy of last year, and Professor Davis seems to have moved no little distance from his heroic saga, *The Roots of the War*.

From the evidence in documents which had been published before last spring, and were analyzed in the May (1924) *Current History*, as well as from monographs and sources since published, the facts about war origins seem to be the following: (In summarizing these facts I do so on my own responsibility, and in no way whatever personally involve any of the experts on contemporary diplomatic history mentioned above to whom I am so heavily indebted. It is apparent, however, that I fully recognize that my reputation in the circumstances is at stake, and that my statements will be justly subject to their scrutiny).

(1) The basic causes of the war were general ones such as nationalism. imperialism, militarism, for which no single country can be held either uniquely or primarily responsible. They were fanned and intensified about equally by German militarism, French revenge aspirations, British navalism and imperialism, and the century-old Russian ambition to get control of Constantinople and the Straits. Whatever the case earlier, Germany was far less prepared for war in a military sense in 1914 than Russia and France. General Buat admits that in 1914 the French active army was 910,000 to 870,000 for Germany with nearly twice the population of France; and Repington, the English military critic, admits that the German army was in regard to equipment, manoeuvres, and leadership inferior to the French. This was especially true in the artillery branch. The active Russian army numbered 1,284,000.

But even if the "system" produced the war, it is important to discover why it produced it in 1914 and not in 1908 or 1920. To answer this question one must place the immediate responsibility upon particular states and specific statesmen and diplomats.

(2) As to the attitude of the various classes in each state toward war, it must be admitted that military and naval circles in every state were willing to accept war, whether it be the German general staff or Churchill and the British naval clique. It must likewise be asserted that the mass of the people in no country wanted war, but that the difficulties in the way of converting the people to the war view were at least slightly less in Germany than in the other countries.

As to the responsible civil governments there is a great contrast. There

is no doubt that the civil authorities in Austria wanted a war on Serbia. There is no question that the group in control of France wanted a world war in 1914, before England could be detached from active participation in the Entente due to her negotiations with Germany in June, 1914. In Russia it is certain that the Czar desired peace, that the court and Izvolski, ambassador at Paris, ardently desired a world war to secure the Straits and that the foreign minister, Sazonov, wavered between peace and a vigorous wish for Constantinople, which he knew could only be obtained by war. In Germany, England and Italy there was a solid sentiment for peace in 1914 on the part of the civil governments, and in this desire for world peace no one was more genuine, within the limitations of his temperament, than the Kaiser. No one of importance in the German civil government was in June or July, 1914, willing to favor any proposal for anything beyond a justly punitive war on Serbia. And it took the atrocious assassination of the Archduke to bring them even to this point.

(3) The immediate responsibility for the World war goes back to 1912, rather than to 1914, and is to be found in the growing collusion between Poincaré and the Russian militarists, actively led in relation with France by Izvolski, who obtained large sums of money from Russia to bribe the French press to convert the French popular sentiment to an aggressive Franco-Russian attitude, particularly in the Balkans. Poincaré took a leading part in deciding as to the specific distribution of this money to the French papers. He also encouraged Russia to adopt a strong policy in the Balkans, and promised consistent French aid, under the stipulation that he should have a supervisory control of Russian policy here, lest it might take forms which would not redound to the furtherance of his plans and those of Izvolski, which were to foment a European war over the Balkans, in order that Russia might secure the Straits, and France recover Alsace-Lorraine, the latter of which had been Poincaré's chief aspiration and obsession since boyhood.

(4) This led Russia to encourage Serbian nationalism after 1913, which was rendered easier by the aggressive attitude of Austria toward Serbia from 1912-1914, in which Austria was successively restrained by Germany. This intensification of Serbian nationalistic agitation and intrigue led to the planning of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievitch, chief of the intelligence division of the Serbian general staff. Jovanovitch has exultantly confessed that the Serbian government had knowledge of the plot. Nikola Nenadovitch, another Serbian writer, has recently admitted that the Serbian government was fully aware of the details of the plot, that it later attempted to have Dimitrievitch assassinated, and failing in this executed him for treason, lest he might reveal the secret.

(5) In spite of its knowledge of the plot the Serbian government did not properly warn Austria.

(6) Despite the fact that Austria did not have positive knowledge of official Serbian complicity in July, 1914, she had plenty of evidence of the general responsibility of Serbia, and her attitude toward Serbia was the only possible one if she hoped to maintain the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy. Serbian consciousness of the inadequacy of the reply to the

Austrian ultimatum is proved by the fact that Serbia had ordered the mobilization of the Serbian army several hours before sending her reply to Austria, and six hours before the Austrian mobilization against Serbia.

(7) The Austrian policy in July, 1914, did not embody in any sense the desire for a world war, but the Austrian statesmen were willing to risk the undesired possibility of such a conflict rather than longer postpone attention to the Serbian nuisance. Germany was willing that Austria should punish Serbia, but the civil government in Germany, and the Kaiser, were distinctly opposed to a world war and put heavy pressure on Austria to restrain her as soon as this prospect loomed up. They would probably have been successful if Poincaré and the Russian militarists had not been able to precipitate the Russian general mobilization which brought on the war.

Until after Poincaré's visit to Russia in July, most European countries admitted that Austria was justified in strong action against Serbia.

(8) Poincaré, carrying out a plan earlier arranged, visited Russia in July, 1914, and before knowing the terms of the Austrian demands upon Serbia, gave Russia a free hand in the Serbian crisis, and promised French aid. This was the crucial step in bringing on the immediate precipitation of the struggle. It alone encouraged the ambitious but cowardly Russian militarists to go ahead with the mobilization, which both French and Russians knew would mean certain and inevitable war.

There has been a tendency of late to lay the responsibility for the immediate outbreak of the war upon Russia, but few reputable scholars believe that Russia would have taken any active stand against Germany and Austria without the ardent incitement and encouragement of Poincaré. Even Fabre-Luce, in the best and most objective French book on the origins of the war, admits that after Poincaré's visit to Russia there was never any real chance of averting the war.

(9) France made no effort to prevent the Russians from proceeding with the fatal military preparation, but urged them to hurry it along, provided they covered up their acts and intentions adequately, in order that more time might be gained on Germany. In this attitude Poincaré and his group were ably and enthusiastically aided by Izvolski and the Russian militarists in the army and the civil government. The Allies rejected a practicable Italian scheme to secure mediation, and Sir Edward Grey, in spite of his general desire for peace, either through confusion or intent, strongly influenced and encouraged the decision as to Russian general mobilization by telling Count Benckendorff, Russian ambassador at London, as early as July 25, that he believed Russia would find it necessary to mobilize against Austria and by informing Sazonov of the continued mobilization of the British fleet on July 27th.

(10) England was bound to enter the war whether Belgium had been invaded or not, and would have done so, though there might have been serious difficulties in uniting the nation as strongly behind war as was possible after the heaven-sent episode of the invasion of Belgium. The English conscience was not acute about Belgium, as the British government had made repeated, if vain, efforts to get the Belgians to consent to the landing of British troops on Belgian soil in the event of war. Nor were the French and British authorities horrified or surprised at the German

invasion of Belgium. They had expected it since 1878, but they were actually surprised at, and unprepared for the rapidity of the German progress through Belgium.

(11) Italy and Belgium may be relieved of all responsibility for the outbreak of the war.

(12) Probably the best summary of the facts is the brilliant epigram of Fabre-Luce: "The actions of Austria and Germany made the war possible; those of the Entente made it inevitable!"

(13) In the controversy of a year ago the writer predicted that new evidence would force progressive revision of views on war responsibility. If we were to arrange the states in order of immediate responsibility it would now probably be necessary to hold that France and Russia are tied for first place, and followed in order by Austria, Germany and England.

In the light of these facts the Dawes plan, and any current European and American agreements as to its application and execution, while immensely better than the Poincaré policy, are comparable to efforts to reduce the living expenses of the wife of a convicted man, known by all to be innocent, whose death penalty has been commuted to life imprisonment.

(14) We will not here go into the causes for the American entry into the war, but there is no doubt that the facts are as far removed from the myths that passed current in 1917, as are the above concerning the European situation. The account will never rise to the dignity of historical relevance or significance until there has been an adequate presentation of the English violations of our neutral rights from 1914 to 1917, and of the dastardly part played by Walter Hines Page in inducing Mr. Wilson to acquiesce in these indignities.

Morel needs no defense from anybody, and least of all from any attack by a man whose record as to the war hysteria was that of William Stearns Davis. Among trained historians it would be unnecessary to mention the fact, but it may protect technically uninformed readers to state that Prof. Davis has in no way whatever established his right to speak in any authoritative manner on the facts or literature of war origins. His talents as an historical novelist no one will be likely to challenge. And the "ancient history" which he cites is but a naive exploitation of one of the most threadbare devices of Jesuit dialectic, namely, the effort to obscure defeat on the main issues by attempting to divert the argument into subordinate issues or extraneous material.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

2. *Professor Davis' Rejoiner to Professor Barnes*

Refuses to Discuss Evidence in Detail and Attacks Barnes' Authority as a Historical Scholar.

To the Editor of The Republican:—

The professor of economics and sociology in Smith college has already made himself known across the land for his friendly willingness to inform the professors of European history in sister institutions about their particular subjects. Last year senior professors in Columbia and Michigan were

favored with what I may call his "affectionate remonstrances," and now their humbler colleague at Minnesota also receives in extremely courteous form his brotherly admonitions. Prof. Harry Elmer Barnes' views on so many subjects (from war causes to his professional specialty—I believe it is penology) are in fact so familiar that I do not feel required to answer his very gracious communication as I might those of a colleague in European history of mellower experience, and (I hope one may politely add) a slightly keener sense of humor.

Of course, omitting all the personal references, Prof. Harry Elmer Barnes does not reply to my letter about war causes at all. He merely embraces the opportunity to present in an abbreviated and drastic form the well-known article in the May *Current History* upon the subject, an article which he is far too modest to explain was written by himself. In his present communication he has apparently swallowed, hook, sinker and bobber, the affirmations and arrangements of evidence by certain ultra-pacifists (French, English and German) who have tried to rewrite the story of 1914. These good folk have centered the entire catastrophe around their particular bête noire, Poincaré, who is held by them far more responsible for the supreme disaster than those other people, whom Prof. Harry Elmer Barnes so gently queries, ever held the Kaiser. Unfortunately history cannot solve its problems in quite such a simple way.

Regard for truth compels me also to state that the publications which the professor of economics and sociology commends are familiar to me, and that I had the more important of them upon my desk when I wrote the letter which has evoked from him his kindly but unmistakable thunders of Sinai. It is a simple fact that many historical scholars of authority have not attached precisely the same weight to these writings and documents as has Prof. Harry Elmer Barnes.

The professor of economics and sociology has, of course, now put himself on formal record as defending what amounts to the extreme German position of non-responsibility for causing the war, a position which I have heard German Liberals sincerely deprecate. He makes statements calculated, I am sure, to be extraordinarily distasteful to some of the "real historical experts" to whom he appeals, and which they could scarcely accept without repudiating their own recently-published writings. His attitude towards France lies patent almost in every other sentence. As for his gratuitous reference to the "dastardly part" of Walter Hines Page, it is reasonable to suppose that here is evidence that he mailed his letter without submitting it to the friendly editing of an experienced colleague. Such an innuendo is hardly calculated to advance the argument.

In about a year I hope to publish a history of modern Europe, in which I will deal responsibly with the causes of the World War, to the satisfaction, it is proper to hope, of certain fellow workers in history if not in sociology. In the meantime, concerning Prof. Harry Elmer Barnes' more personal references to myself (his "love passages" one may perhaps call them); of course, it will be realized that my duties as a gentleman, a scholar, a historian and a professor of European history for 16 years in a great university impose upon me the obligation of silence.

WILLIAM STEARNS DAVIS.

III. REQUIESCAT IN PACE.[1]

The chief fault which a reviewer of contemporary vintage in the historical field is likely to find with this volume is the qualifying or descriptive clause in the title. If the author had not taken the pains explicitly and insistently to brand the book[2] "a history," it might have been regarded and cheerfully accepted as a continuation of the literary labors of the distinguished historical novelist of the University of Minnesota, author of *A Friend of Caesar, God Wills It, A Victor of Salamis, The Friar of Wittenberg, The Beauty of the Purple, The White Queen, Balshazzar*, and of that chief book of fiction produced during the World War—if we except Mr. Britling—*The Roots of the War*. The determination of the author to have his work judged as a solemn product of esoteric historical science, however, makes necessary a somewhat different standard of criticism and inevitably leads to a less favorable verdict as to the merits of the performance.

If we were to form our estimate of the book purely as a literary achievement, in which the author admittedly selected the material which interested him and told the story in exactly the manner he wished to tell it, then very high praise can be bestowed upon the volume. It is a vivid and even thrilling tome which would be highly informing and edifying to most literate American citizens. No particular harm would be done if the book were to be read by a half-million Hundred Percenters. It would greatly augment their information, and would only confirm prejudices which, in any event, they are likely to entertain in perpetuity.

On the other hand, if the work is to be judged as a serious effort to present a vital, profound, complete and well-balanced account of the changes in human life, institutions, culture and ideas since the day that Napoleon boarded the *Bellerophon*, then we must state that it would be difficult to conceive of a book written by an historian of distinguished academic status which reveals a more diverse array of archaic conceptions, nationalistic and partisan biases, factual inaccuracies and flagrant misrepresentations. This is a harsh verdict, but it is difficult to come to any other conclusion than this one, namely, that, when brought before the bar of judgment of sound and up-to-date historical craftsmanship, there is little, if anything, which can be said for the book from the standpoint of its general conception, its scope, its content or its execution. In the field of historical science—whatever its standing as literature—its only useful function will be to serve as the subject-matter for critical dissection and analysis in a seminar on historical methods and conceptions. There is scarcely a canon of conventional historical research or of modern historical conceptions which the book does not consistently violate.

Critical reviewers drawn from the conventional school of historians would be likely to select for initial and most severe condemnation the author's obvious and ever apparent nationalistic, class and partisan biases, but to the reviewer it seems that the most severe criticism should be levelled against Mr. Davis' archaic and trivial conception of the scope and content of relevant historical writing. What shall be said of a history of the last hundred years which tells us almost nothing at all of the progress in ideas,

[1] Reprinted from *Evolution*, March, 1928.

[2] *Europe Since Waterloo—A History* By William Stearns Davis. New York: Century.

general knowledge, science, technology, industry, commerce, social organization, cultural manifestations, religious beliefs and educational developments? Except for the fact that the Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815 and the Battle of the Marne in 1914, one would discover in the book only very vague and infrequent suggestions that the world of Napoleon differed in any sense from the world of Joffre. Not only is the book exclusively political, diplomatic and military history; it is this brand of history at its very worst, namely, biographical, episodical and anecdotal—all, interpreted in conformity with the most distorting prejudices.

The author confesses his underlying historical philosophy in his preface. These are a full acceptance of the principle of nationalism, "an intense belief in democracy," and the conviction that the salvation of the modern world is to be found in the triumph of the spirit of Christianity. His book proves him to be, however, much more of a nationalist than a democrat, though his conception of democracy is sufficiently tolerant and flexible to allow him to include Mussolini as a good democrat and to describe Fascism as merely that type of democratic government best adapted to periods of stress. And if Mr. Davis expouses Christianity, it is manifestly that type of Christianity which emerges from the exegesis of Viviani, Bruce Barton and Solomon S. Menken. If Mr. Davis' Christ were to return he would most certainly divide his residence between the Elysée, the Union League Club and the offices of the National Security League. It is further to be hoped that no one will be unkind enough to consult the author's *Roots of the War* or Part III of the present volume to discover concrete manifestations of Mr. Davis' personal appreciation and rendition of the Christian spirit of humility, understanding and sympathy. As far as Mr. Davis is true to his guiding prejudices he can scarcely present a fair estimate of monarchies, empires, kings, emperors, heathen peoples or Socialists.

The most important special bias which pervades the book is the maintenance of the same dualistic and demonological interpretation of German policy which characterized the *Roots of the War*. This means that not only Franco-German, but also Anglo-German relations are discussed in the form of diatribes matched only on the other side by such works as Eduard Meyer's wartime book on England. The origins of the Franco-Prussian War and the Morocco crisis may well be perused as examples of Mr. Davis' delicately poised handling of debated questions of international relations. The World War, indeed, is declared to have been inevitable because "a great and gifted people surrendered itself to the Bismarckian policy and morality." Mr. Davis seems scarcely to have pondered over Professor Gooch's verdict that the Bismarckian policy was manifestly designed in the interest of European peace, or to have read the monumental work of the great Dutch scholar, Japikse, who has shown on the basis of the latest documentary publications that Bismarck's policy as Imperial Chancellor was the most conspicuous and constructive program for European peace achieved in the nineteenth century. Even when Mr. Davis possesses knowledge obviously destructive to his epical version of affairs he does not allow it to cloud his vision. In dealing with the annexation of Bosnia and the crisis of 1908-9, after some pages of bitter diatribe against Austria and Germany, the diligent reader, who

would be perhaps one reader in fifty, will discover tucked away in an obscure footnote the statement that, after all, it was Izvolski, the Russian Foreign Minister, who suggested to Aehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, that Austria might well annex Bosnia and Herzegovina in return for Austrian support of Russia in the effort to secure the opening of the Straits. Not even a footnote tells us that the Straits project failed because of British opposition to Russia.

In the light of the faet that during the World War Mr. Davis contributed the chief historiographieal projectile which turned the Huns back in dismay at the Canadian border and thwarted their plan to seize the naval bases on the Great Lakes, we naturally turn with interest to Mr. Davis' treatment of the great conflict. He allots ample space to the subject for a comprehensive and magisterial treatment. Out of a total of 950 pages devoted to the history of Europe since 1815, approximately 450 pages are devoted to the World War and its immediate antecedents. It is evident, then, that the War still looms large in Mr. Davis' intellectual horizon. The rubrics and captions employed in the book are also conformable to this pattern of thought. The nomenclature of the eschatology of 1917 is preserved in immaeulate form. The section of the World War is headed "Armageddon" and separate chapters or paragraphs are entitled: "The Armed Peace," "The Pan-Germanic Dream," "Last Months in the Fools' Paradise," "Before the Tempest," "Der Tag," "Sowing the Wind," "Reaping the Whirlwind," "The Scrap of Paper," "Our Backs to the Wall," "The Sword of Foch and Pershing," "The Nemesis of Militarism," "The Ides of November." At times even Mr. Davis' spirited prose is not adequate to the task of verbally transmitting the depth of his moral passion, and he intersperses his text with war-time sonnets dedieated to the abasement of William the Damned. (pp. 715-16).

The objective and seientifieally equipped student of war responsibility, provided he is blessed with a sense of humor can searcely get angry with Mr. Davis for his account of the outbreak of the great struggle. It is unquestionably the most amusing exercise which has yet been contributed to the *Kriegsschuldfrage*, and, however much pure nonsense from the historical point of view, is pert and vivacious and much less irritating than the solemn and pretentious pedantry in Edward R. Turner's effort to exhume the eorpse of the Entente Epic in *Current History* for February. Perhaps the most hilarious portion is his prolegomena, in which he attempts to create an atmosphere of competenee and fairness. The author modestly admits many earlier mistakes due to insufficiency of information in war-time, contends that he has acquainted himself with all the available evidenee, states that he was intensely pro-German in 1914 and has been eonverted to the opposite viewpoint only by a cold and fishy perusal of irrefragable facts, and acknowledges his deep indebtedness to the war guilt studies of Count Montgelas. The trusting and guileless reader might be astonished to discover that we are treated to practically the same interpretation as that in the *Roots of the War*, that Mr. Davis' bibliography on war guilt would scareely do honor to a freshman report on the subject, that if Mr. Davis was pro-German in 1914 he has not safeguarded himself against the ravages of over-compensation. and that there is not the slightest evidence that he has ever seen Montgelas'

erudite work which actually constitutes a complete annihilation of about everything which Mr. Davis contributes to the subject.

We do not have space here to refute by page and line Mr. Davis' treatment of the details of pre-war diplomacy. We have gathered elsewhere some 800 pages of cogent material which may be invoked to perform this task of historical therapy, and there are no points in Mr. Davis' delayed brief for Entente idealism and self-sacrifice which are not voluminously and crushingly demolished in that place. Suffice it to say at this juncture that his book presents an admirable anthology of the war-time mythology including even the Bavarian forgeries and condensations. It contains almost nothing of the body of facts which have been assembled by the revisionists and have served to puncture the balloon of war-time lies and exaggerations. Even poor old Bethmann-Hollweg's attempt to sound out the British on the matter of neutrality on July 29th is regarded by Mr. Davis as proof of the firm determination of the Germans upon war by this time and as an insult to England which was heatedly repulsed by Grey "with the bluntness of an honest man deeply stirred." One finds, however, nothing of Sazonov's statement to Buchanan on July 24th that he "hoped His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France;" nor of his boast the next day that "secure of support of France, Russia will face all the risks of war;" nor of his telegram to Izvolski on July 29th to the effect that: "We have no alternative but to hasten our military preparations and assume that war is inevitable. . . . . It is much to be desired that England, without losing time, join France and Russia." This merely illustrates what can be done instantly to any portion of Mr. Davis' text, once it is confronted by any person equipped with the relevant facts and free from the profound fervor of the war period.

Perhaps more instructive than anything else would be a very brief and incomplete summary of the vital facts which one will not discover in the work. It is denied that the Serbian government had advance knowledge of the assassination plot and yet failed to give Austria as much of a warning as the known facts warranted. There is no mention of the real jeopardy of Austria-Hungary or of the British sympathy with Austria. Austrian policy is represented as really inspired and encouraged by Berlin. There is no recognition of the fact that Germany accepted in 1914 all the British diplomatic proposals save one, and substituted for this a plan which Grey admitted was better than his own. The sincerity of the German efforts to restrain Austria after the 28th is not admitted. There is no reference to the plan for fake negotiations in the Russian Military Protocol of 1912 nor of Dobrorolski's confession that the Russians decided upon war on July 25th and that all of the Russian diplomacy after that date was pure hyprocrisy designed to gain time for the mobilization. Neither does he mention Pashitch's confirmation of this by citing a direct telegram from St. Petersburg to Belgrade. We do not learn that from 1893 onward all informed authorities had recognized that a general Russian mobilization was equivalent to a Russian declaration of war on Germany or that Buchanan solemnly warned Sazonov three times to this effect in July, 1914. He does not touch upon Poincaré's incitement of the Russians while at St. Petersburg in 1914, on his reaffirmation of the Alliance with reference to the Austro-Serbian crisis, or on his blocking of Grey's original diplomatic plan for settling the crisis.

He does not refer to Lord Bertie's characterization of the Franco-Russian case, based upon the alleged Russian obligation to protect the Balkan Slavs, as "mere rubbish," and "an absurd and obsolete attitude." He does not show how France was for peace until Poincaré's return, how Poincaré turned the tide for war and encouraged the Russians to go ahead with their mobilization, nor how the French descended to flagrant diplomatic subterfuges and deliberate falsifications of dates and other relevant facts in 1914 in order to make their policy palatable to the publics of France, Great Britain and Italy. In regard to England we find nothing to inform us of the failure to restrain Russia and France, of the British encouragement of Russian mobilization on the 25th and the 27th, of Grey's informing Cambon that he was for war before he had heard from either France or Germany on the Belgian issue, of Germany's proposal that she keep out of Belgium if England would remain neutral, or of the German promise not to attack the French coast if England would remain neutral, which was delivered on the morning before Grey made his speech of August 3rd before the House of Commons.

In short, Mr. Davis has diligently reassembled the remains of the War Epic, annointed them with fragrant oils and herbs, and laid them in state in a magnificent octavo of 965 pages richly overspread with red and gold. We may rest content with gratefully calling attention to this mortuary service and funereal ritual, and can well refrain from preaching the sermon in memory of the departed. It will suffice to arrange the flowers and to start playing softly the lugubrious strains of Beethoven's "Eroica."

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

Chapter VI.

THE SAVIOUR OF FRANCE: M. RAYMOND POINCARÉ ENTERS THE LISTS IN HIS OWN BEHALF

IN the summer of 1925 the editors of *Foreign Affairs* (American) induced M. Poincaré to break his silence and answer his critics among students of the war-guilt problem who were accusing him of being one of those chiefly responsible for the outbreak of the World War in 1914. He published his article in *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1925, and the writer answered this in the New York *Nation* for October 7th, 1925, and in full in the *American Monthly* for December, 1925. Since then M. Poincaré has begun to issue his memoirs, entitled *Au Service de la France.* Four volumes have been published which bring the story down through the outbreak of the War in 1914. The writer reviewed the earlier volumes in the *Nation* for June 15th, 1927, and he appends a notice of the last volume, that dealing with the crisis of 1914.

I. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR.[1]

By Raymond Poincaré

Is it possible that the power of a lie is even greater than it is pictured as being in the fine book of the Norwegian novelist, Johan Bojer? Its power sometimes disheartens those who seek to defend and bear witness to the truth. Those who have been closely connected with great events and who remember them in their minutest details feel that the truth must be obvious to any fair-minded person. But when they see the imagination of some and the dishonesty of others distorting facts out of all semblance to reality, they feel inclined to withdraw into themselves, to give up counting upon any man to refute such calumnies and to wait for time in its wisdom to re-establish the balance.

This is a mistake. For falsehood is thus given an opportunity to outdistance truth and legend is allowed to take the place of history. In a recent book, Mr. Richard Grelling, an honest German who acknowledges the wrongs committed by his country, draws attention to the Reich's recent attempts to clear Germany of all responsibility for the World War, and at the same time makes short shrift of the assertions that have been given out in support of so astounding a thesis. It is unfortunately true that in

[1] Reprinted by permission from *Foreign Affairs*, (American), October, 1925.

friendly countries, and especially in the United States, the combined propaganda of Germany and the Soviets has sown confusion in the minds even of well-meaning men of high standing.[2] They have actually forgotten that it was Germany who in 1914 made the decisive and irreparable decision by declaring war on Russia and on France, that it was Germany who violated Belgian neutrality, invaded France and devastated ten departments in the north and northeast, and that it was Germany who exhibited such barbarity on land and sea that the United States of America felt called upon to enter the lists against her.

On July 6th, 1922, in the French Chamber of Deputies, M. Herriot, then chief of the Opposition, answering a communist deputy who had expressed himself as in accord with Soviet accusations against me, said: "The point at issue is whether the Republic (and I am thinking both of the country and the governmental régime) could be held in any way, through the acts of its ministers or through its President, responsible in the very slightest degree for the abominable crime of 1914. I for my part answer unhesitatingly, No! This question, I confess, troubled my conscience, as it has doubtless troubled the conscience of others. I now have read all the documents that there are to read, I have gone through, page by page, the "*Livre Noir*" which has so often been quoted in debates here in the Chamber, and I may say that the conclusions which I have drawn from its perusal are not those of my communist interlocutor. Germany so far has not produced a single authentic document with any real proof against us." M. Herriot then referred to the categorical avowal in regard to France's pacific intentions made by the German Ambassador at Paris, Baron von Schoen, who in a telegram dated July 29th, 1914, reported that in the view of M. Viviani, President of the Council, the best expedient would be "prompt and immediate recourse to mediation, no matter in what form." "Viviani," added Baron von Schoen, "refuses to give up hope for the maintenance of peace, which is honestly desired here (Paris)." In conclusion M. Herriot pointed out that it was inconceivable that so many free countries, and in particular the United States, should have been so extravagantly deceived when they threw in their lot with France in the struggle for an idea, for justice. "The American democracy," he cried, "was under the guidance of one of the most conscientious and clear-minded of the world's leaders, a man who for many months had been searching for the truth, weighing the evidence and ripening his great decision. Can we forget that he stood here on our French tribune, forget that from this tribune he announced to the whole world that right and justice lay on the side of France?"

And were they, too, mistaken, those other countries who in turn ranged

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[2] Only a few months ago Mr. Frederick Bausman, a former member of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, wrote in an English publication that "a decided change" had taken place in American public opinion concerning the origins of the war. He quoted a pamphlet of Mr. Albert Jay Nock of New York, articles by Professor Sidney Fay, the German publications of Siebert, the Bolshevik "*Livre Noir*", speeches made before the American Senate in December, 1923, by Senator Robert L. Owen, and the commentaries of Mr. Frank H. Simonds, Professors Seymour of Yale, and Wright and Bernadotte Schmitt of Chicago. He recalled, too, the classification of national responsibilities which Professor Harry E. Barnes felt himself qualified to make: the primary guilt rests upon Austria, then upon Russia, then upon France; Germany, according to Mr. Barnes, wished on the contrary to avoid war.

themselves by the side of France and Belgium,—Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, and Uruguay? And the states who were oppressed and downtrodden before the war and whom the war liberated, Poland and Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, were they too deceived? And if all these people were deceived, what is the diabolic power which led them astray? Can it reside in one man or one nation?

In the July number of *Foreign Affairs*, President Masaryk of the Czechoslovak Republic set over against each other the political and social characteristics of pre-war France and pre-war Germany—imperial Germany Prussianized, accustomed to confound the ability to use force with the right to use it, an entire stranger to democratic customs and unacquainted with liberty: France, steeped in the doctrines of the French Revolution, familiar through long usage with the ideas of justice and equality, and free from warlike aspirations. He was right. The republican institutions of France are indeed conceived in such a manner that no one man can substitute his will for that of the people. No President of the Republic can act without the counter-signature of a minister and every minister is responsible to the Chambers for his actions. It would be a simple matter to show, year by year and point by point, that, before the war as since, the foreign policy of France has been carried on in the open and in complete accord with Parliament.

I have been somewhat astonished to find over the signature of one of my American academic critics a number of remarkable misstatements concerning men and events in France. He speaks of "the Poincaré clique" and alleges that in 1912 there came into power "the advocates of a strong France, prominent among them Poincaré, Delcassé, Millerand, Joffre, Jonnart, and Tardieu." Now as a matter of fact Jonnart did not become minister until 1913, in a cabinet presided over by M. Briand, now Foreign Minister in the "Left" cabinet of M. Painlevé; M. Tardieu was not even a deputy in 1912 or 1913, but a mere journalist; General Joffre was chief of staff before 1912, and he remained as such until the war, but his attitude was never open to criticism and he never attempted in any manner whatsoever to exert any political influence. And, finally, the cabinet of 1912, the formation of which was entrusted to me by President Falliéres, comprised men like M. Briand, who was its Vice-President; M. Léon Bourgeois, one of the most active partisans of international arbitration and one of my most faithful friends; and M. Steeg, today Minister of Justice in the Painlevé cabinet, who like M. Briand and M. Léon Bourgeois was closely associated with the policy of my government, and who has always assumed his share of responsibility and has referred publicly to a remark of mine made one day at the Council of Ministers: "Even if I knew beforehand that war would bring us victory, I should attempt the impossible to prevent it." As to my subsequent conduct as President of the Republic, it was that of the head of a state who belonged to no party and felt it his constitutional duty to act the part of an arbiter between conflicting elements and to maintain the same reserved attitude as the King of England or of Italy. This is of course the very essence of the European parliamentary system. In consequence of this policy, I had as ministers under me republicans of every

shade, such for example as, in 1913, M. Doumergue, now President of France; M. Caillaux, M. Renoult, who was in M. Herriot's cabinet only a short time ago; M. Malvy, M. Viviani and later, during the war, a number of Socialists. I may perhaps be allowed to add, since Messrs. Barnes and Bausman propose to call me to account, that if when I left the Elysée both Chambers, regardless of party and on the initiative of deputies like MM. Briand and Painlevé, voted an act declaring that I had deserved well of my country, it was tantamount to admitting that at no stage had I governed with a clique. Enough of personalities. Let us turn to ideas and facts.

The dominant idea is this: up to the month of August, 1914, France in every situation gave proof of the sincerity and permanence of her pacific intentions. The dominant fact is this: there is always a chance of avoiding war so long as it has not actually been declared, and it was Germany who declared war.

Of course, France had not forgotten and could not forget that in 1871 Germany had torn from her side a living piece of flesh, regardless of the cries of the inhabitants and the solemn protests of the representatives of Alsace and Lorraine in the National Assembly. It is vain to say that it was the Emperor Napoleon III who declared war. Yes, he did declare it after the publication of the mutilated telegram of Ems; and I admit that in spite of this attenuating circumstance he deserved to suffer the consequences of his wrong-doing. France disavowed and dethroned him. It was quite comprehensible for Germany to force the defeated nation to pay an indemnity,—which she did to the tune of five billions of francs. But nothing can justify Germany's adding to this severe punishment an attack upon the liberties of an unoffending and defenseless population. The rape of two provinces which had been incorporated in France for over two hundred years and which wished to remain French was a crime against the law of nations. To have passed the sponge of oblivion over so black a page of history would have been on France's part a complete abdication, a renouncement of sovereignty and a cowardly abandonment of her children. But the fact that she continued to think sorrowfully of those who had been torn from her did not mean that she dreamed for a single moment of delivering them by force of arms. The republicans of 1870 who in the defense of their invaded country girt on the fallen sword of a tottering Empire were no lovers of military glory. Quite the contrary, they were averse to it both by tradition and principle. They were sincere friends of peace. They tried to prevent their country's defeat. Having failed, and having also witnessed the defeat of justice, they withdrew into themselves and gleaned what comfort they could from Gambetta's famous phrase, that sooner or later would sound the hour of immanent justice. This consolation was certainly theoretical rather than practical. Yet they remained satisfied with it and never brooded over the idea of a war of revenge, nor did any of the old republicans —Gambetta, Jules Ferry or Freycinet—ever, even momentarily, pursue a policy that was anything but absolutely frank.

The generation which succeeded them inherited these pacific sentiments and abided by them. Germany turned her energies more and more toward the Germanization of Alsace and Lorraine. In spite of her persistence she did not achieve what she was after, but even if she had succeeded in making

Alsace and Lorraine into a loyal German colony, the immorality of the conquest would have remained the same, for the assimilation, coming after forcible seizure and having been brought about by compulsion, would have been but a different form and prolongation of the initial violence. It was not to be expected that France could give her approval to such an infringement of her national rights. But, however painful it might be for her, she loved peace too much and knew too well how deeply she would suffer from any war ever to allow herself provocation or even indiscretion. And of all her citizens the most peaceful were those who lived near the new frontiers. They knew only too well that a war would expose them and their families and property to invasion and devastation. That brilliant German publicist, Maximilian Harden, realized this when he told his compatriots: "You may if you wish represent M. Poincaré as an abettor of all iniquity, but when you say that he is responsible for the war, it would be all too easy for him to prove the contrary, even without the testimony of outstanding men belonging to different political parties in different parts of the world. Poincaré did not want his Lorraine to become a battlefield again. He wanted to be a President of Peace."

Germany, after for years insisting that economic competition and colonial jealousies with England were the cause of the war, has suddenly changed her tune and now asserts that France, the ally of Russia, was at fault in not opposing the Eastern ambitions of the Tsarist Government, in allowing Russia a free hand and thus participating in a policy that led to the cataclysm.

In advancing so fantastic an explanation Germany quite forgets to show that the Franco-Russian alliance was merely a defensive display, rendered necessary by the Triple Alliance. Between 1871 and 1891 the German Empire had laid a firm basis for its hegemony over Europe. To accomplish this it had concluded a series of accords: in 1879 an alliance with Austria, in 1882 an alliance with Italy, in 1887 the "reinsurance treaty" with Russia. German ascendancy had reached such a point that there was no longer any independence or equilibrium in Europe. Peace meant German despotism and European servitude. An instinct of self-preservation made Europe cast about for a corrective. The first result was the Franco-Russian alliance which was negotiated under the Presidency of M. Carnot by M. de Freycinet and M. Ribot. It was of a strictly defensive nature as Article I clearly shows: "If France should be attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to fight Germany." All the documents relating to the negotiations and to the conclusion of this alliance, as well as to the military and naval annexed conventions, have been published in their entirety in a "*Livre Jaune*" and they admit of no misinterpretation. Other agreements to free Europe and the world from German domination followed the Franco-Russian rapprochement: the Franco-Italian agreements of 1900, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904, and finally the Russo-Japanese, Anglo-Russian and Russo-Italian agreements. No one of these treaties was aggressive in character, no one was directed against Germany, but they had been concluded without her and to this extent set a limit to her imperialistic ambitions. None

the less, Germany's policy continued to be dominated by the arrogant spirit which since the war of 1870 had led to the Franco-German incidents of 1875 and 1887, and which between 1905 and 1911 had constantly poisoned affairs in Morocco. After the insult of Tangiers came the threat of Agadir. Instead of being stung into action by these repeated provocations, France, in her desire for peace, signed, under the very cannon of the *Panther*, the treaty of November 4th, 1911, and in exchange for liberty of action in Morocco made important territorial concessions in the Congo. In the early part of 1912, as head of the French Government, I saw the treaty through the Senate in spite of the opposition of M. Clemenceau, and I put into application its provisions in spite of continued intrigues which German agents such as Karl Ficke carried out in Morocco with the connivance of the Berlin cabinet. The Resident-General, General Lyautey, reported officially in 1914 that Germany was acting in Morocco exactly as if she were still in possession of the rights which she had forfeited by the treaty of 1911 and that she thus was keeping alive the germs of war.

On top of all this, hostilities broke out between the Balkan States and Turkey. As soon as she received the first inkling of this danger France did her best to prevent it. But she was not in a position to muzzle the dogs of war which others had let loose. The Italian expedition into Tripoli (begun in September, 1911), the many difficulties which it encountered, the persistence of the local resistance with which it met, the broader scope given it by the Italian Government, the occupation of the islands of the Dodecanese entailing a threat to the Dardanelles themselves—all had fired Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro with the determination to obtain from a weakened Turkey the reforms so long and so imperiously demanded by the Slavs and Greeks of Macedonia. Never indeed had the Ottoman administration been so shiftless and so mischief-making; everywhere the Christian populations were complaining of the way they were being treated. On January 17, 1912, with the idea of continuing its detestable practises more freely, the cabinet of Saïd Pasha had dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and proceeded under army surveillance to hold fake elections and thus set up a veritable despotism. It was at this moment that in the minds of the Balkan statesmen there took definite shape the plan to liberate their Macedonian brothers from the oppression of the Committee of Union and Progress. Pourparlers had taken place some months before between M. Venizelos and M. Gueschoff, between M. Rizoff and M. Pashitch. It was decided to strike while the iron was hot, and the conventions constituting the Balkan League were concluded at the end of May. It was not until the following August that France learned their actual contents, but beginning in January, 1912, alarming rumors from the Balkans had reached the ears of the French Government and they at once got in touch with Russia with a view to considering the various eventualities which Europe might have to face sooner or later in the East. Russia gave us assurances that she would abide by the territorial status quo in the Balkans. As the clouds loomed more threateningly on the horizon regular daily conversations took place among the Great Powers, including of course Germany and Austria-Hungary. This exchange of views is contained at length in a voluminous "*Livre Jaune*," the existence of which seems to be completely unsuspected by students of the Soviet Documents, and which shows day by day what efforts France made

for peace. But the course of events moved so rapidly that the agitation in the Balkans had reached an alarming point before the Great Powers could agree on any concerted program of reform. In the face of the approaching danger the French Government felt that while recommending the utmost patience and calm in Sofia, Belgrade, Athens, and Cetinje, it would be advisable to ask the Porte to carry out certain reforms. But the Porte continued to promise everything and to do nothing. In order to prevent a clash between Austria and Russia, and to emphasize the unanimity of European opinion, we suggested that these two Powers make a joint appeal to the Balkan States to be wise and maintain absolute calm. Unfortunately on the very day when this joint appeal was to be launched by Russia and Austria, Montenegro suddenly declared war on Turkey. From then on, of course, the European concert of nations altered its goal; having failed to prevent war, they turned all their energies to limiting its scope and duration. The French Government did all it could in support of this policy by keeping in constant touch with the Great Powers and by helping to organize the Conference of London, so ably and impartially presided over by the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey.

In this European conference, which she had worked so hard to establish, France played the rôle of a moderator. The instructions given M. Paul Cambon by the successive French Governments—my own, M. Briand's, M. Barthou's, M. Doumergue's—bear witness to this contestant pacific influence. In a speech delivered on June 22, 1916, M. Tittoni, then Italian Foreign Minister, who had been Ambassador in Paris during the Balkan crisis, could truthfully say: "Everything that Austria asked for after the two Balkan Wars she obtained with the consent and support of all the Powers. It was in this way that Albania was created at Austria's request, its King designated by Austria, Montenegro obliged to give up Scutari, Serbia forced to abandon her claim to an outlet on the Adriatic, and the frontiers of Albania toward Serbia and Greece drawn at Austria's dictation." These triumphs were referred to by Count Berchtold himself in a speech on November 20th, 1913, in which, after mentioning specific instances, he concluded: "We carried out the essential part of our program and safeguarded the peace of the Monarchy." And if more proof were needed it is supplied by Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador to Great Britain and designated to represent his Government at the London Conference, when he refers in his memoirs to the continued, often indiscrete, support given by Berlin to Vienna's claims. He states that Russia did not wish to drive the Sultan from Constantinople and that Germany compromised the whole situation by trying to extend her control to the shores of the Bosphorous. He declares that the Hohenzollern Empire moved toward a conflict with Russia, "viewing the Eastern Question through Austrian spectacles." He adds: "We supported, against our own economic interests, Austria's political interests, which aimed at the strangulation of Serbia." And again: "Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with prudence, calm and tact. Whenever a question threatened to become dangerous, he would propose a harmonious formula which was always just and always acceptable. His personality inspired equal confidence in all the negotiating parties. We had indeed once more come happily out of one of the numerous crises to which our policies constantly subjected us.

Russia had been obliged to back down on every point, for she had in no instance been able to obtain satisfaction for her Serbian protégés; Albania had been created a vassal state to Austria; Serbia had been kept from the sea. In short, the whole Conference was another humiliation to Russia's dignity. Just as in 1878 and in 1908, once again we opposed Russia's ambitions, although Germany's interests were in no way at stake." Lichnowsky then makes reference to the conciliatory attitude of his Russian colleague, Ambassador Benckendorf, recalling his German origin and that consequently he was supposedly German in sympathies. "He was careful," he writes, "never to take too intransigent a stand on any question; and was supported in this by the attitude of France and Great Britain."

In the face of such positive proofs, proofs which correspond exactly with the French Documents and the actual facts, what weight can be attached to the Soviet publications and the commentaries resulting from them? Maximilian Harden has drawn attention to the fact that there is no way of distinguishing in the Soviet diplomatic reports between objective truth and personal prejudices. As Mr. Richard Grelling observes, no one knows if the texts divulged to Germany by the Soviets in 1919 have been reproduced whole or piece-meal, nor is it known whether the French, English and German translations are correct. Mr. Grelling has brought to light what appear to be intentional mistakes and contradictions in the texts as they stand. But even admitting the authenticity of these documents, we French politicians find it hard not to shrug our shoulders when we find that the statements taken so seriously emanate from M. Isvolsky. The French Government felt so little confidence in the Russian Ambassador that in August, 1912, I made energetic representations about him to M. Kokovtzev, President of the Russian Council, asking for his recall. Of course, as he was the representative of a friendly nation we had to put up with him, but we looked upon him as quite capable of serving his own interests and, if it suited him, of garbling our conversations in his reports. Traces of our mistrust are quite apparent to anyone who reads the "*Livre Jaune*" and the "*Livre Noir*," and I feel sure that anyone who will take the trouble to peruse, page by page, the five large volumes of M. Friedrich Stieve containing the Soviet Documents will come to the same conclusions as did M. Herriot. I cannot, owing to lack of space, undertake to go into all the details of this matter here. A summary of M. Stieve's books has already been published by a French diplomat, Mr. Romieu. I am looking forward myself to publishing a detailed, complete study on the subject. It will show how well-founded were Prince Lichnowsky's estimates of events, and how, in the East as elsewhere, France was a sincere and faithful friend of peace.

As an indication of France's too blind obedience to Russia much has been made of the recall of our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, M. George Louis, who, it is claimed, was sacrificed unjustly to M. Isvolsky's whim. We need only consult the "*Livre Noir*" to find that it was not M. Isvolsky but M. Sazonov, Russia's Foreign Minister, who, rightly or wrongly, objected to M. George Louis. M. George Louis' health and his rather unusual reserve made it hard for him properly to fill a post which required untiring energy as well as great social gifts. After thoroughly examining the complaints made against him, I nevertheless refused to inflict upon him a rebuke which seemed quite unwarranted, as he had always professed to be

in complete agreement with the policy of the French Government. Later on, when I was no longer President of the Council and before I had become President of France, M. Briand, who had become Premier, and M. Jonnart, Minister of Foreign Affairs, decided that M. Louis' health was so impaired as to prevent his properly fulfilling his duties and he was placed on the retired list. A few months ago M. Jonnart published the reasons for this decision. It was made, by his and M. Briand's request, at a Council meeting presided over by M. Fallières and which I did not attend. Upon his return to France, more and more broken in health and perhaps a little soured in spirit, M. Louis had the ill fortune to enter a *milieu* made up in part of defeatists and adventurers. This accounts for his admitting to his inner circle a most questionable financier, Bolo Pasha, to whom Germany had paid many millions of francs and who (as the result of unimpeachable evidence secured by the American Department of Justice) was condemned and shot as a traitor. So taken in was he by Bolo that George Louis offered to vouch for his patriotism and probity.

After having during his lifetime given so sorry an example of his lack of discrimination, the ex-Ambassador entrusted to friends who approved his stand during the latter days of his life the task of showing after his death that he had been the innocent victim of a government's caprice. A journalist against whom M. Clemenceau brought a charge of intelligence with the enemy, who escaped across the frontier, who was condemned in default of defense, and who, returning to France after many years of exile, managed to secure an acquittal after the war was over, has published a correspondence attributed to M. Louis. This book was announced in Germany before it appeared here and no one has been able to verify its authenticity. If these conversations do really emanate from the pen of M. Louis, I fear that we are forced to conclude that his intellect had become even more clouded than his ill-considered testimony in favor of Bolo had led us to believe. The documents published under his name consist of conversations which he alleges to have had with politicians and diplomats from 1914 to 1917. They might justly be entitled "Dialogues of the Dead;" and if the interlocutors are no longer here to protest, the opinions attributed to them are contradicted by everything that they ever wrote while they were alive. Those few who still linger among the living have one and all been at pains categorically to deny their alleged remarks—as for example M. Stephen Pichon, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Jules Cambon, ex-Ambassador to Germany; and M. Paleologue, ex-Minister to Russia. M. Daeschner, now our Ambassador in Washington, who in 1912 was my *chef de cabinet* and one of my most valuable collaborators, has found glaring misstatements in these documents. M. Daeschner knows better than anyone else how tenaciously we fought for peace and the purely political reasons which obliged MM. Briand and Jonnart to put an end to the mission of M. Louis.

An administrative incident of this kind could of course in no way influence France's diplomatic policies. With or without M. Louis, France's policies remained unalterably pacific and no sympathy toward imaginary Russian ambitions ever turned us from the paths of peace. And besides, the results of the Conference of London put an end to all of such discussions. In consequence at least in part of France's efforts, the status in the Balkans remained as Austria desired it and she expressed her complete satisfaction

officially. Germany had been a contributing factor in this success of her "brilliant second." The Triple Alliance had been renewed by anticipation on December 5th, 1912. On March 24th and 29th, 1913, Emperor William II had stopped on the *Hohenzollern* at Pola and Venice and reviewed the Austrian fleet and visited the Italian. A few weeks later King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who was on very intimate terms with the Hapsburg Monarch and who shortly afterwards was to range himself on the side of the Triple Alliance, gave General Savoff the order to attack the Serbs on the Vardar on the night of June 29-30. Ferdinand of Coburg had received an assurance from Vienna that the King of Rumania, Carol I of Hohenzollern, would come to his aid in consideration of certain specific concessions. These rosy schemes of Vienna and her Bulgarian ally were frustrated by the head of the Rumanian Government, Take Jonescu, who launched the army not against Serbia but against the conspiring Bulgars. At the end of two weeks King Ferdinand was beaten and a new Congress of Peace met at Bucharest. It was then that Austria made up her mind to take determined measures against her small neighbor, Serbia, whose proximity was a source of constant anxiety. The Dual Monarchy was in truth a tyrannous and precarious system, based entirely on the supremacy of the Austrian Germans and the Magyars and the subordination of all the Slavs of the Empire. Vienna and Budapest instinctively distrusted the attraction which independent Serbia might exercise over her brother Slavs. Therefore in July, 1913, Austria-Hungary communicated to the Italian Government, as also to Germany, her intention to act against Serbia, and, in order to involve Italy, she defined this enterprise as "a defensive action." M. Giolitti and the Marquis di San Giuliano at once characterized the proposal as "an extremely dangerous adventure" and refused to have anything to do with it. This attempted attack of 1913 casts a sinister light on the events of the following year.

Nevertheless, the world was at peace at the time of the Sarajevo murder. The immediate determining causes of the war must therefore be sought in the conduct of the various European nations after this tragedy.[1]

Thoroughly dissatisfied with the Treaty of Bucharest and realizing that the national aspirations of the Southern Slavs constituted a menace to the maintenance of her artificial and fragile Empire, Austria eagerly seized upon the assassination at Sarajevo as an opportunity to eliminate Serbia as a political factor. At first Germany did not disapprove of this dangerous scheme. Quite the contrary, on July 5th Emperor William II and his Chancellor knowingly gave their adhesion to Austria's plan. They pretended not to know the details of its execution; they took no part in drawing up the ultimatum to Serbia; but they knew its general meaning and scope, and, far from restraining, egged Austria on. The ultimatum was to be so drawn as to make Serbia's humiliation complete and Count Berchtold certainly hoped that a local war would result. I do not claim that Austria or Germany, in this first phase, had a conscious thought-out intention of

[1] An eminent French historian, M. Pierre Renouvin, has made a conscientious study of these causes in his lectures before the student body of the University of Paris. He has examined the arguments advanced in different countries with scrupulous care, he has given deep consideration to the claims of Germany's defenders, and has just published his conclusions in a remarkable book. It shows no trace of passion or resentment, but exposes to the pitiless light of day the guilt of the Central Empires.

provoking a general war. No existing document gives us the right to suppose that, at that time, they had planned anything so systematic. Perhaps they did fondly imagine that Europe would watch unmoved the annihilation of Serbia, that Russia would limit her interference to diplomatic representations, and that England and France would give way, as they had given way before to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, even so, the Central Empires from the beginning had taken into account the fact that the despatch of a threatening note to Belgrade might result in action by Russia and they were decided to run the attendant risks. They had of course staked everything on England's neutrality.

Their first thesis therefore consisted in saying: "This is a special quarrel between Austria and Serbia. The quarrel concerns them alone. No one has the right to interfere in it." Germany saw to it that Austria was left free to act. M. Sazonov suggested entering into negotiations with Austria. "No," said Austria, "my affairs are none of your business." The Great Powers suggested a conference. "No," said Germany, "this matter concerns Austria alone." And William added: "In a vital matter one does not consult outsiders." In order to prevent every attempt at mediation, Count Berchtold brought matters to a head by declaring war on Serbia on July 28th. Did Germany ask Austria to delay? Did she advise calm and patience? Far from it. She allowed her "brilliant second" to declare war, in other words to perform the first irreparable act in the long and bloody series yet to come. Was not this the time to invoke the old maxim: *principiis obsta?* Obviously, neither Berlin nor Vienna could suppose the Russians would lightly pass over such an act of brutality against a small Slav state, particularly when the state in question had just replied to the ultimatum in the most conciliatory terms, and publicly condemned the crime of Printsip and Tchabrinoviteh, and had promised Austria to take the most severe and reassuring measures. By their common action on July 27th Germany and Austria therefore did everything to make a European War possible. They had cast the fatal die. It could no longer be recalled by scruples or by any form of mere regrets.

It was because I feared the incalculable consequence of the first act of violence that on Tuesday, July 21st, at a reception in St. Petersburg to the members of the diplomatic corps, I called the attention of the Austrian Ambassador to Russia, Count Szápáry, to the sinister complications which an ill-considered act on the part of his country might precipitate. At this time I knew nothing, of course, of the contents of the Austrian note, but rumor had it that the terms were very harsh. The trip which I had undertaken in Russia, and which was to extend to Sweden, Denmark and Norway, had been determined upon in the preceding January by M. Doumergue's cabinet. It had been modeled on similar trips of all my predecessors as President of France. However tense the situation might be after the Sarajevo murder, the French Government had decided that it was wiser not to postpone my visit so as not to increase the anxiety of Europe. But, as proved by the German and Austrian Documents published since the Russian Revolution, the two Governments of Vienna and Berlin had arranged to delay the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia until I had left Russia. I suppose that they wanted to avoid giving M. Viviani, my Foreign Minister, who accompanied me, an opportunity to consult with M. Sazonov. And

indeed from July 23rd to 29th, except for a short stop at Stockholm, the President of France and her Foreign Minister were in mid-seas with only scanty information from often indecipherable radiograms.

In Paris, M. Bienvenu Martin, now president of the most advanced group in the Senate, filled the functions of Minister of Justice and Vice-President of the Council. He was in constant communication with Great Britain and joined in all London's efforts to avert war. But, as was of course to be expected, Austria's aggression had caused tremendous feeling in Russia. On July 29th Russia informed the Powers that she was proceeding to a partial mobilization against Austria. She hoped by this to prevent the complete collapse of Serbia, which would have entailed a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest. It is true that Austria assured the Government of St. Petersburg that she herself contemplated no territorial annexation, but she made no promises regarding the partition of Serbia and its possible distribution between her clients, Albania and Bulgaria. The Austrian Ambassadors in Rome and London had in fact given it to be understood that such a partition was contemplated. Russia's partial mobilization was therefore nothing but her reply to the Austrian declaration of war and to the strong suspicions engendered by it.

It is a fact that the attitude of the German Government underwent a slight change just at the end. Up to the close of the day of the 27th, Germany had given Austria wholehearted support which could only be interpreted as encouragement. Germany had clung tenaciously to the theory of localization—not to interfere and to let things take their course. Serbia was to receive one of those magisterial lessons which William II flamboyantly clamored for in his annotations. But on the 28th, coming to the sudden realization that things were not turning out as they had planned, the German Government began to fear that its bluff was being called and made a tardy attempt to bring the runaway car to a standstill. On the 28th, the Imperial Chancellor advised Count Berchtold not to reject entirely the possibility of merely taking some security of good faith from Serbia. It was the fear of England which was bringing her to her senses. During the night of July 28-29 Germany pressed her new views rather more strongly. "If the war is to become a general one," wrote Bethmann, "it is absolutely essential that Russia should bear the onus of it." Vienna received these unexpected suggestions with great ill-humor. She had on the 28th broken off the direct negotiations begun on the 26th with Russia at the initiative of M. Sazonov because Count Berchtold was only willing to carry on "an academic discussion on generalities." Austria was no more disposed merely to accept securities of good faith from Serbia than to accept mediation. What was more serious was that the evasive answers of Vienna had had their repercussions in Berlin. The General Staff and the military clique surrounding the Emperor (for it was in monarchial Germany and not in republican France that a military clique held sway) had found new courage to combat the Chancellor's changed attitude. M. Bethmann-Hollweg at first resisted, but finally gave way during the evening of the 30th. He agreed to cancel the instructions sent to the Ambassador at Vienna, M. Tschirschky, and he contented himself with forwarding to the Austro-Hungarian Government a telegram from the King of England without comment of any kind upon its vital significance.

On the evening of the 30th, then, Germany, like Austria, went back to the policy of the mailed fist. At that time she did not know of the ukase ordering general mobilization in Russia. This mobilization was therefore not responsible for the German Government's return to the paths of war laid out by the General Staff; the responsibility rests upon the all-powerful military spirit of Berlin.

Could the Russian mobilization in any event be considered as of an aggressive nature? It must not be forgotten that, technically, a partial mobilization causes great confusion among the workmen on the inadequately manned railroads and thus makes a possible general mobilization more difficult. It must also not be forgotten that in Russia, whose immense territory was far less densely populated than Austria or Germany, mobilization and concentration were slow affairs. A head-start of several days' mobilization could not by any means put Russia on an equal footing with Austria. And in any event German superiority was assured. M. Sazonov had many times repeated, and the Tsar himself had written to "Willy," that mobilization did not mean war and that the army would remain with arms grounded. At the very worst, as a last resort, Germany could always have mobilized her army without declaring war and have then continued the interrupted parleys. She would thus have retained her advantage over Russia and yet not wrecked all chances of peace.

On the contrary, however, Germany hastened to bring about the irreparable. Why? Because such was the wish of the General Staff. And it is here that the real difference between the French and the German régimes becomes apparent. In France, when the threat of a general war seemed to call for mobilization, the General Staff requested the Government to order it. The Government answered that it preferred to delay a little longer. The decree was postponed twenty-four hours and General Joffre obeyed. Once mobilization was decreed, M. Viviani, so as to avoid any incidents which might lead to bloodshed and thus provoke war, decided, with the consent of the President of France, to withdraw the French troops ten kilometers from the frontier. The General Staff regarded such a proceeding with the utmost disfavor, as being likely to put us in a stragetically bad position. The order was given nevertheless. The General Staff carried it out at once. They are accustomed to respect the civil government and do not try to usurp its prerogatives. In Germany in 1914 it was the General Staff who controlled everything, and they were the prisoners of their own plan of campaign. Moltke had prepared a sudden offensive in the west. France was to be invaded through Belgium, the civil populations were to be terrorized, our army was to be dealt with before England should have time to come to our assistance, and the more slow-moving Russians were then to be annihilated. On July 26th the German General Staff had already drawn up the Belgian ultimatum. The violation of Belgian neutrality was an essential part of the plan of campaign. When the Chancellor, under the sway of the military clique, finally characterized as a "scrap of paper" one of the most solemn treaties of our time, he merely gave a striking expression to the abiding conviction of the General Staff. In only one eventuality were France and Belgium to be spared—in the event of their remaining neutral. The Chancellor therefore ordered his Ambassador at Paris, Baron von Schoen, imperiously to demand neutrality from the French cabinet. Even should

France be willing to tear up her defensive alliance and agree not to assist Russia, even should she express a willingness to withdraw completely from a struggle involving all the issues of the European balance of power, Germany was nevertheless to exact tangible guarantees. Baron von Schoen was directed to say: "Hand over to us, for the duration of the war, the fortified places of Toul and Verdun. We will return them to you later on when we have beaten Russia."

Germany has been so successful in plunging into darkness even the memory of these many facts that certain people actually believe that she is less responsible for the war than Russia or France. Did France draw up military plans for a sudden attack involving the violation of Belgian neutrality? Did she put herself deliberately, beforehand, in a position where she had to declare war and had to tear to shreds an international treaty bearing her own signature? Let no one say: "It was the German General Staff who drew up the plans, not the German Government." No, it was not the Government; but the Government was cognizant of the plans, had approved them, had assumed responsibility for them and knew whither these plans would lead if the general situation grew threatening. It is therefore of little import that the Government should have declared war only because it was committed beforehand to a certain line of action. The Government was not obliged to adopt any such program; it did adopt it, in spite of all risks. William himself foresaw the consequence, as is proved by the entry on August 1 of one of his all-too-famous annotations: "So if we do not respect Belgian neutrality, England attacks and Italy deserts us, that is the situation in a nutshell! So there is another betrayal by our Allies!" Why had Germany brought herself to the edge of such a precipice? Her fault was the price which she had to pay for a military and autocratic régime. Perhaps she would never have committed it had she ever known liberty.

Mobilization is not aggression. Else Austria, whose army remained mobilized during the greater part of the Balkan Wars, was the aggressor against Serbia. The aggressor is the one who renders inevitable the first shot, in other words the nation who first declares war. An aggression is even more clearly characterized when the nation who declares war suddenly breaks off negotiations which are under way and, taking advantage of its more rapid mobilization, is able, because of its precipitate action, to obtain strategic advantages over the nation which it attacks.

Imperial Germany is guilty because she did not try to prevent Austria from attacking Serbia. She is guilty because on the contrary she manoeuvred so that Europe should leave Serbia alone face to face with its powerful neighbor. She is guilty because having for a time, through belated fear of Great Britain, gone back on her first counsels of violence and made feeble attempts at moderation, she returned, as the Scriptures say, to her vomit. She is guilty because without being forced by anything except strategic considerations she set a torch to the powder houses of Europe by declaring a senseless war on Russia and then on France. Against these unalterable truths the gates of hell themselves shall not prevail.

II. A REJOINDER TO M. POINCARE.[1]

> "Is it possible that the power of a lie is even greater than it is pictured as being in the fine book of the Norwegian novelist, Johan Bojer? Its power sometimes disheartens those who seek to defend and bear witness to the truth. Those who have been closely connected with great events and who remember them in their minutest details feel that the truth must be obvious to any fair-minded person. But when they see the imagination of some and the dishonesty of others distorting facts out of all semblance to reality, they feel inclined to withdraw into themselves, to give up counting upon any man to refute such calumnies and to wait the time in its wisdom to reëstablish the balance. This is a mistake. For falsehood is thus given an opportunity to outdistance truth and legend is allowed to take the place of history."
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> M. RAYMOND POINCARÉ in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1925.

All historical students who have been examining the sources relative to war guilt in the last six years and have gradually reconstructed on the basis of the authentic facts the reliable and relatively permanent picture of the acts and responsibilities therewith connected must certainly feel as Huxley did at the close of the address of the Fundamentalist Dean, namely, that the Lord has delivered our enemy into our hands.

Nothing could do more in a negative way to strengthen the case for the Revisionists than to be presented with so sorry a rejoinder from a distinguished intellect, and the one which has more to lose or gain by the success or failure of his effort than any other living person. It is doubtful if the most ardent admirer of the Crown Prince or the most outstanding enemy of Poincaré would contend that the former possesses the cerebral power of the latter, yet no approximately honest or intelligent student can consult Poincaré's *Apologia* and the Crown Prince's recent book on war guilt, *Ich suche die Wahrheit*, simultaneously without concluding that the Crown Prince has been infinitely more successful in establishing his case than has Poincaré from the standpoint of scholarship and logic alike. In fact, Poincaré's achievement can satisfy only "bitter enders" like the editor of the New York *Tribune* with his contempt for "pettifogging pro-German historians," and Simeon Strunsky with his similar disdain for "microscopic document-chopping."

At the outset we should make it clear that this article is intended as a specific and explicit reply to M. Poincaré and not as an attempt at a systematic and logical summary of the question of war guilt. An understanding of this fact is necessary in order to explain the order and sequence of the material, which would be far different if we did not contemplate a point by point refutation of the distinguished French statesman.

We should be clear about the issues involved in this controversy at the very beginning. Poincaré insists upon attempting to sustain throughout the basic element in the Entente propaganda during the World War, which became the cornerstone of the peace of Versailles, namely, the thesis of the unique and sole German guilt for the outbreak of the World War. He will

[1] From *American Monthly*, December, 1925.

not concede a whit even to the timid and lukewarm expositors of the thesis that the guilt and responsibility were distributed among all the major powers involved.

It is probable that he could not well do this, in the light of the fact that he has already committed himself to an assertion that, if the responsibility for the War is divided, then the task of paying for its damages must likewise be distributed among all in any sense responsible. But students of the documentary evidence in regard to war guilt are more and more coming to the inevitable conclusion that even the halfway position of distributed guilt can no longer be safely maintained. Poincaré seems indignant over the conclusions of my article in the May *Current History* for 1924, in which I placed the responsibility for the War in the following order: Austria, Russia, France, Germany and England. It is rather too bad that he could not have had available my more recent assessment of guilt. It now seems unavoidable that we must come to the conclusion that the order of guilt is France and Russia tied for the first place, with Austria, Germany and England following in the order indicated.

The reasons for this revision of the order of guilt are clear. In the first place, we have the new evidence proving beyond the possibility of doubt the complicity of both the Serbian military and civil authorities in the plot for the assassination of the Archduke. Even more important than this is a reconsideration of the complete and abysmal difference between the local war desired by Austria and the European War steadily worked for by France and Russia in the crisis of 1914.

This is a point which has not been seriously considered by most other Revisionist historians, but it appears to the writer as probably the most important factor involved in the whole problem of assessing war responsibility in the case of France and Russia as against Austria. In the light of these considerations it seems conclusive that France, Russia and Serbia can alone be held guilty in any direct or wilful sense for the direct precipitation of the World War in 1914.

No other European countries desired such a war. It can no longer be held that Austria, Germany or England actually wished a general European war in 1914, and the criticism which may be directed against them is that which must be brought forward on the grounds of alleged stupidity, rashness and incompetence in trying to avoid war. Russia and France from the beginning envisaged and worked solely for a general European war. The sound conclusions are those of Fabre-Luce: "The acts of Austria and Germany made the War possible; those of the Entente made the War inevitable."

The writer is often asked why he does not support the theory of divided guilt when it would be so much easier to convince readers of this position as over against the thesis of the sole and unique guilt of France and Russia in the matter of the direct and immediate responsibility for the development of a general European conflict. No one knows better than the writer how much an acceptance of the view of divided responsibility would facilitate the campaign for the enticement of the American people away from the hypothesis of sole German guilt, but the writer is not interested in convincing people of anything but the truth. There is no particular advantage in exchanging one myth for another slightly less malignant. A scholar may and

should defy popularity in the interest of logic and veracity; if the writer were running for Congress on the issue of war guilt, he would doubtless find it strategically desirable to support the cause of distributed responsibility.

Poincaré fires his opening guns by citing the views of Richard Grelling, Maximilian Harden and Prince Lichnowsky in favor of the view of German responsibility for the War, and in charging that the Revisionist historians are consciously or unconsciously victims of German and Soviet propaganda and dishonesty.

It so happens that Mr. Richard Grelling is the same man who at the outbreak of the War published a savage attack upon the German Government as responsible for the War, entitled *J'Accuse*. Having committed himself in a violently dogmatic fashion to the question of German guilt before any of the valid documentary evidence was available, he has not possessed either the honesty or the scholarship to look into the question and revise his views, but has simply tried to save his face, like M. Poincaré, by rehashing the dogmas of 1914. No informed person could contend that Grelling is a scholar of any standing in any field—least of all a competent authority in the mastery of historical documentation. Count Montgelas has pulverized his latest book. It is well established that Grelling's anti-German campaign is being subsidized by the French. Likewise, Harden has established his reputation for a generation upon the basis of being a Kaiser-baiter, and has, like Grelling, a vested interest in maintaining the thesis of German guilt. No one suspects him of being an authority on the history of war guilt. Lichnowsky's views are entirely irrelevant as far as the immediate responsibility for the War is concerned, as his opinions are those written before 1919 when he could possess none of the cogent evidence whatever establishing the Franco-Russian guilt. Herr von Jagow has mercilessly exposed Lichnowsky's errors and bias.

But even more important is the consideration that the question of war guilt is not to be settled by the opinion of any single man, but solely by recourse to the authentic documents. Bryan was an eminent man, but his opinions on evolution do not constitute the well-established facts of modern biology. Again, what could be more absurd than to quote the opinions of any single citizen of any state as establishing the truth in any great historic problem? We might inquire how well Poincaré would be pleased to have the Crown Prince cite the opinions of Guttenoire de Toury as those of the one "honest Frenchman" whose views could be accepted as absolutely definite on the question of war guilt. It may be still further pointed out that the Revisionist point of view is generally unpopular with German Radicals. because their original purpose in opening the German archives was their hope that this action would thoroughly establish the guilt of the Kaiser and his colleagues and thus help still further to discredit the former German Government.

Even more ridiculous is Poincaré's allegation that the Revisionist scholars have either been duped by or have consciously sold themselves to the propaganda of Germany and the Bolsheviks.

In the first place, all Revisionist scholars worthy of the name have not founded their reconstructed views upon controversial publications, but upon the authentic documents in the Foreign Offices of Vienna, Berlin and St.

Petersburg. Poincaré would lead the uninformed reader to believe that the basis for the reconstruction of our views on war guilt is the polemic pamphlets of Lenine, Trotsky, Bela Kun, Ludendorff, Von Tirpitz and the Kaiser. A more detailed examination of the nature of these sources will still further reveal the nonsense in the insinuations of Poincaré.

The German documents were not published under the auspices of the friends of the Kaiser and his régime but by his enemies who enthusiastically hoped to prove thereby the guilt of Austria and Germany. If the German documents had been garbled at all they would have been garbled against the German Monarchy and Austria and not in such a way as to favor the whitewashing of Germany. As an actual matter of fact, however, while the decision to make them public was taken by the Socialists, the German documents were actually edited by highly competent scholars from both the Progressive and Conservative camps in Germany, and no reputable authority has ever questioned their complete authenticity.

The same facts hold true with regard to the Austrian documents, and there has never been any serious question raised as to the competence and honesty of their editor, Dr. Roderich Goos.

The case against the Russian documents is even weaker. We have, in the first place, the Siebert collection, which embodies the exchanges between London and St. Petersburg from 1908-1914, compiled years before the Soviets came into authority by an aristocratic landlord. The two important editions of the exchanges between Paris and St. Petersburg were both made by Frenchmen, namely, M. Laloy and M. Marchand. Subsequently another edition of the Russian documents has been prepared by a German scholar, Dr. F. Stieve. No important discrepancies are to be discovered in these separate editions and no informed scholar suspects forgeries or other garbling. What has been proved, however. is that the Russian *Orange Book,* published in 1914 to clear the French and Russians of the charge of war guilt, was most notoriously garbled, leaving out all the incriminating evidence against Sazonov, Izvolski and their French collaborators.

Still further, if M. Poincaré knows or believes that these Russian documents describing the Franco-German relations and arrangements are inaccurate and misleading, why did he not throw open the French archives so that the allegations in the *Livre Noir* might be overthrown and discredited? Why did he find it necessary, moreover, to have the *Livres Jaunes* officially edited with the damaging sections deleted? Why did he not turn over this task to reputable scholars who could have vouched for the completeness and the honesty of these publications? These questions become daily more pertinent and relevant in the light of the fact that England has now given full consent to the publication of her pre-war archives under the editorship of the distinguished scholars, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley.

Poincaré appears to derive great satisfaction from a speech of former Premier Herriot in the Chamber of Deputies, contending that there is nothing in the *Livre Noir* in any way establishing even partial guilt on the part of France with regard to war responsibility. Certainly no scholar of the slightest insight would assign any credence whatever to the statement of a politician as to the facts of history, least of all those of a French politician in a speech before the Chamber of Deputies. Herriot would himself un-

questionably be amused to think that any one would regard this statement of his as one even intended to convey substantial historical truth. At any rate, we have the frequent testimony of Izvolski that from 1912-1914 Herriot was one of those pacific Frenchmen who recognized the menace to peace in the plans of Izvolski and Poincaré, and whose influence for peace had to be offset by the expenditure of large funds to bribe the French papers.

On this matter of the *Livre Noir*, however, let us see how a perusal of it affected a distinguished scholar, the late Baron Serge Korff, himself a vigorous enemy of the Bolsheviks:

"We find new light thrown upon the pre-war attitude of France, strangely but constantly connected with one big name—Poincaré. Pichon, Barthou and many other familiar names are frequently mentioned, but none seems to have played any such prominent role in the building up and strengthening of the Franco-Russian alliance as Poincaré; and besides, with a very evident object—steady preparation for the coming conflict with Germany. The reader will put aside this volume with the inevitable conviction that Poincaré long before 1914 had one idea on his mind, the war with Germany. These documents give a most vivid picture of the French pressure exerted on Russia with that one object in view, a war with Germany. At times the Russians were even losing patience with the French, so little did the latter mind the Russian interests; they were willing to lend the Russians money, but only on condition that Russia would increase her army and build new strategic, but otherwise quite useless, railways."

Or, if one French authority seems adequate to Poincaré to clear him of responsibility, we might with equal propriety cite the conclusions of Morhardt, certainly a man far better qualified to render a judgment on the content and implications of the *Livre Noir* than M. Herriot:

"Let one take again, one by one, the acts of his political life during these twelve long years! Let one analyze even the secret intentions! One always will find there the same spirit, the same will, the same methods. Raymond Poincaré—he has solemnly affirmed it in the *Manifeste aux Etudiants* which we have cited—had no other idea than to recapture Alsace-Lorraine. His policy was invariably directed against Germany. It was a narrow policy of reparation. To satisfy it, he consented to the worst sacrifices and we have seen him putting France, the blood of two million of her children, even her fortune, to the service of the imperialistic ambitions of the Russian autocracy, the least compatible of governments with the genius and with the democratic aspirations of our own country!"

Those who desire detail and documentation in regard to this charge may well consult the excellent, if severe, book of Guttenoire de Toury, *Jaurès et le Parti de la Guerre.*

Another rhetorical plea of Poincaré is his contention that the very fact that a great number of nations were allied against the Central Powers proves that the latter were necessarily in the wrong. This assertion completely breaks down the moment one attempts to ascertain the reasons why these various countries joined the Allies.

This matter has been thoroughly disposed of in the opening chapters of Dr. J. S. Ewart's work devoted to the actual reasons why the various countries entered the conflict after 1914. Poincaré might also reread with profit the

Secret Treaties of the Entente. Almost invariably the action of the states who came into the War after 1914 had no relation whatever to any interest in the question of war guilt, but was determined solely by the advantages of prestige, territory or spoil to be obtained at the moment by entry into the War. Even the United States did not actually come into the War because of what Germany did in 1914, but because of her subsequent actions. Poincaré further maintains that so conscientious and clear-minded a leader as Woodrow Wilson could not possibly have been deceived as to the real responsibility for the War. But was Wilson clear-headed in 1914 or in 1917? Between these two dates he completely reversed his judgment, without giving any evidence whatever of any study of the actual facts of war responsibility. Down to our entry into the World War Wilson never alleged unique German war guilt as a justification for American participation in the conflict. If there is any one self-evident proposition to the historian it is that numbers are no test whatever of truth. Poincaré asks if one man could possibly have been powerful or sagacious enough to have deceived the world or to have bent it to his will. We may answer that such an achievement has not been without precedent in the past, as we may see from citing the instances of Alexander the Great, Caesar or Napoleon. Morhardt, in fact, regards Poincaré as having exerted a greater influence upon the world than any of these great historic figures:

"If we examine his role, not, indeed, from the point of view of morality and reason, but from the standpoint of historic events, he takes the first place among the men who have exercised a decisive influence upon the world. Take for example, Napoleon I; the great Corsican adventurer did not succeed, after fifteen years of the most absolute power, in accomplishing results comparable at all to those which M. Raymond Poincaré can glory in having achieved. No one before him has upset the world with more cold-blooded enthusiasm."

Poincaré still further seeks immunity in the allegation that President Masaryk has contended for the superiority of the French system of government as over against the German system of 1914, and has alleged that France was characterized as much by a love of peace as was Germany by a desire for war. If the opinions of one scholar are to be regarded as decisive one can cite against Masaryk Judge Bausman, who has devoted much more attention to a study of the subject and who arrives at precisely the opposite conclusion. Further, Bausman cites a vast mass of evidence to support his position, while Masaryk merely gives an opinion. As an actual matter of fact, however, the point at issue is not the relative excellence of the French Republic or the former German Monarchy, but the relation of each to the military policies and aggressive acts prior to August 3, 1914, which brought on the War.

Revisionist scholars have repeatedly proved from French statistics that in the spring of 1914 the French were not only possessed of a larger army and a better military equipment in proportion to their population than was Germany, but that actually the French army and equipment were greater than the German, in spite of the fact that Germany was nearly twice as populous as France and surrounded by powerful enemies.

Further, Poincaré's reference to the constitutional procedure of France and the responsibility of the Cabinet to the Chamber possesses no relevance

in the matter of war responsibility in 1914. Whatever the theory, in the crisis of 1914 Poincaré's Cabinet did not consult the Chamber of Deputies at all. Poincaré persistently refused to submit the question of the declaration of war to the Chamber, but he and his Cabinet took full personal responsibility for the decision, and after war was declared relied upon the censorship, war psychology and the assassination of Jaurès to induce the Chamber to approve their action.

In the matter of the decision upon war in 1914, the action of Sazonov and the Tzar was, in no sense more irresponsible and autocratic than that of Poincaré, Viviani and Messimy. Even more striking as bearing upon Poincaré's assertion that French diplomacy has always been carried on in the open is the fact that when the French Chamber voted to approve the declaration of war in 1914 it was not even yet acquainted with the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance concluded in 1891-93. Poincaré lays much stress upon French liberty and the freedom of the French people to arrive at their own judgments in political affairs and govern their political conduct accordingly. Yet from 1912-14, whenever the French people showed any tendency to do some thinking for themselves, Poincaré warmly cooperated with Izvolsky and applied some more Russian gold to set their thinking "right." It will also be noted that Poincaré does not stress the liberalism, republicanism, or cabinet responsibility of his close ally, Russia.

Mr. Strunsky in his *Times* editorial (Sept. 14, 1925) alleges that Poincaré wields a wicked pen in his exact citation of historical materials. Fortunately, we have one very specific illustration in his article as a test of this ability. He endeavors to discredit the Revisionist historians by alleging certain inaccuracies in my *Current History* statements about the rise of his party to power. He states (p. 3) that I explicitly asserted that in 1912 Poincaré, Delcassé, Millerand, Joffre, Jonnart and Tardieu came into the French Cabinet. He then takes great glee in showing that Jonnart did not come into the Cabinet until 1913, and that neither Joffre nor Tardieu were ever members of the Cabinet. What I actually said was that "about 1909 the party represented by Caillaux began to lose its dominating position and was replaced by the advocates of a 'Strong France,' prominent among them Poincaré, Delcassé, Millerand, Joffre, Jonnart and Tardieu." Poincaré still further alleges that I did not recognize the diversity of interests in the Cabinets from 1912-14 or that there were pacifists in the Cabinet. This is exactly what I emphasized at length (p. 191), stating that:

"Of course, we must distinguish rather sharply between the attitude of the French people and that of Poincaré and his Government. There is no doubt the French people were pacifically inclined and taken by surprise at the sudden outbreak of hostilities. In fact, it is necessary to go even further, and distinguish between Poincaré and his group and other members of the Cabinet. Several members of the Cabinet were Socialists or socialistically inclined and opposed to war. The French foreign policy on crucial points in the critical period of July, 1914, was arbitrarily, and in some cases secretly, handled by Poincaré, Viviani, and Messimy. Upon Poincaré himself must fall the major responsibility for the determination of French policy from June to August, 1914, as well as for the control of Franco-Russian relations from 1912 to 1914."

Symptomatic likewise is Poincaré's summary disposal of Tardieu as a "mere journalist." It was Tardieu, in fact, who was the official propagandist of the Poincaré party, contributing articles to the bribed press trying to arouse the French people to a fear of Austro-German policy in the Balkans. He was also one of the most trusted and utilized lieutenants of Poincaré and Izvolsky in distributing the Russian gold to the French press.

With respect to 1870 and the German peace terms, Poincaré at least frankly admits that Prussia was not solely responsible for the declaration of war. But he resents the billion dollar indemnity, forgetful of his own part in righting the wrong of 1870 by imposing a fifty billion dollar indemnity on Germany in 1919.

In this connection (p. 4) there is an admirable example of the Poincaré logic and of his persistent assumption that there are two quite different standards which have to be used in judging the acts of Germany and France. He states that Germany was palpably guilty in 1914 because she *declared war*, yet in the next paragraph we learn that "it is vain to say that it was the Emperor Napoleon III who declared war" in 1870.

The writer believes that the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 was a great German blunder, but it was the natural thing to do, and Miss Schieber and Dr. Ewart have shown how the predominant opinion in both England and the United States favored the annexation policy. It is childishly absurd to hold, as does Poincaré, that the Republicans never cherished the hope of revenge or of the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine by force. In fact, as Morhardt points out, in his address to the university students Poincaré specifically declared that "I could not see for my generation any reason for existing unless it were for the hope of recovering our lost provinces." Certainly one as familiar as M. Poincaré with European politics and international relations could not have supposed that they could be recovered except by force. And Poincaré cannot allege German efforts toward the denationalization of Alsace-Lorraine as the cause of his plan for its forceful recovery from 1912-14, as in 1912 Germany made an attempt at a Franco-German *rapprochement* on the basis of autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine.

This was at once rejected by Poincaré personally on the ground that to accept it would put an end to the hope of *recovering* the provinces by force through the aid of England and Russia, and would thus forfeit the objective of the French revenge program which had been basic for more than a generation.

Poincaré accuses Germany of damaging inconsistency in having once looked upon English rivalry as a main cause of the War, while she now holds France and Russia chiefly responsible for the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. There is nothing strange or illogical about this. Ewart shows at length that Anglo-German economic and naval rivalry was next to Alsace-Lorraine the chief cause of war in the West, and it is clear that valid accusations could not be made against France and Russia until the publication at the close of the War of the information on which these charges rest. The high point of Poincaré's demagogy and rhetoric is to be found on pages 6-7 where he contends that by definition the Triple Alliance and all other German negotiations were offensive, while the Triple Entente and all international agree-

ments of any members of the Entente were purely pacific and defensive, and designed to "free Europe and the world from German domination."

Not even Charles Downer Hazen, William Stearns Davis or Frank Maloy Anderson could be induced to deliver themselves of such obvious nonsense at this date. He makes the childish assertion that by 1890 "German ascendency had reached such a point that there was no longer any independence or equilibrium in Europe. Peace meant German despotism and European servitude" but this is belied by the express statements and policies of British, Russian and Italian statesmen at the time, as well as by the conclusions of every reputable historian of the diplomacy of Europe from 1870 to 1914. It would, further, be hard to show just how the Franco-Italian and Anglo-Japanese alliances were designed to "free Europe from German domination." If Franco-Russian relations had been purely defensive France would not have had to go to war against Germany in behalf of Russia in 1914, as it was Russia which took the initiative in mobilization. As to his assertion that the *Livres Jaunes* contain all of the Franco-Russian understandings, the burden of proof is on him until France throws open her archives. In fact, in several cases we have been able to discover damaging documents which have been excluded from the *Livres Jaunes.*

Poincaré's interpretation of the Morocco disputes is equally remote from the facts. German methods in both 1905 and 1911 may be open to question as gracious diplomacy, but that she had both moral and legal right on her side cannot be doubted. In 1905 she merely gave notice that northern Africa could not be partitioned without taking some notice of German rights and interests, and in 1911 she was protesting against the violations of the Act of Algeciras by France and Spain. Judge Ewart, after a careful examination of all the evidence, including that recently set forth by Thayer and Bishop as to the part alleged to have been played by Roosevelt, concludes as follows:

"Germany was within her rights in insisting in 1905 upon a reference of her dispute with France concerning Morocco to an international conference. President Roosevelt was of that opinion. He warmly congratulated the Kaiser on his success in that regard. And the result of the proceedings of the conference—the Act of Algeciras—was to a large extent a declaration in favor of the German contention for international equality in Morocco, and a denial of the claim of France and Spain to exclusive domination.

"French and Spanish military operations in 1911 were subversive of the chief principle of the Act of Algeciras, namely, the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan. France so regarded the Spanish actions, and Spain so regarded the French. Germany, as a party to the Act was within her rights in objecting to these proceedings."

It is interesting to note that Poincaré is outraged to think that the Kaiser should object to France's desire to make Morocco "her affair," while Poincaré is insistent that it was atrocious for Austria to entertain a far less menacing attitude toward Serbia in 1914. His insinuation that France was forced to sign the agreement of 1911 at the mouth of the cannon of the *Panther* is dramatic literature but poor history. The *Panther* was a little boat carrying a crew of 125 men, not much more impressive as a war vessel than the Kaiser's private yacht. There were enough French battleships in

the Mediterranean to have blown the *Panther* into atoms at the first discharge.

Poincaré's contention that France was always a restraining and moderating influence upon Russian activity in the Balkans and Turkey is belied by a large mass of incontrovertible documents. Poincaré from 1912-1914 worked hand in hand with Izvolski in encouraging the growth of a strong and alert Russian interest in the Near Eastern question.

By 1911 Izvolski had become convinced, not only that the securing of the Straits should be the pivotal element in Russian foreign policy, but also that they could not be secured short of a Balkan war. Poincaré moved to restrain Russia in the Balkans only when it seemed possible that France might get involved in such fashion that the crisis would not be capable of exploitation in the interest of the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine.

Poincaré's proud recital of his efforts to preserve peace in the Balkans in 1912-13 presumes throughout on the ignorance of his readers of the details of diplomatic and Balkan history. He tried to preserve peace in 1912 because Russia was not ready in a military sense for war, and because he and Izvolski had only begun their process of "fixing" French opinion through the bribery of the papers. In 1912 the French people were not sentimentally prepared to follow Poincaré with enthusiasm into a war over the Balkans. Brandenburg has shown that the Russians immediately informed the French of the Balkan League and of the Russian part in forming it.

The Grey-Cambon correspondence proves clearly that Poincaré was certainly not pacific in November, 1912, after war had broken out. Poincaré laid low in this crisis because it was necessary for him to do so, as his plans and preparations had not matured. Further, England and Russia had been having serious difficulties over Persia, and the Germans and English were beginning to smooth over their difficulties in regard to the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad. No one doubts that Grey was pacific in 1912-13. Peace was preserved at that time primarily because he refused to allow England to become involved to advance the Russian ambitions, and aided Germany in localizing the conflict. If he had acted in 1914 as he did in 1912-13 there might well have been no World War.

On the other hand, France frequently urged Russia on to more vigorous and challenging policies than the Russian government was willing to undertake on its own initiative. In 1912-13, for instance, the lack of Russian excitement and military preparations when Austria threatened Serbia was protested by France whose leaders viewed such an attitude with "astonishment and unconcealed apprehension." The famous Millerand Conversation on December 18th, 1912 (See Stieve, *Isvolsky and the World War*, p. 124) shows that even at the close of 1912 the French preferred a European war to allowing Russia to gain the Straits by a Balkan war, which would end the probability of Russian support of France in the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine.

Again on February 1, 1914, France urged Russia to send a warship to Constantinople to demand a modification of the Turkish arrangements with Germany. This was a violation of the treaties of 1856 and 1871, and might well have precipitated war. It is significant, as bearing upon the allegation of Poincaré that everything relating to Franco-Russian negotiations in re-

gard to the Balkans is contained in the French *Livre Jaune* on Balkan affairs, to note that neither of these instances of French incitement are contained therein, but have to be discovered in the *Livre Noir.*

Likewise, Poincaré misleads his readers by contending that the Balkan Wars ended most favorably for Austrian interests. The reverse was the case. Bulgaria was greatly weakened, and Serbia correspondingly strengthened, with a resulting development of the Pan-Serbian intrigues against Austria to unprecedented proportions. The favorable terms which Austria did get were due to the fact that the English were well disposed and because the Italian interests agreed with those of Austria in keeping Serbia away from the Adriatic.

Poincaré says nothing of the Russian Ministerial Councils of December 31st, 1913, and February 8th, 1914, which decided that it would be best to await an imminent world war in order to seize Constantinople and the Straits. Nor does he refer to the activity of Russia in forming the Balkan League, or to the Russian bribery of Serbian officials to continue and extend the plotting against Austria.

Perhaps the most inevitable, but also the most discreditable, phase of Poincaré's lame defense is his attack upon the departed Izvolski. The absent are always wrong, and the dead are very absent. He ridicules Judet's edition of Georges Louis' diary as being "Dialogues of the Dead," but he does not hesitate himself to indulge in a monologue at the expense of the dead.

Poincaré gives the impression of himself as a person unwillingly dragged about by a man whom he hated and whose policy he opposed. Professor Bernadotte Schmitt, one of our most cautious and pro-Entente students of war-guilt, gives quite a different picture of the part played by Poincaré in coöperating with Izvolski in strengthening Franco-Russian relations. And no one suspects Professor Schmitt of not having read both volumes of the *Livre Noir*, word by word, an achievement which we doubt can truthfully be claimed by M. Poincaré. Schmitt says in part:

"The credit belongs in the first instance to M. Raymond Poincaré, who became Premier of France in January, 1912. Under his masterly care, Franco-Russian relations, which had become somewhat tenuous, while one ally was absorbed in Morocco and the other in Persia and the Far East, were soon exhibiting the closest harmony. M. Poincaré repeatedly assured Izvolsky, now Ambassador to France, that the republic would fulfill all the obligations of the alliance; Izvolsky took the Paris press into pay to create a sentiment for Russia and to strengthen the position of the Premier whom he recognized as most useful to Russia."

Particularly absurd and incredible is Poincaré's contention that if one reads Professor Stieve's edition of Izvolski's communications he will instantly conclude that Poincaré and France took no part in the aggressive Russian plans following 1912, that Poincaré and Izvolski were continually at loggerheads, and that France is guiltless with respect to the war. Let us get the verdict of scholars on this point. It so happened that this very collection has been carefully read by a historical specialist, Professor William L. Langer, bibliographic editor of the very journal in which Poincaré's

article appeared. The following is a part of Professor Langer's summary of Poincaré's distrust of Izvolski, and his persistent refusal to coöperate with him:

"But the gods were with Izvolsky and against humanity. Everything changed as in a dream, when, in March, 1912, Poincaré succeeded to the premiership. It was a disastrous event, for Poincaré, convinced of the inevitability of war with Germany, agreed entirely with Izvolsky that the Entente must be strengthened and that the Central Powers must be shown that the days of their dictation were over. After the first conversations with the new premier, Izvolsky felt like a new man. Life was once more worth living. Of course there were still obstacles in the way. Sazonov was one of them, and Grey was another. But both Poincaré and Izvolsky were determined to succeed, and the chronicle of the two years preceding the War is the story of their victory over all opposition. They were not particular as to means, nor considerate of persons. Every opportunity was seized to revivify the Entente and develop it, and the utmost care was taken to replace the European concert by two opposing coalitions.

"The story is a long one, and not very edifying. Poincaré seems to have disliked Izvolsky personally, and both appear to have distrusted each other. But in political matters they made an ideal team. There was no divergence in their views. And so they were able to coöperate, supporting and assisting each other in the attainment of the "great solution." Together they intrigued against the pacific French ambassador at St. Petersburg. Georges Louis, and Russian funds were put at the disposal of Poincaré and Klotz to enable them to silence the opposition and even to bring about Poincaré's election as president. And where they could not coöperate, they supplemented each other. It was Poincaré's opposition that wrecked the agreement between England and Germany and it was Poincaré who effected the naval agreement between England and Russia in 1914, after Izvolsky had already brought about the Russian-French naval pact of 1912."

Poincaré not only "put up" with Izvolski personally; he also coöperated with him in "putting up" several million francs of Russian money to bribe the French press to carry editorials or news designed to convert the French people to the support of the new and aggressive Franco-Russian policies in the Balkans. Further, Poincaré may be accused of ingratitude in failing to recall the generous assistance of Izvolski in obtaining Russian financial aid for Poincaré's campaign for the presidency of the French Republic.

Finally, one may ask why, if Izvolski was such an infernal liar and so greatly misrepresented Poincaré, the latter did not, while premier after the appearance of the *Livre Noir*, open the French archives and discredit Izvolski and the *Livre Noir* for all time. It is most significant that Poincaré, in spite of his diatribe against Izvolski, does not deny any of the vital statements attributed to him by Izvolski in the Russian documents.

Poincaré's attempt to dispose of Georges Louis' damaging revelations is as disingenuous and unconvincing as his assault on Izvolski. Louis' disqualifying ill-health seems to have been in large part a fiction of his enemies. It does not help Poincaré's case in the slightest to show, if he can, that it was Sazonov who asked for the recall of Louis instead of Izvolski. The most important point in the whole issue is that whatever the forces

leading to Louis' recall he was replaced first by Delcassé and then by Paléologue, both notorious Revanchards and thoroughly in accord with the policies of Poincaré and Izvolski. These appointments are a sufficient commentary upon the validity of Poincaré's assertion that in the whole situation he and his associates "tenaciously fought for peace."

Nor is anything gained by bringing up the old war mythology about the French "defeatists" and trying to discredit Louis and his editor, Ernest Judet, by linking them with Bolo Pasha. We now know that the "defeatists" were much more statesmanlike than Poincaré, Clemenceau and their like, bent upon the destruction of Germany and the peace of force and revenge. We should not forget that both Poincaré and Clemenceau made the most desperate effort to convict Caillaux along with Bolo, and if they had had their way that eminent French statesman would now be sleeping beneath French sod, instead of acting as the French agent to negotiate a debt settlement with the United States. It is only natural that the men most implicated by Louis would try to repudiate his revelations, especially as it can be done safely since Louis, like Izvolski, has been gathered to the angels.

The most damaging admission in the whole article is his agreement (p. 13) that, after all, the real causes of the outbreak of the war must be sought in the events after the assassination of the Archduke. This is, however, distinctly ungracious to such friends as Mr. Strunsky and leaves them "out on a limb." Such writers have rather grudgingly admitted that France and Russia precipitated the war in 1914, but were justified in doing so because of what Germany had brought them to in the period from 1905 to 1914.

Now Poincaré admits that what happened prior to June, 1914, is after all largely irrelevant to the case. It is in his treatment of events in the summer of 1914, however, that his critics have Poincaré most easily at their mercy. It may be stated categorically that, with the exception of the astonishing concession at the outset that there was no Potsdam Conference and that Germany and Austria did not will the war from June 28th onward, there is not a single element in Poincaré's presentation of the crisis which is not palpably erroneous either in fact, implications or both.

He begins by a footnote implying that Renouvin's recent book is a vindication of his article, something grossly misleading. In stating the circumstances with respect to the Serbian crisis he gives no hint whatever of the long-continued and menacing Serbian intrigue against Austria, of the German restraint of Austria in 1912-13, or of the most crucial fact of all, namely, the full official Serbian complicity in the plot for the murder of the Archduke. He does not reveal the fact that the Serbian intrigues against Austria were intensified by the Russian bribery of Serbian officials and plotters. He does not admit at any point that Austria had a legitimate grievance or that past Austrian experience with Serbia constituted adequate grounds for Austrian scepticism as to the reliability of Serbian promises.

The picture is still that of 1914—the innocent and terrified Serbian lamb bleating in terror before the Austrian wolf.

The Serbian government actually was arrogant in its attitude towards Austria; it did not publicly and officially condemn the assassination; it refused the one vital demand in the Austrian ultimatum, which practically

invalidated the assent to the others; and it ordered the full mobilization of the Serbian army three hours before sending a messenger with the reply to the Austrian ultimatum.

Poincaré's allegation that Austria planned to partition Serbia and that the Austrian Ambassadors at Paris and London confirmed this impression is but a repetition of the 1914 misrepresentations of Poincaré and Izvolski, which are amply exposed by Number 223 of the corrected Russian *Orange Book*. We now know from the Austrian *Red Book* that, from the 24th of July onward, the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg gave Sazonov ample assurance that Austria would respect Serbian territory and sovereignty. Count Szécsen, the Austrian Ambassador in Paris in 1914, has told how he vainly endeavored to convince Poincaré and Izvolski on this point in July 1914, but both arrogantly refused to listen to information so deadly to their public thesis that Austria desired to gobble up Serbia and that Russia was fighting to save her brave and innocent little Slavic brother!

Poincaré severely criticizes the Kaiser for giving Austria a free hand in regard to Serbia on July 5th, but this is exactly what Poincaré soon gave to Russia in regard to the same issue. And what the Kaiser consented to was a purely local punitive war believed essential to the continued integrity of the Dual-Monachy, while what Poincaré consented to was the aggressive intervention of Russia in a situation which did not concern her safety or integrity in any way whatever and which, if persisted in, was bound to involve all Europe in war.

When the Kaiser saw that this proposed local war was likely to endanger Europe he immediately put the strongest pressure upon Austria to desist and negotiate with Russia; when Poincaré saw that the Russian action threatened war he urged Russia on to more rapid and far-reaching military preparations.

Poincaré's assertion that Germany favored the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia is atrociously false. Whether rightly or wrongly, the Kaiser and his Chancellor believed the Serbian reply a satisfactory basis for negotiations and strongly disapproved of the opening of hostilities. At the same time, Jagow felt that if Austria was determined to make war she should do it as soon as possible.

Poincaré's picture of the German attitude from July 28-31 is wholly misleading. He denominates the vigorous German pressure to restrain Austria as "a slight change in attitude just at the end." Even Sazonov has admitted that the Kaiser appeared frantic in his efforts to maintain peace at the end, and the British military attaché at Berlin has pictured him as extremely loath to sign the declaration of war. Poincaré falsifies the situation further in declaring that on the 30th Germany relinquished her pressure and once more favored war. The German pressure on Austria grew stronger on the 30th and 31st, and at the very end Austria unwillingly agreed to negotiate with Russia, but the possibility of peace had been destroyed by the premature and unjustifiable Russian mobilization which France had encouraged. However sorry the result of his effort, Poincaré was actually compelled to attempt to show that Germany had reverted to the war scheme be-

fore midnight of July 30th, the day of the Russian general mobilization, which was announced formally on the 31st. Otherwise the case for Russian aggression would be obvious.

This matter also furnishes us with another opportunity to test Poincaré's accuracy and acumen in handling documents which is so highly recommended by Mr. Strunsky. He states (p. 17) that by the evening of the 30th Bethmann-Hollweg had capitulated to the demand of the general staff for war, had given up hope of restraining Austria, and forwarded the telegram of the King of England to Austria "without comment of any kind on its vital significance."

What does Professor Fay find to be the truth in regard to this situation?

In the *American Historical Review*, October, 1920, (pp. 50-51), he shows how the Kaiser and Bethmann were beside themselves in the effort to restrain the Austrians and the pressure of the general staff for war. Just before midnight he received the telegram of the King of England. Professor Fay thus describes his attitude. "Bethmann grasped at this telegram from George V as another chance for peace. He sent it on with a last urgent appeal 'for a definite decision in Vienna within the course of the day.'" The insolence of Poincaré in attempting to minimize the real German efforts for peace in 1914 is the more striking in the light of the entire absence of any French attempt to restrain Russia.

Poincaré's account of his visit to Russia in July, 1914, is amusingly ludicrous. He pictures himself a timid and cautious being who undertook the trip as a detached figurehead in tow of Viviani in order to promote the tranquillity of Europe, leaving all discussions of foreign policy at the Czar's court to Viviani.

Actually there was nothing which could have happened more likely to arouse the apprehension of Europe than the visit of Poincaré to St. Petersburg at this time, though he is, of course, right in saying that the visit had been planned some months before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Paléologue gives us a full and naïvely frank picture of the reception of Poincaré.

Poincaré was the center of the whole occasion, he was enthusiastically received by the Russian militarists, and took full charge of negotiations and conversations. We have authentic photographs of him at this time in earnest conversation, arm in arm with the Czar, Grand Duke Nicholas and Sazonov.

He represents himself as terror-stricken and undecided on the seas on the return voyage, but the French action in the crisis had been largely decided before he left St. Petersburg. Before he reached home Paléologue had given Sazonov full assurance of complete French support in the Russian policy which all understood would lead to war, and Paléologue would not have dared to do this without the prior authorization of Poincaré.

We may certainly accept the opinion of Fabre-Luce that after Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg there was very little hope of averting the war. Poincaré is doubtless right in his contention that the Austrians delayed sending their ultimatum to Serbia in part because of their desire to have Poincaré

out of Russia first, but this is a boomerang to Poincaré for this is simply an added proof that Austria desired to localize the Serbian conflict and avoid general European complications. It also shows that Poincaré and the Russians had made up their minds to oppose the Austrian policy in regard to Serbia, whatever it turned out to be, as Poincaré left St. Petersburg before learning the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. As soon as Poincaré reached home French policy became actively belligerent in the inner circles.

Sophistry, error and evasion exude from every sentence of M. Poincaré's discussion of the Russian and French mobilization, and the question as to whether Russian mobilization was equivalent to war. He represents the Russian mobilization as essential to the very safety of the Russian Empire.

It was in no sense. Even Sazonov admitted that he was convinced that Austria did not contemplate territorial aggression at the expense of Serbia, but even if she had Russia could with little propriety object, as she had been willing to suggest the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 when she expected to be able to gain something at the expense of Serbian aspirations.

There was no threat directly at Russia at all. Germany had not mobilized in any way, and Austria had merely mobilized 22 divisions against Serbia. But as early as July 29th Russia mobilized 55 divisions directly against Austria. The only thing which was menaced by the Austrian intervention in Serbia was the greater Serbia program of Russia and France. and this they cared little about except as something which might create a crisis which would enable them to exploit a war over the Balkans.

Months before the murder of the Archduke, Sazonov had become convinced that Russia could get the Straits only through war, and 1914 was the year of all years for the war from the Franco-Russian viewpoint, as the success of the Anglo-German negotiations in June, 1914, seemed likely to reduce the interest of England in the Triple Entente. Further, it is necessary to remember that the Russian general mobilization was ordered at a time when Austria was weakening under German pressure and when the prospects of direct negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg seemed brighter than at any other time during the crisis.

As to whether general Russian mobilization meant war there can be no doubt. Whatever the Czar or Sazonov may have written, the Franco-Russian military authorities had based their military plans for a generation upon the assumption that general Russian mobilization was equivalent to a Russian declaration of war on Germany and would doubtless be followed by an immediate German declaration of war. Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg had, moreover, reminded Sazonov of this fact as early as July 25th, and warned him accordingly. Morhardt proves by pertinent quotations from their speeches and writings that practically all the crowned heads and leading statesmen of Europe had clearly recognized before the crisis of 1914 that Russian mobilization was equivalent to war.

Far from determining upon war before knowing of the Russian mobilization, as Poincaré asserts was the case, the German government did not even declare war after they learned of Russian mobilization, but took every possible step to induce the Russians to suspend mobilization. Further proof of the absence of any German desire to crush France is to be found in the

German effort to secure French neutrality after deciding on the war with Russia; and the demand for the temporary occupation of Toul and Verdun was the least possible security which Germany could have asked for proof of French good faith, though it was possibly a clumsy ruse to get the French to declare war first. Under the circumstances of the prior Russian mobilization against Germany, France was not obligated by her agreement with Russia to come to the aid of the latter, and hence it would not have been necessary for France to "tear up her defensive alliance."

Sazonov's early warning that he wanted no restraint from France or England would have let France out of responsibility to aid Russia with much better grace than Italy was able to escape from her obligations to the Triple Alliance. What actually held France in line with the aggressive Russian action were Poincaré's promises to Izvolsky before 1914, his unqualified promise of French aid on his St. Petersburg visit, and the secret French encouragement of the Russian preparations and mobilization after he had returned to France.

Poincaré is doubtless right about the impatience of Moltke and the German general staff, but he openly confesses the same impatience on the part of General Joffre and the French general staff.

Poincaré's case for the alleged desire of France to delay and defend herself against German aggression does not hold water at any point. The fact that the German Ambassador at Paris could report on July 29th that peace was honestly desired in Paris is simply evidence of how successful Poincaré, Viviani and Messimy had been in deceiving Schoen. The French authorities knew that Russian mobilization meant inevitable war; they knew that the Russian preparations were proceeding and mobilization was contemplated; and they well knew that if forced into war Germany desired only a defensive war against Russia. Yet the French authorities made no effort whatever to restrain the Russians, and refused to be neutral after the Russian aggression had relieved them of their treaty obligations.

Further, the French actually urged the Russians to speed up their fatal preparations, but to be more secretive about them so as to gain the greatest possible amount of time on Germany. As bearing upon Poincaré's will for peace in 1914 we might call attention to the fact that whereas he criticizes Bismarck for condensing the *Ems* telegram in 1870 his faithful henchman, Berthelot, did the same thing in 1914 by distorting the conversations of Schoen and Bienvenu-Martin and publishing them so as to inflame the French people. But the most damning element in the whole case against France is to be found in the date of the French determination upon war. Of this there is no doubt. At 1 A. M., August 1st, Izvolski sent the following telegram to St. Petersburg:

> "The French War Minister informed me, in hearty high spirits, that the Government have firmly determined upon war, and begged me to endorse the hope of the French General Staff that all of our efforts will be directed against Germany, and that Austria will be treated as a *quantité négligeable*."

This decision must have been arrived at some hours before Izvolski reported it to his home government, but even his telegram was sent sixteen hours before Germany declared war on Russia and two and a half days be-

fore Germany declared war upon France as a mere formality after having exhausted every effort to secure French neutrality.

France was, thus, the first country in Europe decisively to declare itself for war in the diplomatic crisis.

Poincaré makes much of the refusal of the French government to grant Joffre's original request for mobilization, and represents it as a proof of the pacific aspirations of France. As an actual matter of fact we have definitive proof that it was, like the ten kilometer imposture, a purely diplomatic ruse to influence England. Izvolski fully explains the reason in a telegram sent in answer to a query of Sazonov:

> "It is very important for France on account of political considerations relative to Italy and most especially England, that the French mobilization should not precede the German one, but form an answer to the latter."

Even Poincaré does not dare to assert that the French military preparations were not rapidly carried forward in secret in spite of the temporary withholding of the mobilization order to create a favorable influence on Italy and England.

It is most astonishing that Poincaré should once more bring up the ten kilometer withdrawal order of July 30th as a proof of defensive policy on the part of the French authorities. This has been riddled, not only by historians, but by both Viviani and Messimy. Poincaré asserts that this withdrawal order meant a weakening of French military strength and was vigorously opposed by the general staff.

Both Viviani and Messimy denied this explicitly in speeches before the French Chamber on January 31, 1919, and Viviani admitted that diplomatic considerations were solely responsible for the withdrawal order. Messimy also informed General Joffre explicity on this point in a telegram sent to him on August 1st at 5 P. M.

These "diplomatic considerations" were the creation of a favorable impression on England, Italy and the French people themselves, by endeavoring to demonstrate that France was contemplating a defensive war. In reality the withdrawal order did not weaken the French military defenses in any sense whatever, but actually strengthened the French preparatory measures by enabling them to speed up the secret preparations behind the screen of the ten kilometer line.

Likewise it is almost inconceivable that an Englishman or a Frenchman should once more bring up the invasion of Belgium as something at all related to the matter of war guilt, even though Mr. Strunsky still affects to believe that it is the "German guns before Liège" rather than any diplomatic documents which constitute the complete and adequate basis upon which to determine war responsibility.

Poincaré's ostensible awe before "one of the most solemn treaties of our time" is amusing in the light of the fact that the Anglo-French military plans of 1911, 1912, 1913 involved a movement through Belgium, and the King of Belgium in 1914 stated that he feared the French more than the Germans and that the French espionage on Belgium territory was a constant source of irritation to him.

England had for years before 1914 made vain efforts to get the Belgians to consent to the landing of British troops on Belgian soil in the event of a war with Germany. In fact, the French had not even created any significant military defenses along the Belgian boundary. The French were not surprised in 1914, for they had known of the possibility of a German invasion of Belgium since 1906. The fact is that Germany simply beat the French and English to it in 1914 because of the delay which Grey found necessary in swinging England into war. France did not dare move into Belgium alone because of fear of the effect of the move on English opinion.

In 1871 and 1887 England had, as Judge Ewart clearly shows, repudiated her obligation to defend the neutrality of Belgium, and in 1914 Germany clearly offered to respect Belgian territory if England would remain neutral—a proposition flatly rejected by Grey.

As Montgelas frankly admits, these facts do not excuse the German blunder in invading Belgium, but they do silence for all time the hypocritical Anglo-French presumptions of righteous indignation in the circumstances. But if one were to accept Poincaré's theory that the invasion of Belgium was a unique and dastardly crime which no civilized nation would have contemplated for a moment, it is evident that the Belgian question has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914.

The above facts constitute a disconcerting commentary on everything implied to Poincaré's grandiose questions: "Did France draw up military plans for a sudden attack involving the violation of Belgian neutrality? Did she put herself deliberately, beforehand, in a position where she had to declare war?" It was Poincaré's deliberate promises to Russia, and not the obligations of France under the Franco-Russian Alliance, that brought France into the War in 1914.

"The gates of hell" may not prevail against the fabric of Entente mythology and propaganda, as the existence of these portals is now mildly doubted by liberal theologians, but the much more relevant and substantial documentary facts of diplomatic history not only will prevail against them; they have already done so, however many generations may elapse before a consciousness of this fact begins to pervade the editorial columns of the New York *Times* and the New York *Tribune*.

III. POINCARE'S DEFENSE.[1]

Beginning with the publication in 1920 of Joseph Caillaux's "Les Responsables" and the following year of Fernand Gouttenoire de Toury's "Poincaré a-t-il voulu la guerre?" there has been a steady stream of books and pamphlets produced in France assaulting the diplomacy of M. Raymond Poincaré from January, 1912, to August, 1914. His assailants have included partisan pamphleteers, distinguished literary figures, eminent scholars, and famous publicists. The more important of these have been, in addition to the two authors mentioned above, Victor Margueritte, Ernest Judet, Alfred Pevet, Alfred Fabre-Luce, Mathias Morhardt, Colonel Converset, Georges Demartial, Gustave Dupin, "Lazare," Armand Charpentier, Grillot de Givry, and René Marchand.

[1] The *Nation*, June 15, 1928.

The indictment of Poincaré which has been formulated by his own countrymen may be summarized under the following points:

(1) When he assumed office as Premier and Foreign Minister in 1912 he rejected the German efforts at a *rapprochement,* including the offer of far-reaching autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine; (2) his all-absorbing life passion was the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, which he recognized could be achieved only by war; (3) in November, 1912, he promised Izvolski that in case France was kept informed concerning Russian policies in the Balkans, France would follow Russia into any war which broke out over a Balkan crisis and brought in Germany against Russia; (4) he connived at the recall of the moderate French Ambassador to Russia, Georges Louis, and replaced Louis by the incendiaries Delcassé and Paléologue; (5) he cooperated with the Russians in the bribery of the French press in order to induce the French papers to publish material designed to persuade the French people to support the French Government in joining Russia in a European war over Balkan issues; (6) he approved the large French loans to Russia in 1912-1913 for the purpose of increasing the Russian army and building strategic railroads from central Russia to the German frontier; (7) he helped to obstruct the Anglo-German accord in 1913 and exercised a powerful part in promoting the Anglo-Russian naval convention in the spring of 1914; (8) he greatly strengthened the Russian militarists while on his visit to St. Petersburg in July, 1914, encouraged them to take a bellicose stand against Austria, and rejected Sir Edward Grey's pacific proposal to the effect that Russia and Austria should avert a crisis by amiable direct conversations; (9) when the crucial decision had to be made on the night of July 29th, 1914, as to whether France would stand for peace or war, he threw the weight of his great personal influence for war at a time when he knew that diplomatic negotiations would in all probability succeed in adjusting the situation without an armed conflict; (10) once he and his clique had made the decision upon war he launched a policy of deceiving the French people as to the facts in the crisis; (11) he cleverly invented a number of diplomatic subterfuges designed to influence not only the French people, but also the public opinion of Italy and England, in order to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance and to bring England into the war on the side of France and Russia.

These serious charges rest for the most part upon the materials revealed through the publication of the Russian Documents in the *Livre Noir,* the Stieve collection, and the complete "Orange Book." If they are true they prove Poincaré to have been, along with Izvolski, primarily responsible for the diplomatic revolution of 1912-1914 and for deliberately forcing the Austro-Serbian crisis of 1914 into the proportions of a general European conflict. What has M. Raymond Poincaré been able to say in self-defense?

In 1921, in answer to some of his earlier critics, Poincaré composed his "Origines de la guerre," setting forth his version of the diplomacy in 1914. This was thoroughly demolished by a French publicist, writing under the name of "Lazare," in a trenchant work entitled *À l'Origine du mensonge.* In the summer of 1925 the editor of *Foreign Affairs* was able to tease out of M. Poincaré a summary article once more attacking his critics, this time especially his American critics. This was published in the above-mentioned periodical in October, 1925, and was immediately riddled by Professor Fay, Judge Bausman, M. Dupin, and the present writer. Undaunted, M.

Poincaré made use of the spare time afforded by his political retirement to prepare his official apology, which may run to ten volumes. This work he has had the audacity to entitle *Au Service de la France.* Three volumes, covering the period of 1912-1913, were published before his return to public office in the summer of 1926. The volume under review constitutes a translation and slight abridgment of the first volume and the first half of the second volume of the French original.

As Alfred Fabre-Luce says, "Poincaré has contented himself with the effort to conceal highly significant omissions under a luxuriant mass of explanations dealing with wholly secondary issues." He often attempts to refute the deadly criticisms of his French opponents, not by dealing with their specific charges but by invoking irrelevant personalities. Fabre-Luce is dismissed because he was only twenty-six years old when he wrote his *La Victoire.* Victor Margueritte's charges have no validity because Margueritte has not been duly grateful for past political favors from Poincaré and because he was dismissed from the Legion of Honor for writing *La Garconne.* René Marchand's *Livre Noir* and other writings are not to be taken seriously because Marchand was not adequately thankful for Poincaré's aid in getting him established as a reporter in Russia. Ernest Judet's editions of Georges Louis' diary are not to be trusted because Judet was opposed to the aggressive Franco-Russian diplomacy and favored a negotiated peace with Germany. At other times, when Poincaré detects a minor error in the works of a critic, he will devote pages to an ostentatiously minute refutation while ignoring vitally important issues.

In dealing with the basic charges against him Poincaré ignores his own letter of 1912 admitting the ardent German desire for a *rapprochement* with France, and presents the conventional tirade against German aggression and ambitions. He is successful in showing that he was opposed to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912 and that he preferred not to have a European war start in 1912 or 1913. But this does not in any sense prove that Poincaré and Izvolski were not planning a European war at a later date when France and Russia should be ready. It merely shows that Poincaré had the good sense not to want to precipitate hostilities prematurely.

The section in Poincaré's apology which has been most exploited by the "bitter-enders" is that in which he attempts to prove that he never made his famous promise of November 17th, 1912, to aid Russia in the event that an appropriate crisis broke out in the Balkans. No one who honestly compares Izvolski's account of Poincaré's commitment and Poincaré's official version can contend that there is any essential difference in the sense and implications of the two accounts (cf. Stieve, op. cit., p. 113; Poincaré, *Memoirs* (Eng. ed.), vol. I, p. 311). What Poincaré stressed was that France must be informed as to Russian policy and that Germany must enter the conflict in order to bring in France. The latter was necessary if France was to recover Alsace-Lorraine through her aid of Russia. These two points reveal nothing new: they were repeatedly stressed by Izvolski in his correspondence with Sazonov. We may grant, though Poincaré does not prove it to be a fact, that Sazonov rather than Poincaré took the initiative in demanding the recall of Georges Louis, but the fact is that the chief item in the case against Poincaré at this point is not the recall of Louis but that the

firebrands Delcassé and Palèologue were appointed as his successors. With respect to this capital point Poincaré does not even attempt to offer any defense.

The remaining items in the case against Poincaré are either left unchallenged or are not dealt with in this first volume. In the second and third French volumes he admits his part in the bribery of the French press, but tries to represent himself as participating in order to prevent the situation from getting out of hand. As Poincaré cannot be expected to know more at the present time about the crisis of 1914 than he did when he published his *Origines de la guerre* and his *Foreign Affairs* article, it can hardly be believed that he will be able to make a better case for himself in the succeeding volumes than he has in the three thus far published. The publication this spring of Georges Demartial's *L'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay*—a most devastating exposé of French official lies in 1914—may well cause Poincaré to reflect as to whether he should not allow the excuse of official duties and advancing age to prevent the resumption of his apology.

Throughout the work Poincaré bitterly attacks Izvolski as an impostor who persistently misrepresented him, but, while he is able to show in some cases slight verbal discrepancies between Izvolski's reports and the French official records, he is not successful in proving that Izvolski misrepresented the French policies or commitments in any decisive manner. Izvolski had every reason to represent Poincaré accurately to his home government, and Poincaré has both every reason to desire to falsify in his apology and almost unparalleled safety and facility in so doing. Nor can we accept Professor Fay's contention (in the *New Republic*) that Poincaré's aggressive diplomacy can be excused on the ground that he felt that war was inevitable and that he must prepare France for it. Poincaré's confession that in 1912 Germany was eager for a *rapprochement* completely destroys this interpretation. If war was "inevitable," Poincaré well knew *why* it was going to be inevitable, namely, because of the policy he and Izvolski formulated in 1912 and carried through resolutely until August, 1914.

Another consideration of basic and elemental importance is that if Izvolski misrepresented Poincaré, then the way to make this apparent to the whole world is to publish the documents in the French archives in full. Though premier twice since 1918, Poincaré has made no move to do so. Until these documents are made freely available for public consumption Poincaré and his associates in 1914 must stand self-condemned before the bar of skeptical public opinion.

The fact is that the present controversy in France concerning responsibility for the World War is the Dreyfus case all over again, with Victor Marguerite occupying the role of Zola. Indeed, it is not without significance that Mathias Morhardt, one of the leaders in the effort to establish the truth in the Dreyfus conspiracy, is also one of the active directors of the present struggle for truth and justice in regard to war-guilt and international good-will. But it will be a harder struggle to discredit Poincaré and his clique than it was to incriminate the conspirators against Dreyfus. The foes of Dreyfus could only make use of class and race hatred, while Poincaré can invoke in his defense the whole patriotic sentiment of France, the ostensible self-respect of a nation, the prestige of a great victory over a traditional

foe, and the fruits of a dictated peace. It will be interesting during the next generation to observe how far the situation in France with respect to war-guilt confirms or disproves the late Mr. Lincoln's optimistic observation as to the inability of politicians permanently to deceive the populace at large.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

IV. POINCARE'S FINAL EFFORT.

In the autumn of 1927 M. Poincaré published his fourth volume, dealing with the crisis of 1914. He failed here, as before, to meet and answer successfully any of the major charges advanced against him by his French critics. We have already (pp. 74 ff.) analyzed this volume, and shall not repeat our criticism in this place. Readers interested in this subject may be referred to the masterly critique of Poincaré's last volume by Georges Demartial in *Plain Talk* for April, 1928, and by Count Max Montgelas in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* February, 1928. See also below, Part II, Chap. XI.

Chapter VII.

STILL THE GERMAN OCTOPUS: EARL EVELYN SPERRY REMAINS RECALCITRANT.

ONE of the few patriotic blasts issued by propaganda organizations during the World War which actually rested upon real research was Professor Earl Evelyn Sperry's *The Tentacles of the German Octopus in America,* published in 1917 by the National Security League. Professor Sperry worked hard in going through the files of the Pan-Germanist publications, and the materials he cited were authentic. His great error, which he could not have adequately recognized until after the publication of Miss Wertheimer's book on the Pan-German League, was in assuming that the Pan-German League represented the opinions of the German people or spoke for the German government. Professor Sperry can be forgiven for holding such views in 1917, but one can scarcely be as forebearing in regard to his present retention of the war-time mythology.

The material printed below grew out of an attack by Professor Sperry upon the writer's *Genesis of the World War* in the Syracuse *Daily Orange* (Syracuse University) for December 13th, 1926.

I. BARNES IS WRONG ON WORLD WAR CAUSE HEAD OF HISTORY DEPARTMENT CONTENDS.[1]

"Russia did not cause the World War," Dr. Earl E. Sperry, chairman of the Hill history department, stated in sharp contradiction to the assertions of Professor Harry Elmer Barnes of Smith College which appeared in The *New Student* and were quoted in Saturday's edition of the *Daily Orange.*

"Austria, backed by Germany, began the war," Professor Sperry continued.

"Where did Professor Barnes get his information to the effect that Russia caused the war?" I venture to ask.

"Barnes has swallowed whole, without consideration, without analysis, the one-sided view of a German author who founded his views on the letters of one man," Dr. Sperry promptly replied. Then he went on to prove that Barnes does entertain a narrow and biased view on the subject.

Professor Barnes' ideas concerning Russia's responsibility for causing the war are taken almost exclusively from a book which was written by

[1] From the Syracuse *Daily Orange,* December 13, 1926, *et seq.*

Friedrich Stieve, a German writer. Stieve, in turn, has based his book on the correspondence of Izvolski who was Russian Ambassador at Paris during the two years immediately preceding the war.

Izvolski's letters represent for the most part his own views and not those of the Russian government. In his book, Stieve has used only these letters and in doing so he has ignored a large number of documents which present the other side of the situation.

So much for where Barnes got his information. "How then did the World War actually start?" was the next question which I advanced.

"The war was started by Austria with German backing. Austria was determined to destroy Serbia and started the war to do it," was Professor Sperry's animated response.

On two occasions prior to the assassination of the archduke, Austria was on the verge of a war to destroy Serbia. These two attempts were made in the fall and winter of 1913-1914. Austria was restrained by Italy the first time and the second time by Germany. These facts are substantiated by available documents.

When the archduke was assassinated the policy of Germany changed from peace to war. Montgelas, a defender of Germany, admits that in July of 1914 a change of policy took place.

"Make war on Serbia if you consider it necessary and do it quickly," were the instructions given by Germany to Austria when the latter asked Germany's advice on attacking Serbia. Thus the war began.

"But where does Russia come in?" was the next query I made of the head of the History department.

"Russia long cherished the plan of getting a warm water port, if possible Constantinople. If Austria destroyed Serbia and became the dominant power in the Balkans, Russia's plans would be permanently thwarted.

"Did not Russia aid in bringing on the war by rushing to champion the Serbian cause?"

"No, instead of trying to bring on a conflict, the Russian government accepted the plan of Sir Edward Grey to have the Austria-Serbian question mediated by a conference of Ambassadors, while Germany and Austria rejected the plan."

The Czar also proposed that the question at issue be submitted to the Hague Court of Arbitration. The Kaiser refused this proposal. Early in the crisis, Russia wished to negotiate with Austria over the Serbian question, but Austria refused.

Russia even advised Serbia to make a conciliatory answer to the brutal ultimatum of Austria and to avert war if possible. It is obvious that during this period Russia tried to keep the peace, but Germany and Austria were stubbornly resolved to crush Serbia.

"What could have induced Professor Barnes to advance the theory that Russia started the war?" was the question which now perplexed me. The tendency to present a startling theory to the public, was the only explanation.

II. DR. SPERRY'S CLAIMS REFUTED BY BARNES

(Editor's Note)—The *Daily Orange* today presents a reply by Professor Harry Elmer Barnes of Smith College and Amherst to assertions made recently by Professor E. E. Sperry, head of the Syracuse History department that Professor Barnes was wrong in regard to the cause of the World War.

Professor Barnes stated in The *New Student* that Russia was responsible for the war and his views were quoted in The *Daily Orange* a few weeks ago. Shortly after Professor Sperry granted an interview that appeared in this publication on December 13th in which he stated that Mr. Barnes had the wrong information and that his ideas were erroneous. This article was sent to Mr. Barnes, who prepared the following for publication in support of his side of the controversy:

Editor of *Daily Orange*:—I thank you for sending me the appreciation of my work on war responsibility by Professor Sperry. I am loath to enter into any controversy with my old teacher, whom I have always regarded as one of the ablest classroom instructors I have ever met. Further, there is not space in your columns for any adequate discussion of the whole problem of war-guilt. Therefore, I shall confine myself to a few impersonal comments on the points Professor Sperry has raised in his interview with Mr. Bryan.

In the first place, Professor Sperry holds that I have founded my whole case on a German interpretation of an incomplete publication of Russian diplomatic documents by the Bolshevik government. Now it so happens that Dr. Stieve's work relates only to one phase of war-guilt and that the diplomacy of the period from 1911-1914, particularly the Franco-Russian diplomacy. I have not used Stieve in relation to the crisis of 1914 to any appreciable degree, for the good reason, among others, that he does not attempt to cover this matter. But even on 1911-1914 I have not relied upon Stieve alone, but upon the *Siebert Documents*, the *Livre Noir*, Georges Louis' diary, Henderson's *Lord Grey*, Ewart's elaborate work, the English works by Gooch and Loreburn, the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, the French works of Fabre-Luce, Pevet, Demartial and Marchand, and the American work of Professors Earle, Langer and Schmitt, to mention but a few of the more important monographs. Any one who cares to do so may consult the bibliography on pages 91-5 of my book, as well as the bibliographic appendix, to see whether or not my acquaintance transcends Stive's one book. So much for Professor Sperry's allegation that I have "swallowed whole, without consideration, without analysis, the one-sided view of a German author who founds his views on the letters of one man."

Professor Sperry has apparently not consulted Stieve's collection of Russian Documents directly or he would know that it does not contain Izvolski's correspondence alone, but a large number of letters of Sazonov. Sazonov's memoranda of the Tsar, minutes of Russian ministerial council meetings, and many letters of other Russian statesmen and diplomats. If, as Professor Sperry contends, the French Documents would refute Izvolski why has not Poincaré published them in the eight years which have elapsed since the Russians began to permit the publication of Izvolski's letters?

The next point made by Professor Sperry is that the war was started by Austria, urged on by Germany to the destruction of Serbia. Professor Sperry

admits that Germany was a restraining influence on Austria until July, 1914, when "a change of policy took place." No doubt there did, but Professor Sperry does not state why this change came, leaving his readers to imply that it was because of the triumph of the Hunnish desire to seize the planet. The change took place because the heir to the Austrian throne was assassinated by a member of a secret Serbian society, having its seat in Belgrade and directed by Serbians, who planned the assassination through the chief of the intelligence division of the Serbian general staff, in full knowledge of the Serbian civil government and royal family. If Professor Sperry and I should start down Salina street in an affable manner, and then I should caress him with a gas-pipe, there would no doubt be a change in his attitude which would be no reflection on his character or disposition. Of course, there was a change in German opinion after the assassination. If Professor Sperry's most beloved colleague on the Syracuse faculty should be shot by a student who flunked an examination, no doubt Professor Sperry's views on university discipline might undergo a marked transformation.

Germany did not insist that Austria make war on Serbia, but that she should take such steps as she deemed necessary to keep the Empire together in the face of Serb intrigue. The Kaiser advised rapid Austrian action to take Europe by surprise, in order to make a European war less likely when Europe faced a *fait accompli*. In 1914 Austria faced the disintegration of her domain and political authority; Russia merely faced a minor diplomatic rebuff and a possible blow to her imperialistic aims in the Near East—two quite different matters. Nor did Austria intend to destroy Serbia. Before July 28th she had assured Sazonov, who took care not to reveal this to his allies, that she would respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia, and intended merely to put an end to the illegal and menacing Serbian plots against the integrity of Austria-Hungary. Compared with the action of the United States with respect to many Latin American countries, the action of Austria under the circumstances was mild and deliberate indeed.

Professor Sperry holds that Russia fully accepted Grey's plan for a conference, which Germany rejected. Let us see the facts. Russia agreed to a conference over the Austro-Serbian dispute, where Austria and Germany would be outvoted, but rejected a conference in regard to the Austro-Russian controversy, which was the important one and the conflict that brought on the war. Early in the crisis Sazonov warned the Powers that he would tolerate no interference whatever with Russia's freedom of action in regard to Austria. Even Lord Grey admitted that the German suggestion of direct conversations between Russia and Austria was better than his conference plan.

Germany did not stand for war in 1914. As soon as the Kaiser read the terms of the Serbian reply to Austria he opposed even a local punitive war of Austria against Serbia. When it began to look as though the Austrian war on Serbia would produce a European war, Germany began to press Austria to hold up her military activities and worked hand in hand with England to settle matters by diplomacy until the Russian mobilization, secretly approved by France with full knowledge of its consequences, made the European war inevitable. If Professor Sperry believes that only the English tell the truth, he might read the last document in the new collection

of English Documents—a letter written on July 30th, 1914 from the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Arthur Nicolson in the British Foreign Office in which he states it as his firm conviction that both the German government and the German financial and industrial classes were dead against war. If Professor Sperry should recur to his old "chestnut" of the Moltke-Conrad telegrams, it is sufficient to remind him that Moltke refused to advise mobilization until he had had three independent and reliable confirmations of the Russian mobilization, which French and Russian military authorities and diplomats had recognized since 1893 to be equivalent to a Russian declaration of war on Germany.

Professor Sperry should possess enough of a sense of humor not to mention the Tsar's proposal to submit the Austro-Serbian dispute to the Hague. Such a thing was unthinkable in those days of diplomatic procedure. No country in history has submitted a dispute of such magnitude to the Hague. It was as idealistic as it would be to imagine Professor Sperry listening to Scott Nearing with open-mindedness. Even Sazonov regarded it as a huge joke in 1914.

It is true that Russia advised Serbia to make a soft answer to Austria and not to declare war on Austria in a precipitate fashion. But why did she do this? Precisely, as we now fully know from Russian Documents, so as to put Austria in a bad light and Serbia and Russia in a good light before European opinion, and to prevent Serbia from spilling the beans by starting hostilities before Russia could complete her secret mobilization. On the very day that Russia counselled moderation on Serbia she herself provided for the mobilization of 1,100,000 men and began military preparations which the Russians knew would bring on war. General Dobrorolski, chief of the mobilization division of the Russian army in 1914, has frankly told us that the Russians definitely decided on war at a crown council meeting on July 25th, three days before Austria declared war on Serbia, and further says that the Russian diplomatic proposals after the 25th were a pure fake to conceal the military activities conducted in accordance with the decision upon war—"the stage-dressing" behind which the military drama was being prepared. This had already been arranged for in the Russian military protocol of 1912; and in 1915, General Palizyn, Russian chief of staff, exultantly boasted that the Russians had gained nearly two weeks on the simple-minded Germans and Austrians who had believed in the sincerity of the Franco-Russian diplomatic suggestions in July, 1914.

Professor Sperry suggests that my book could have no other basis than the cheap desire to gain publicity by setting forth a sensational theory. Now nobody short of an incredible fool would think that he could help himself by anything so opposed to American favor and opinion as a repudiation of the conventional theories of war-guilt. Further, this subject would be the last place in the world where one would risk his reputation unless he was sure of his ground and acquainted with the literature, for a whole corps of "die-hards," numbering among themselves my good friend Professor Sperry, stand ready to pounce upon the revisionist who dares to appear in print. Just to show that Professor Sperry does not represent the opinion of all authorities I may cite a few estimates of my book by men in whose judgment Professor Sperry has at one time or another expressed high confidence:

"No other American has done as much as Professor Barnes to familiarize his countrymen with the new evidence which has been rapidly accumulating during the last few years, and to compel them to revise their war-time judgments in the light of this new material.

G. P. Gooch, in *Contemporary Review.*

"Professor Barnes is thoroughly familiar with the huge accumulation of diplomatic materials bearing on the origins of the World War. . . . Before his powerful argument, buttressed with relevant facts, the Sunday-School theory of war-guilt is utterly demolished."

Charles A. Beard, in *Current History.*

"Professor Barnes has written a volume which will enhance his reputation. He is frank, honest and sober in his statements. He has studied the evidence with care; and he has presented his case in the temper of a historian rather than of a lawyer. We must pay attention to books like this."

Herbert Adams Gibbons, *New York Sun.*

"The first full narrative account by an American studied from the documents. His case must in all its essential features be held as proved."

Ferdinand Schevill, in *Christian Century.*

Professor Sperry has hazarded an opinion as to the explanation of my writings on war-guilt. To return the courtesy I will express the view that Professor Sperry, in other fields a competent and judicious scholar, has never recovered from war hysteria, still fears the "tentacles of the German octopus" and has not yet divested himself of "the Sunday-School theory of war-guilt."

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

III. DR. SPERRY CITES AUTHORITIES TO SUPPORT HIS CONTENTIONS.

(Editor's Note—The *Daily Orange* today presents a reply by Dr. E. E. Sperry, head of the Hill history department, to assertions made by Professor Harry Elmer Barnes of Smith College and Amherst. Because of its length, the article has been divided, the concluding portion to appear in Tuesday's edition of The *Daily Orange.*)

To the Editor of the *Daily Orange*:

If I felt free to do as I pleased, I should not make this demand on your space to reply to Professor Barnes' letter in Friday's *Daily Orange.* He has taken my passing comments so seriously, however, that perhaps I should explain just what I meant.

Passing over personalities and coming directly to the first point at issue, I did not intend to convey the impression in my five minute interview that Professor Barnes had founded his whole case on Stieve's book entitled, *Isvolsky and the World War.* I never had any such idea. I have read Professor Barnes' book and know that he has used many sources. What I did say in slightly figurative language was that he had accepted Stieve's views in an uncritical manner and such is the fact. Stieve tries to prove that France and Russia desired a general European war and conspired to bring it about. Professor Barnes heads Chapter III of his book *The Franco-Russian Plot that Produced the War.* The fact that he has adopted Stieve's view can hardly be denied.

The next question is whether or not Stieve's contention is correct. I do not believe that it is and wrote Professor Barnes to this effect last July. Since then my opinion has been confirmed by two of the foremost scholars in the United States who are writing on the causes of the war. One of them is Professor Bernadotte Schmitt of the University of Chicago whom Professor Barnes describes as "one of our most judicious students of contemporary European diplomacy" (*Genesis of the World War*, p. 101). Professor Schmitt in his review of Stieve's book (*Foreign Affairs*, October, 1926, p. 133) writes thus: "In general the method of the book is to insinuate and suggest that because France and Russia were preparing for war they were intending to provoke it." Concerning Poincaré, Schmitt says, "Unless he is an unconscionable liar he did not desire war. He did expect it and therefore prepared for it, but he strove to avert it." (Ibid., p. 136). Reviewing Poincaré's recent book, *Au Service de la France*, he further asserts, "One can fairly acquit M. Poincaré of war-like ambitions:" (Ibid., p. 136).

Professor Fay of Smith College, whom Professor Barnes describes as possessing "unrivalled knowledge of the facts concerning the diplomatic crisis of 1914" (*Genesis of the World War*, p. XIX) makes the following statements in his review of Stieve's book: "Against Isvolski Herr Stieve seems to make a pretty convincing case. . . .But as regards M. Poincaré and M. Sazonov Herr Stieve is less convincing.". . . ."Poincaré believed that it (a European war) was inevitable. He made his preparations accordingly. . . .in so doing he did in fact tend to make the war inevitable. This is his great responsibility, rather than that he plotted deliberately to bring about a war by which France should recover Alsace-Lorraine." (*Nation* Nov. 10, 1926, pp. 483-484).

Professor Preston Slosson of the University of Michigan in his review of the *Genesis of the World War* thus refers to Professor Barnes' presentation of Stieve's contention: "The very interesting negotiations of Izvolski, Sazonov and Poincaré in tightening the Franco-Russian alliance, especially after 1912, are taken as proof conclusive of a premeditated attack on Germany to recover Alsace-Lorraine for France and acquire the Straits for Russia. Throughout the whole book all military steps of Entente countries taken in anticipation of war are treated as proofs of intention to begin the war themselves." (*American Historical Review*, January, 1927, pp. 319-329). It is thus evident that Professor Slosson, like Fay and Schmitt, agrees with me in rejecting the Stieve-Barnes thesis that France and Russia conspired to provoke a war.

Lest the readers of *The Daily Orange*, after noting the list of eminent authorities whom Professor Barnes names as sources of his information, should make the natural inference that they all agree with him, I must here state that such is not the case. Neither Henderson, Ewart, Gooch, Loreburn nor Fabre-Luce contend that Germany and Austria were without responsibility for the war. Fabre-Luce, for example, though reprobating the policies of France and Russia, thus summarizes "the three vulnerable points of the Imperial (German) policy in July, 1914: Austro-German complicity against Serbia; the refusal of a Conference; and the initiative in declaring war." (Limitations of Victory, p. 25). Under a section heading entitled, "Where Germany Was Really to Blame," he says: "But it is just for having adopted this ancient worship of Mars that we blame her more particularly. Having failed in her role of guide, shaken peace by her vain

threats, and done nothing to deprive her adversaries of the reasons for their nationalistic agitations, Germany was very ill-equipped to throw the blame for the ruin caused by the war on them." (p. 210). These two passages, among others which might be cited, make it clear enough that while Professor Barnes has used Fabre-Luce, the latter decisively rejects the view that Germany was guiltless of responsibility.

Passing on now to Professor Barnes' statements in which he makes light of the Czar's proposal to avert war by appealing to the Hague Tribunal, let me summarize Russia's principal moves for peace during the Twelve Days. When Austria sent the ultimatum to Serbia with the universally admitted purpose of making war, Russia at first advised Serbia not to resort to arms, but to submit her case to the Powers. Russia next advised Serbia to make a humble and conciliatory reply to Austria's demand. She then asked Austria to extend the time limit of the ultimatum, which was only forty-eight hours, and Austria refused. Russia accepted Grey's proposal to settle the controversy peacefully in a conference of ambassadors at London, a proposal rejected by Germany. She offered to negotiate directly with Austria concerning the ultimatum and Austria refused for nearly a week. The Czar proposed that the controversy should be submitted to the Hague, but Germany refused. Yet Professor Barnes charges Russia with chief responsibility for bringing on the war. He says Russia wanted war. If that is true why did Russian statesmen take precisely those steps which would preserve peace had Germany and Austria cooperated with her? If Russia was only bluffing, as he charges, why did not Germany call the bluff by accepting some of these proposals and thus force Russia to expose her aggressive purposes?

What, now, was the course of Germany and Austria during these same days? After the murder of the archduke, Germany told Austria to attack Serbia if she wished, to do it quickly, and feel assured of Germany's armed support. Austria accordingly sent her ultimatum intended to cause war. Serbia accepted all the demands, save those infringing her sovereignty. Austria rejected the reply, and declared war, the first state to draw the sword. Yet Professor Barnes declares that Germany and Austria are not responsible to any degree whatever for bringing on the war. Germany tried to restrain Austria after reading Serbia's answer, but her efforts were nullified by Austria's duplicity and determination to fight.

Austria's action is justified on the ground that she "faced the disintegration of her domain and political authority." Leaving aside the question whether Austria was in such imminent danger as Professor Barnes alleges, I emphatically deny that Austria was justified in committing an aggression on Serbia which was practically certain to cause a general European war. It was a commonplace of European diplomacy, a fact known to every statesman, publicist, professor and student, that if either Russia or Austria undertook to destroy one of the Balkan states, or to subjugate it, that all Europe would be dragged into war. Yet the central Empires plunged ahead.

Did German statesmen know the consequences? Let them speak freely in their own official publication, the German White Paper of August, 1914. "We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action which she might

consider necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Serbia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an ally." German statesmen here make the official confession that they knew the dread possibilities contained in their pledge of support to Austria, yet they gave it.

Professor Barnes further justifies Austria's action on the ground that the heir to the throne was murdered by "a member of a secret Serbian society, having its seat in Belgrade, and directed by Serbians who planned the assassination through the chief of the intelligence division of the Serbian general staff in full knowledge of the Serbian civil government and royal family." But in July, 1914, the Austrian government did not possess this information. It knew that the archduke had been shot by an Austrian subject in an Austrian town, but did not know that the Serbian government or any of its officials was implicated. Its special agent sent into Serbia to investigate that government's connection with the crime, if any, made the following report: "Nothing to prove or even suggest that the Serbian government was accessory to the murder or its preparation or to the supply of weapons. There is, on the contrary, a good deal to make this seem out of the question." (Montgelas, p. 236). Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister, suppressed this report, however. He did not communicate it either to the Emperor Francis Joseph or the Kaiser. Why? Because he knew that with this information in hand the Kaiser would not support Austria and that Francis Joseph would thwart the plans of the military party to destroy Serbia. Months before the murder of the archduke, Austria had been planning to crush and dismember Serbia. In the fall of 1913 she had been restrained from this aggression by her ally Italy.

In reading Proessor Barnes' writings on the war it seems to me that he has a double standard of judgment, one standard for the Triple Entente, another for the Triple Alliance. The moves of the Entente powers for peace he considers hypocritical, a cloak for aggressive designs. The moves of the Triple Alliance for war, he argues, were really made with the purpose of preserving the general peace. This benevolent design was frustrated, however, by the devilish machinations of France and Russia, with England a bad third. In some respects he has the true Germanic psychology revealed so copiously during the war. He believes that anything the central Empires wished to do was justifiable; that any resistance to their designs was wrong. For Austria to defend her interests by smashing Serbia was entirely permissible. For Russia to defend her Balkan interests by aiding Serbia was a crime.

I think I had better stop here, lest this "Orange" be rendered entirely juiceless.

E. E. SPERRY.

IV. BARNES FINDS FALLACIES IN SPERRY'S CONTENTIONS.

Smith College Professor Defends His Position In Reference to World War Cause

(Editor's Note—The *Daily Orange* today presents the first installment

of a refutation by Professor H. E. Barnes of Smith College and Amherst to claims set forth by Dr. E. E. Sperry, head of the Hill history department, concerning responsibility or the commencement of the World War. Tomorrow's edition of The *Daily Orange* will contain the second installment of Professor Barnes' reply).

Editor of the *Daily Orange*: With your permission I will continue the amiable and impersonal exchange with my friend Professor Sperry over the question of the responsibility for the World War.

(1) As to the allegation that I have adopted Stieve's interpretation of Franco-Russian diplomacy from 1912-1914, this is true only in so far as we have both accepted the only plausible and common-sense reading of the Russian Documents. The careful reader will find that more than ninety-five per cent of my references to Stieve's book are not to his textual material but to the documents he prints. As I indicated, I used this so that interested readers might check up on the sources in English—Stieve's book being the only volume which gives any considerable number of Izvolski's letters in English.

(2) Professor Sperry holds that his opinion is confirmed by the views of Bernadotte Schmitt and Sidney B. Fay, and regards this as conclusive. Professor Sperry cites me as holding that Schmitt is a highly objective and reliable historian of war-guilt, though he knows that my characterization of Schmitt which he cites, was written before Schmitt had fully revealed his biasses and limitations in his articles in *Current History* for March, 1926 and *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1926. Professor Sperry further knew that at the time my book appeared Professor Schmitt had expressed himself publicly as in general agreement with my point of view in our debate in Chicago last spring. Then, Professor Sperry had read my article in the *Progressive* for December 1st, in which I advanced extensive and cogent evidence to support my contention that in the last year Schmitt has given evidence of subjective emotional influences which makes his opinions on war-guilt open to grave criticisms. Finally, he knew from this article that I had shown the utterly preposterous nature of Schmitt's judgment of the monograph of Stieve and the apology of Poincaré. If he has been following the detailed literature of war-guilt he also is aware of the complete extinction of Schmitt by a series of experts in the December *Kriegsschuldfrage*.

It is most peculiar that Professor Sperry should regard Professor Fay as supporting his position. On this point I would only ask readers of The *Daily Orange* to reread Professor Sperry's quotation from Professor Fay on this point. I would merely add that either Professor Fay or Professor Sperry would have great difficulty in reconciling the opinion that Poincaré did not premeditate the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine with Poincaré's public statement to French university students: "I could discover no other reason why my generation should go on existing except for the hope of recovering our lost provinces." I expressed myself as in full agreement with Professor Schmitt's statement that "unless Poincaré is an unconscionable liar he did not desire war," and pointed out in this same *Progressive* article that the famous French authority, Georges Demartial, has just published his *L'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay*, which devotes over two hundred pages to the French lies of 1914, in the *Yellow Book* and elsewhere, with respect to the single sub-

ject of the Russian mobilization. It should, of course, be conceded that Poincaré should be designated as a "legal" or "juristic" liar, similar to a guilty man who pleads innocent in court. His statements in a personal capacity may very likely be honorable and veracious.

(3) Professor Sperry quotes from Professors Schmitt, Fay and Slosson to the effect that Poincaré regarded the World War as inevitable, and was hence justified in making every preparation for it. Professor Sperry does not indicate why Poincaré regarded the war as inevitable, leaving his readers to assume that it was because Poincaré feared a deliberate and unprovoked German attack. Now Professor Sperry has just reviewed the book by Fabre-Luce, and hence he must have read it. He must have recalled that on p. 101 Fabre-Luce quotes a letter written by Poincaré in 1912 (in his premiership), in which he frankly states that Germany was trying her best to reach a friendly understanding with France, but that France would have nothing to do with such a proposal until she recovered Alsace-Lorraine. Poincaré then wrote: "The German Government seems obstinately bent on a *rapprochement* which nothing but complete reparation for the past would render possible." But Professor Sperry, if he has not read Oncken's recent book on the background of the Franco-Prussian war, might present the conventional view that Prussia was the brutal aggressor in 1870, and that hence Poincaré was justified in holding that France would never give up her insistence upon a war of revenge and restitution. It is interesting to note on this point that Clemenceau has himself written in the *Saturday Evening Post* for October 24, 1914: "No true Frenchman has ever hesitated to admit that the wrongs of 1870 were committed by our side. Dearly have we paid for them." Professor Sperry should also be aware that, as early as March, 1871, Napoleon III himself wrote to Countess Louise de Mercy-Argenteau: "I acknowledge that we were the aggressors." Thus the whole bottom drops out of the Entente mythology which represents the Poincaré policy as but preparation for an inevitable war that he did not will and which he wished to avert. It is equally clear why Poincaré "expected" a European war. Professor Sperry might contend that there is no extensive documentary proof of French plans to recover Alsace-Lorraine, but if he has read Judet's "Georges Louis" he knows that Louis, French Ambassador to Russia, tells us (p. 143) that the prospect of Russian occupation of the Straits and French recovery of Alsace-Lorraine was assumed as so axiomatic in the purposes of the Franco-Russian alliance that it was taken for granted without discussion or notation.

(4) Professor Sperry points out that neither Henderson, Ewart, Gooch, Loreburn nor Fabre-Luce contend that Germany and Austria are guiltless. He might well have added my name, as I expressed myself decisively to this effect in a number of places in my book. Germany bears an equal share with the other states for the system of 1914 which made war possible, and in 1914 she was guilty of some stupid diplomatic acts, but none of them revealed any desire whatever for a European war. Where I maintain Germany to have been guiltless is with respect to the old charge that she desired and wilfully precipitated the European war and worked against the pacific measures proposed in 1914. I believe my views here are so well established as to be no longer even debatable.

Professor Sperry makes several quotations from the distinguished young

French scholar, Fabre-Luce, but he does not call attention to the following crucial generalizations of that author. In the first place, he completely demolishes the core of the French epic, to the effect that France had to fight Germany in self-defense. He says: "In short, with variations in their tactics, the Germans consistently aimed at reconciliation until 1913, when, finding all their proposals rejected, they were persuaded that France wanted war, and turned their whole attention to strengthening their armaments to insure their defense." In the second place, Fabre-Luce states decisively that by the time of Poincaré's departure from St. Petersburg on July 23, 1914, "there was very slight chance of averting the European war," because of the bellicose and provocative policy which Poincaré had encouraged in the Russian circles and of his promise of unconditional French aid to Russia if the war came. It will be remembered that the 23rd of July was the day Austria submitted her ultimatum to Serbia. Hence, Fabre-Luce shows, and quite correctly, that Poincaré had made war extremely likely even before the French and Russians knew what Germany and Austria proposed to do in 1914. Lastly, Fabre-Luce submits as his final judgment on war guilt the following generalization: "The acts of the Central Powers made the war possible; those of the Entente made the war inevitable." As I stated in my book (p. 673), I regard this as the best phrasing of the verdict of history as to war guilt which I have thus far discovered.

(5) Professor Sperry states that Russia took every step to preserve peace and that Germany and Austria rejected these offers. He lays great stress upon the fact that on July 24th Russia counselled moderation on Serbia and urged Austria to extend the time-limit on the ultimatum. He does not point out that this was merely to gain time for the Russian military preparations. He fails to make clear to his readers the fact that the moment Sazonov saw the Austrian ultimatum he exclaimed, "This is the European war!" and that at this same council meeting of the 24th, in which it was decided to advise Serbian moderation, it was also decided to mobilize the Russian fleets and get ready for the mobilization of the Russian army, which as all informed Russians knew, meant absolutely unavoidable European war. It was also determined at this meeting that all Russian money should be recalled from Germany and Austria. These were scarcely the acts of a peace-loving group eager to avert war. On the 25th, before the Russians had learned what reply the Serbians would make to Austria or what Austria would do when she learned of the reply, the Russian authorities definitely decided upon war.

Professor Sperry contends that the Russian diplomatic proposals were genuine and made in good faith. He fails to state that the Russian military Protocol of 1912, still in force in 1914, provided for the concealment of military preparations leading to inevitable war by "clever pretended diplomatic negotiations, designed to lull the fears of the enemy." Nor does he tell us that General Dobrorolski, Russian chief of mobilization in 1914, frankly states that all Russian diplomacy after the 25th was merely the stage-setting behind which the military drama was being rapidly and fully prepared. He does not make it clear that the proposal to take the Serbian dispute to the Hague Court was such a joke that even Sazonov refused to take it seriously in 1914. Finally, he does not point out to his readers that Sazonov's most insistent proposal of a diplomatic conference came on July

31st, long after the Russian mobilization had been ordered and put into execution, an act which not only meant war but, by common agreement of the French and Russians, *was war*. In other words, the real steps taken by Russia after July 24th were those which made for war, while her diplomatic proposals were patently faked. For proof of this we do not have to rely upon German and Austrian evidence but upon the very best Russian authorities. As I pointed out in my earlier letter, General Palizyn, Russian chief of-staff in 1915, openly boasted of the great advantages in time the Russians had gained by making the poor German and Austrian "boobs" believe that the Russian diplomatic proposals in 1914 were genuine.

Professor Sperry complains because Austria refused to discuss her ultimatum to Serbia with Russia or to arbitrate the issue (a refusal which she relinquished in the last days of the crisis to no avail). We should like to ask Professor Sperry if he thinks the United States would have submitted to a Brazilian demand for discussion and arbitration in case Theodore Roosevelt and his wife had been shot at El Paso, Texas, in December, 1900, by a full-blood Mexican citizen of the United States, who was a member of a notorious anti-American Mexican secret society and whose murderous act was praised in fulsome language by the whole Mexican press, while the Mexican authorities offered no apologies and made no efforts to run down the conspirators? Professor Sperry asks why Germany did not consent to accept some of the diplomatic proposals in 1914. She did consent to all except the conference proposal of Grey, which she could not accept as a loyal ally of Austria, but she substituted for this a plan which Grey himself in 1914 admitted to be far better than his conference plan. Germany's record as to coöperation with Grey's diplomatic proposals in 1914 is far cleaner than that of Russia or France.

(6) Professor Sperry writes much about the alleged Austrian determination to "destroy" Serbia in 1914, but he knows that nothing of this sort was intended when Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914. Before this time (from July 24th onward) the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg had repeatedly assured Sazonov that Austria would respect both the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Serbia. Sazonov carefully refrained from telling France and Great Britain of this all-important assurance, as it would have completely undermined all ostensible excuse for Russian intervention to aid Serbia. The Austrians, however, presented this information at Paris and London. Number 223 of the Russian *Orange Book* reveals the fact that Poincaré and Izvolski were greatly perturbed over this and agreed that they must deny it to keep England from attempting to restrain Russia in the interest of European peace. Hence, whatever action might have been justifiable on the part of France and Russia, in case Austria had really been intending to destroy Serbia, has no bearing whatever in estimating the facts and relative guilt of the states involved in July and August, 1914.

(7) Professor Sperry makes the strange assertion that Austria was ignorant of any Serbian complicity in the assassination of the Archduke in 1914. We have here a rather sad revelation of Professor Sperry's methods as an historian of war guilt.

He cites in support the grossly misleading excerpt from the full report of the Austrian commissioner, Dr. Friedrich von Wiesner, sent by Austria

to investigate the plot in 1914. This excerpt is that which was dishonestly torn from the context by Secretary Lansing and James Brown Scott at the Paris Peace Conference. Now Professor Sperry had read my book. Hence he knew that on pp. 187-190 I give this excerpt and then the full report, which completely repudiates the exeerpt and proves that by July 14th the Austrians knew that the assassination had been executed by a Serbian secret society having its center in Belgrade; that prominent Serbian officials had taken part in the plot; that the arms had been obtained from the Serbian arsenal; that the assassins had been smuggled from Serbia into Bosnia with the connivance of the Serbian border officials; and that the Serbian government had tolerated the subversive seeret societies. They further knew that the Serbian government had offered no apologies; that the Serbian government was making no investigation of the erime; and that the Serbian press was warmly commending the assassination as a great patriotic act. All of this in spite of the fact that in 1909 Serbia had promised to suppress all subversive societies and all propaganda directed against the integrity of Austria! Here was surely enough information to justify the aetion of Austria in 1914.

Professor Sperry is particularly fond of British authorities. Professor Lowes Dickinson says of the Austrian policy in 1914: "I do not believe there was a state in existence that would not, under similar eircumstances, have determined, as Austria did, to finish the menace, once for all, by war."

(8) Professor Sperry makes much out of the German statement that Germany might have to back Austria to the extent of war, but comparable statements were made by Russia, Franee and England, all of whom fully reeognized that their policies might entail a European war. What the German statement comes down to is this: that she would rather go to war than to see her only ally destroyed by plots, revolutions or an attack by Russia. This was not only a justifiable, but the only rational, attitude, given European conditions as they were in 1914. The worst that can be said of Germany is that she recognized that her loyal support of Austria *might* bring war, while Franee and Russia openly recognized that their aets *must inevitably* bring war, and then deliberately chose the path of war. Professor Sperry well knows, as does every other student of war guilt, that the German advice of haste in Austrian action towards Serbia was dietated by a desire to preserve the peace of Europe. Germany reeognized that there would be far less probability of war if Austria took Europe by surprise in a *fait accompli* than would be the case if she allowed France and Russia to have time to plan aggressive action. The faets of 1914 proved the Germans were right.

(9) Professor Sperry holds that I have a double standard for judging the acts of Franee and Russia, on the one hand, and those of Germany and Austria, on the other. Indeed I have. In the case of a struggle between a highwayman and his victim we judge quite differently the violenee done by the highwayman and that by his victim. Austria was admittedly taking a last desperate chance to preserve her territorial integrity, and we ean scarcely blame an Austrian for thinking that it was worth while and justifiable to do so. Germany was merely standing by her loyally in her efforts at self-preservation. Russia, on the other hand, was aggressively intervening in the situation to advance her imperialistic designs. There was no justifica-

tion for Russian pretentions to great solicitude for the Balkan Slavs. In the six years before 1914 she had shown herself sufficiently willing to desert them when she could gain something thereby. It was Izvolski, then Russian Foreign Minister, who suggested in 1908 that Austria annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1911 the Russians offered even the Mohammedan Turks Russian support against the Balkan Slavs if the Turks would open the Straits to Russia. We can quote here another of the British opinions so dear to Professor Sperry; this time from no less a person than Lord Bertie, British Ambassador to Paris in 1914. He wrote on July 26, 1914: "Russia comes forward as the protectress of Serbia; by what title except on the exploded pretention that she is, by right, the protectress of all Slavs? What rubbish!" France, by backing Russia, was not saving an ally from destruction, as was Germany, but encouraging an ally in deliberate aggression, so that the realization of Russian imperialistic aims might also bring about the French program of seizing Alsace-Lorraine. Another reason for a double-standard is that in 1914 Germany's words tallied with her deeds. She not only said she was going to restrain Austria in the interest of peace, but she actually tried to do so. Neither France nor Great Britain made any serious efforts to restrain the fatally aggressive Russian action. On the point of the relative guilt of the two opposing alliances in 1914, we may cite the opinion of Lowes Dickinson once more, whose book is stated by even Professor Schmitt to be the best yet written on the subject: "The Powers of the Entente say that the offense was Germany's backing of Austria. Germans say that the offense was Russia's backing of Serbia. On that point, really, the whole controversy turns. To my mind, the German position is the more reasonable."

(10) In conclusion, we shall indulge once more Professor Sperry's altogether commendable admiration for English judgment. We will show how matters appeared to A. G. Gardiner, the greatest British editor of contemporary times, next to Mr. Scott of the Manchester *Guardian*. In his famous editorial of August 1, 1914, in the London *Daily News*, Mr. Gardiner expressed full recognition of the impending aggressive action of Russia and of the desirability of British abstention from participation in the inexcusable tragedy: "The peace of every land, the happiness of every home in Europe, the very bread by which we live, hang at this moment upon the will of one man, the Tsar of Russia. It is he whose hand is on the avalanche. . . . Our neutrality is the only protection that Europe has against the hideous ruin and combustion on the brink of which it trembles. Let us announce that neutrality to the world. It is the one hope. Let us make it clear that unless and until British interests are attacked, we will have no part in this world-insanity, that we will not shed a drop of blood for the Tsar or Serbia, that our one obligation is the interests and peace of this land, and that we refuse to recognize any other. We can save Europe from war even at this last moment. But we can only save it by telling the Tsar that he must fight his own battles and take the consequences of his own action. If the British government does this it will do the greatest service to humanity in history. If it does not do it, it will have brought the greatest curse to humanity in history. The youngest of us will not live to see the end of its crime."

Of Serbia the Manchester *Guardian* said in its editorial of August 3rd, 1914: "Of all the smaller Powers of Europe, Serbia is, quite decidedly,

the one whose name is most foully daubed with dishonour. The record of her rulers and her policy in recent years is unmatched as a tissue of cruelty, greed, hypocrisy and ill-faith."

Even the conservatives had no notion that Serbia was worth a European war. *John Bull*, the reactionary and nationalistic Bottomly journal was publishing its leading article at this same time under the heading: "To Hell with Serbia; once more, to Hell with Serbia."

If anybody desires to see how far the revisionist theory of war guilt has got under Professor Sperry's skin and upset his endocrine balance, let him consult the last paragraph of his review on p. 326 of the *American Historical Review* for January, 1927.

HARRY E. BARNES.

Chapter VIII.

TIMID AND VACILLATING REVISIONISM: BERNADOTTE EVERLY SCHMITT

BERNADOTTE EVERLY SCHMITT first came to public attention as a writer on international relations through the publication of his *England and Germany, 1740-1914*, in the year 1916. It was a book which showed considerable reading and contact with monographic and source material, but was markedly pro-English throughout. This was not surprising, however, considering the date of publication, as the majority of American studies of international relations of this period were pro-British and anti-German. During the War Professor Schmitt contributed what little he wrote to the Allied cause, but he was certainly not more biased than the majority of his colleagues in the profession, including the present writer. In December, 1923, at the Columbus meeting of the American Historical Association, Professor Schmitt sprung something of a sensation through the reading of a remarkable paper on the diplomatic background of the World War, which was published in the *American Historical Review* for April, 1924, under the title "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente." Professor Fay's notable articles of 1920 had been written too early to make use of the new Russian materials which were so damaging to the reputations of France and Russia. Therefore, Professor Schmitt's paper was the first well-rounded presentation of the background of 1914 from the Revisionist viewpoint. It was hoped by many that we would continue to have from his pen notable achievements in the task of destroying war-time prejudices and establishing a basis for understanding how the War actually came to Europe.

His contributions to the *New Republic* for May 21, 1924, and *Current History* for June, 1924, showed, however, that he was even then beginning to falter and lose courage. More serious evidence of his debacle was afforded by his article in *Current History* for March, 1926, and the collapse of Professor Schmitt as a Revisionist came in

his article on July, 1914, in *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1926. His decline has been progressive since that time, as may be discovered from a perusal of his articles and reviews in *Current History* for March and December, 1927, in the *Saturday Review of Literature* for November 20, 1926, February 19, 1927, and April 16, 1927, in the *Christian Century* for March 3, 1927, and in the *American Historical Review* for July, 1927. Of these, by far the finest models of disingenuity and obfuscation are his analyses of the British Documents in *Current History* for March, 1927, and the *Christian Century* for March 3, 1927. Any one seriously interested in Professor Schmitt's competence as a diplomatic historian at the present time should compare these with the reviews of the British Documents by Professors Fay and Langer or with the masterly analysis of their implications by Count Montgelas in his *British Foreign Policy Before the War* and by Hermann Lutz in his *Lord Grey and the War.*

The material which follows in this section was published in the *Progressive* for December 1, 1926, as a rejoinder to Professor Schmitt's article in *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1926. To the great regret of the writer, Professor Schmitt's consent to the reproduction of his whole article in *Foreign Affairs* could not be obtained. On his own responsibility, however, the writer has reproduced Professor Schmitt's critique of the *Genesis of the World War*, so that it cannot be charged that he feared to have the public discover Professor Schmitt's attack on his own work. At the close of the critique on Professor Schmitt, we reproduce the review of the *Genesis of the World War*, published in the *Christian Century* by Professor Schmitt's superior in the department of modern European history at the University of Chicago, Professor Ferdinand Schevill.

I. PROFESSOR BERNADOTTE SCHMITT'S OPINION OF THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR[1]

Since the publication of Professor Fay's well-known articles some years ago, no American scholar has attempted to deal on a large scale with the tragic events of July, 1914. There was real need of a book which should take account of the more recent revelations and discussions. If, in the hope of finding balanced judgment and well-ordered presentation of the facts, one turns to Harry Elmer Barnes' *The Genesis of the World War*, the result will be grievous disappointment, for Mr. Barnes is nothing if not a con-

[1] *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1926.

troversialist and anything but dispassionate. To say this is not to question either his courage or his sincerity. He seeks the truth and is fearless in stating what he thinks it to be. But if his purpose is highly honorable, his performance leaves much to be desired.

To begin with, Mr. Barnes does not present an orderly account of what happened. After carrying the reader up to July, 1914, in three introductory chapters, he treats the events of that month by country, devoting one chapter to each of the five Great Powers. Such a method makes it impossible to follow the development of the crisis, for the attention is focused on the conduct of a particular state and diverted from happenings elsewhere which, at a given moment, may be all-important. Foreign offices manoeuvre in the light of information coming in from many sources; the situation is constantly changing; the policy of one day is often overtaken by events before it can be applied. This was never more true than in July, 1914, when Ministers were being almost hourly disconcerted by telegrams from half a dozen capitals. Thus, Mr. Barnes' account of the Russian mobilization does not mention the refusal of Austria to open conversations, her declaration of war against Serbia, or the bombardment of Belgrade; yet it was those events which precipitated the mobilization.

Another serious criticism is that Mr. Barnes too often prefers to rely on the writings of others instead of letting the documents speak for themselves. One cannot avoid the impression that he has not blazed his own trail through the documents, for there are many of great importance to which he does not refer at all. Nor does he apply much critical faculty to his secondary authorities, unless they run counter to his argument. Thus he lays great store by Mathias Morhardt, whose *parti-pris* is evident (see the quotation on pp. 324-6) and by Hon. John S. Ewart, whose reasoning, as it seems to the present writer, is sometimes specious. Similarly he accepts the story of an Austrian publicist that the Russian Military Attaché in Belgrade was privy to the Sarajevo plot; perhaps he was, but Mr. Barnes does not note that Mr. Seton-Watson has challenged the reliability of the witness. Mr. Barnes follows Miss Durham's version of the plot, and states that Mr. Seton-Watson's review of her book "does not upset or disprove a single vital assertion" (p. 174); he then remarks, "the critical reader will probably conclude that the truth lies in the ground intermediate between the versions of Miss Durham and Seton-Watson"—and lets his own account stand!

Mr. Barnes makes a number of statements for which he does not adduce proof, for instance, "Before June, 1914, it was practically assured that Great Britain would enter any war on the side of France and Russia against Germany" (p. 90). Again: "France had not erected any significant defenses on the Belgian frontier, thus indicating her intention to enter Belgium to meet the German advance" (p. 290). Often he distorts or stretches the evidence. A telegram sent by M. Sazonov to Vienna on the day before the ultimatum was dispatched is represented as a threat (p. 328), whereas by any fair reading it must be construed as a warning. It is stated several times that M. Poincaré gave Russia a blank cheque on the occasion of his visit to St. Petersburg at the beginning of the crisis; all that the evidence warrants is that France agreed to act with Russia in making a strong stand. "The Russian Chief of Staff, Janushkevich, urged Sazonov to promise him at this time that the Russians would make war solely on Austria, and refrain from

hostilities against Germany. Sazonov refused" (p. 338). Actually, Janushkevich, who was opposed to a partial mobilization, asked M. Sazonov if he could guarantee that war with Austria would not be followed by war with Germany, and M. Sazonov replied that he could not, for he assumed that Germany stood behind Austria. It is an exaggeration to say that "on August 2nd, long before the German invasion, Grey promised Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, that England would enter the war on the side of France" (p. 288); Sir Edward Grey made the conditional promise that if the German fleet came down the Channel to attack the northern coasts of France, Great Britain would lend assistance. More than once Mr. Barnes alleges that "even before she sent Belgium an ultimatum, Grey refused the German offer to respect Belgian neutrality on condition that England remain neutral" (p. 452). Germany never made any such offer; the most that can be said is that her Ambassador personally suggested this possibility to Sir Edward Grey.

There are errors of fact. To say that Germany "unwillingly tolerated" Austria's local war against Serbia (p. 220), "did nothing to incite Austria beyond giving her the blank cheque" (p. 251), and "opposed the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia" (p. 223), is simply to fly in the face of documentary evidence to the contrary. To declare that Russia declined Grey's proposal for a conference (pp. 261, 500) is misleading, to say the least; for while M. Sazonov preferred to negotiate directly with Vienna, he did finally accept the proposal. It is incorrect to say that "the French did not of course wait for the German general mobilization, but ordered mobilization as soon as they were informed of the German proclamation of a state of imminent war" (p. 414); the French waited twenty-four hours after learning of the proclamation.

There are serious omissions. In demolishing the myth of the Potsdam conference of July 5, Mr. Barnes fails to mention the conferences of the Kaiser with various officials. Herr von Jagow's lies about his ignorance of the ultimatum are not told, M. Sazonov's "formulae" are ignored. Much is made of M. Sazonov's pressure on the Tsar to secure mobilization, but nothing is said of the false report of a Serbian attack by which Count Berchtold induced Francis Joseph to sign the declaration of war on Serbia. The compromising telegrams of General von Moltke to Field Marshal Conrad are indeed mentioned (pp. 234, 720), but rather casually, without any indication that these telegrams determined Count Berchtold to make no concessions. In harping on the fact that the French decision for war was announced to Isvolsky sixteen hours before the German declaration of war on Russia (pp. 288, 415), Mr. Barnes does not mention that Germany had six hours before presented an ultimatum requiring France to state her intentions in the impending war between Germany and Russia.

This long criticism is not offered in any captious spirit, for mistakes can hardly be avoided in the handling of the voluminous evidence; nor is it intended to whitewash Germany's enemies by implications or insinuations. But the errors of Mr. Barnes are numerous and serious enough to suggest that he has not mastered his sources and that his writing is often highly *tendenziöz.*

Mr. Barnes' point of departure is seen in the title of Chapter III., "The

Franco-Russian Plot That Produced the War." His next step is to assert that in July, 1914, M. Poincaré "gave (the Russian extremists) to understand that the prospective Austro-Serbian crisis would be satisfactory to him as the 'incident in the Balkans' over which the Russians might kindle a European war" (p. 372). Well, there is not a document which warrants any such assertion. Continuing, Mr. Barnes discounts all the peace proposals of M. Sazonov as a "diplomatic barrage" (p. 654) behind which to prepare secretly the measures necessary for war, *i.e.* mobilization, citing as proof statements of certain Russian officials to the effect that M. Sazonov exclaimed, on hearing of the ultimatum, "*C'est la guerre européenne*," and that the military group likewise assumed the war to be "*on*" (p. 200). It was generally understood, he says, not merely by Germany, but by Russia, France and England (p. 356), that mobilization meant war. Therefore, when Russia resorted to that measure, it was with the deliberate intent of war; the French knew its consequences equally well, yet they urged their ally to proceed secretly to it.

That mobilization was likely to produce war, was indeed generally understood; still, Mr. Barnes might have referred to M. Sazonov's repeated statements that this was not a necessary consequence. It may also be observed that the language of M. Sazonov and the soldiers may be interpreted to signify only their expectation or their conviction that war would come. They were bound to assume that Austria was determined on war and that she was sure of German support; probably they did not expect Russian mobilization to deter Austria and they had been warned that Germany would make it a *casus belli*. But it does not follow that Russia deliberately seized the chance to precipitate war. She waited six days for her mobilization, during which she gave diplomacy every chance. That she might, perhaps should, have waited another day or two, may be granted; but all the German talk about pressure on Austria had produced no results, and we know that Austria intended to yield nothing. That from a strictly military point of view, the German position was sound, may also be conceded. But strategy was not the only factor. Gen. von Moltke and Von Bethmann-Hollweg both declared that it was intolerable to German dignity to have to negotiate under the pressure of Russian mobilization; in other words, they preferred war to the diplomatic defeat which would stare them in the face if they allowed Russia to complete her preparations—just as, one hastens to add, Russia and France preferred war to the diplomatic humiliation of allowing Austria to have her way.

Of course Mr. Barnes contends that Russia had no right, moral or other, to support Serbia, and that Russia should have been satisfied with Austrian promises to respect the integrity and sovereignty of Serbia. Whether these promises were sincere, is more than doubtful; in any case, Count Berchtold refused to give them in binding form. The weakness of the argument is that both Germany and Austria fully expected Russia to object; only they thought that she would not resort to arms. Similarly Mr. Barnes' reiterations that Germany and Austria desired only a local war (which is true) have to be discounted by the admissions of their statesmen that a conflict with Russia might develop. Russia can be fairly criticised for precipitate mobilization; France for undue encouragement of her ally; but the Central

Powers must be charged with deliberately and recklessly embarking on a policy which contained the possibility of a European war.

Mr. Barnes rightly emphasizes the efforts of Germany to restrain Austria when she perceived the danger of a general war, but he fails to point out that Von Bethmann-Hollweg's telegrams were concerned as much with throwing upon Russia the responsibility for a rupture as with advising Austria to make concessions. The long chapter on Sir Edward Grey is far from convincing. That "England in 1914 was determined to go to war if France did" (p. 575), is an assertion refuted by what is known of the dissensions in the Cabinet and the uncertainty of public opinion. And one must really protest against the statements that "Grey felt very comfortable" when Germany declined to answer his question about Belgian neutrality (p. 511), and that he "light-heartedly" despatched his ultimatum to Berlin (p. 554).

To sum up, it must be said that Mr. Barnes' book falls far short of being that objective and scientific analysis of the great problem which is so urgently needed. As a protest against the old notion of unique German responsibility for the war, it will be welcomed by all honest men, but as an attempt to set up a new doctrine of unique Franco-Russian responsibility, it must be unhesitatingly rejected. The war was the consequence, perhaps inevitable, of the whole system of alliances and armaments, and in the origin, development and working of that system, the Central Powers, more particularly Germany, played a conspicuous part. Indeed, it was Germany who put the system to the test in July, 1914. Because the test failed, she is not entitled to claim that no responsibility attaches to her.

II. MR. BERNADOTTE EVERLY SCHMITT AND THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR.[1]

By HARRY ELMER BARNES

I. The Personal Equation in Mr. Schmitt's Writings on the War-Guilt Question

Feeling quite safe, smug and comfortable in the full knowledge of the editorial policy to publish no rejoinders to book reviews, Mr. Bernadotte Everly Schmitt of the University of Chicago has in the October issue of *Foreign Affairs* (American) launched an assault against the revisionist scholars and has risked a last desperate effort to stem the tide of incriminating evidence which is rapidly submerging the faint remaining traces of the foundering Entente Epic. It is of great significance, however, to note that in his assault upon Revisionism he rests content with the effort to prove divided responsibility and, beyond veiled insinuations, does not even pretend to defend the view of exclusive German and Austrian responsibility for the War. The "Old Guard," which once occupied the front-line trenches in the battle against the acceptance of the results of historical scholarship in documents and monographs—Charles Downer Hazen, Frank Maloy Anderson, Anson Ely Morse, Edward Raymond Turner *et al.*—have now abandoned the fray, and have left the heat of the conflict to be borne by men like Mr. Schmitt who were themselves looked upon three years ago as revisionists when compared with the epic-mongers of ye olden days. Only William

[1] From the *Progressive*, December 1, 1926.

Stearn Davis has recently risen from the dead, to return immediately by way of suicide.

Mr. Schmitt's partisans, after reading this long reply, will inevitably contend that it furnishes complete proof that the present writer cannot endure criticism graciously or generously. In fact, even before it was known that any reply was contemplated, one of Mr. Schmitt's champions, the estimable "Historicus," advanced this thesis in an astute communication to the New York *Times* for October 18, 1926. The fact is that I ignore criticism unless it is both utterly unfair and likely to obscure the truth. I have never assumed to say a word in reply to the indignant and long-winded assault of the over-compensating ex-Socialist and renegade "Red," W. J. Ghent, in the *Outlook* for June 23rd, for the simple reason that he was in no danger of misleading any person of consequence. Professor Charles Austin Beard, in his review of my book in *Current History* for August, diverged about as far as Mr. Schmitt from my conclusions as to the innocence of the Central Powers, but instead of attacking him I wrote him thanking him heartily for his review. While he differed radically from me on many points, he proved himself an honest and fair-minded reviewer and frankly admitted what even Mr. Schmitt has not dared to contest, namely, that the book completely dissolved the Entente Epic. Indeed, I wrote Mr. Schmitt after our Chicago debate of last April, that I would welcome any discriminating comment upon my future publications on the war-guilt problem. It will be seen that in this reply I am much more concerned over Mr. Schmitt's comments on other war-guilt books than I am over his strictures on my own work. Further, only a person like Mr. Headlam-Morley could allege that Mr. Schmitt's review of my book is in any sense fair. In five long pages there is only one line grudgingly admitting that the book performs any useful service whatever, and in some cases he goes to the extent of conscious and overt misrepresentation. If it be contended that my estimate of Mr. Schmitt has changed since reading Mr. Schmitt's *Foreign Affairs* article, it may be answered that this article is the most extensive and illuminating exhibit of his methods and biases yet published and the first to lead me to examine in detail the underlying reasons for his opinions and interpretations. The adjective used on p. 101 of my *Genesis of the World War* was selected before either his *Current History* or *Foreign Affairs* articles had appeared. Certainly this reply will furnish evidence that my patience with Mr. Schmitt and my generosity towards him have actually been almost incredible. In one sense, perhaps, I have been grossly unfair to Mr. Schmitt, namely, in taking up the cudgel after having given him seemingly convincing evidence for some three years that, in regard to him at least, nothing would suffice to make the worm turn.

As Mr. Schmitt deals at some length with what he regards as the personal biases and prejudices of the scholars he criticises, it is necessary at the outset of this rejoinder to raise the question as to whether Mr. Schmitt is not himself subject to some of these frailties and handicaps under which even the best-intentioned humans labor in varying degrees. In many circles there has developed a sort of Schmitt legend which represents this writer as the very embodiment of the most highly esteemed traits of the hypothetical or ideal historical scholar—icy detachment, absolute absence of any special favoritism or prejudices, complete fearlessness, unapproached command of documentary and monographic materials, amazing consistency in opinion, re-

lentless logic, and rare powers of organization and synthesis. Therefore, it is held that when he drops a pearl of wisdom on the "Kriegsschuldfrage" we may regard ourselves as having received a dual, synchronous and completely harmonious dispensation from both Minerva and Clio which makes that matter henceforth a closed subject. Are there any qualifications which one may at least tentatively attach to this already robust myth? This will take us into intimate matters, but Mr. Schmitt, having assumed to lay bare the souls of the authors he considers, cannot fairly wince when this type of historical therapy is invoked in regard to his own psyche.

While it has long been a basic principle of historical criticism and methodology that we must look into the personal equation of the authors of historical documents, written by men long since dead, there has never been developed a comparable determination or willingness to examine the predilections of contemporary historians while they are living. Such indispensable procedure has been obstructed by that Rotarian urbanity and formal courtesy which prevails in the ranks of American historians and is dignified by the euphonious term "good taste." Yet it should be quite obvious that we cannot intelligently read any contemporary historical writer without investigating his biases, prejudices and favoritisms any more than we can use a remotely compiled historical document without knowing everything possible about the personal views and attitudes of the author. Hence, we must either relinquish our foolish obeisance to the fictitious fetish of "good taste" or else be frank enough to rewrite our manuals on historical methodology in such a fashion as to include "good taste" along with patriotic ardor, religious bigotry and partisan fury as a leading obstacle to the acquisition and dissemination of historical truth. It is difficult to see why anything should stand above the acquisition of truth in the ethical principles of the historian. [1]

A. Teutonic Aversions

In the first place, much as one may regret having to mention personal

[1] The following may be of interest in relation to this really important methodological problem of "good taste" and personal references. One of my most loyal friends and one of the most progressive and capable of living historians, wrote me the following relative to my psychoanalysis of Professor Schmitt:

"I esteem the question of Schmitt's complexes and motives of very slight importance and irrelevant to the question of war guilt. Prove the truth of your assertions objectively without going into the problem of what warps Schmitt's judgment of the facts. By dragging in your critic's private opinions you act as George Berkeley did when he attacked Newton's theory of fluxions by alleging that Newton was an atheist or at least a deist."

Such criticism would, it seems to me, be entirely just if I had in any case brought up personal issues not vitally, immediately and obviously related to Mr. Schmitt's attitude towards war guilt. To have attacked him as a single-taxer or an Episcopalian in this connection would have been preposterous. Mr. Schmitt's Teutonic aversions and British inclinations are something far different in regard to the problem of his reaction to war guilt than the question of Newton's religious views with respect to his achievements in the more abstruse aspects of theoretical mathematics. The divergent opinions of historians on this point are well shown by the following quotation from another American historian, probably the only real rival of the one first quoted from the standpoint of scholarship, intellectual emancipation and tolerance of novel methods:

"I hold the method of psychoanalysis to be a novel and profitable form of criticism, though open to abuse. When you psychoanalyzed Schmitt, you did, in my opinion, a good piece of work and did not go beyond the limits of propriety because, though you employed highly personal matter, you made use of it in an impersonal way to the end of uncovering a situation and clarifying an attitude."

considerations, there is the very important fact that Mr. Schmitt seems to live in daily dread of being mistaken for a member of the detestable Teutonic breed. This suspicion of Nordic derivation would need nothing for complete confirmation with the average American reader beyond the most nebulous suggestion of an amiable willingness to concede the possibility that any Germanic historian could be moved by an aspiration to give circulation to the truth. Now what right have we to make any such insinuation? Why is this not a mean and contemptible accusation, based upon the most improbable type of circumstantial evidence? What is the evidence? Fortunately, Mr. Schmitt has supplied it himself. Back in 1921 (*Who's Who*, Vol. XI) when he first graced by his presence that august list of notables who fill the sombre pages of *Who's Who in America*, Mr. Schmitt attempted to make himself foursquare with Mr. Palmer, Mr. Daugherty and Stanwood Menken by one of the most curious entries ever submitted in the myriad biographical exhibits embalmed in this formidable publication. In addition to really meritorious achievements as a rising young historical scholar, Mr. Schmitt, like many of his Old Testament historiographical prototypes, here laid claim to prophetic talents of no mean calibre in the régime of international relations. We learn that in "*a lecture on 'Germany in the Reign of William II,' given in Cleveland in January, 1914, he predicted that Germany was preparing to begin a European war.*" Had Grey, Sazonov and Poincaré availed themselves of this sagacious and timely warning they might have taken steps to check the great German bully before he leapt from ambush upon his innocent and unsuspecting victims in the summer of 1914. Had Mr. Schmitt kept up to date in his studies of historical methodology he would have known that while the gift of visions was once regarded as an incontrovertible sign of a true historian, this criterion has rather gone out of fashion at the present time. As an eminent man once remarked in another connection, so in the historical field, we "need men of vision but not men of visions."

It can scarcely be claimed by even the most generous patron of Mr. Schmitt that a person who would go to this humorous extreme to demonstrate his "right-thinking" in regard to the Teutonic menace could possibly be expected to exhibit any great amount of that ideally commendable frigid disinterestedness when handling a subject so inseparably interwoven with the Germanic issue as the background and origins of the World War. It must also be remembered that 1921 was not the period of war-time hatreds, but in the days after Professor Fay's articles had dissolved the very foundations of the "Sunday School theory of war-guilt." Further, Mr. Schmitt's war record was perfectly good, indeed immaculate. He had been a lieutenant in the field artillery, had voluminously defended Britannia's right to rule the waves, and had walloped the German annexationists. Now Mr. Schmitt should realize that his cognomen is exactly as respectable and enviable as Tardieu, Le Fevre, Balfour, Churchill, or Raffalovitch—certainly more distinguished than Barnes—and cease his worries on this point. If he cannot do so, he must be reminded that the courts rather than the subtleties of diplomatic history or political prophecy are the place in which to rectify any discontent concerning the formal embellishments of one's genealogical tree.

B. Prophetic Pretensions

Then, there is the very important related point that in handling the question of responsibility for the war Mr. Schmitt's prowess and pretentions in the prophetic realm hang very much in the balance. In fact, his ominous augury of 1914, proudly recalled in 1921, has already been placed very much in jeopardy by what he has himself been forced to concede when faced by the deluge of new historical materials. Should he admit the correctness of the thoroughgoing revisionist point of view to the effect that Germany and Austria did not wish the war, but that the leaders of Serbia. Russia and France did wish it, then his standing as a prognosticatory soothsayer in the pastures of Clio would crash down to the level of the late Pastor Russell and Judge Rutherford in the field of cosmological and theological foresight. Little wonder that in his uneasiness he nominates Poincaré as first Vice-President of the Cherry Tree Association, Ltd., founded some time back by our revered Father of His Country, and puts Berchtold, Jagow, Moltke and Co. high on the waiting list of the Ananias Club!

C. Pro-British Inclinations

Further, there is the consideration of academic training and nationalistic and cultural attachments. We have already shown the basis for Mr. Schmitt's coldness towards Germany. Is there any evidence of a warmth of feeling for any other State comparable to this ostentatious aversion for the land of the Teuton? We believe that there is. Like his compatriot, the late Walter Hines Page, Mr. Schmitt was reared in our Southland, so noted for its altogether commendable esteem for the culture of our mother country, Great Britain. Like Mr. Page, he was also bathed in the tepid waters of this engaging civilization under the most seductive circumstances. In 1905, at the highly impressionable age of nineteen he was translated from the pious and rugged hills of Tennessee to the rich old culture of Oxford University, from which he graduated in 1908 with first class honors in modern history at Merton College. Unquestionably Oxford thrilled this Tennessee schoolboy quite as much as the Court of St. James filled Mr. Page with a divine afflatus. Who would contend that Mr. Schmitt in those three crucial years remained wholly immune to what President Wilson and Mr. Colby, in referring to Page, designated as "the subtle, encompassing and penetrating charm which is English?" Particularly, when it is ever evident that Mr. Schmitt is more sensitive on the subject of Grey and England than on any other of the heresies of the Revisionists! As Mr. Schmitt states in his article now under consideration: "Of all the statesmen who have written on the war, Lord Grey most easily and most successfully inspires confidence in his readers." Indeed, in the original edition of his *England and Germany*, Mr. Schmitt says: "As a beneficiary of the Rhodes Trust I was imbued with the idea of Anglo-Saxon solidarity." Mr. Schmitt's one book, *England and Germany, 1740-1914*, is distinctly pro-British and, in the light of the *Grosse Politik*, exceedingly unreliable. The reputation which Mr. Schmitt has built up on the basis of this book is an admirable demonstration of the fact that popularity and advancement in the historical profession does not depend as much upon complete objectivity as it does upon the popular and approved variety of subjectivity and bias. Had an American historian written a treatise on this subject which was as favorable towards Germany as Mr.

Schmitt is towards England his promotion would have been blocked in any important American university, if, indeed, he would have been able to hold his post. Yet, it was this book which effected the translation of Mr. Schmitt from Western Reserve University to the University of Chicago under the ægis of Andrew Cunningham McLaughlin. Mr. Schmitt might counter by alleging that my head has been turned by my reception in Germany last summer, but before he can get far along this line he will have to face the fact that I took my present position before I was known by even a German boot-black, as well as having to show the slightest evidence that I have altered my views on war guilt for any reason other than the growth of our knowledge of the subject.[1]

D. Traits as an Historian

In the scope of his historical interests and activities Mr. Schmitt fully measures up to the most august standards of the most exacting minority in the most exclusive circles of the American Historical Association. He has absorbed himself in a complete immersion in diplomatic history. The relations between States, conceived in their most respectable fashion as juristically immaculate areas of endeavor presided over by a succession of dominant personalities, have engaged his every moment of professional activity. If he has ever worried about the "new history," the psychology of human behavior, the motives of man, the logic of events or the synthesis of cultural evolution it has been behind closed shutters, for he has never given any evidence of it to the outside world. This has developed in him high talent when recording the succession of diplomatic events in a given area over a limited period of time. No more impressive bit of detailed diplomatic narrative has ever been offered in comparable space than his "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente," published in the *American Historical Review* for April, 1924. But this very skill in amassing minute details seems, unfortunately, to be accompanied by an apparent incapacity to see things in the large, to organize any significant synthesis of historical achievements, to interpret great historical characters, or to draw solid and illuminating comparisons between important crises in history. Whereas his above mentioned article was one of the finest examples of exact historical scholarship in the way of a chronological summary of a limited problem to be found in our language, his effort at a general synthesis of the war-guilt problem, even on a small scale, in the New York *Times Current History Magazine* for March, 1926, was one of the most astonishing performances which the writer has yet uncovered in the entire literature of the war-guilt controversy. It was unworthy of a well-read amateur, and the present writer was able to point out more errors of fact and logic in it than Mr. Schmitt has even alleged that he can detect in my whole treatise. The amazing discrepancy between these two articles may also be accounted for in part on the hypothesis that the further the sub-

[1] If one desires to gain some concrete impression of Mr. Schmitt's well-nigh complete lapse of objectivity when he approaches English interests and figures in diplomacy, he should read Mr. Schmitt's reviews of the British Documents in *Current History* for March, 1927, and the *Christian Century* for March 3, 1927, and then compare them with the reviews by Professors Fay and Langer in the *Saturday Review of Literature* and by Professor Fay in the *American Historical Review.* Likewise, they would do well to compare his review of Grey's Memoirs in *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1926, with Raymond Beazley's estimate of Grey in *Foreign Affairs* (English), October, 1927.

ject from the immediate outbreak of the war in July-August, 1914, the more Mr. Schmitt can control his writing by cerebral effort and the less he is subject to the domination of his emotional complexes. Moreover, his *American Historical Review* article was written in the Fall of 1923 before there had developed any controversy of proportions concerning war-guilt. Between 1923 and 1926 much had happened which may have frightened Mr. Schmitt and otherwise impeded the full play of his cerebration with respect to the "Kriegsschuldfrage." In other words, there was much more in the air in 1926 to liven up Mr. Schmitt's above-mentioned complexes than there was in 1923. To the present writer it would seem that this last point—the fact that the heightened controversy over war-guilt has furnished a basis for the intensification of Mr. Schmitt's aversion to being identified with the Teutons, of his English sympathies, and of his sense for academic security and prestige—is more important than any other in explaining why Mr. Schmitt has become progressively more anti-revisionist about in direct proportion to the increase of documentary evidence supporting the revisionist viewpoint. It is worth while, however, to examine this *Current History* article as an example of what constitutes about the best which can be done in the way of extreme conservative apologetic.

Mr. Schmitt appears to have had little training in what is known as the principles of internal criticism of historical documents and seems almost wholly ignorant of the necessity of understanding the psychology of the personages with whom he is dealing. He shows little insight into the general logic and setting of historical details and into the real core of historical situations. To him a document is a document and, too often, a document is believed to be the truth. This leads him frequently into serious errors in regard to complicated situations not covered in one or a few documents, into rather absurd attempts to compare incomparables, into broad mistakes of judgment, and into excessive gullibility where the first rudiments of historical criticism would indicate that he must be on his guard.

Representative examples of these characteristics are the following: In his article in *Current History* for March, 1926, he represents the French declaration of war on Prussia in 1870 as wholly comparable to the German declaration of war on Russia in 1914, apparently solely because in one case France took the initiative and in the other Germany. As a matter of fact, it would be difficult to find two situations which are really more sharply contrasted. In 1870, France was simply faced with the somewhat indignant refusal of the King of Prussia to agree to an insulting and admittedly impossible and unjustifiable demand on the part of France. In 1914, Germany was faced by the gigantic army of her powerful neighbor, mobilized on her boundary under conditions which even Russians had recognized for a generation to be such as to justify an immediate German declaration of war—conditions which even General Dobrorolski has admitted constituted an actual state of war even before the technical declaration by Germany. In his article in *Foreign Affairs* for October he represents as comparable situations: (1) Germany faced with Russian mobilization on her frontier, and (2) France and Russia faced by the prospect that Austria might justly punish an intriguing and guilty State whose press was glorifying the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne.

Again, and even more ludicrous, in his debate with me before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on April 3, 1926, he based his chief argument (in refutation of my discussion of the Poincaré-Isvolski collusion in regard to a prospective war over the Balkans) on the secret military understandings of Conrad and Moltke arrived at in 1909. In other words, he compared the military convention existing between the general staffs of one group of States with the negotiations carried on between the diplomats of the other group. I submit that a greater logical and methodological blunder in diplomatic history can scarcely be imagined. He assumed to regard it as permissible and legitimate to compare the plans of two military officers as to what they would do if they came into control of affairs *in the event of war* with the arrangements between two diplomats as to how the European situation could be so juggled as to *bring about a war* under conditions favorable to France and Russia. And the fact that when the test came in 1914, the circumstances and the acts of Conrad and Moltke were very different from what they had contemplated in the exchange of 1909 did not feaze Mr. Schmitt in the slightest. He gave no evidence of the realization that he must either compare the staff conventions and protocols of the Central Powers with those of the Entente or the diplomacy of Germany and Austria with that of France, Russia and England. If one were to take the secret plans of the military and naval authorities as a proof of the diplomacy of a state, then we should have proof of England's determination upon war in Sir John Fisher's plan to scuttle the German navy in 1908, in the British mobilization of the fleet in July, 1914, long before the mobilizations of the armies on the Continent, in Haldane's plans for the sending of the British army to France and Belgium, in the Russian secret protocol of November 8, 1912, and in the Russian Ministerial Council of February 8, 1914. These illuminating and wholly typical representative examples will suffice to indicate how we must scrutinize Mr. Schmitt's utilization of documentary materials, freely granting his acquaintance with their content, his sincerity of purpose and his complete integrity. Mr. Schmitt might complain that I have myself exploited the Russian military protocol of November 8, 1912, as a proof of Russian bad faith and will for war. But this called for collusion between the military and civil authorities for execution, and in 1914 it was Sazonov who both secured the mobilization order and conducted the diplomatic barrage "to lull the fears of the enemy." [1]

Then, Mr. Schmitt, with his exclusive penchant for documents, does not give enough attention to the monographic materials based on these documents and written by men much more familiar with the figures and circumstances involved than Mr. Schmitt could possibly be. For example, his failure to acquaint himself with the recent critical monographic discussions of Moltke's attitude towards the outbreak of the war makes it possible for him to continue with a quite untenable view of the policy of that incompetent but much maligned officer, and his arrogant and disdainful avoidance of the French publicists who have relentlessly dissected Poincaré's *apologia* leads him into a pathetic and oft-repeated misrepresentation of that statesman.

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[1] See above pp. 35, 54 for the demonstration by Professor Fay and Count Montgelas that Mr. Schmitt's whole conception of the sinister Moltke-Conrad Convention has no real basis in fact.

Most incredible of all is Mr. Schmitt's gullibility when examining materials favorable to his point of view. While we shall go into this more in detail later, we can illustrate this point here by reference to his attitude towards the works of Poincaré and Seton-Watson. Now if there are two men living who, from every principle of historical method and criticism could not be trusted unless corroborated by documents freely available to all, they are Raymond Poincaré and Robert William Seton-Watson. Poincaré is on trial before the world for major complicity in the greatest public crime in human history. His Memoirs cannot be regarded as other than very special pleading in which his accusers are excluded from the privilege of examining the validity of the evidence he submits. The person who would believe him in an unquestioning manner would be capable of giving full credit to the testimony of the defendant in a murder trial who knew that he was to be wholly immune from cross-examination and the laws relating to perjury. Seton-Watson, for all practical purposes, was actually a member of the Southern-Slav conspiracy. He has committed himself for a generation to the theory of Serbian innocence, humility and sweetness, and for an equal period of time has endeavored to stir up British hatred of Austria through gross misrepresentation of the Austrian policies and tactics. Now, faced with an overwhelming body of incontestible evidence as to the Serbian guilt in planning and executing the dastardly plot that plunged Europe in blood, he snarls at the honest students of the Serbian problem and strains himself to the utmost in the vain endeavor to obscure the incriminating evidence against his beloved Serbians and to divert his readers from the main issues at stake.

Yet Mr. Schmitt accepts the statements of both Poincaré and Seton-Watson as self-evident truth scarcely susceptible of challenge. Indeed, he implies that because Poincaré has examined (sic!) the secret documents in the French archives his account must be correct. At a lecture in the University of Pennsylvania late last March, Mr. Schmitt was asked by a student if he did not think that Poincaré's account of matters might be inaccurate or falsified. He replied that he believed this highly unlikely because Poincaré had been able to make use of all of the French documents! To any one familiar with the logic of historical criticism exactly the opposite would, of course, appear to be the case. If Poincaré's statements were in accord with all of the documentary evidence there would be no reason why he should not be willing to publish the contents of the French archives on the period from 1912 to 1914. Would Mr. Schmitt trust any German, even one with the most immaculate record and with nothing personal at stake, simply because he had access to the German documents? According to this theory any person possessing a set of the *Grosse Politik* and the *Kautsky Documents* could be trusted to tell the truth about German policy before 1914.

Unquestionably, Mr. Schmitt's most notorious deficiency as an historical writer is his seeming complete lack of any comprehension of the necessity of considering the psychological factors involved in the circumstances under which a statesman or diplomat writes or speaks. He seems to believe that a given person is equally credible and veracious under all circumstances, that all Germans and Austrians uniformly lie, and that all Entente spokesmen can be relied upon to set forth the whole truth and nothing but the truth (unless it be when a Russian differs with an Englishman or a Frenchman). What could be more preposterous than to contend that it is

more likely that Izvolski misrepresented the facts in his secret despatches to the Tsar and Sazonov than that Poincaré has distorted the facts in his frantic effort to clear himself in his apologetic Memoirs? Izvolski was submitting confidential information which he never believed would see light, and which was absolutely indispensable to the intelligent control of Russian foreign policy directed towards an object in which he had the most intense personal interest. To have "double-crossed" or deceived Sazonov or the Tsar would have been disastrous to both Izvolski and his country. In other words, there were no rational grounds for mendacity on the part of Izvolski but every reason for his telling the truth, fully granting his unscrupulous nature. The one instance in which Poincaré attempts to prove Izvolski guilty of significant misrepresentation is inconclusive in this respect, and where Izvolski's report corroborates Poincaré's contentions the latter has no hesitation in accepting Izvolski's statements at their face value as proof of the Frenchman's accuracy and veracity. Poincaré wrote his Memoirs under the grave necessity of making as good a case as possible for himself before world opinion, with the great advantage of knowing that it was virtually impossible for scholars to check up on his statements on account of the failure to publish the documents in the French archives, and fully aware that Izvolski could not rise from the dead to challenge his statements. In contrast with the case of Izvolski, there was every reason why Poincaré should attempt to confuse and mislead his readers and every reason to suspect that he has executed this attempt. Even the simple formula—*les absents sont toujours tort*—has been ignored by Mr. Schmitt. Equally amazing is Mr. Schmitt's contention in the *Saturday Review of Literature* for November 20th, to the effect that it was much more likely that Sazonov lied to the Tsar in his secret report about the English agreement to aid France in the event of war (as reported to him voluntarily by Poincaré and Grey independently) than that Asquith, Grey and Poincaré lied about this matter in their post-war efforts as a self-administered white-washing.

Mr. Schmitt has also committed himself in advance to a theory of war guilt which makes it very difficult for him to examine new evidence in an impartial and empirical fashion. While in 1921 still proclaiming himself a believer in the unique perfidy of William the Damned, when he blossomed out as a full-fledged student of war-guilt in April, 1924, he declared himself most dogmatically and unequivocally to the effect that the war was caused primarily by the two great systems of alliances for whose existence Germany was mainly responsible and for whose clash in 1914 Germany must bear the major guilt. Therefore, he has erected two impregnable barriers of resistance between himself and the acceptance of the view that France and Russia were chiefly responsible for the outbreak of the conflict in August, 1914: (1) his prophecy of January, 1914, assuming complete German guilt, and (2) his dogma of 1924 with respect to the inevitable conflict growing out of the division of Europe into "armed camps." Surely, no one would suggest that Mr. Schmitt can be capable of examining in an unbiased fashion evidence indicating the guilt of Serbia, France, or Russia, such as is contained in Dr. Stieve's, Dr. Boghitschevitch's and Miss Durham's works.

E. Vacillation and Indecisiveness

These various conflicting motives, influences and purposes, namely Mr.

Schmitt's unquestionable desire to be honest and sincere, his sensitivity to the charge of Teutonic affiliations, his prophetic pretensions, his pro-British sympathies, his premature dogmatic commitment to a particular and rigid theory of war-guilt before adequate evidence was in, and his inability to avoid some consideration of new evidence and interpretations, have resulted in a certain instability and vacillation on his part with respect to his position on war-guilt at different times, with little or no relation to the growth of evidence on the subject. The present writer's experience with Mr. Schmitt would appear not to be unusual in this respect. When preparing my article on war-guilt for *Current History* in May, 1924, I sent a copy of the manuscript to Mr. Schmitt, asking if he would be good enough to point out what he believed to be any errors of fact or judgment. I was aware of Mr. Schmitt's interest in the subject from the fact that he had read the substance of his *American Historical Review* article before the American Historical Association late in the previous December. Mr. Schmitt courteously and promptly examined my manuscript—evidently with the greatest thoroughness—made some excellent general suggestions in his letter, and sent a memorandum of more than a score of suggested changes in matters of detail. In this letter of April 1, 1924, he stated, "While I have criticized some of your statements, our views are not so very divergent." In revising my manuscript for the printer, I embodied the great majority of Mr. Schmitt's admirable suggestions, so that our views were certainly less "divergent" than when Mr. Schmitt wrote his letter. In the note of acknowledgment I gave recognition to his valuable aid, without in any way implicating him in my conclusions. It would have been most ungenerous for me to have done less than this. What was my astonishment to learn that on May 9, 1924, he wrote to the Editor of *Current History*, repudiating any agreement with my views! I had, of course, overlooked the fact that his letter to me was written on the first day of April. In a reply to Professor Hazen in the *New Republic* for May 7, 1924, I also mentioned the fact that a point of view generally similar to my *Current History* article was to be found in "the abler and more scholarly article by Professor Schmitt in the April number of the *American Historical Review*." Mr. Schmitt immediately wrote to the Editor of the *New Republic*, disclaiming any such agreement (letter published in the issue of May 21st). The Editor sent me Mr. Schmitt's letter to which I made a reply (also published in the issue of May 21st).[1] I sent a carbon copy of this reply to Mr. Schmitt, who then hastily communicated with the Editor of the *New Republic* and requested him not to publish his own letter of disclaimer. It was too late, however, and both letters appeared in the issue of May 21, 1924, as noted above. Mr. Schmitt then wrote me on May 18th that "as to the *New Republic* you clearly have me in the hole. In view of what I wrote you, you were certainly justified in claiming for our two articles 'the same general position.'" He apologized for his *New Republic* letter, hostilities ceased and there the matter rested.

[1] The slight difference in wording, but not in sense between, Mr. Schmitt's letter of April 1st and my citation in the *New Republic* for May 21st was due to the fact that I had mislaid his letter and had to quote from memory in order to meet the editorial request to send my answer in by the next mail. Mr. Schmitt admits that I did not misrepresent him.

In February, 1926, I sent Mr. Schmitt some sections of the proof of my *Genesis of the World War*, asking for criticisms. He made a few critical marginal notes accompanied by a haughty letter in which he stated that we were so utterly divergent in our viewpoints that he did not want to associate himself with the enterprise in any way. Yet I acknowledged in my preface his anonymous but valuable criticisms. Next came Mr. Schmitt's article on war-guilt in *Current History* for March, 1926. I was invited to criticize this in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* and *Evolution*—and did so, but without rancor or animus. (See *Kriegsschuldfrage*, May, 1926; *Evolution*, June 15, 1926).

At almost this same time there came an invitation to debate the war-guilt issue with Mr. Schmitt before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on April 3, 1926. I went to Chicago, "loaded for bear" as the expression goes, fully expecting a fierce and sanguinary conflict. I was nearly floored—so nearly that I did not detect his blunder about Conrad and Moltke—to find that, though I presented a very extreme and uncompromising statement of the advanced revisionist point of view, the whole affair turned out to be a love-feast.[1] At the outset of Mr. Schmitt's rejoinder he stated that "with a great many of the opinions expressed by Mr. Barnes I am in entire agreement." With the exception of his absurd comparison of the staff agreements of Conrad and Moltke with the diplomacy of Poincaré and Izvolski, his speech consisted mainly in some judicious qualifications upon my position, chiefly in the way of supplementing my remarks. In my reply I frankly admitted that there seemed to be no great difference between us and that our versions were supplementary rather than contradictory. To this Mr. Schmitt assented in his conclusion, stating that "I have only a few remarks to make, because as Professor Barnes has said, our two statements complement each other (laughter). And the net result is that we seem to be more or less in agreement about the facts, but do not see eye to eye in interpreting them."

After the debate I wrote Mr. Schmitt, telling him of my happy surprise at his attitude in Chicago, expressing regret that I had exaggerated my notion of his animus and divergencies and had consented to criticize him in the two leading European war-guilt journals, and stating the hope that these criticisms would not open a new feud between us. I received an amiable reply from Mr. Schmitt, but after he read the critical articles in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* and *Evolution* there was an ominous silence until his present outburst in the October issue of *Foreign Affairs*. By August, he found that the views on war-guilt, with which he had twice expressed himself as in general agreement on April 3rd, must be "unhesitatingly rejected." [2] The same impression of uncertainty as to Mr. Schmitt's views at any given time exists in Europe. European experts in every country, familiar with and impressed by his article in the *American Historical Review*, unanimously expressed to me their consternation at his article in *Current History* for March,

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[1] The debate and discussion is published by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations under the title "Recent Disclosures Concerning the Origins of the World War."

[2] The address I gave at Chicago was essentially the conclusions on pp. 651-59 of my *Genesis of the World War*.

1926, and it will be interesting to ascertain their reaction to his present bull in *Foreign Affairs*.[1]

The fact that I persist in my admiration of Mr. Schmitt's *American Historical Review* article—reiterated during the course of the Chicago debate—and that my alteration of esteem for his judgment set in last spring after reading his *Current History* article will suffice to answer the allegation of the learned "Historicus." expressed in the New York *Times* of October 18th, to the effect that I had held Mr. Schmitt to be "judicious" up to the time I read his article in *Foreign Affairs*, attacking my book.

F. Academic Strategy

Then one must not forget the astute academic strategy of Mr. Schmitt in remaining quite "correct" and immaculate in his theories of war-guilt. No person, once he had thought the matter over, would care to challenge the sound and approved doctrine of war-guilt held by the chiefs of his profession, or to associate his name with that of the present writer if he desired to rise to any dizzy heights in the conventional departments of history in our most respectable universities and to bask in the favor and honorific emoluments of the American Historical Association. Not only do the most eminent pundits and mandarins of the historical guild stand firm in maintaining the correctness of their views expressed when serving as the historical adjunct of the Creel Committee, but they lust mightily for the scalp of any one who has dared to assault their sacred tenets as to the adequacy and enduring qualities of an historical science founded upon exclusive attention to political episodes, diplomatic intrigues and personal anecdotes. Mr. Schmitt has, indeed, guessed right. In 1924, he was an associate professor in Western Reserve University; today he is a full professor of modern history in what is by many legitimately held to be the best department of history in the United States. We cannot say that he was translated to Chicago simply because of his pussy-footing on the war-guilt matter, but it is wholly safe to say that if he had come out four-square in the controversy of two years ago, in a manner like Professor Becker, Professor Langer, or Professor Fuller (see *Current History*, June, 1924; *New Republic*, April 30, 1924; June 18, 1924; July 30, 1924), he would still be fretfully languishing in the confines of the Cleveland institution.

This long exposition of Mr. Schmitt's qualities as a writer on diplomatic history from 1912-1914 is not, to use Mr. Schmitt's phrase, "offered in any captious spirit," as none of us are free from our special biases and tendencies, no matter how hard we may struggle to be fair and objective. We have gone into these matters because Mr. Schmitt will be heard from for many years on the problem of war-guilt, and it is desirable that we should know as early as possible what we need to be on our guard against when perusing his contributions. He may not be a greater sinner in these respects than the rest of us, but the foregoing material should at least be adequate to establish the strong presumption that to look upon him as the abstract historical ideal, of which the youthful Leopold von Ranke dreamed a century ago, suddenly become flesh and dwelling in our midst is not quite a tenable hypothesis. What some of his admirers have mistaken for frost turns

[1] See the comments in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, December, 1926, pp. 948 ff.

out upon examination to have been, to no small degree, steam. Mr. Schmitt should learn that to remark that another writer is not dispassionate does not suffice to prove his own frigid detachment. In other words, there is little ground for that pontifical and supercilious air that exudes from much of Mr. Schmitt's writing on war-guilt. Mr. Schmitt might counter that it is equally desirable for the reading public to be acquainted with my own personal equation, but the answer is easy here. The "Old Guard" at home and abroad have already had at me in innumerable published letters, articles, editorials and reviews—and even more in surreptitious gossip and comment. Hence, the public is in no comparable danger of perusing my contributions without being safeguarded against reverent credulity.

2. *Mr. Schmitt On the Contemporary War-Guilt Literature*

We may now turn to Mr. Schmitt's analysis of some of the more important recent books on the question of responsibility for the World War in his article, entitled "July, 1914," in *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1926, illustrating as we go along how Mr. Schmitt exhibits the above-mentioned traits in his exegesis.

A. Stieve

Mr. Schmitt starts off with a discussion of Dr. Stieve's *Isvolsky and the World War*. Deadly as this book is to both Mr. Schmitt's gift of prophecy and his fatalistic dogma of inevitable war due to conflicting alliances, about all he can do in his effort to discredit it is to assert that the author is a German. He further states that "the present German tactics are to divert attention as far as possible from the policy of their own and the Austro-Hungarian Governments and to concentrate upon the activities of their enemies." Now, either Mr. Schmitt is ignorant of the German publications on war-guilt or he is here guilty of conscious misrepresentation. There has been more activity in Germany in dealing with the foreign policy of Germany before the war—both as regards editing of documents and monographic publications—than in the consideration of the acts and policies of all the other States combined. Mr. Schmitt states that there is only one document, and that of doubtful authenticity, which deals with the French intention to get Alsace-Lorraine by war (presumably that quoted on pp. 120-121 of my book). Yet I pointed out to Mr. Schmitt last spring in our Chicago debate that in the appendix to this very book of Stieve's there is an unquestionably authentic document which refers to Delcassé's negotiations in St. Petersburg in 1913 concerning the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France as the result of a European war. Further, it would appear that Mr. Schmitt has not read Ernest Judet's *Georges Louis*, where, in an entry of 1910, Louis points out that the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits and the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine were inseparably linked in the objectives of the Franco-Russian Alliance and that they were accepted as veritably axiomatic by both the Russians and the French. Mr. Schmitt likewise has nothing to say of Sazonov's declaration of December, 1913, that Russia must have the Straits and could get them only by a European war, or of the Russian Ministerial Council of February, 1914, which was already discussing the procedure to be followed in this war. Mr. Schmitt contends that the Russian policy in 1912-14 was so conciliatory towards Germany that the latter did not expect Russia to resist in the crisis of 1914. Obviously Russia was conciliatory in 1912-13 because, in the first

place, she hoped that the Balkan States might defeat Turkey and give Russia control of the Straits, and in the second place, her military condition before 1914 in no way fitted her for a war with Germany to obtain the Straits. Mr. Schmitt forgets that the Russian tune had markedly changed with the improvement of the Russian military preparations, and that the articles of Sukhomlinov, published in March and June, 1914, were both belligerent and provocative. The chief reason why Germany did not expect Russian armed intervention in 1914 was the special nature of the crisis, namely, that the Kaiser did not believe that the Tsar would take up arms in behalf of regicides. The worst that Mr. Schmitt can say of Stieve's book is that "to the uninitiated it will carry conviction." He apparently means by "uninitiated" those not committed in advance to Mr. Schmitt's dogmas.

Mr. Schmitt states that there are plenty of French documents, ignored by Dr. Stieve, which would refute his major thesis, logically derived from the Izvolski correspondence. We may make bold to inquire what and where these are. The only ones of importance published are in the French *Yellow Books*, and there is only one of vital significance there, namely, one in which Poincaré makes it clear that he must be kept thoroughly informed in regard to Russian politics in the Balkans if he is to fulfill the terms of the alliance. But this does not refute the Izvolski correspondence. Izvolski amplifies this very point later, and Stieve cites the documents where he does it. (Op. cit. pp. 134-35). There are doubtless many French documents on the period from 1912 to 1914, but they rest secure in the vaults of the *Quai d'Orsay*. If their content would refute Isvolski's version of his understandings with Poincaré does any sane person doubt that Poincaré would have published them when he was prime minister after the war?

B. Poincaré

The highest flights of apologetic in Mr. Schmitt's article are to be found in his discussion of the Memoirs of M. Raymond Poincaré. The combination of Poincaré's apology apologetically expounded by Mr. Schmitt is adequate to give the French statesman as thorough a dose of whitewash as is administered to the German diplomats and officers by the Crown Prince.

M. Poincaré is presented to Mr. Schmitt's readers with the best of credentials: he has a passion for logic; he has an intense conviction of his own rectitude and honesty; he makes a sincere effort to refute every charge which has been made against him; and he succeeds almost perfectly in this crucial attempt. In other words, if one takes M. Poincaré's assertions at their face value without any scepticism, and resolutely determines to forget facts that contradict them and what has been written in the way of challenging his record, then one must admit that Poincaré is guiltless! Mr. Schmitt appears to be convinced, and whenever Poincaré, unaided, seems about to slip he extends a helping hand.

It was my privilege in several publications during the last year to call attention to the fact that Poincaré's *apologia* in *Foreign Affairs* a year ago gave evidence that his logical powers left much to be desired.[1] The same is true on a large scale in his Memoirs, which merely amplify the points

[1] Most notably in the *Nuova Revista Storica*. See above pp. 254 ff.

made in that article or attempt to distract the reader from the main issues by a flood of irrelevant details. As to M. Poincaré's conviction of his own honesty, while we cannot expect Mr. Schmitt to know psychiatry and be familiar with the mechanism of "over-compensation," yet a scholar trained in England should remember the lines attributed to Shakespeare which call attention to the suspicions which may legitimately attach to excessive protestations of innocence. M. Poincaré's outbursts on September 26th (1926) cannot be ignored in this connection.

Mr. Schmitt is the first man, so far as I am aware, who has emerged from a reading of Poincaré's Memoirs with the impression that he has even attempted to answer any considerable part of the really vital charges made against him. It is not the number of charges which Poincaré has answered, but the nature of those which he has ignored which is the most conspicuous and illuminating thing about his Memoirs. The truth in this regard is contained in the following sentence from the brilliant reply to the Memoirs by Fabre-Luce in *Europe* for April 15th, 1926: "In this last bit of pleading, as in his earlier efforts to clear himself, Poincaré has contented himself with the effort to conceal highly significant omissions under a luxuriant mass of explanations dealing with wholly secondary issues." This is well illustrated by Poincaré's attempt to meet the earlier strictures of Fabre-Luce (in his *La Victoire*). While going into great detail in regard to minor errors of Fabre-Luce, instead of dealing directly with his most deadly charges, Poincaré attempts to discredit this brilliant young Frenchman and divert the reader from the real issues by such rhetorical subterfuges as stating many times that Fabre-Luce was only twenty-six years old when he wrote his admirable book on the background of the war. Similarly, instead of answering the more serious charges advanced by Victor Margueritte in *Les Criminels*, Poincaré occupies himself chiefly with an account of the hypocritical dismissal of Margueritte from the Legion of Honor for writing *La Garconne*, and of Margueritte's alleged ingratitude for Poincaré's past political aid to him.

Mr. Schmitt implies that Poincaré is successful in clearing himself from any suspicion of guilt in producing the crisis of 1914. Let us see how far this is true. The point most emphasized by Poincaré and his apologists is that he was opposed to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912. No doubt, this is so, but is this a proof of his pacific program? Is it not, rather, evidence of sagacious strategy on the part of a man who did not desire to see his plan fall through because of a premature effort before the military preparations of Russia had been carried further and the French people "educated" by the bribed press to the point where they would support the government in a war over a Balkan crisis? Mr. Schmitt makes much of Poincaré's assertion that he repeatedly assured Izvolski that France would not enter a European war unless Germany was involved. Does this prove his will for peace? Is it not obviously proof that Poincaré did not propose to participate in any war unless it held out some promise of restoring the lost provinces?

As to the statement that France never specifically promised Russia the Straits in the event of war, even if this is true it was not necessary to give such assurance, as it was always assumed to be axiomatic. Georges

Louis tells us that this was invariably taken for granted in all Franco-Russian discussions of a possible war in the decade before 1914. We know what the Russians thought on the matter, and as early as September, 1914, there was an understanding between France and Russia that the latter should have the Straits, an agreement that was embodied in the Secret Treaties of the next spring. Naturally, Poincaré was opposed to independent Russian action in regard to the Straits. If Russia obtained the Straits unaided and without a general European war, the chance of France's recovering Alsace-Lorraine would have been reduced to a nullity or indefinitely postponed.

Likewise, Poincaré's explanation of the Georges Louis affair in no way demonstrates his love of peace. We now know that Ernest Judet has exaggerated the "pacificism" of M. Louis. M. Louis was agreeable to the idea that France might recover Alsace-Lorraine in a European war, but, like other French moderates, such as Caillaux, he opposed Poincaré and Izvolski because he feared that they would bungle the matter through precipitating the war too soon. But the really significant aspect of the Louis affair is not his recall, for which we may grant that Poincaré was not primarily responsible, but the appointment of the firebrand, Delcassé, in his place. Poincaré does not even attempt to establish an "alibi" with respect to this. The other major item in the indictment, namely, the bribery of the French press by Russian gold, M. Poincaré has failed to explain away even to such a degree as would satisfy Mr. Schmitt. Certainly no more need be said in regard to this! No doubt, the Germans were willing to bribe papers, but they had no such directly belligerent goal in their bribery and corruption program as did Izvolski and the Russians. Baron Schoen never distributed a franc to the French papers during his Ambassadorship to Paris.

With respect to Poincaré's allegation that after he became President he ceased to take an active part in directing foreign policy and rarely saw Izvolski, what convincing reason have we for believing any such statement? Izvolski, who would scarcely have dared to misinform his government on so vital a matter, tells us that as soon as Poincaré became president he told Izvolski to come to him rather than to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on matters of major importance in Franco-Russian relations. And there are no recorded complaints from Izvolski that he had any difficulty in getting access to President Poincaré. Izvolski states, further, that after becoming President, Poincaré went almost daily to the foreign office, and that nothing of importance was done without consulting Poincaré.

We know that in the two important diplomatic achievements between Poincaré's accession to the presidency and the outbreak of the war—the negotiation of the Russian naval understanding with Great Britain in the spring of 1914 and the crucial visit to St. Petersburg—it was Poincaré who took full charge of French policy and commitments. He was certainly responsible also for the selection of Delcassé and Paléologue for the Russian post. If Izvolski misrepresented Poincaré, why has the latter refused to throw open the French archives and crush the late Russian intriguer under an irrefutable mass of convincing evidence as to his perfidy and mendacity? It is significant that in the three volumes thus far published M. Poincaré

has not seen fit to explain why the French Documents have not been forthcoming!

Nothing could be more ridiculous than Poincaré's contention, warmly supported by Mr. Schmitt, to the effect that he was forced into whatever arrangements he made with Russia in 1912 because of a conviction that Germany was planning a war on France. As Poincaré himself wrote in 1912: "The German Government seems obstinately bent on a *rapprochment.*" This, as Poincaré proceeded to explain, could never be realized without a German promise to return Alsace-Lorraine. Mr. Schmitt closes with the statement that "One can fairly acquit M. Poincaré of warlike ambitions . . . ." This should be changed to read: "One, Bernadotte Schmitt, can acquit. . . ." The fact is, that, as critics of his *Foreign Affairs* article predicted a year ago, the case against Poincaré is more decisive now than it was before he published his Memoirs. Before their publication even his enemies would have conceded that he might have something of consequence to say on his own behalf; now they know he did not have anything of significance "up his sleeve." If Mr. Schmitt had deigned to examine seriously, not only the somewhat partisan attacks on Poincaré's memoirs by Dupin, Charpentier and Margueritte, but also the exceedingly clever and wholly crushing reply by Alfred Fabre-Luce in *Europe* for April 1st, 1926, he might have been saved from the naïve gullibility which he has exhibited in regard to this whole Poincaré matter.

In one regard, however, Mr. Schmitt and I are in entire agreement, namely, that "unless Poincaré is an unconscionable liar, he did not desire war." For those who have not already been convinced on this point by the *Yellow Books,* Poincaré's own writings, and the books already published by his French and American critics, the forthcoming work of Georges Demartial on *L'Evangile de Quai d'Orsay* will prove highly relevant. A whole book, exhibiting the most exacting scholarship, is devoted to the single topic of the falsifications sponsored by the French leaders of 1914 with respect to the vital subject of the Russian mobilization. If, in defiance of the Izvolski documents and the logic of the known historic facts of 1912-14, one gives complete credence to Poincaré's version of his diplomacy and regards him as an apostle of sweetness and light, then such a writer qualifies for the honor of being "dispassionate." Many will prefer to bear the epithet of "passionate" unabashed in the circumstances.

To sum up, the chief and relevant charges against Poincaré are: (1) that he refused the German efforts at a *rapprochement* in 1912 and the offer of far-reaching autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine; (2) that in the fall of 1912 he promised Izvolski that in case France was kept informed of Russian policies in the Balkans France would follow Russia into any war which broke out over a Balkan crisis and brought in Germany against Russia; (3) that he at least connived at the recall of Georges Louis and was directly responsible for the appointment of the incendiaries, Delcassé and Paléologue. to the Russian ambassadorship; (4) that he engaged with the Russians in the intrigues involved in the bribery of the French press in order to bring the French people to a point where they would support a war over the Balkans; (5) that he approved the loans of large sums of French money to strengthen the Russian army and strategic railways; (6) that he played an

important part in promoting the Anglo-Russian naval convention of the spring of 1914; (7) that he encouraged the Russian military party on his visit to St. Petersburg in July, 1914; (8) that when the great decision had to be made on the night of July 29th, 1914, as to whether France would stand for war or peace he threw in the weight of his great personal influence on the side of war at a time when he knew that diplomatic negotiations would in all probability be able to adjust the situation without armed conflict; and (9) that he gave his support to a policy of deceiving the French people and of ignoring the French democratic political institutions in the crisis of 1914 to such a degree that Georges Demartial has been able to remark quite correctly that France was thrown into the war in 1914 with no more knowledge of vital facts or freedom of decision than a chicken handed to the butcher in a grainsack. Nothing which M. Poincaré has thus far published in any way disproves any of these really serious charges, even though he may have shown Victor Margueritte to have been politically ungrateful and Fabre-Luce to be a brilliant young man.

But we should disabuse all readers of the notion that, because we hold that Poincaré wanted a war to recover Alsace-Lorraine, he was a demon. He was merely a good French patriot, placed in a position where he could take decisive steps with respect to a possible realization of the chief goal of French patriots in 1912. Fabre-Luce agrees to this: "I have never held M. Poincaré to be a blood-thirsty monster." Still, as Dupin goes on to say: "Though such an interpretation may be tenable, the problem does not present itself thus. It is not possible to know the real internal motives of another person. Yet if Poincaré is not a monster, it is true nevertheless that the myth (revenge) to which he devoted himself is monstrous, and, in reality, the result is the same for the victims."

C. Grey

We need not waste much space on Mr. Schmitt's assessment of the significance of the memoirs of poor old Grey, now turned into an amiable and senile naturalist. The flavor of his analysis is readily apparent from his categorical declaration that "of all the statesmen who have written on the war, Lord Grey most easily and most successfully inspires confidence in his readers. His book, incomplete as it is on many points, will remain the classic exposition of British policy." We would suggest that it would be more accurate to state that Lord Grey's book "most easily and most successfully inspires confidence on the part of Bernadotte Schmitt, Lowes Dickinson, and Headlam Morley." And if British policy from 1905 to 1914 is to rest for its justification on Grey's apology, then the future bodes ill for the repute of British policy! Mr. Schmitt could have profited enormously by a perusal of Count Montgelas' study of Grey in recent issues of the *Kriegsschuldfrage.*

Perhaps Grey did not *promise* France unconditional support in 1912 but he *gave* her unconditional support in 1914. Not the combined German proposals to keep out of Belgium, to restrict their offensive solely to the eastern front, and to refrain from attacking the French channel ports sufficed to secure British neutrality in 1914. The proof of the pudding is, after all, in the eating! Mr. Schmitt quotes both Grey and Poincaré to the effect that England was in no way bound to aid France from 1912-14, but this

is in direct contradiction to Sazonov's statement to the Czar in the late summer of 1912 to the effect that "On his own initiative Grey gave me a confirmation of what I already knew through Poincaré, namely, an agreement exists between France and Great Britain, under which in the event of a war with Germany Great Britain has accepted the obligation of bringing assistance to France not only on sea but on land, by landing troops on the Continent." It is also contradicted by the facts of 1914.

Mr. Schmitt quotes with approval Grey's contention that all of his plans for peace were wrecked in 1914 because Germany had chosen that moment (July) to precipitate her long planned war of aggression. If the reader is acquainted with Grey's memoirs he will remember that the foundation for this all-important hypothesis of Grey is the fact that it was *summer time,* the same season of the year as that chosen by the Prussians in 1870! Mr. Schmitt reiterates Grey's perennial drool concerning the fatal results flowing from Germany's having rejected his conference plan in 1914. No more than Grey does Mr. Schmitt make it clear: (1) that Germany adhered to Grey's first plan of *mediation à quatre* which was not specifically approved by France or Russia; (2) that France and Russia were as opposed to a conference on Austro-Russian relations as was Germany to one on Austro-Serbian affairs; (3) that in the same way that Germany declined this conference so Russia announced that she would tolerate no outside interference with her freedom of action against Austria; (4) that Germany was more favorable to the Italian conference plan, a much better one than Grey's, than were the members of the Entente; (5) that Grey admitted in 1914 that the German substitute of direct negotiations between St. Petersburg and Vienna was better than his conference plan; (6) that Germany had actually anticipated Grey's pledge-plan with respect to the solution of the Austro-Serbian crisis; and (7) that, whereas Germany put active restraint on Austria, Great Britain made no real effort to restrain France or Russia. It is not without significance that not even Mr. Schmitt cares to bring up the Belgian imposture in extenuation of British conduct in the crisis of 1914.

D. Dickinson

The writer would not quarrel with Mr. Schmitt in his estimate of the place of Mr. Lowes Dickinson's *International Anarchy* in the literature of the *Kriegsschuldfrage.* Of this Mr. Schmitt says: "If allowance is made for the avowed pacifist bias of the author, his book must be voted the best account of pre-war diplomacy yet written." It would, perhaps, be better to state that "if allowance is made for his invincible faith in the legend of the honesty, integrity and pacific aspirations of Sir Edward Grey, his book is the best account of the diplomatic history of Europe in the decade before 1914." We may, further, doubt whether, as Mr. Schmitt fondly hopes, Mr. Dickinson will prove as gullible with respect to Poincaré's memoirs as has Mr. Schmitt. Further, we should like to invite Mr. Schmitt or Mr. Dickinson to point out any significant divergence between my own conclusions on war-guilt (*Genesis of the World War,* pp. 651-59) and those embodied in the following quotation from Mr. Dickinson's summary, remembering that, in the words of Mr. Schmitt, Mr. Dickinson "has read and digested the voluminous materials published since 1918."

"Little Serbia stood on the verge of satisfying her national ambitions at the cost of the peoples and civilizations of three continents.

"For years the little State of Serbia had been undermining the Austrian Empire. . . . What was the Empire to do in self-defense? One can conceive a world in which Austria would not have wished to hold down a nationality against its will. But that would not be the world of history, past or present. Never has an empire resigned before the disruptive forces of nationality. Always it has fought. And I do not believe that there was a State in existence that would not, under similar circumstances, have determined, as Austria did, to finish the menace, once for all, by war. . . . With every year that passed the Austrian position would get worse and the Serbian better. So at least the Austrians thought, and not without reason. They took their risk according to the usual canons in such matters. They may be accused of miscalculation, but I do not see that they can be accused of wrong by any one who accepts now, or who accepted then, the principles which have always dictated the policy of States. German diplomacy was cumbersome, stupid, and dishonest. Granted, it was! But German policy was such as any State would have adopted in her position. The Powers of the Entente say that the offense was Germany's backing of Austria. Germans say that the offense was Russia's backing of Serbia. On that point, really, the whole controversy turns. To my mind the German position is the more reasonable.

"Why was the war not localized, as Austria and Germany intended and desired? There is only one answer to this: because Russia did not choose to allow it. Why not? The answer is that she wanted Constantinople and the Straits; that she wanted access to the Mediterranean; that she wanted extension of territory and influence; that she had a "historic mission;" that she must make herself secure; in short, the whole farrago of superstitions that dominate all States under the conditions of the armed anarchy. . . . France entered for the sake of the balance of power and to recover Alsace-Lorraine; and her technical success in waiting till the declaration of war came from Germany does not alter the position. It had been known for at least two years past, it was reaffirmed more than once during the crisis that, if Germany came in against Russia, France would come in against Germany . . . . At any rate, since 1912 France would have entered when Russia did. And does any one who has perused the previous chapters, and who realizes the state of Europe, believe that Russia would not have started the war a year or two later? . . . And England? . . . . She had military and naval commitments to France which were like a suction-pipe to draw her, whether she would or no, into the war. And that approximation to the other two powers of the Entente was made for no other reason than the maintenance of the balance of power. We had become more afraid of Germany than of our traditional enemies, France and Russia. After all of our commitments to France it would have been base to desert her. Agreed! But what were the objects for which those commitments were made? Our own power, our own empire, our own security."

E. Seton-Watson and "Poor Little Serbia"

Nowhere does Mr. Schmitt's "will to believe" emerge more palpably than in his handling of the problem of the relation of Serbia to the assassi-

nation of the archduke. Nevertheless, it is worth while to note that since last spring he has distinctly descended from his "high horse" with respect to Miss Durham's *The Serajevo Crime*. He then wrote me to the effect that he believed that Seton-Watson has completely wiped Miss Durham off the map in his review of her book in the *Slavonic Review* for December, 1925. Now, it will be observed that Mr. Schmitt is as reluctant as Seton-Watson to grapple with Miss Durham on any of the main points at issue. Mr. Schmitt attempts at the outset to prejudice his readers against Miss Durham by the inaccurate statement that she "despises the Serbs." She does nothing of the sort, she merely *understands* them. Though a champion of the Albanians, she highly esteems the Serbian people, has devoted much of her life to a study of them, has many warm friends among them, and has been honored by them. She may be pardoned, perhaps, for failing to have a proper affection for Serbian plotters and assassins. She may have been too deeply infected with the British respect for life, property and public order adequately to appreciate the subtleties of Serb *Politik* in the twelve years preceding June 28th, 1914.

What we now know confirms all of Miss Durham's major theses and adds much new and more incriminating material, and it is interesting to note that Seton-Watson does not dare to challenge her in these matters further than by a half-hearted attack on Ljuba Jovanovich, for whose version of Pashitch's revelations he substitutes a most fantastic and improbable tale. We now know that not only did responsible Russians approve the assassination plot in advance of its execution and promise aid to Serbia if attacked by Austria, but that Artamanov supplied Russian gold to finance the consummation of the plot. It may also be more than an interesting coincidence that, some time after Hartwig and Artamanov communicated a knowledge of the plot to St. Petersburg, Sazonov in June, 1914, at Constantza, inquired of the Roumanians as to what they would do in case the archduke was assassinated in Bosnia later in the month.

Now just who is Robert William Seton-Watson? He is an English publicist, now lecturing at the University of London, who is rated as an authority on Austria-Hungary and the Southern Slavs. Writing first under the *nom de plume* of "Scotus Viator" and later under his own name he has done more to poison British opinion against Austria-Hungary in the last twenty years than any other person, unless it be the notorious Wickham Steed. While the Dual-Monarchy fell far short of perfection as a political system, any informed and unbiased person will have to concede that the picture of its policies and acts given by Seton-Watson is hardly more than a caricature. So fiercely and unceasingly has he championed the cause of the Serbs against the Hapsburgs that, as a distinguished Englishman remarked to me this summer, one may, without exaggeration, list Mr. Seton-Watson as virtually a member of the Southern Slav conspiracy, though we need not accuse him of any anticipatory target practice with Browning pistols. On account of both his pre-war prejudices and his wartime dogmas as to Serbian innocence of complicity in *Sarajevo*, it would be impossible to conceive of a person less likely to be trusted to investigate the Sarajevo plot than Seton-Watson. Compared with Seton-Watson, Miss Durham is the most unprejudiced person in the world. Still, Mr. Schmitt swallows him as lustily and unhesitatingly as he does the Great Lorrainer. To be sure.

Seton-Watson gives a more pedantic impression of erudition and scholarship than Miss Durham, because he has been more highly trained in the academic technique of historical bibliography and annotation. He far excels her in the formal display of footnotes, in imposing bibliographic summaries, and in skillful propagandistic prose expression born of long experience. His primacy ends here!

Mr. Schmitt would seem to imply that Seton-Watson's *Sarajevo* is an honest and straight-forward effort to get at the truth with respect to the responsibility for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is an amazing example of evasiveness and Jesuitry in the effort to get himself out of a most embarrassing hole. He had committed himself to the hypothesis of Serbian innocence in advance of the recent revelations and he had shouted loudly as to what dire things he was going to do to Miss Durham and Professor Fay when his book appeared. The facts, however, proved to be so overwhelmingly against his version of the case that he was faced with the alternative of either keeping silent or attempting to divert the attention of the reader from the real problems and issues. He chose the latter course. (See Edith Durham in *Foreign Affairs* (English), September, 1925, and October. 1926).

Mr. Schmitt gives the impression that Seton-Watson has gone into the question of the Bosnian intrigues in order to give us a more exact and comprehensive knowledge of the Sarajevo plot. What he has actually done is to try to get his readers absorbed in another subject and hence make them forget about the Black Hand and Mr. Seton-Watson's beloved Serbs. The Sarajevo problem is a specific one, namely, who laid the plot that actually resulted in the murder of Franz Ferdinand and who executed it? It is not a question of who *might* have shot the archduke, but of who *did* shoot him, and why. Conceivably, the archduke might have been shot by Bosnians, not members of the Black Hand, if a good opportunity had presented itself, just as it is possible that he might have been shot early in the morning in lower NewYork City if he had happened to be in New York and to have run into the right gang of thugs.

Seton-Watson knew before he started to write his *Sarajevo* that the Sarajevo plot was organized and brought to fruition by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievich, chief of the intelligence division of the Serbian general staff and the leader of the Black Hand. He knew that the Black Hand concluded the plot in Serbia, trained and fitted out the assassins there, sent them into Bosnia, and had prominent Bosnian members of the Black Hand look after them when they got to Sarajevo. He should also have known that the chief source of information concerning the Black Hand and the plot is the account of the Saloniki trials of 1917, and that there is a fairly complete record of the testimony at these trials in the Serbian work entitled "Secret Subversive Organization." If he did not himself possess a copy of this work he knew that he could borrow a copy from Miss Durham or Dr. Boghitschevitch. Seton-Watson does not mention this book in his bibliography on Serbian nationalism, but hides it with a disparaging remark in the bibliography to the following chapter. Now, if he had been really interested in giving us the truth about the Sarajevo plot he would, quite obviously, have provided us with a thorough history of the Black Hand, its organization.

its execution of the plot, and its treatment in the "judicial" process at Saloniki. Instead, he has devoted a book to a study of the Bosnians, who possibly might have shot Franz Ferdinand later if he had not been killed at Sarajevo on June 28th, 1914, by members of the Black Hand, and to the Austrians who, he alleges, maltreated the Bosnians. Imagine a District-Attorney who would deal with the case of a self-confessed murderer by ignoring the culprit altogether and preparing an elaborate brief discussing the various persons who might conceivably have slain the deceased at some other time and under different circumstances! There is only a paragraph on the Black Hand (pp. 137-8) and the whole matter of the relation of the Serbian government to the plot is adroitly hidden away in small type as a brief appendix to one of the chapters (pp. 155-9). Mr. Seton-Watson states that he will deal with the history of the Black Hand in a forthcoming book on the history of Jugo-Slavia, but we may suspect that he will deal with its activities in Serbia and Macedonia, and will not mention more than casually its relation to the assassination of June 28th, 1914. He will thus successfully obscure the relation of Serbia to the Sarajevo plot in both of his books.

Not only does Seton-Watson endeavor to confuse and obscure the whole question of the Black Hand and Sarajevo by emphasizing the Bosnian revolutionary and nationalistic organizations, but he devotes about half of the book to the Austrian policy towards the Serbs, and particularly to the relation of Germany and Austria to the outbreak of the War. Thus the book is quite as much a general work on war origins as one on the Sarajevo murder. Rarely has a book been more of a misnomer. In treating war origins in general Seton-Watson might have written his work in 1918. He swallows the "Szögyény Telegram" whole, and even dishonestly tries to represent it in the text as a telegram from Jagow to Berchtold (p. 267). Only the expert familiar with the contents of the telegram and taking time to consult the footnotes would discover this attempted deception. His version of the Russian mobilization (p. 277) is ludicrous. He cites Dobrorolski in a footnote as the best work on the subject but proves by his text that he has not read this important memoir. Ignoring Schilling's diary and other recent material, he takes the completely untenable view that the Czar did not consent to the Russian general mobilization on July 29th but only to partial mobilization. We know beyond any doubt that the Czar did consent to general mobilization on the 29th and cancelled the order only upon the receipt of a telegram from the Kaiser urging him not to jeopardize the latter's pressure for peace upon Austria. In full defiance of the facts he declares that Austria mobilized before learning of Russian mobilization. Likewise, he follows Renouvin's unsupportable position that the Germans had decided upon war before learning of the Russian mobilization, basing this view on Moltke's telegrams to Conrad. He ignores the statement of Moltke on the morning of the 31st of July that the German civil government was still completely in control of things and that he could do nothing in the way of securing German mobilization unless the rumor of Russian mobilization was definitely confirmed. In the light of revelations by Dobrorolski, Palizyn and others as to the Russian preparations in 1914 we can now see that Moltke's telegrams to Conrad were purely precautionary and came exceedingly, almost fatally, late. Seton-Watson follows Grey's memoirs in representing Germany as opposed to all diplomatic proposals

to settle the crisis and as urging Austria on so as to make the European war inevitable. Mr. Seton-Watson's manual could have been safely broadcasted by Mr. Creel or used in the "War Issues" courses in the Student R. O. T. C. classes in the autumn of 1918!

Further, there are serious errors in the details of Seton-Watson's account. His unwillingness to trust Ljuba Jovanovich's story concerning Pashich's revelation of the plot some weeks before its execution seems unfounded, as Jovanovich has dared Pashich to produce the documents in the case and Pashich has since remained silent. The version that the Central Committee of the Black Hand was "aghast" when they learned of the Sarajevo plot from Dimitrievich, and tried to halt it, is nonsense. The alleged power of the "Central Committee" is largely a myth. Dimitrievich was the absolute master of the Black Hand, his associates were early informed about the plot, and there was no attempt to restrain him or call it off. Dr. Boghitschevitch has shown in the September 1926 issue of the *Kriegsschuldfrage* and elsewhere that the Black Hand was by no means "at daggers drawn" with the entire Serbian government, but worked hand in hand with many of the more prominent politicians of the time. The Saloniki evidence fully confirms this view. Seton-Watson does not make it clear just why "Serbia had every reason for avoiding a war with Austria" in the summer of 1914. Pashich and the Czar had felt quite differently about that question in the previous February. Likewise, in Dr. Boghitschevitch's *Causes of the War* we find quite another picture of Austro-Serbian relations in 1912-13 from Seton-Watson's version to the effect that Serbia was at this time ardently seeking a *rapprochement* with Austria. It is highly significant that, as a most important point bearing upon the knowledge and complicity of the Serbian civil government, neither Mr. Schmitt nor Seton-Watson has anything to say of the scandalous relations existing between the Serbian government and Milan Tsiganovitch, the most important confederate of Dimitrievich in 1914.

Mr. Schmitt concludes his section on the Serbian problem by the following sentence: "In the handling of the conflicting evidence Mr. Seton-Watson exhibits far greater skill than Miss Durham. His book is a real contribution to our knowledge of an obscure subject." We would suggest that a much more accurate verdict would be about as follows: "In the technique of concealing or ignoring evidence damaging to his case Mr. Seton-Watson exhibits far greater skill than Miss Durham. His book is a real contribution to our knowledge of how to obscure embarrassing facts." It may safely be said that no more evasive and fundamentally misleading work has yet been contributed to the literature of the *Kriegsschuldfrage*. Certainly Mr. Seton-Watson will no longer be entitled to cast any stones at Leopold Mandl!

Those who have taken the view that the Serbian civil government and certain Russian officials were implicated in advance in the Sarajevo plot need have no fears; they will have the pleasure of watching Mr. Seton-Watson go into hiding as soon as the information already known is made public in systematic form by Miss Durham and Dr. Boghitschevitch. Miss Durham's *Serajevo Crime*, in factual content if not in tone, now seems a moderate and restrained version of the plot and its ramifications. In attempting to assess the relative competence and mastery of Miss Durham

and Seton-Watson in handling the Sarajevo question Mr. Schmitt might also have gained illuminating evidence by inquiring as to what has happened to Seton-Watson when he has faced Miss Durham on the public platform in England to discuss the Sarajevo plot.

It is also worth mentioning that neither Mr. Schmitt nor Seton-Watson have seen fit to expand upon the interesting problem as to why, if the case of the Serbs, Czecho-Slovaks and Roumanians is so free from turpitude and the record of Austria-Hungary is so unrelievedly black, did these succession states feel it necessary to include in the arrangements connected with the Treaty of St. Germain a provision that no use could be made of the Austrian archives dealing with matters pertaining to these succession states without the consent of the latter? One may further raise the question as to why these same succession states have seen fit to set a very remote date at which scholars may for the first time make free use of the facts in the Vienna archives pertaining to their history in the period preceding 1914.

As bearing upon the relation of Serbia to the Sarajevo assassination it is pertinent and illuminating to learn that the Serbians now frankly admit that Colonel Dimitrievich has already become the greatest Serbian national hero, next to Karageorge himself, and that Serbian patriots predict that within another half century he will have completely eclipsed Karageorge in the esteem of the Serbs Printsip, the actual assassin, ranks third in the Serbian national trinity. Artamanov, the Russian military attaché in 1914, who was the intermediary between Dimitrievich and Russia, now holds a sinecure in the Serbian Foreign Office, and his sons are being educated at the expense of the Serbian government.

F. "The Genesis of the World War"

To come now, in conclusion to Mr. Schmitt's strictures against my own modest preliminary contribution to the question of responsibility for the World War. In the first place, Mr. Schmitt raises the question of our relative competence in the field and as to my acquaintance with the documentary evidence. I would be the first to concede that Mr. Schmitt in all probability knows far more details about the diplomatic history of modern times than I do. If he does not, he has sadly wasted his time, because diplomatic history is only a minor diversion with me while it has absorbed all of the cerebral effort of which Mr. Schmitt has given any evidence. Yet, I am not unacquainted with the diplomatic history of Europe from 1870 to 1912, having conducted graduate university courses in the subject for some four years, and for the period from 1912 to 1914 I am quite willing to match my knowledge of the documents against that of Mr. Schmitt. This is, however, nothing to boast of, for it is not a serious task to read these through and digest them. It is quite true that I have not reproduced every document in the *Red Book*, the *Kautsky Documents* or the Stieve collection—I was not compiling a ten volume source-book. But Mr. Schmitt's statement that there are many documents of great importance to which I do not refer is certainly unwarranted if taken in any sensible interpretation. In a task like this it is naturally a matter of judicious selection from the standpoint of relevancy and cogency, and I defy Mr. Schmitt to cite any documents I have overlooked which would materially alter my interpreta-

tion of the situation from January, 1912, to August, 1914. Then, there is not only the necessity of knowing the content of documents but also the matter of being able to use them intelligently.

Nevertheless, while I have real respect for Mr. Schmitt's knowledge of the documentary basis of contemporary diplomatic history, his record is not quite unimpeachable. If it had been he would, for example, have been able to pounce with great gusto upon my statement on page 82 to the effect that Germany did not suggest the retirement of Delcassé after the first Morocco crisis. We now know from the "Grosse Politik" that she did, though with the collusion of Rouvier and Delcassé's French opponents. Likewise, last April Mr. Schmitt admitted to both myself and some Chicago reporters that he had not read No. 123 of the British *Blue Book* describing the proposal of Lichnowsky that Great Britain remain neutral in return for the German respect of Belgian neutrality, and yet this is the most important document in assessing the war-guilt of England, the European country on the history of which Mr. Schmitt is most expert! He should also have familiarized himself with the important documents in the appendix to Stieve's book which he reviewed in the article under discussion. Likewise, in his review article in the *Saturday Review of Literature* for November 20th. 1926, Mr. Schmitt makes the astounding statement that Germany originated the policy of European alliances and the practice of conscription.

I have followed here, as elsewhere, the practice of citing a liberal number of the best secondary authorities, but this has been intended as a supplement to the documents and not as a substitute for them. Mr. Schmitt complains that I have not been critical in my reliance upon secondary authorities, citing my use of Morhardt, Ewart and Stieve as examples. I have used Morhardt but slightly, and then invariably in connection with French policy, concerning which he knows much more than either Mr. Schmitt or myself. Undoubtedly Morhardt is biased in his judgment of England, but I have not used him on that subject. As to Ewart, no one can well call in question his resolute detachment and keen logical powers. Mr. Schmitt contends that I have "swallowed whole" Dr. Stieve's book on the relation of Izvolski to the World War. The fact is that I neither swallow nor reject Dr. Stieve's excellent work. Only on page 323 have I relied upon his personal interpretation of the Franco-Russian policy. What I have done is to make my footnote references in Chapter IV to the documents in this work, which has been translated into English, rather than to the *Livre Noir* or the Stieve collection of documents in German. In this way curious or interested readers not familiar with the European languages would be able to refer to the documents directly. Where there were relevant documents not in Stieve's book I referred to his collection of the Russian documents.

In describing my handling of the Serbian problem Mr. Schmitt has quite misrepresented me. He states that I have followed Miss Durham, whereas it should be evident to any reader that I relied chiefly upon Professor Fay. In my remark about the truth lying somewhere between the versions of Miss Durham and Seton-Watson, it was clear from the context that I did not have reference to the major issues at stake, but to the somewhat irrelevant controversy over minor matters which constituted the burden of Seton-Watson's review. I had already declared my belief that on all important matters connected with the Serbian problem Professor Fay and Miss Durham

were correct. While claiming that I have ignored Seton-Watson's challenging of Leopold Mandl, Mr. Schmitt does not mention the challenging of the adequacy and credibility of Mr. Seton-Watson's evidence and witnesses as to the Sarajevo plot by Miss Durham and Dr. Boghitschevitch. But even if Mr. Schmitt were accurate in his worst charges of lack of critical acumen in using my authorities, my sinning could scarcely equal his in regard to Poincaré and Seton-Watson.

Mr. Schmitt raises a great rumpus here as elsewhere because I did not make much of the fact that von Jagow lied about his partial previous knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum. But why single out Jagow as a liar in a crisis in which all the diplomats were lying? Especially when this lie of Jagow's had little bearing upon the question of war guilt. No sensible student of the war guilt problem believes that Jagow in any way influenced the formulation of the ultimatum. But while on this subject of lying about the Austrian ultimatum, has anybody noticed Mr. Schmitt calling attention to Grey's deliberate lie to Lichnowsky on July 20, 1914? Though Grey had learned of the general import of the Austrian ultimatum on July 16th, he told Lichnowsky on the 20th that he knew nothing of its nature. Not too much should be made of either of these lies, but one was certainly as bad as the other.

Further, if I do not cite enough documents to suit Mr. Schmitt, he himself has not shown enough acquaintance with the best secondary works which would have saved him from many blunders and misinterpretations. Most of the more important European authorities on the war-guilt problem not only know the documents as well or better than Mr. Schmitt or myself, but have also had the advantage of knowing intimately the chief figures in the army and civil government of their respective States and of other countries as well. This has made it possible for them to use the documents much more intelligently than Mr. Schmitt and I can possibly exploit them, as well as to draw upon a rich fund of personal knowledge. When I had the privilege this summer of sitting in on war-guilt discussions with men like Wiesner, Montgelas, Demartial, Boghitschevitch and others of this type I often wondered at the temerity of men like Mr. Schmitt and myself in assuming to touch the problem of war-guilt at all.

The other major point raised by Mr. Schmitt is his allegation that I do not present an orderly account of the crisis of 1914. What he means is that I do not make use of the strictly chronological method, but take up the situation country by country. This method was determined upon after careful consideration of the possible alternatives. It is the only method which makes possible a detailed treatment and still allows the average and non-expert reader to follow the narrative with interest or intelligence. The strictly chronological presentation, lumping all countries together, may be read by experts but is hopelessly confusing to the intelligent amateur who desires to inform himself. Further, the method which I have followed is obviously the best if one is chiefly concerned with the policies and "guilt" of the countries involved in the crisis of 1914. Whatever my own wishes, then, I was limited to this mode of procedure if I wished to write an "introduction" to the war-guilt problem. Then, there is no need for another strictly chronological treatment until new and revolutionary documents appear, as this method has been utilized by Count Max Montgelas

whose detailed knowledge of the documents and events in the period from July 23rd to August 4th, 1914, is probably unrivalled by that of any other person now alive.

Moreover, I contend that the method of treating the situation country by country really gives the most accurate picture of the policy of each State and of the conduct of its officials. Contrary to Mr. Schmitt's allegation (p. 143), there were no important changes of policy on the part of any country from July 23rd to August 4th. The diplomats, statesmen and soldiers *did not* vary their policy with each new batch of telegrams. There were changes in details but few in basic policy. Austria was determined to punish Serbia, at the risk of a European war unless England intervened. Germany was determined to give Austria a free hand unless Serbia capitulated or the Austrian policy seemed likely to bring on a World War. Russia was determined to use the Austrian policy with respect to Serbia as the occasion for precipitating a European war unless Austria backed down so markedly as to put Russian aggression in so bad a light as to keep England neutral. France was determined to come in if Russia and Germany engaged in combat. England was determined to come in if France was involved in war with Germany. These policies were persisted in throughout. Austria began to waver only at the end and then too late to avert hostilities which were precipitated by Russia. Germany acted to restrain Austria only after Russia threatened the peace of all of Europe and after English neutrality began to appear doubtful. The most striking thing about the July crisis in 1914 is how little the settled policies and anticipated procedure of the various diplomats were altered or modified by the events of the fatal two weeks following July 23rd.

After examining Mr. Schmitt's list of my statements for which he alleges I do not offer proof, of my errors of fact, and of my sins of omission (pp. 144-5) I would modify or qualify only one statement in the light of Mr. Schmitt's criticisms, namely, that about the relation between the French mobilization and the German proclamation of a state of imminent war. This should read: "The French did not wait for the German general mobilization, but used the German proclamation of a state of imminent war as the justification for their mobilization order." None of the alleged omissions possess any significance in assessing the question of war-guilt, and the Kaiser's conferences with officials on July 5th are fully covered in the excellent quotation from Professor Fay on page 242. The Kaiser would have been an idiot if he had left for his vacation without such conferences. And Mr. Schmitt well knows that in his conferences of July 5th, 1914, the Kaiser was of the opinion that there would be no European war, and that the officers should not be recalled from their vacations. He left orders that no warlike measures should be undertaken. Mr. Schmitt's allegation that the German inquiry as to what France intended to do in the crisis justified the French decision on war is one of the most amusing examples of what Lévy-Bruhl would call his "pre-logical" mode of thinking.

Mr. Schmitt's treatment of England's attitude towards Belgium, of Poincaré in St. Petersburg, and of the Russian mobilization is the typical one characteristic of the "pussy-footers" and "die-hards." Like Grey he attempts to escape the implications of the German proposal to England that England remain neutral on condition that Germany keep out of Belgium,

refrain from attacking the French channel ports, and guarantee the integrity of France. He states that this was not an official German "offer" but only a suggestion by the German ambassador. Grey treated it in 1914 as though he understood it to be an official and formal offer, and Lichnowsky has shown that he was authorized to make this suggestion. But whether the offer was official or not Grey indicated that he would not accept it in any case. No country ever had less incitment to make war upon another than England had to go in against Germany up to August 3rd, 1914, but Grey had made the decision by this time. Yet Mr. Schmitt declares Grey "passionately and sincerely devoted to peace." Even Grey himself in his memoirs refutes Mr. Schmitt's denial of the truth of my assertion that "England in 1914 was determined to go to war if France did." Grey admits that he would have resigned if England had not followed France, irrespective of the Belgian issue.

Mr. Schmitt contends that there is no documentary evidence that Poincaré assured the Russians that the Austro-Serbian dispute would be adequate as the "Balkan incident" which would call forth the French fulfilment of the terms of the Franco-Russian military alliance and bring France into the prospective war on the side of the Russians. Had Mr. Schmitt read Stieve's book before he reviewed it, he would have learned that the document I cite on page 322 is a genuine one which Dr. Stieve obtained permission to print from the British archives. Further, we know from Paléologue that when Poincaré left Russia he told Paléologue that he must not allow Sazonov to weaken in his menacing attitude towards Austria.[1] Even Fabre-Luce admits that after Poincaré's Russian visit there was only the slightest possibility of averting the European war.

Mr. Schmitt ridicules my contention that Russian diplomacy in July, 1914, was a barrage to gain time, holds that the Russian mobilization was merely "likely to produce war," states that Russia waited six days before mobilization, gave diplomacy every chance, and mobilized merely because German pressure had yielded nothing. He ignores the fact that this diplomatic "barrage" was specifically provided for in the Russian military protocol of November 8th, 1912, where it was stated that to gain time on Germany, "Our military measures must be masked by clever pretended diplomatic negotiations in order to lull the fears of the enemy as completely as possible." He likewise seems unconscious of the fact that in 1915 General Palizyn, Russian chief of staff, boasted that this had been the Russian procedure in the July crisis of 1914: "Our mobilization struck the Austrians like a thunderbolt. It was then too late for them. They had become involved with Serbia. The Germans, too, permitted the first days to lapse without action. Altogether we gained twelve days. Our enemies committed a huge blunder (by regarding Russian diplomatic efforts as sincere) and conceded to us at the same time an incalculable advantage." Mr. Schmitt also fails to indicate that, while the Russians waited six (actually five) days to mobilize, they really began their military preparations for immediate war on July 24th—just as soon as they heard of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. He does not point out that the terms of the Franco-Russian military alliance did not say that mobilization made war "likely,"

[1] All fully confirmed by the *British Documents.*

but stated uncquivocally that "mobilization is war," or that Dobrorolski frankly admits that the war was "on" as soon as the mobilization order had been put on the wires about six o'clock on the evening of July 30th, 1914. Dobrorolski frankly states that Russian diplomacy in July, 1914, was a barrage, as I have contended. Nor does Mr. Schmitt state that the Russian mobilization had been decided upon before Germany had been given time enough to restrain Austria or that Austria's resistance was already breaking, in spite of Moltke, when hostilities were forced by the premature Russian mobilization and the Russian refusal to demobilize. Sazonov was opposed to any conference relating to Austro-Serbian relations and announced early in the crisis that Russia would tolerate no outside interference in her policy in regard to Austria. This, rather than Germany's attitude toward a conference, was what made it difficult for Grey to consider restraining Russia in 1914. As we pointed out above, Mr. Schmitt errs amazingly in representing the grave military danger with which Germany was confronted through the Russian mobilization as no more serious than the dubious diplomatic humiliation to which France and Russia would have been subjected in case they had been compelled to watch Austria proceed with the legitimate punishment of Serbia.

Mr. Schmitt rests his attack upon the revisionist theory of war-guilt chiefly on the ground of the Moltke telegrams to Conrad (which I mentioned not twice, as Mr. Schmitt states, but three times) which, he alleges, prove that Moltke wanted war and held Austria thoroughly in line with his bellicose purposes. We now know beyond any reasonable doubt that Moltke did not desire a European war, lacked self-confidence in the crisis, and was by no means sure of the outcome. The telegrams which Moltke secretly sent to Conrad were purely precautionary, and, in any event, were sent after the prospects for peace had been ruined by the Russian mobilization. It is of no avail for Mr. Schmitt and Seton-Watson to allege that Moltke sent these telegrams before he absolutely knew of the Russian general mobilization. He had much corroborative information confirming the rumors of mobilization before he sent the telegrams, and his telegrams *did not* make war inevitable as did the Russian mobilization.[1]

It will be noted that Mr. Schmitt does not care to challenge specifically my assertion that Russia had no legitimate justification for intervening in behalf of Serbia in 1914, but, as Lowes Dickinson points out, *this is the pivotal and crucial point in the whole controversy as to the immediate responsibility for the World War.* The fact that Germany and Austria desired only a local punitive war (which, to be strictly accurate, Germany did not desire after July 25th) is not affected by their recognition that Russia *might* precipitate a general war over this local war. The onus falls upon Russia here rather than upon the Central Powers, unless it can be shown that Russia's safety was at stake—a claim which not even Mr. Schmitt has ever dared to advance. Bethmann-Hollweg was certainly chiefly interested in preventing war, but, if it had to come, he wanted to make it clear that Russia had taken the initiative—obviously a wholly legitimate desire which in no way compromises the genuineness of his efforts for peace. And in the end Mr.

[1] See above p. 55 for Berchtold's statement that the Moltke telegrams had no influence on Austrian policy.

Schmitt scarcely dares to go further than Fabre-Luce's famous war-guilt formula, which I enthusiastically approved in my book, to the effect that "the gestures of the Central Powers made war possible; those of the Entente made it inevitable." This is certainly the only intelligent interpretation of the last sentence in the first paragraph on page 147. Mr. Schmitt's last thrust to the effect that "as an attempt to set up a new doctrine of unique Franco-Russian responsibility the book must be unhesitatingly rejected" is true in a sense not intended by Mr. Schmitt. If one were to hesitate he might be convinced, not because of any merit on the part of the author but because of the inescapable logic of the facts when intelligently organized and honestly interpreted.

Certainly I would be the last to pretend that my book is the final word on the question of war guilt, but if this is the most that Mr. Schmitt can do to discredit it I have been more successful than I have ever dared to hope. Further, should I rewrite the book now, in the light of materials which have appeared in the last year and those which I was able to accumulate in Europe last summer, I should be both inclined and able to make the case against the Entente at least twenty-five per cent stronger than I have.

Nor have I any apology to offer for the general type of book which I have written, even though Mr. Schmitt brands me as "anything but dispassionate." I did not pretend to be writing for the purpose of being advanced from an assistant professor to an associate professor in the conventional American university. Had I been angling for a promotion in academic historical circles I should not have chosen any subject bearing upon the war-guilt problem, but would have written with the most immaculate restraint and the most approved indecisiveness upon some such highly relevant and stirring problem as scutage, knight-errantry, the Legend of the Year 1000 or the historiography of the Donation of Constantine. What I was endeavoring to do was to make a modest dent upon public opinion with respect to one of the most important of contemporary issues. For this purpose the style and tone of the book were, it still seems to me, very well adapted. My only regret is that the book is not a better one of the same general character.

Nor can Mr. Schmitt get very far by any allegation that my book is designedly pro-German and pro-Austrian and written with the underlying desire to attract favorable attention from the Central Powers. If I had been writing for that purpose I would have done a better piece of work from that angle. Only those who have actually acquainted themselves with the facts can adequately appreciate how far my book is from pleasing the conventional German and Austrian. The Germans bitterly resent my assertion that up to 1912 the German policy was as unwise and inciting as that of the Powers of the Entente and they are even more irritated at my moderation toward Sir Edward Grey. The German radicals look askance at my acquittal of the Kaiser of an open determination upon a European war, while my progressive inclinations make me a legitimate object of suspicion to the nationalistic and monarchist circles. The book is even less satisfactory to the Austrians. They deny the accuracy of my basic charge against Austria, namely, that she planned the ultimatum to Serbia deliberately in such a fashion as to make it probable that Serbia would reject it and thus furnish

the excuse for the Austrian punitive expedition into Serbia. And many Austrians further contend that I grossly under-estimate the incendiary influence of Germany upon Austria in the crisis of July, 1914. My treatment of war guilt is about as popular with the conventional Germans and Austrians as J. T. Adams' "Revolutionary New England" is with the average chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution. Candid German and Austrian scholars, of course, welcome such advances in objectivity as the book shows as compared with the works of Hazen and W. S. Davis.

And those who contend that my contributions to the war guilt controversy have consisted solely in typing in my name on manuscripts furnished from Haus Doorn are in for a rude shock when they acquaint themselves with the views held on this subject by His Majesty. They will find that he differs from me both in general interpretation and in detail. He has no antipathy towards Sazonov, Izvolski, Poincaré and Delcassé, but believes that the War was launched by the international Jewish bankers and Free Masons, who desired to destroy the national State system and orthodox Christianity, and used first Edward VII and later Sir Edward Grey as their stupid and willing tools. He regards England as infinitely more guilty in the circumstances than France or Russia.

G. Concluding Observations

Mr. Schmitt errs to a large extent in his judgment as to war guilt chiefly because he hopelessly confuses two quite different matters—namely the general diplomatic background of 1914 (better 1912) and the crisis of July-August, 1914. His conception of the former is quite correct. There is divided—perhaps equal—responsibility here, and the system of alliances were responsible for this situation. We may grant that war could not have come without the alliances, but in 1914 it was France and Russia who forced the issue to an armed European conflict. The worst that can be said of the Central Powers is that they made it possible for France and Russia to do so—and surely their provocation and justification in the Sarajevo murder were great.

A sensible view of war guilt consistent with the facts would seem to be that with respect to the basic causes of the World War, namely, nationalism, imperialism, economic rivalry, armaments, etc., there was divided and relatively equal responsibility. Likewise, there was about equal responsibility for the diplomatic alignments and controversies in the period from 1870 to 1912, though certainly the Triple Alliance was more pacific in its objectives than the Triple Entente. From 1912-1914, however, France and Russia took the lead in the aggressive diplomacy which helped to create the specific situations that made the war possible in 1914. In the crisis of July-August, 1914, the responsibility for bringing about a European war was almost exclusively that of the Serbian plotters and the French and Russian leaders. While we should agree with Mr. Schmitt and Mr. Dickinson as to the dangerous and menacing situation created by the European system of anarchy and alliances in 1914 and as to the necessity of supplanting this system by one based upon international control and compulsory arbitration of disputes, yet, in the interest of truth, it is also desirable to combat the notion of the inevitability of war in 1914. It was the specific personalities and policies controlling matters in 1914 which brought on the war. This

assertion can be substantiated by simply asking Mr. Schmitt and Mr. Dickinson if they believe that there would have been any war in 1914, following the assassination of the Archduke, if Tisza had been in charge of Austrian foreign policy, Caillaux in control in France, Kokovtsov, Russian Foreign Minister, and Lord Morley in charge of British foreign policy? The crisis of 1914 developed into a general war because it was admirably adapted to exploitation by those who desired a general conflict. At the same time, it is difficult to imagine a crisis, arising out of an incident so conspicuous as the murder of Franz Ferdinand, which could have been more readily handled *without war* by a truly pacific and decisive group of European foreign secretaries.

NOTE

Professor Schmitt hazarded no reply to my rejoinder, but he secretly circulated a mimeographed sheet among American historians. In it he made certain corrections which I acknowledge and accept. He states that what was reported to me as a lecture at the University of Pennsylvania was an informal discussion with some graduate students there. He holds that he did not mean that he had not read of Lichnowsky's offer to Grey concerning Belgium, but had forgotten it at the time of my visit to Chicago in April, 1926. I have no desire to enter into any personal issues raised.

Those who regard the writer's strictures on Professor Schmitt as too severe are invited to investigate Professor Schmitt's subsequent writings on the problem of the outbreak of the War, such as his articles in *Current History* for March and December, 1927; the *Saturday Review of Literature*, November 20, 1926, February 19, 1927, and April 16, 1927; the *Christian Century*, March 3, 1927; and the *American Historical Review*, July, 1927. The Schmitt-Kanner Myth is demolished by Professor Fay in the *American Historical Review* for January, 1927, and by Count Montgelas in *Current History* for April, 1927. His latest myth about Germany, the Russian mobilization and the German declaration of war on Germany is dealt with by the present writer on the basis of European interviews in the *American Historical Review* for January and July, 1928. As a representative sample of Professor Schmitt's recent reasoning let us quote from Professor Schmitt's review of the British Documents in the *Christian Century* for March 3, 1927. Dealing with the reason for the British decision on war he says: "It is perfectly clear that it was the German violation of Belgian neutrality which forced a decision, and even then Germany was given a chance to withdraw." No comment will be necesary for students of the war guilt problem. Others may well compare this with Crowe's memorandum of July 25th or with Grey's own admission in his Memoirs that he would have resigned had he not been able to put England into the War irrespective of the Belgian issue.

III. PROFESSOR BARNES ON WAR GUILT.[1]

By Ferdinand Schevill.

When Professor Barnes resolved to become a human gadfly and sting the sluggish conscience of his countrymen into life he made more trouble for himself than he could possibly have foreseen. For whoever listens carefully

[1] *The Christian Century*, June 17, 1926.

around will discover that even in academic circles, supposed to be partial to enlightenment, Professor Barnes passes as a good deal of a nuisance. Indeed it has yet to be proved that there are many people anywhere in the world who love to be separated from their settled opinions and gratefully offer their thanks to the disturber of their mental repose. But for several reasons revealed in his book Professor Barnes was simply obliged to become a gadfly, one of them being that he feels the strong urge of the convert. We are frankly told that throughout the period 1914-1918 he accepted whole-heartedly the elaborate mythology touching the origin of the World War popularized by the propaganda agencies of the Entente. To prove his earnestness he even joined the propagandist crew in person and contributed his literary bit to win the war. With disarming candor he singles out his pamphlet written for the National Security League as a horrific example of the flagrant misinformation foisted on the public during the late excitement. But the reader will not get far without becoming aware of another and weightier factor in the author's mental background. He is, together with Professor Robinson, a leading exponent of that new doctrine of salvation loosely comprehended by the term "social intelligence." Therefore when on the conclusion of the deafening uproar the documents began to appear which for the first time disclosed the actual facts regarding the diplomatic crisis of the summer of 1914, not only was he in his capacity as a scholar prompted to revise his erring views but also, because of his long established faith in the directive role of the enlightened mind in human affairs, he was fairly impelled insistently to raise his voice against a mass of absurdities and falsehoods which hopelessly poisoned the international situation and paralyzed and would indefinitely continue to paralyze every program and movement looking toward a more gracious order of society than the one we have upon our hands. Before long he joined the small but growing band of revisionist historians, found his way into the public prints, and only last autumn expounded his fresh findings in the hospitable columns of the *Christian Century*. The present book,[1] however, must not for a moment be regarded as a reprint of his already published articles. In the nature of the case it covers some of the same material, but its distinguishing feature is that it considers the problem with which it deals as a single vast historical complex, which it approaches and illumines from every conceivable angle. In consequence the book is anything but a series of loosely connected essays. It is an uncommonly impressive whole, which plunges the reader into the animating current of a sustained dramatic narrative and holds his attention from first to last with the firm tentacles of a relentless logic.

The book has not been written primarily for scholars but for the body of intelligent readers. Let that be clearly understood. But it invites, of course, the tests of scholarship and is provided with a full discussion of the documents, memoirs, apologies, and expositions which have appeared since 1918 and which must form the basis of any new interpretation of war origins. Dry-as-dust scholars will not fail to complain that the book lacks that air of frozen detachment which is their fetish except when under the illicit inspiration of other idols they grind out wisdom for Mr. Creel's bureau of information. But as long as they do not catch him suppressing or

[1] *The Genesis of the World War.* An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt. By Harry Elmer Barnes, New York. Alfred A. Knopf, 1926, $4.00.

misinterpreting any of the fundamental data he will not mind their criticism overmuch since, as already said, he addresses himself to as wide an audience as can be reached by his voice and recognizes that a vigorously controversial tone is absolutely necessary if he is to make any kind of an impression. For this prospective audience of his already is in possesion of a version of the war hardened by custom and hallowed by the sacred sentiment of patriotism. Only labor on a heroic scale can demolish an edifice of legend which seems to be as solidly based as the pyramids; and Professor Barnes, disdainfully dismissing the attitude of scholarly abstraction, works like a high-power wrecking-machine to level this evil inheritance with the ground. But, while thus employed, he at the same time isolates and tests anew all the circumstances of the pre-War situation disclosed in the sources in order to utilize them as the proved building stones of the new edifice of truth which, when he at last rests from his toil, stands complete before our eyes.

Although the book is primarily a diplomatic study concerned with the crisis which in 1914 shook the European chancelleries, Professor Barnes does not believe that diplomacy alone will suffice to make intelligible the dread event which for five terrible years agitated our planet. As a trained social student he recognizes that the war was in reality nothing more or less than a convulsion of our occidental civilization; and in his introductory chapter he offers a swift survey of the general forces operative in our society which keep it permanently at high tension and which, unless constantly watched and restrained, may at almost any moment precipitate a war. These forces he enumerates as biological, psychological, sociological, economic, and political, and to each and all interested in penetrating behind the diplomatic play of the historic foreground, often the merest make-believe staged to impress the ignorant, gaping public, it may be recommended most earnestly to ponder this illuminating analysis. Whoever wishes to change our world will have to reckon primarily with these great underlying currents; but, aware of them as he is, Professor Barnes does not believe that "they operate independently of the individual actors in the historic drama." For did not these currents heave and surge like Father Ocean long before 1914? And yet not till the summer of that year did they break their bounds by rising in a sudden engulfing tidal wave. Fundamental as is an understanding of the deep and remote causes of the war, its immediate occasion was the ill-will and incompetence of the men whom either the chance of birth or the confidence of the people and of their party associates had put in control of the European States. To investigate the responsibilities of these men is a thoroughly legitimate inquiry, provided the investigator does not exaggerate their rôle by charging them with creating the conditions in the first place. These, let it be understood, the various foreign offices must be considered as finding ready to their hand. The narrowly circumscribed issue which Professor Barnes faces in his book is: In what spirit and to what end did the various sovereigns and their ministers manipulate an inherently explosive situation and how did it come about that at a particular moment a match was touched off which released the most destructive war in the history of our earth?

To this question of the responsibility for the War Professor Barnes gives at once an answer which is a complete reversal of the verdict proclaimed

in 1914 from a thousand Entente trumpets and sent in deafening reverberations round the world. There was, we were told in tones of shrillest vehemence, a single guilty nation, Germany, a single guilty sovereign, the Kaiser. And when the War ended with Germany brought exhausted to the ground, that first-minute verdict was incorporated in the peace of Versailles to form the moral basis of a reconstruction of Europe, the main feature of which was so extensive a bleeding of Germany that she would be permanently eliminated from the Councils of the Powers. With a gesture of contempt Professor Barnes dismisses the familiar charge as the baseless fabrication of war hatred. In this he is, six years after the peace, no longer original for he merely associates himself with the whole body of students throughout the world in so far as they deserve serious consideration. In short, there are today among reputable historians only Revisionists. However, a considerable percentage among them lean toward a distributed responsibility, by virtue of which Germany would still come in for blame but not for more than all the rest. Professor Barnes heads a group of what we may call radical Revisionists. He rejects the thesis of distributed responsibility as being almost as far from the truth as the discarded view of Germany's sole guilt and lays the outbreak of the war squarely on the shoulders of France and Russia. France and Russia do not, of course, mean the French and Russian peoples but a handful of men in control of foreign affairs, in France more particularly Poincaré and Delcassé, in Russia Isvolski and Sazonov. He launches his exhaustive diplomatic story in the most dramatic fashion by having the curtain rise, as it were, on Poincaré and Isvolski secretly spinning the first threads of their plot. Their close coöperation dates from January, 1912, at which period Poincaré became prime minister to the delight of Isvolski, who in his capacity of Russian spokesman at Paris had been for some months eagerly awaiting the event. During the two following years they met and argued, often heatedly enough but not without making steady headway toward a common plan for seizing the primacy of Europe.

A common plan—this is Professor Barnes' great central contention which at the hand of the Russian documents he establishes so firmly that the present writer cannot see how disproof is possible except by means of the French documents, which so far at least have been sedulously withheld from inspection. The agreement was of the sort ironically called a gentleman's agreement and specified not only that in a coming general war Russia was to acquire the Straits (the Bosporus and Dardanelles) and France the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine but also that a Balkan disturbance should be utilized as the occasion for setting the match to the powder train. One of the weaknesses inhering in the old charge against Germany was the extraordinarily vague character of the Kaiser's purpose: he wanted to conquer the world. Apart from the utter absurdity of such a program in the face of the actual distribution of the land and peoples of our earth, no one short of a madman—whose madness moreover, it would have to be assumed, had been instantaneously communicated to sixty-five million subjects—would have begun his difficult and subtle game by jumping on everybody at once. And indeed to add the needed touch of verisimilitude the Kaiser was presently declared insane and branded as "the mad dog of Europe." Over against this wholly nebulous German program, to which no single document of the hundreds brought to light since 1918 has given the least substantiality,

Professor Barnes places the Franco-Russian plot for certain definite political objects in direct line with the ancient traditions of the two countries. This at once puts the plot in the realm of credibility. But it can become indisputable fact only in the light of the documentary evidence and this our author has marshalled so effectively that his case must in all its essential features be held as proved.

On June 28, 1914, the expected Balkan crisis was precipitated by the murder of the Austrian heir at Sarajevo, and the Franco-Russian plot immediately began to march. For its labyrinthine unfolding the reader is referred to the text with just this word of encouragement, that he will recall no detective story of his youth which was half as engrossing. Unfortunately the writer will have to content himself with pointing out a few of the more notable circumstances which Professor Barnes weaves into his picture of the Serbian developments. Without the least delay Belgrade accepted the dictation of France and Russia who counselled a public attitude of lamb-like innocence and patience. How this belied the facts becomes apparent when we consider that the evidence is now available which proves not only that the murder of the Archduke was hatched by the Serbian military authorities but that the civil government also was fully cognizant of what was going on. Innocent little Serbia indeed! We must now imperatively revise our judgment of the Austrian ultimatum and, as relations go among the countries of this imperfect world, find its demands justified and even moderate. But until the truth should become known, and that might not be till the crack of doom, the Belgrade government on the whispered advice of its two great friends, was pleased to assume the posture of the well-mannered little Sunday-school boy in the presence of the neighborhood bully. But, mind you, only the posture. Three hours before dispatching its meek answer to Vienna the Serbian government issued the order which put its whole army on a war footing; and as much even as twenty-four hours before this Serbian order was given out, Russia under Sazonov's inspiration took its first fateful mobilization measures. Such are the facts. From which we may learn that it is not its hollow public professions which define a government's true attitude but its acts, however secret they may be. No sooner had the murder of the Austrian heir been perpetrated than the acts of both Serbia and Russia looked uncompromisingly to war.

In successive chapters the roles of Germany, Russia, and France during the hectic July days are reviewed in elaborate detail. Professor Barnes' unusually vivacious style maintains the interest at high pitch, though there is naturally some duplication through the necessity of occasionally taking up the same circumstance from a different national angle. On every page he drives home, never failing to quote chapter and verse, his thesis of the common war guilt of France and Russia and of the innocence in every capital respect of Germany. His vigorously sustained contention regarding the Kaiser is that he was indeed ready to give support to Austria in her program of a purely punitive expedition against Serbia, but that when on July 28 he became aware of the danger threatening him from Russia, he withdrew from even this position and made notable and sustained efforts to bring the Austro-Serbian conflict to a close. Never for a moment did he desire a general war and with no least step in that direction can he be charged

until the fateful general mobilization order of Russia on July 30 closed every door to negotiation.

Amidst a wealth of matter inviting comment one may not overlook Professor Barnes' analysis of the policy of Sir Edward Grey. This was, perhaps, his most delicate task owing to the established reputation of the British foreign minister for candor and fair-dealing. But Sir Edward's would be a case not without example in history should it turn out that all of his good intentions did not suffice to preserve him from becoming the victim of a self-produced dilemma. That at least is Professor Barnes' position and until it is disproved by the publication of the British documents which Messrs. Gooch and Temperley are engaged in selecting from the foreign office materials belonging to the period just before the war, it may be regarded as established with reasonable certainty. And what was the Grey dilemma of 1914? This: that while throughout the July crisis he worked for peace in company with Germany, the only power truly disposed to give his efforts support, he also worked for war—unwittingly one hopes but still effectively—by giving express encouragement to Russia in her mobilization program formulated with the single purpose of sabotaging negotiations. Perhaps the verdict of history will go no farther than to set down Sir Edward as a mediocre statesman. For sadly mediocre it surely was to want one all-important thing and yet not to want it supremely enough to subordinate to it, according to a proper scale of values, all other wishes and considerations. It is amazing and deserves to be recorded anew that the purely intuitive judgment of Lord Loreburn, ex-chancellor of England, pronounced as early as 1915 should not differ by a hair's breadth from the opinion culled by Barnes in long and painful study from the documents. Here are Lord Loreburn's memorable words: "We went to war in a Russian quarrel because we were tied to France in the dark." The "dark" refers of course to the private commitment of Sir Edward to the France of the war-plotter, Poincaré.

The bulk of the book will probably stand the test of time, though it may be conceded that numerous details will be not insubstantially modified by the appearance of material yet unpublished. Should this judgment prove correct, his work will constitute a fine feather in Professor Barnes' cap, for it will pass into history as the first full narrative account by an American of the crisis of 1914 studied from the documents. But the rescue from under a heap of falsehoods of an unexampled event in the history of the world is by the author's own confession only a small part of his purpose. He wishes to contribute to the security of the earth's peoples by showing how in a particular case the peace was broken not by a decree of fate but by the deliberate act of a few men; and beyond that he hopes to promote an international society not driven hither and yon by chance and passion but directed toward a definite goal by the norms of social intelligence. In other words, with a finite historical program he couples infinite social aspirations. About them it is not here the place to speak, except perhaps to say that they depend for their fulfillment on a bewildering mass of circumstances, among which the most decisive would be the miraculous adoption by the coming generation of Professor Barnes' social attitude and faith.

Chapter IX.

SAINT EDWARD AND ENGLAND'S HOLY WAR: A CONSIDERATION OF BRITISH INTERPRETATIONS OF WAR GUILT

NO phase of the wartime mythology so cries out for dissipation as the legend of the straight-forward honesty, open diplomacy, vast diplomatic and international information, peace-loving labors, keen insight and masterly decisiveness of the former British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Nowhere has less progress been made in revising wartime theories of responsibility than in Great Britain, and nowhere else is there such smug satisfaction with the part played by the governing group in 1914. Even many former critics are now silenced. Those dailies and weeklies, which sharply criticized Grey in 1914, have recently hailed his weak and evasive memoirs and the incriminating British Documents as an overwhelming vindication of the wisdom of the British Foreign Office in July and August, 1914, even though these two publications actually show that the critics of Grey in 1914 were wise and accurate far beyond any knowledge which they could possibly have possessed at the outbreak of the conflict. Indeed, there is almost everywhere in England today a pontifical and superior air about the whole question of war guilt which is more irritating to the objective student of the subject than any attitude to be discovered elsewhere in Europe.[1] A Headlam-Morley in 1927 remains the same Headlam-Morley as in 1917, in spite of an alleged acquaintance with the European and American literature of war guilt and what should have been the illuminating task of editing the British Documents on the origins of the World War. One can contemplate the passionate and realistic speeches of M. Poincaré reaffirming the Versailles version of war responsibility, with more equanimity than he can the "holier-than-thou" psychology

[1] In writing this indictment of British stubborness in adhering to the mythology of the war days, the author is not unconscious of, or ungrateful for, the brilliant and courageous work of disillusionment executed in England by E. D. Morel, F. C. Conybeare, C. Raymond Beazley, Lord Loreburn, G. P. Gooch, Bertrand Russell, Norman Angell, M. Edith Durham, Irene Cooper Willis, Seymour Cocks, Henry W. Nevinson and others.

which pervades so many influential English circles and leads even cultured and urbane Englishmen to affect an air of injured indignation when one suggests that England and her leaders may have been at one with the rest of the world in sharing the pre-War territorial and economic greed, obsessed patriotism, trust in superior armaments and indulgence in secret and unscrupulously dishonest diplomacy. Poincaré at least has important vested interests of a territorial, economic and political nature to protect through the perpetuation of the wartime illusions.

The keystone to this arch of British smugness and adamant blindness to the realities revealed in the source-material on the causes of the War is the myth of the majestic character and ability of Grey, who is alleged to have towered far above the avarice and duplicity which characterized the dominating personalities in the other European states, particularly those in charge of the destinies of the Central Powers. And this same view has lately spread rather widely in America, due in large part to the captivating memoirs of Viscount Grey of Fallodon which are admittedly as disarming and convincing to the amateur student of pre-War diplomacy as they are disappointing and self-condemnatory in the eyes of the technically equipped scholar in the premises.

We shall in this section set forth representative English reactions to the author's *Genesis of the World War*, together with the author's rejoinder in cases where such seemed necessary. We first present the views of three thorough-going Revisionists, Professor C. Raymond Beazley, the distinguished British historian; Miss Edith Durham, the specialist on the Serbian issue, and Henry W. Nevinson, the famous British publicist, journalist and student of international affairs. Then we offer the view of Dr. G. P. Gooch, the leading British authority on diplomatic history. Dr. Gooch is a Revisionist, but more hesistant than Professor Beazley. Next we come to a great British pacifist and classical scholar, G. Lowes Dickinson, author of one of the best books on the coming of the World War. In his book he took the advanced Revisionist position, but in his review of my book he departed from his usual stand. He presents an excellent example of the sensitiveness of many Englishmen to foreign criticism of their diplomacy and

diplomatic leaders. He apparently deeply resented my stating the same general conclusions at which he had arrived in his volume. Finally, we conclude the section by an examination of the contentions of two inflexible "bitter-enders," the reviewer in the London *Times* (presumably Wickham Steed or R. W. Seton-Watson) and J. W. Headlam-Morley.

I. THE OPINION OF PROFESSOR C. RAYMOND BEAZLEY.[1]

This work (*Genesis of the World War*) describes itself, with justice, as one of the first readable and trustworthy attempts to present the revised views on war responsibility. It is not only readable and trustworthy, I must confess it is comprehensive. Herein both the student and the scholar, on the one side, and the average intelligent man-in-the-street, on the other, may find a stimulating and searching treatment of the roots and causes of the Great War of yesterday.

Since the termination of the main hostilities in 1918, masses of secret documents, bright beams of new and surprising light, have been afforded us —largely through the development of events in Russia, where men are now in power who know not Joseph, and to whom the *arcana* of the Tsardom are in no wise sacrosanct.

Assuredly the truth lies, remarks an American enquirer, (and I cordially agree with her), in the direction pointed out by Professor Barnes. He has indeed made himself well acquainted with the evidence, and he has laid aside war-spectacles. This is the verdict of a well-known British historian, whom I am glad to call my friend, and whose judgment I honor as unusually free from alloy—the coinage of a scholar to whom justice is the touchstone.

Professor Barnes' book should serve as a worthy introduction to the study of the Question of Questions in recent political history: What are the Origins, Where is the Responsibility, for the War of 1914? It should also serve to produce a reversal of human judgment in many minds. And with this reversal of judgment there might come, in Heaven's good time, a reversal of temper and of policy. Yet the author modestly professes that he will not be dissatisfied, at any rate, with even less. He will be happy if he can but arouse interest in his great subject, if he can but help to create a general conviction that here is an outstanding international problem, the nature and importance of which are not even yet realized by the educated world.

Professor Barnes has written these pages under the sound conviction that these problems of war responsibility are not mere esoteric matters of historical scholarship, isolated from practical affairs. On the contrary, he very reasonably regards them as absolutely fundamental in the whole problem of the present European and World situation, which rests upon a certain peace treaty or group of treaties, dominated by particular conceptions (which are misconceptions) of war responsibility. Never was any struggle, Professor Barnes reminds us, more widely proclaimed as necessary in its

[1] From the *Historical Outlook*, May, 1927.

origins; holy in its nature; just, moderate and constructive in its aims—for the peoples of the Entente, on the one side; for the Germans and their Allies, on the other. Yet seldom has there been a world conflict and world settlement on which thinking men will reflect with more sadness.

II. THE ESTIMATE OF MISS M. EDITH DURHAM.[1]

Professor Seton-Watson makes a theory and searches for facts to support it. Professor Barnes analyzes a mass of facts and builds a theory. . . Aware that the future of the world's civilization depends largely upon the right understanding and handling of the war problems—aware, too, that the busy man cannot attempt to sort through the mass of documents himself—he has put together the available material in compact form, and tried to draw conclusions. We do not entirely agree with them. But the author himself does not regard them as the last word. Meanwhile none can fear to find *The Genesis of the World War* dry reading. Matters are shown in new lights; the lump of political facts is leavened with humor, and character sketches of leading personalities show how ignorance of the underlying causes often led gentlemen with the best of intentions to pave the road to hell. . . . Finally, he asks only that the facts shall be weighed and considered and declares himself ready to welcome fresh evidence and reconsider his conclusions if necessary. We hope he may find many readers to co-operate with him. . . .

III. THE GREAT REVISION.[2]

By Henry W. Nevinson

Shameful and disastrous as was the whole Treaty of Versailles, there was one clause in it that surpassed all others in shame. It was Article 231, and it ran:—

> "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of herself and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

Other Articles in the Treaty are shameless in their bullying treatment of a gallant and vanquished enemy, and in the acquisitive greed that is sure to engender future wars, but that article expresses a lie of such grossness that I wonder the hand which first wrote it did not wither. I do not wonder that the German representative to whom it was first shown refused to sign such an atrocious perversion of the truth. Ultimately a German did consent to sign, and his consent is the most terrible evidence of the abject misery to which war, disease, and the starvation of women and children owing to the British blockade for seven months after the Armistice had reduced the German people.

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[1] M. E. Durham, in London *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1926.

[2] *Saturday Review of Literature*, November 20, 1926.

Whether M. Clemenceau or Mr. Lloyd George concocted the lie, I cannot be sure, but amid all the orgy of iniquity that prevailed in Versailles in 1919, that Article stands out conspicuous, and no historian will ever dare to repeat it except with indignant scorn. That is quite certain, no matter what view of the war's origins history may take. Many views will be put forward, for the authorities are already numerous, and often contradictory. Adapting the words of St. John's Gospel, I may say that, if the ultimate causes of the Great War should be written by every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written. Year by year since the double disasters of the war and the peace, the distinguished statesmen, ambassadors, and generals most closely concerned have been issuing their memoirs, their defensive versions, or their adverse criticisms, and I will not question the earnest solicitude of each to narrate the events with exactness, and to claim as motives the noblest that enlightened patriotism could inspire. Even if we went a step further and assumed that the narratives of all were precisely true and their claims nobly justified, the war would remain only another instance of the philosopher's law that tragedy is not the conflict of right and wrong, but of right and right.

The consoling and serviceable idea that one particular man or nation was solely responsible for the violent deaths of some ten millions of young Europeans and Americans during the fifty-two months of the war has faded rather rapidly within the last seven years, and to discover the causes of the war, whether distant or immediate, the historian will have to seek far more deeply into the hearts of men and nations. "Hang the Kaiser!" and "Make Germany Pay!" shrieked Mr. Lloyd George in hopes of winning the election that directly followed the Armistice in December, 1918, but how ridiculous such outcries now appear! The natural reaction has come, and the chief blame is thrown on very different shoulders. Certainly the most remarkable instance of this reaction that I have seen is *The Genesis of the World War*,[1] by Professor Harry Elmer Barnes. In this large and carefully written book, Professor Barnes sets himself out to prove that of all the Great Powers engaged in the war, Germany was in fact the least to blame. The main guilt—almost the sole guilt—he attributes to France and Russia as nations, and to M. Poincaré in France and Sazonov in Russia as the men chiefly implicated. Call it a piece of special pleading if you will, the book remains a powerful instance of advocacy, fully documented and supplied with accurate references to a vast body of evidence. The conclusion is a tremendous indictment of statesmen who were regarded as national heroes less than ten years ago, and if it had been published at that time, I cannot say what would have happened to the author. Imprisonment would have been too good for him in England, shooting in France, torture in Russia. But it is useless to speculate. Ten years ago the book could not have been published in any country but Germany.

The main argument of the volume may be summed up as follows: Poincaré was a born Lorrainer, and from boyhood had been possessed of the idea of "Revenge"—revenge for the overwhelming defeat of France by Germany in 1870-1871, and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, the two

[1] *The Genesis of the World War.* By Harry Elmer Barnes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1926.

border provinces which had been annexed by Louis XIV nearly two centuries before. In passing I may notice that Bismarck himself was strongly opposed to this annexation, forseeing in it the certain cause of future war, but he was overruled by Moltke and the military authorities, who hoped that the two provinces would serve as a barrier against French aggression. As usual, Bismarck was right. The French never forgave the loss. As Gambetta advised, they never spoke of it, but always thought. Poincaré never ceased to think. He is a man of great persistence, and imbued with a hatred of Germany that one may describe as a "possession." Since the war he has often proved it.

Side by side with M. Poincaré in guilt, says Professor Barnes, stood Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, equally possessed by the ancient Russian ambition of obtaining Constantinople or at least the free passage of the Dardanelles. For these objects those two persistent spirits worked incessantly, and after the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 they clearly perceived that they could be gained only by a general European war. The war must be against Germany, allied with Austria, and perhaps allied with Italy, though that was very doubtful, since the Triple Alliance, founded in 1882, had been falling to pieces within the last ten years. But Germany would also be allied with Turkey, if indeed Turkey counted for much after her defeat by the Balkan League.

The question was: what would England do? At that time the most popular papers in London, especially the *Times* and the *Daily Mail*, under the influence of Lord Northcliffe, were working up extreme fear and hatred of Germany, mainly on the grounds of her growing navy and her commercial success. For more than three centuries Britannia had obeyed the call to rule the waves. In turn she had wiped out the rival fleets of Spain, Holland, and France. Here was another rival fleet to be wiped out, and that was all there was about it. At the same time Germany had suddenly become industrialized. Her factories were spreading her cheap products all over the world and ousting the English from their long-established markets. She was also setting up as a Colonial Empire and occupying bits of Africa, planning a railway to Bagdad, and otherwise displaying an enterprise and superiority which every Englishman had regarded as his natural right, bestowed upon his race by Heaven itself. The English people as a whole were ignorant of the German language, and seldom visited Germany for pleasure. What they knew of German manners was not agreeable, and German literature was stiff and unalluring compared with French. It was true that France had been our enemy for centuries, but she was our "sweet enemy," and sweetness was not a German quality.

Sir Edward Grey shared all these feelings and apprehensions. Though so long Foreign Minister, he remained singularly ignorant of foreign countries. He never traveled and knew no language but his own. Influenced, as I think, chiefly by fear—fear of German supremacy in Europe, of German rivalry on land and sea, and of possible attack upon our shores or colonies—Grey allowed himself to be won over to the Poincaré-Sazonov plot for the creation of a general war. He yielded bit by bit till it was too late to draw back. He permitted English officers of the highest rank to draw up schemes for war, both naval and military, against Germany, and even to

visit Belgium and the French frontiers to examine the ground for our campaign. He allowed the whole of the British fleet to be concentrated for war in the North Sea. We now know from the Sazonov correspondence with the Czar that Grey did in fact give certain promises to France and Russia that pledged our support, and though nothing may have been definitely written on paper in the nature of a Treaty, he so implicated our national honor that we could not have stood aside when the crisis came. At the last he struggled for peace, and I have no doubt he struggled honestly, for his has always been a peaceful nature, like that of all fishermen. But on July 30th, when he made his final and most hopeful offer to Germany, it was already too late. Fortunately for him and the Cabinet, Germany then made the almost incredible mistake of invading France through Belgium. To act as though an old Treaty were a scrap of paper was nothing new. We had stood unmoved when the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Berlin were torn up by Russia and Austria respectively. But the assault upon Belgium—a small and defenceless country, dangerously threatening our eastern shores, gave a first-rate excuse to our war parties, silenced the opposition of the Liberals, and united almost the whole country in the passionate indignation required for war.

Even at the last moment—say up to July 28th—Grey might have prevented war by telling France and Russia that England would have nothing to do with it. But he considered his honor and the country's honor involved, and, besides, he was very much afraid. If Germany defeated France and Russia in turn, as she would have done without the help of our fleet and the "Old Contemptibles," it would be England's turn next, and he thought his duty to the country plain.

There are minor points that I must omit, such as the sinister desires and conspiracies of financiers and the great munitions firms, the complicity of the Serbian Government in the Archduke's murder at Serajevo, the question how far Germany was behind the Austrian ultimatum to Belgrade, and the action of Sazonov in ordering the Russian mobilization (which began the war) without the Czar's consent, or even against his express order. Those points are now being fairly well cleared up, and on the whole the advantage lies with Germany. But they are all secondary to the main question of the two origins—the Frenchman's desire for revenge by the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, and the Russian's ambition to hoist the Russian flag in Constantinople or up and down the Dardanelles. I was in Berlin when the war broke out, and no one questioned its real intention. If anything it was regarded as a Russian war rather than a French. It was the work of Sazonov and Izvolski, the Russian Ambassador in Paris. "So Izvolski has his war!" cried the true patriot Jaurès just before he was murdered as an opponent of the war. "That is my war!" said Izvolski himself when it came.

I think this fairly represents the line taken by Professor Barnes in his very remarkable work (which runs to 750 pages), and so far I entirely agree with him. So far I believe most English people would now agree with him, especially since France has displayed a militarism and aggressive policy that do not promise well for peace ever since the crime of Versailles, to say nothing of her growing hostility towards ourselves. But there was another side to the events leading up to the Great War, and Professor Barnes

seems to me to make too light of it. He is a special pleader, and he does not conceal his part. For instance, so far as I have discovered, he altogether omits the "Willy-Nicky" correspondence between the Kaiser and the Czar, and it is a correspondence that reveals both the weakness of the Czar and the arrogant conceit of the Kaiser, together with his detestation of England. Indeed, though he frequently professed the truest affection for this country (especially in the famous interview of 1908), the Kaiser's main object in regard to us was evidently to humiliate our "insolence and pride." It is quite possible that we well deserved humiliation, but we cannot blame our Ministers, our Navy, or our Army for doing their utmost to provide against it.

In omitting the Kaiser's personality from his examination of the war's origins, Professor Barnes has omitted an important factor and neglected an opportunity of great interest. If the Kaiser in his personal vanity had not dismissed Bismarck so soon after his accession, it is almost certain that Germany would never have had to withstand the fatal war on both flanks. For the root of Bismarck's policy was to maintain friendship with Russia at all costs. The Kaiser was, and still is, a man of enviable versatility, of enviable energy, but, perhaps through his half-English mother (though she was a clever and sensible woman) he missed the German characteristics of patience, thoroughness, and dogged limitation. Everything by turn or together—King and Emperor by Divine Right, Supreme War Lord, Critic of Art, lecturer on Strategy, Master of Ceremonies, glorified Commercial Traveler for his country—he appeared to diffuse rather than sum up the characters of his ancestry on both sides, and the diffusion rent him in pieces.

At the beginning of his reign (1891) a Portuguese writer, Eca de Queiroz, published a remarkable essay in which he said of the Kaiser:—

"In my opinion he is nothing but a *dilettante* of activities—a man enamoured of activity, comprehending and feeling with unusual intensity the infinite delight it affords, and desiring to experience and enjoy it in every form permissible in our state of civilization."

That insatiable desire to experience every form of activity, combined with a mistaken conviction that God was his special Ally and would promote the success of his every undertaking, led him to disaster. But what man among us would act very differently from the young Kaiser, if the same opportunities were his? Give to anyone among us two highly gifted parents, bring any one of us up among great traditions of martial and imperial glory, place him upon a throne in command of an army hitherto invincible, and over a people singularly submissive to authority, concede the opportunity of indulging all the many-sided tastes that most of us share—the love of knowledge, the lust of travel, delight in music and art, pleasure in society, the joy of making large bodies of drilled men move in harmony like an orchestra, the desire to benefit one's fellow creatures, and to win their love for benefits conferred, together with a passion for imposing one's will upon the whole world for the world's lasting good—place anyone among us in such a position, and who can swear that he will not behave very much as the young Kaiser, or a hind let loose, or a wild ass galloping over the open desert? That was why when I saw the Kaiser, whether in

Berlin, or at an Aldershot review, or at Queen Victoria's funeral, I always thought to myself, "There but for the grace of God go I!"

Yet the day came when, as foretold by Eca de Queiroz twenty years before, "Europe would awake to the roar of clashing armies, because in the soul of the great *dilettante* the desire to know war, to enjoy war, was stronger than reason, counsel, or pity for his subjects." How nearly prophetic was the writer's conclusion!—

"If he win, he may have within and without the frontiers altars such as were raised to Augustus; should he lose, exile, the traditional exile in England, awaits him. In the course of years (may God make them slow and lengthy!) this youth, ardent, pleasing, fertile in imagination, of sincere, perhaps heroic soul, may be sitting in calm majesty in his Berlin Schloss presiding over the destinities of Europe, or he may be in the Hotel Métropole in London sadly unpacking from his exile's handbag the battered double crown of Prussia and Germany."

Put a remote village in Holland for London, and so it has happened. But whose was the fault? Professor Barnes admits that Germany was nationalistic, imperialistic, militaristic, ambitious as to naval plans, and given to secret diplomacy. "Germany," he says, "was certainly not a lamb in the midst of the pack of European wolves, but it is just as apparent that she was not the unique wolf in the fold." I entirely agree. No sane man would question it now. We all stand for revision if we have any sense at all. But in his zeal for the revision—a just and noble revision—it does seem to me that Professor Barnes forgets the weights that might prevent the German scale from kicking the beam of heavenly innocence.

Consider briefly the main international events since the fall of Bismarck (1890), and though each would require an article to itself, apportion, if you can, the praise or blame in case after case. At once the Kaiser took the direction of foreign affairs into his own hands, and traveled around Europe, partly to secure alliances, partly to display his own and his country's power. In 1894 Nicholas II became Czar, a weak-willed, well-intentioned man, dominated by an energetic wife, whose first thought was the maintenance of the dynasty, and her second the superstitious worship of religious charlatans. Early in 1896 the Kaiser telegraphed congratulations to Kruger on the suppression of the Jameson Raid, a justified but provocative action, giving false hopes to the Boers. In 1897, after the defeat of China by Japan, England, Russia, and Germany seized points upon the Chinese coast for future developments. In 1898 war between England and France over the Fashoda incident was narrowly averted, and in the South African War of 1899-1902 hatred of England was so strong in France and Germany that only the Kaiser's opposition prevented a general league against her. In 1900 a Navy Bill doubled the German Navy so as to protect German commerce and hold its own in the North Sea. About the same time Joseph Chamberlain attempted in vain to arrange a close understanding between England and Germany. In 1901 the pro-German Queen Victoria died, and Edward VII began to turn our foreign policy towards France and Russia. In 1902 England concluded an alliance with Japan, and this was followed by an arrangement with France in regard to Egypt and Morocco, whereupon the Kaiser visited Tangier with great display

(1905). This was during the defeat of Russia by Japan, and it caused the fall of Deleassé, always as strong an opponent of Germany as M. Poincaré has been. The Algeeiras Conference on Morocco was, however, a defeat for Germany (1906). In the next year England and Russia agreed to the partition of Persia into "spheres of influence," and after Edward VII's visit to the Czar in Reval (1908), the Kaiser in an interview with the *Daily Telegraph* protested his lasting affection for England.

The "Young Turk" revolution of 1908 created a new situation. Prince Ferdinand declared himself Czar of Bulgaria; Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina; Russia threatened war, and was only prevented by the appearance of the Kaiser on Austria's side "in shining armour" (1909). Owing to our construction of the first "Dreadnought" our former fleet became obsolete, and Germany started level in building a rival fleet. In 1910 Edward VII, so strangely called the "Peace Maker," died, and when the French in the following year marched to Fez, the Kaiser sent the small war-ship, *Panther*, to the Moroccan port of Agadir, whereupon Mr. Lloyd George uttered so violent a protest in a speech at the Guildhall that war was with difficulty averted (July, 1911). Later in the same year Italy seized Tripoli from the Turks, and in 1912 the Balkan League might have driven the Turks out of Europe altogether but for Russia's interference. The war of the other members of the League against Bulgaria, followed by the disastrous Treaty of Bucharest (1913) left the Near East in chaos, and all the Great Powers began increasing their armaments, Mr. Haldane's visit to Berlin (1912) in the hope of inducing the Kaiser to limit his fleet construction having failed. So we come to the Sarajevo murders of June, 1914, and the crash of general war.

It is a hideous story of intrigue and defiance, prompted chiefly by international fear and jealousy, but partly by personal vanity and the hope of personal glory or gain. How to unravel it with exact and unprejudiced industry one must leave to that amiable creature "the Future Historian," and I do not envy him the task.

IV. DR. GEORGE PEABODY GOOCH ON REVISIONISM.[1]

Among American students of the causes of the War of 1914 Professor Barnes, Professor Fay and Professor Bernadotte Schmitt are the best known; and no other American scholar has done so much as Professor Barnes to familiarize his countrymen with the new evidence which has been rapidly accumulating during the last few years, or to compel them to revise their war-time judgments in the light of this new material. His latest and most important contribution to the great debate is a volume of 750 pages entitled *The Genesis of the World War*. Lest readers be frightened away by the bulk of the treatise, it may be added that the print is large, and that the author commands an easy, flowing style. The book indeed in some ways reminds one rather of an advocate's speech, full of invective and repetitions, than the grave treatise of an academic historian. All the experts, as he reminds us, are now "revisionists," but the revisionists themselves are divided into the conservative and radical camps. Professor Barnes

[1] *Contemporary Review*, October, 1926.

belongs to the latter, and brings a formidable array of facts, quotations, and arguments to the support of his views. The responsibility for the European situation which produced the war, he declares, was divided among all the Great and some of the smaller Powers; but the guilt of the actual outbreak of hostilities he places on the shoulders of Russia and France. Not only, he argues, did they needlessly transform the Austro-Serb dispute into a European issue, though neither of them was bound by treaty to fight for Serbia, but Izvolsky and Poincaré had been for some time deliberately working for a World War at the first suitable opportunity, the former to obtain Constantinople and the Straits, the latter to recover the Rhine provinces. Sazonov, he declares, was converted by the arch-conspirators, and Sir Edward Grey was their unconscious tool. These grave charges are in large measure based on Izvolsky's despatches and telegrams, which certainly leave a very disagreeable impression. Poincaré's reply, set forth in his voluminous Memoirs, which appeared too late for Professor Barnes to use, is that Izvolsky systematically misreported his utterances. Critical readers of this well-documented and pugnacious book will probably feel that the revisionist pendulum has swung rather too far, and that the author is sometimes too cocksure; but his views are widely shared, and nowhere has the literary attack on Poincaré's pre-war policy been more vigorous than in his own country.

V. EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY? [1]

The author of this useful volume [2] is one of the ablest of living Englishmen. He has done distinguished work as a historian of modern historiography, as a keen expositor of early modern English political thought, as the author of the best history of contemporary European diplomacy, as the biographer of Lord Courtney, and as the editor of the papers of Lord John Russell, the Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, and the recently published British Documents on the crisis of 1914. Moreover, he has been prominent in English political life and has studied extensively abroad, so that his knowledge of European statesmen, history and politics furnishes an illuminating contrast to the ignorance of Viscount Grey on these same subjects. A book by such a man on the outbreak of the World War is an international event.

The book is the outgrowth and expansion of a brochure of the same title published in 1922. In successive chapters the author lists and characterizes, country by country, the diplomatic documents, memoirs, diaries, and monographs published since 1918 which bear upon the problem of responsibility for the World War. A concluding chapter sets forth Dr. Gooch's conclusions as to the matter of responsibility for the World War, and it is worthy of careful and respectful analysis. It represents the contemporary verdict of the moderate and informed English opinion intermediate between the slashing assault on the Entente Epic by Morel and his group on the one hand and the pitiable apologetics of "die-hards" and "straw-

[1] New York *Nation*, August 3, 1927.

[2] *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*. By G. P. Gooch. Longmans, Green and Company.

clutchers" of the stripe of Headlam-Morley, Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson on the other.

In the first place one will be struck with the fact that the conclusions in the present volume are almost word for word identical with those expressed in Dr. Gooch's pamphlet of 1922 and in his "History of Modern Europe" written the same year. Yet there has been as much progress in the way of demolishing the Entente mythology between 1922 and 1927 as there was between 1918 and 1922. At the same time, Dr. Gooch thoroughly repudiates the war-time version of unique Austro-German responsibility and comes out four-square as an exponent of divided or equal responsibility in the literal sense of that term. Now this conclusion is sweet, amiable, and comforting, and better adapted than any other to serve as the basis for the wiping away of war-time prejudices. It is also as destructive of all the foundations of the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, and the Trianon as the position of the most pro-German extremists. Yet we do not believe that the facts as to war responsibility, as we now know them, warrant stopping at the thesis of divided or equal responsibility, much as one might wish to do so from strategic and pedagogical considerations.

In the light of what we now know about Serbian plots and intrigues, it is doubtful if the Austrian determination to attack Serbia in 1914 was as "short-sighted" as Dr. Gooch contends. Nor is it accurate to represent Russia as a consistent and solicitous protector of "brave and innocent little Serbia" in the light of 1908, and of the Russo-Turkish negotiations of 1911. France, says Dr. Gooch, "had no desire for war and took no step to precipitate it." We should like to ask Dr. Gooch to suggest how any country could have given more evidence of a desire for a war at the proper time than did France from March, 1912, to August, 1914, or how Poincaré could have acted more decisively than he did to precipitate war adroitly in 1914.

But the proof of the bankruptcy of the case for equal responsibility is most clearly revealed when Dr. Gooch admits that it cannot be sustained except upon the hypothesis that it is as defensible to slay for purposes of robbery as to shoot in self-defense. "It is true that while Austria fought under the banner of self-preservation, Russia whom nobody threatened to attack, marched out to battle in the name of prestige; but in the accepted scale of national values, safety, honor, and prestige are motive-forces of approximately the same weight." Dr. Gooch's work may veritably be regarded as the requiem of the thesis of equal responsibility. This hypothesis could not have a more learned, persuasive, reasonable, and conciliatory exponent; but even he can sustain it only on the basis of considerations and evaluations which he would indignantly repudiate with respect to any other subject under the sun.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

VI. PROPAGANDA AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA.[1]

By G. Lowes Dickinson

One of the evils of propaganda, and not the least, is that it evokes counter-propaganda. The one is the negative image of the other, substituting dark for light and light for dark; and both alike travesty that cold gray

[1] *New Republic*, July 28, 1926.

fact which is the truth. Of this general rule the controversy about the origins of the War is a prominent example. The treaty of peace affirmed, and made the Germans sign, the statement that they, and they alone, were responsible for the World War; and this signature is the alleged ground of the terms imposed upon them. But a signature given under threat of starvation cannot alter the facts; and the German historians, ever since their government signed the clause, have been engaged in demonstrating its falsity. In this they have been completely successful. But, since they have been making counter-propaganda, they have gone almost as far from the truth on the one side as their enemies did on the other. This, under the circumstances, was inevitable. An American, one might expect, would be under less temptation to yield to the swing of the pendulum. But it is difficult to uphold an unpopular case without being provoked into exaggeration; and in the book before us [1] Professor Barnes has succumbed to the provocation, partly because he has dwelt but slightly and apologetically on the German misdemeanors, knowing how much they were exaggerated in public opinion, partly because he has blackened the policies of the Entente almost as much as they had blackened those of their enemies.

In a single sentence he sums up his position thus: "The main, in fact the only, direct and immediate responsibility for the general European War falls upon Russia and France," and I think an uninstructed reader of his book would come to the conclusion that England is not far behind these principal criminals. Professor Barnes no doubt is prepared to defend his position, and it is not possible to refute it satisfactorily within the scope of a review, since every point bristles with controversy. I will endeavor, however, to justify what I have said by some definite examples.

Speaking of the invasion of Belgium the author says: "There was no treaty obligation whatever binding England to protect the neutrality of Belgium." This statement is, to say the least, highly controversial. Everything turns on the meaning of the phrase (which Professor Barnes does not cite)—"under the guarantee" of the signatory states. Does this phrase imply a "general" or an "individual" guarantee? That is, was each signatory, individually, bound to act if the neutrality of Belgium were violated, or did the failure of one to act release the others? Lord Loreburn, whom our author cites, took, it would seem, the former view. Messrs. Oakes and Mowatt on the other hand say: "This was not a mere collective undertaking, where the guaranteeing Powers bound themselves to act together as one body. It was an individual obligation imposed by each Power on itself." We have here an example of the general truth that treaties are commonly ambiguous on the most vital points. Sir Edward Grey, it is true, would have gone to war, quite apart from Belgium. But it does not follow that the invasion of Belgium was indifferent to him, any more than it was to the mass of the British people.

Again, referring to the discussions of Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges with the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, Professor Barnes writes: "The British arrived at a determination to land the troops (in Belgium) whether Belgium gave her consent or not." But the Colonel's conversations were

[1] *The Genesis of the World War*, by Harry Elmer Barnes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

obiter dicta of his own, and were never endorsed by the British government. The documents published in the appendix to the Belgian *Gray Book* make this clear. Or, if Professor Barnes has other evidence, he should say what it is.

Again, in one place, we find the phrase: "The secret agreement to aid France on land and sea in the event of a war with Germany." This made me rub my eyes. Later we read more accurately: "England had bound herself by a verbal agreement to come to the aid of France, if the latter were attacked by Germany." The word "agreement" would certainly be repudiated by Lord Grey. But the important point is the last clause. Everything, in the view of the British government, depended on how the War arose. It is, I think, just to criticize the policy of making great events hang on such ambiguous words as "attack." But the summary statements cited are not really defensible, and will not help the cause Professor Barnes has at heart. As I read his account of Sir Edward Grey I felt that that statesman was being represented as a kind of muddled Machiavelli. That is not really the author's view. But then, what is? He cites as an "admirable characterization" some words of Dr. Henderson. But the words cited contain two contradictory statements: "He said what he did not mean and meant what he did not say;" and then: "His evident deep emotion, his undoubted earnestness and sincerity, his certainty that he was right, won him the victory." It is hard for a plain man to see how both can be true. I am not aware of holding any brief for or against Lord Grey. But after I had finished reading his *Twenty-five Years* there came into my mind the line of Wordsworth: "Moving about in worlds not realized." Of his sincerity, of his passionate love of peace and hatred of war, it seemed to me there could be no reasonable doubt, and Professor Barnes has not convinced me of the contrary.

M. Poincaré is another matter. He realized very well the world in which he moved, and it is plausible to say, as many Frenchmen have said, that he willed the War. Nevertheless I believe that psychology to be too simple. Professor Barnes cites, after Mr. John S. Ewart, a speech by the President, made in 1920, in which he said that when he descended from his "metaphysical clouds" he could discover "no other reason why my generation should go on living except for the hope of recovering our lost provinces." I do not know the context, and have not verified the quotation; but it seems consonant with all that is known of M. Poincaré. May we therefore infer that he was deliberately working for war? Hardly! His position was probably this: "Those wicked Germans are determined to have war. We must be ready. And when the war comes (as it will, but without our provoking it), we shall recover Alsace-Lorraine." This is, of course, a most dangerous frame of mind, and every lover of humanity must wish that M. Poincaré had never left the "metaphysical clouds" in which he would, at least, have been harmless. But I see no sufficient evidence that he was determined deliberately to have a World War. His contribution to it was the assurance he had given to Russia that he would back her if she came in. This was analogous to the assurance of the Germans that they would back Austria; and these backings caused the War. But the statesmen on either side were convinced that the backing was their duty, and that, if the worst came to the worst, the responsibility would rest on their opponents.

The Russians were in the same case. Did M. Sazonov "want" the War? Probably not, or not at that moment. But he meant, if it came, to take the Straits; and he was determined not to allow the destruction of Serbia. The Austrians, it will be said, had given assurances on that head. Yes, but who could believe them? We know, indeed, that owing to the opposition of Count Tisza, they had agreed not to annex Serbian territory; but they were contemplating its distribution among the other Balkan states. Again, the Russian mobilization precipitated the War at the last moment. But this did not imply a will to war. It implied fear of the greater preparedness of Germany.

Enough has been said—of necessity with undue brevity—to explain what I mean by "counter-propaganda." I have raised the point, not because I wish to pick a quarrel with Professor Barnes, but because the dust raised by these excursions diverts men's minds from the main point. What matters is not who was "guilty" of the late War, but how we are to avoid another. The belief that the War was due solely to the deliberate wickedness of Germany blocked the way, and Professor Barnes is one of those to whom we are indebted for dispelling the myth. But equally a counter-belief in the wickedness of France and Russia blocks the way. I have endeavored elsewhere to show that either nobody was "guilty," or everybody, and that if guilt is to be imputed its accurate apportionment is impossible, since, in the absence of objective scales wherein the quantities may be weighed, it is national feeling that always determines the verdict. What is true, and true with an urgency men have not begun to perceive, is that civilization itself is at stake; for it can hardly be expected to survive another war. Professor Barnes, as his first chapter shows, is well aware of this. Upon it I think we should all concentrate our efforts; and we shall therefore insist that wars follow inevitably from the international anarchy, whoever is judged to be guilty or innocent.

VII. A PACIFIST AND A SCHOLAR, BUT AN ENGLISHMAN FIRST.[1]

To the Editor of the New Republic:

Having been in Europe during the summer I have just read the review of my *Genesis of the World War* by Mr. Lowes Dickinson which you published in the issue of July 28th. I beg to impose once more upon your good nature and generosity in allowing me space to reply to Mr. Dickinson, as I believe that his attitude raises fully as important methodological and historical problems as to the war-guilt controversy as were presented by the second edition of Mr. Hazen's classic which we examined in your columns on March 19th, 1924. At that time the seekers for truth in this province had to face chiefly those who still clung to the war epic and held Germany uniquely responsible for the War. It is significant with respect to the progress of scholarship and opinion in this field in the last two years that this group—made up in America of such men as Charles Downer Hazen, William Stearns Davis, Frank Maloy Anderson, Anson Ely Morse and Edward Raymond Turner—now seem among the ancients. They are no more heard from on the subject and the students of war-guilt no more concern

[1] *New Republic*, October 20, 1926.

themselves with writers of this feather than the chemists do with the alchemists or the astronomers with the astrologers.

Today the opposition has come to consist of those who contend for the equal or divided responsibility of the Central Powers and the Entente for the War. This is a much more benign attitude than the war-time mythology, and, to many, seems worthy of support, whether historically correct or not, on account of its alleged pragmatic value in promoting the cause of world peace and international good-will. Unfortunately, this view no more squares with the facts than the thesis of unique German responsibility and those who seek the whole truth must recognize that their next and last great battle consists in discrediting the hypothesis of equal responsibility. Mr. Lowes Dickinson comes forward as a champion of the theory of divided responsibility. It is on this account that it is worth while to examine at some length the arguments of Mr. Dickinson.

It is worthy of remark in passing that these modern Horatiuses who seek to stem the tide of incriminating truth which is flowing in ever greater abundance from the new documents should make their last stand on a position which would require a complete overhauling of the Treaty of Versailles, in so far as it rests upon the theory of war-guilt entertained by its makers. Verily the work of the revisionist scholars has not been entirely in vain! Whereas there was, two years ago, arrogant and defiant proclamation of unmatched German wickedness there is now the most frantic clutching at any straw which will help to prove that Germany was no less guilty than France, Russia and England.

Mr. Dickinson designated my book as "propaganda." Now if there is any stigma to be attached to propaganda it must lie in a demonstration of the falsity of the facts or deductions submitted. The test of propaganda is not the degree of the divergence of the material from popular opinion or the distasteful nature of the content. Mr. Dickinson can prove my book to be propaganda only by demonstrating its fundamental inaccuracy, and this he has failed conspicuously to accomplish, as I shall endeavor to indicate in the material to follow.

Mr. Dickinson holds that I have dwelt "but slightly and apologetically" with German acts and policies and have unjustly blackened the record of the Entente states. As an actual matter of fact, I have treated the matter of German responsibility fully as thoroughly, in proportion to its importance, as I have the part of any other state in the crisis of 1914, and there is nothing apologetic in adducing relevant facts to refute the most grossly inaccurate of the Entente accusations against Germany. I will frankly admit that my treatment of France and Russia makes the leaders of these countries from 1912 to 1914 about as black as the Entente indictment of Germany during the war, but it is the facts and not my writing which has made the case black against these powers. Flattering as Mr. Dickinson's implication may be, I must deny any personal participation in the Serbian backing of the assassination of the Archduke, the compilation of the Izvolski correspondence, the Delcassé mission, the arrangement of the Poincaré trip to St. Petersburg in 1914, or the secret deliberations of the French and Russian ministerial councils in July and August, 1914. If Mr. Dickinson desires to spread a new coat of whitewash over Messrs. Izvolski, Sazonov,

Delcassé, Poincaré, Millerand, Cambon *et al.* he must prove the facts which I have brought forward to be inaccurate in themselves or incorrectly interpreted. The exponents of equal responsibility cannot escape the issue by the usual cheap and casual fling that those who have endeavored to prove the primary responsibility of France and Russia are merely the silly and irrational victims of a revulsion of feeling and represent the swing of the psychological pendulum from one extreme to the other.

In regard to the Belgian issue and English intervention, certainly Mr. Dickinson would not contend that Oakes or Mowat are worthy to be compared in the slightest degree as legal experts with Loreburn and Ewart, whom I have followed in my view of whether or not England was obligated by the Treaty of 1839 to intervene in case Belgian neutrality was violated. Further, every important British statesman who was faced with this problem in the nineteenth century took the position which I have maintained, namely, that England was not bound to act individually in support of Belgium. This was the interpretation accepted officially by Lord Derby, Gladstone and Salisbury. In 1870-71 Gladstone even recognized the necessity of making a separate treaty in order to place England in a position where she could legally guarantee Belgian neutrality. I certainly have not held, as Mr. Dickinson states, that Grey was indifferent to the invasion of Belgium. I have indicated that this was the thing he desired above all else in the 1914 crisis. On page 552 I stated: "After August 2nd, if there was anything in the world which Grey feared and desired to avert, it was the possibility that Germany might respect Belgian neutrality, or, if she did invade Belgium, that the Belgian attitude would be such that the Belgian issue would not constitute highly potent material for inflaming the British populace." No, indeed, Grey was not indifferent to the invasion of Belgium. What he was indifferent to was what might happen to Belgian lives, property and national integrity, provided they could be used as a pawn in his determination to devote England to the cause of Franco-Russian war aims. Like so many other perennial apologists for Grey, Mr. Dickinson fails to state that Grey refused point-blank the proposition of the German Ambassador that England remain neutral in return for a German guaranty to keep out of Belgium.

With respect to the British negotiations concerning the landing of the British troops in Belgium, of course the British government was too clever to endorse this action officially and publicly, but it made its war plans on the basis of this project, while the British chief-of-staff and his associates traveled all over Belgium and carefully planned the positions and movements of the British army in Belgium. If the British government did not approve the discussions of Col. Bridges in word, it did very really and very fully in fact and practice. Mr. Dickinson makes the amazing statement that I have not indicated that there are any other sources on this subject except the officially edited and very incomplete Belgian *Grey Book*. The great source is the Schwertfeger collection of Belgian Documents, to which may be added the Belgian Documents appended to the German *White Book* and the very interesting chapter in Fox's *Behind the Scenes in Warring Germany*. Mr. Dickinson will find these all cited in my book in the appropriate place, together with Haldane's *Before the War* which proves the practical adherence of the British war department to the objectives of Col. Bridges.

Mr. Dickinson complains that he was compelled to "rub his eyes" over my statement that there existed "a secret British agreement to aid France on land and sea in the event of a war with Germany." A little "eye-rubbing" will manifestly do Mr. Dickinson no harm in his search for truth about Britain's relation to the World War. If he had rubbed his eyes earlier he might long ago have read in the *Livre Noir* Sazonov's letter to the Tsar in September of 1912 describing his visit to England, in which he said: "On his own initiative Grey gave me a confirmation of what I already knew through Poincaré—an agreement exists between France and Great Britain. under which in the event of war with Germany Great Britain has accepted the obligation of bringing assistance to France not only on sea but on land. by landing troops on the Continent." This was. of course, before Grey went much further in committing England to the aid of France in the Grey-Cambon correspondence of November, 1912. Whether Grey would have repudiated the term "agreement" or not is of no significance. One can entertain no respect for or confidence in Grey's "repudiations" after having read his dishonest denials when interrogated about British commitments to France in the House of Commons in the spring of 1914. Further, it did not require a German attack on France to bring England to the aid of France. On the morning of August 3rd, 1914, before he made his famous speech asking support for his war policy, Grey had received from Germany a promise not to attack the channel ports of France if England would remain neutral. Hence, my summary statements, which Mr. Dickinson brands as "indefensible," are thoroughly supported by the documents and by the historic events of 1914, and are actually the only statements of the case which are defensible. If Mr. Dickinson is puzzled by Dr. Henderson's statement we may remind him that such devices as irony and sarcasm exist in the art of English prose expression.

If Mr. Dickinson has the audacity to state that, after reading Grey's Memoirs: "Of his sincerity, of his passionate love of peace and hatred of war, it seemed to me there could be no reasonable doubt" we can simply throw up our hands, but we may suggest that in making this statement Mr. Dickinson must be held to relinquish any claim to be able to view modern diplomacy in an unbaised fashion, unaffected by nationalistic myopia. It would be difficult to imagine a statement more damaging to Mr. Dickinson's position of leadership in the movement for world peace. To Mr. Dickinson the crusade for international understanding must apparently rest upon the corner-stone of the assumption of the honesty, integrity and pacifism of Grey! Further, if Grey "moved about in worlds not realized" it constitutes a grave indictment of the British government for allowing such a man to continue for a decade in almost autocratic control of the destinies of a great empire. He should have been speedily dismissed and allowed to return to his trout-fishing, his tennis and his birds. Fortunately, not all the English scholars are still paralyzed by the Grey spell. Less than a month ago the greatest of the English students of the war-guilt problem personally informed me that the more he read of the British Documents and Grey's Memoirs the more he was convinced of Grey's basic Jesuitry. And it may be worth while to state that my moderation in regard to Grey in my book was the point most criticized by the scholars I met this summer in every European country I visited, whether the Central Powers or the Entente countries. And I am

further able to state that the complete British *Blue Book*, now about to be published, completely confirms our case against Grey and in no way softens the indictment.

Mr. Dickinson's effort to mitigate the indictment of Poincaré is equally ineffective. He gives the impression that my brief quotation from his university lecture in 1920 is the only evidence which I adduce to the effect that he desired a war to recover Alsace-Lorraine, while, as a matter of fact, I have over a hundred pages of materials based strictly on the documents which prove that his acts from January, 1912, to August, 1914, were uniformly consistent with the attitude expressed in this lecture. Nothing could be more obvious nonsense than Mr. Dickinson's interpretation of Poincaré's attitude, to the effect that he felt that "Those wicked Germans are determined to have war. We must be ready. And when the war comes we shall recover Alsace-Lorraine." Any one familiar with the facts knows that exactly the opposite was the case and that the great fear of Poincaré, Delcassé, Millerand *et al.* was that Germany would be able to induce the pacific group in France to accept a *rapprochement* with Germany which would make the war of revenge impossible. Poincaré has himself admitted that in 1912, when he was taking the crucial steps with Izvolski to lay the plans for this war, Germany was making the most vigorous efforts to find a *modus vivendi* with France and to avert the possibility of war. In 1912 Poincaré himself wrote that "the German Government seems obstinately bent on a *rapprochement* which nothing but complete reparation for the past would render possible." What was this past for which this "complete reparation" was due? The Franco-Prussian War, of course, of which Clemenceau has written: "In 1870 Napoleon III in a moment of folly declared war on Germany without even having the excuse of military preparedness. No true Frenchman has ever hesitated to admit that the wrongs of that day were committed by our side. Dearly have we paid for them." In a letter of March 2nd, 1871, to Countess Louise de Mercy-Argenteau, Napoleon himself wrote: "I acknowledge that we were the aggressors." In the decade before the war Germany, far from wanting war with France, was determined to prevent it if possible, and the so-called German "bullying" of France was chiefly limited to efforts to compel the French to give up the idea of revenge. Nobody has summarized this vital fact better than the brilliant young Frenchman, Alfred Fabre-Luce: "In short, with variations in their tactics, the Germans consistently aimed at reconciliation until 1913, when, finding all their proposals rejected, they were persuaded that France wanted war, and turned their whole attention to strengthening their armaments to insure their defense."

Mr. Dickinson contends that Sazonov did not want war. Probably he did not before 1912, but we have documentary proof that by December, 1913, Izvolski and Poincaré had won him for the war party. His memorandum to the Tsar on December 8th, 1913, and the minutes of the ministerial councils of December 31st, 1913, and February 8th, 1914, amply prove this. The fact is that the Sarajevo murder came a year or so too early to suit the plans of France and Russia, but they felt that, even though premature, this Balkan incident must not be allowed to pass without bringing in its train the European war, especially as England seemed toying with the dangerous proposition of an agreement with Germany. We know that before the Russian

general mobilization was ordered Sazonov admitted that he was satisfied that Austria would respect the territorial integrity of Serbia, and on several different occasions the Austrian Ambassador assured him that Austria would also respect the sovereignty of Serbia, a promise that Sazonov was careful to conceal from France and England in the crisis of 1914. And there is no ground whatever for the thesis that the Russian general mobilization was a defensive act. Austria did not mobilize until two days after Russia had first decided upon general mobilization (July 29th) and Germany did not mobilize until late on August 1st. The Russian mobilization was an effort to gain time on Germany and catch her as unawares and unprepared as possible. Dr. Frantz has amply proved this in his article in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* for April, 1926. The Russian diplomatic proposals during this period were purely a subterfuge and a barrage, already planned out in the secret Russian military protocol of November 8th, 1912, to the effect that: "Mobilization does not necessarily mean the immediate beginning of hostilities because it may be of advantage to complete the marshalling of the troops without beginning hostilities, so that the opponent may not be entirely deprived of the hope that war may be avoided. Our military measures will then have to be masked by pretended clever diplomatic negotiations in order to lull the fears of the enemy as completely as possible. If by such measures we can gain a few days then they absolutely must be taken." This was the procedure which was followed with exactness in 1914. Writing in 1915, General Palizyn, Russian chief-of-staff, complained that events made it impossible for the Russians to carry out their mobilization plans completely under cover of the diplomatic subterfuges, but expressed great satisfaction that the Russians had gained twelve days by their secret military measures and were able to surprise their enemies completely by the degree of their preparations: "Our mobilization struck the Austrians like a thunderbolt. It was then too late for them. They had become involved with Serbia. The Germans too, permitted the first days to elapse without action. Altogether we gained twelve days. Our enemies committed a huge blunder [by crediting Russian diplomatic efforts as sincere] and conceded to us at the same time an incalculable advantage."

Mr. Dickinson complains—and this is perhaps the most crucial issue in the present debate—that studies of war-guilt are obstructive to the cause of the improvement of European international relations and the elimination of war. He likewise contends that the view of the unique guilt of France and Russia is as obstructive to world peace as the war-time conception of the unique guilt of Germany. It seems to me that both of these propositions are entirely fallacious. In the first place, if one is to study the problem of war-guilt he must pursue his investigations with no other aim in view than to discover the truth, no matter whether it promotes peace or war. Again, the only way to end war is to study the causes of war, and the causes of the World War in particular. Mr. Dickinson's view that we can end war in general without investigating the cause of wars in particular is equivalent to having a sanitary engineer contend that the proper way to prevent a recurrence of a typhoid epidemic in a given town is not to seek out the sources of water pollution, but to peruse in one's study a general treatise on pathology. The fatalistic interpretation of the World War is not tenable. The "international anarchy" made war likely but it did not make war inevitable. The great

problem is to find who was responsible for bringing it on in 1914 and to take steps to prevent such action in the future. Even more untenable is Mr. Dickinson's contention that to demonstrate the unique guilt of France and Russia would hinder the settlement of European international relations. Quite the contrary, nothing should do more to forward this salutary objective. The chief cause of European unrest and international anarchy today is the nefarious Treaty of Versailles. We can never have a settled European situation until its vicious work is nullified and a new arrangement based upon fact and justice substituted in its place. The Treaty of Versailles was erected on the basis of the assumption of unique and complete German responsibility for the World War. The proof that France and Russia were actually chiefly at fault in the circumstance would seem to create a much more effective argument for eliminating the injustice of the Versailles pact than the view of divided responsibility. We should like to hear from Mr. Lowes Dickinson as to why I am not historically and logically correct on this point.

To come now, in conclusion, to Mr. Dickinson's basic contention in regard to the responsibility for the World War—"either nobody was guilty or everybody"—it is wholly a question of meaning and degree. One cannot utter a categorical verdict about war-guilt unless he carefully separates the remote from the immediate cause of the calamity of 1914. When we deal with the causes of war in general we must agree that everybody was guilty and that the thesis of divided responsibility may be conceded without argument. When we view the diplomatic history of Europe from 1870 to 1912 we must also admit divided responsibility for the international situation. When, however, we examine the period from 1912 to 1914, there is no question that France and Russia were the most aggressive challengers of the European peace, but the Central Powers were not faultless. Finally, in the crisis of July, 1914, Serbia, France and Russia must bear the almost unique and complete blame for allowing the Sarajevo murder to plunge all Europe in blood. To support the above contention we shall not bring forward the arguments which I have assembled in my own book, but rest content with quoting from Mr. Dickinson's admirable *International Anarchy* pp. 429, 463-6):

"Little Serbia stood on the verge of satisfying her national ambitions at the cost of the peoples and civilizations of three continents.

"For years the little State of Serbia had been undermining the Austrian Empire. . . . What was the Empire to do in self-defense? One can conceive a world in which Austria would not have wished to hold down a nationality against its will. But that would not be the world of history, past or present. Never has an empire resigned before the disruptive forces of nationality. Always it has fought. And I do not believe that there was a State in existence that would not, under similar circumstances, have determined, as Austria did, to finish the menace, once for all, by war. . . . With every year that passed the Austrian position would get worse and the Serbian better. So at least the Austrians thought, and not without reason. They took their risk according to the usual canons in such matters. They may be accused of miscalculation, but I do not see that they can be accused of wrong by any one who accepts now, or who accepted then, the principles which have always dictated the policy of States. German diplomacy was cumbersome, stupid,

and dishonest. Granted, it was! But German policy was such as any State would have adopted in her position. The Powers of the Entente say that the offense was Germany's backing of Austria. Germans say that the offense was Russia's backing of Serbia. On that point, really, the whole controversy turns. To my mind the German position is the more reasonable.

"Why was the war not localized, as Austria and Germany intended and desired? There is only one answer to this: because Russia did not choose to allow it. Why not? . . . The answer is that she wanted Constantinople and the Straits; that she wanted access to the Mediterranean; that she wanted extension of territory and influence; that she had a "historic mission"; that she must make herself secure; in short, the whole farrago of superstitions that dominate all States under the conditions of the armed anarchy. . . . France entered for the sake of the balance of power and to recover Alsace-Lorraine; and her technical success in waiting till the declaration of war came from Germany does not alter the position. It had been known for at least two years past, it was reaffirmed more than once during the crisis that, if Germany came in against Russia, France would come in against Germany. . . . At any rate, since 1912 France would have entered when Russia did. And does any one who has perused the previous chapters, and who realizes the state of Europe, believe that Russia would not have started the war a year or two later? . . . And England? . . . She had military and naval commitments to France which were like a suction-pipe to draw her, whether she would or no, into the war. And that approximation to the other two powers of the Entente was made for no other reason than the maintenance of the balance of power. We had become more afraid of Germany than of our traditional enemies, France and Russia. After all of our commitments to France it would have been base to desert her. Agreed! But what were the objects for which those commitments were made? Our own power, our own empire, our own security."

Does Mr. Dickinson stand by his own book or by his review of my book? He cannot very well do both.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

VIII. A TORY REACTION TO REVISIONISM.[1]

Professor Barnes has during recent years come into prominence as the chief protagonist in America of the view that the responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914 attaches solely to the Entente, and that Germany, though in some matters her diplomacy was unwise and ill-directed, was for all practical purposes guiltless. This view he has expounded in a number of lectures and articles which, however, were so superficial and sketchy that they did not seem to deserve serious consideration. He has recently conducted a lecturing tour in Germany, where, naturally enough, he has had a very cordial reception. Now he has produced a book of some pretensions, in which he claims to demonstrate his theories.[2]

His book is devoted to defending the thesis that the whole thing was a

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[1] From London *Times*, September 30, 1927.

[2] *The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt.* By Harry Elmer Barnes. (Knopf. 21s. net).

put up plot between France and Russia, to which Sir Edward Grey was a half-willing accomplice. He would persuade us that M. Poincaré and M. Isvolsky had for two years been deliberately working to bring about a European war, and that when the crisis caused by the assassination of the Archduke occurred they used the opportunity which was thereby offered them to make war a certainty. This thesis, which is, of course, a purely hypothetical effort of his imagination, he defends in a manner which often reminds us of the writings of those who would persuade us that this or that man of note wrote Shakespeare. There is the same industry, the same curious ingenuity, the same fertility in digging out and exaggerating the importance of small fragments of evidence, and also the same fundamental misunderstanding of the general aspects of the problem with which they are dealing. These qualities, while they indicate a complete absence of sound political judgment, are of course common enough when a writer allows himself to be obsessed by some general theory the improbability of which he has not sufficient knowledge or insight to understand. It is a very different thing when we find, as we do in this case, an obvious disregard of the real facts which he purports to narrate.

The curious way in which he deals with inconvenient facts may be illustrated by his treatment of the events of 1912. He finds that at this time France was certainly using a restraining influence upon Russia, particularly in regard to Balkan affairs, with the obvious object of preventing European complications. This is inconvenient to him; he therefore gets out of it by an ingenious theory. Poincaré, according to his interpretation, was frightened that if Russia went her own way she might succeed in obtaining her object, the control of the Straits, without a European war. Now, what Poincaré wanted and was working for was a European war; and it was for this reason that he often opposed and criticized the projects of his ally. Could anything be more fantastic? And, again, when he finds Russia and France in July, 1914, giving advice to Serbia to act with moderation, to avoid, so far as possible, provocation to Austria, and to go as far as they could in giving a conciliatory answer to the Austrian Note, the explanation he gives is that in reality the Allies did this, not with the object of preventing a war, but only desiring to postpone the outbreak of war as long as possible in order that they might have time to complete their own military preparations. He does not quote any evidence to justify this interpretation. So little does he know of personalities and the general political situation, that he asks us to believe that Isvolsky's resignation of the post of Foreign Minister and appointment to be Ambassador at Paris was voluntary on his part, and that he welcomed the change because he believed that he could do better work to bring about war in Paris than in St. Petersburg. It is, of course, unfortunate for him that his book should have been written before the publication of M. Poincaré's recent volume; but even without that he should have been aware of the Ambassador's extraordinary unreliability and have known that, so far from directing, as he suggests, the policy of Russia, he was thoroughly distrusted by Sazonoff, who had superseded him, and that he belonged to a completely different school of politics.

In writing the book Professor Barnes does not appear to have made an independent study of the original material; the method he seems to have adopted is that he has read many of the secondary works and a few also of

the primary works, such as Grey's Memoirs, abstracted from them every statement or opinion which can in any way be used in support of his thesis and simply ignored everything else. Again and again, when he makes some particularly outrageous statement, we find that the reference he gives in support of it is not to an original telegram or dispatch or other authoritative document, but to some book such as Ewart or Morel, not to speak of even less reliable writers such as Dupin or Morhardt. As has already been pointed out in these columns, Ewart is not a reliable authority, and in one case is guilty of giving completely fictitious quotations from the *Times*. We are indeed in doubt whether Professor Barnes has ever read the more important of the original documents to which he refers. For instance, in describing the *Livre Noir*, he writes: "It presents in detail the Russian diplomatic documents of the years 1910-14, particularly stressing Franco-Russian relations and policies." To judge from this, he does not appear to know that the book is not a picture of Russian diplomacy, but merely a collection of the correspondence between St. Petersburg and Isvolsky at Paris.

But there are worse things than errors and blunders of this sort. Again and again we get positive misstatements of a kind which seem inexcusable. For instance, he repeatedly tells us that Great Britain had in 1912 definitely undertaken to support France in a war against Germany, whatever the causes and circumstances of the war might be, although he must know that not even the French claimed that this was the case; in the final crisis they always had to acknowledge that there was no specific obligation of this kind for England to come to their aid. Again, he repeatedly states that Grey had in a letter to Cambon of August 2, 1914, definitely committed himself in writing to take part in the War. Of course, the memorandum (which he calls a letter) did not contain anything of the kind; all that it said was that Great Britain would oppose Germany if she sent her fleet into the Channel in order to attack France, which was a very different thing—as he recognizes in other places, when it is convenient to him. He says that Germany offered to keep out of Belgium if England would remain neutral during the war. Of course, they never did anything of the kind. His general ignorance of the fundamental conditions of European diplomacy is shown by his treatment of the question of the Straits. He quite rightly points out that this was a matter with which the Russians were chiefly concerned, and that their interests in Serbia were subordinate to it. But he never distinguishes between the different aspects of what may be called the opening of the Straits, the control of the Straits, and the occupation of the Straits. He represents, for instance, the objects of Isvolsky in 1909 as identical with the projects for the seizure of the Straits, which were discussed in Russia after 1912, and entirely omits to take into consideration the evolution in the Russian attitude on this matter—an evolution which was, of course, explained by the results of the Balkan wars, which made the Turkish continued tenure of Constantinople very precarious—the growing influence of Germany at Constantinople, together with the Liman von Sanders episode. None of these matters are even referred to, although they are essential to the most elementary understanding of the subject.

This ignorance leads him to accuse Isvolsky and the French of "unmitigated hypocrisy and dishonesty" because, when in August, 1914, they recommended that Russia should attempt to purchase Turkish neutrality by

promising to Turkey inviolability of her territory, they were careful to explain that this would not in any way prevent Russia from deciding the Dardanelles question according to her own wishes at the close of the war. It looks as if he had never referred to the original documents, but taken the whole point from a book by Morel; otherwise he must have seen that the French suggestion was that at the close of the war they would be able to insist on the opening of the Straits to Russian ships of war and not to the occupation of the Straits; the opening of the Straits would, of course, be in no way inconsistent with the inviolability of Turkish territory, and it was the opening of the Straits, not the seizure of Constantinople, which had in European diplomacy long been recognized as the object of Russian policy. The very next sentence reads: "As early as September 2, 1915, we know that there existed between Russia and France 'a political agreement which recognized Russia's right to the final possession of Constantinople after the conclusion of peace.'" Does he not know that the agreement by which both Great Britain and France awarded Constantinople to Russia was made in March, 1915, as an immediate consequence of the attack upon the Dardanelles?

This charge of hypocrisy and dishonesty is characteristic of one of the most repellent features of the book. Professor Barnes is quite unscrupulous in bringing accusations of this kind against statesmen and writers whose acts and words he records. For instance, in one place he writes that Grey "with astonishing mendacity refers to the fact that Germany rejected a European Conference and vigorously contends that this wrecked all chances of peace." But Germany did reject a European Conference; and surely Grey was quite right in maintaining that the uncompromising rejection and the refusal to suggest any alternative scheme did in fact wreck the chances of peace. Where, then, is the "mendacity"? It is very unwise for a writer to bring charges of this kind against others unless he is quite sure that he has not let himself open to counter-charges of the same kind. Mr. Barnes has been very remiss in this. Dealing with this very matter, he says that Russia "refused to consent to Grey's proposal for a Conference because she would tolerate no interference with her freedom of action in the crisis." The truth is that Sazonoff telegraphed that, while he preferred direct conversations with Austria, "if these were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind which would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict." What are we to do with an author who claims to write with a sole regard for the attainment of the truth, when he is guilty of misstatements of this kind?

It is necessary for the purposes of his argument to show that the growing hostility between Great Britain and Germany was entirely the fault of this country, and quite unprovoked. For this purpose he must, of course, ignore as far as possible the effect in England of the provocative increase in the German navy and must suggest that this increase was no legitimate ground for apprehension in this country. He never, however, attempts to give any clear statement as to the relative strength of the two navies, and in one place he goes so far as to speak of the German navy in 1914 as "insignificant." No honest historian could possibly use this expression unless he was completely ignorant, not only of the size and composition of the German navy, but also of the very great efficiency which, by common agreement, it had attained. He even suggests that it was less important than the

French navy. We can only come to the conclusion that he has never attempted to work out the subject for himself or read any reliable book about it. These illustrations of the author's methods, which might be indefinitely extended, will suffice to show on how unsound a basis are built up the larger political and historical appreciations which are the chief object of the book.

IX. A CONSIDERATION OF THE STRICTURES OF THE "TIMES" REVIEWER.

We shall point out at the outset that this reviewer pursues the conventional Jesuitical method of throwing dust in the eyes of his readers. He nowhere makes the slightest attempt to grapple with the major theses developed in my book and to refute them by the citation of the relevant documents and monographs. Rather, he chooses to pick out minor details, where, by misrepresentation, he believes he can produce an impression of unreliability and, therefore, convince the uncritical reader of the untenable nature of the conclusions of the book as a whole. There is no effort to prove the charges of superficiality by citing collections of documents or monographs which I have neglected. Far from omitting inconvenient facts, I have, throughout the book, gone out of my way to bring to light every important charge in Entente propaganda levelled against Germany and Austria, in order that such allegations might be examined and refuted. Moreover, I have presented the arguments set forth in all of the apologetic memoirs written by leading Entente statesmen and diplomats. The other side has been given an opportunity to be heard, and, if the hearing has not proved convincing it is because of the weakness of their case. No tactics could be more foolish for a writer on the subject of war guilt from the revisionist point of view than to suppress facts and arguments contrary to his point of view. And, I might further state, no procedure could possibly be less necessary for any person informed in the premises. Indeed, the chief recreational feature connected with the execution of my book was the examination and riddling of the Entente myths and apologetics. Nor is the allegation of the *Times* critic that my advanced position is based upon the views of "unreliable" secondary writers, like Morel, Ewart, Morhardt and Dupin, at all founded upon fact In the first place, his slanders of the above writers are in no sense justified. They have all given evidence of much more information and candor than their detractor. But the important fact is that I have not based any conclusion of significance upon any foundation except the relevant documents. If I have cited secondary writers, it has been merely to drive home a point originally based upon the sources. If anything has been introduced into the book on the authority of any writer or observer this has been frankly stated, and all hypotheses have been described as hypotheses. We may now examine some of the specific points raised against me in the *Times* review.

No informed person has ever contended that Poincaré desired a European war in 1912-1913. He did not desire one until after Russia was armed and French opinion converted by the press campaign. It is definitely known that the French and Russians did not desire a European conflict before the close of 1915 at the earliest, all other things being equal. They expected that the critical crisis would come at the death of Franz Joseph. But what Poincaré feared especially was that Russia might be able to obtain the Straits

without a European war, which would end the hope of returning Alsace-Lorraine to France. Hence, he was much more willing than the Russians to have the Balkan wars grow into a European war, as Millerand's conversation with Ignatyev (Stieve, *Isvolsky and the World War*, p. 124) makes clear. At first, Russia had hopes that she might gain her objectives by the restricted Balkan war against Turkey, while Poincaré realized that this would bring nothing to France; indeed, that it would ruin the French hopes of having Russian aid to recover the Lost Provinces. We may answer the *Times* reviewer by asking if anything could be less fantastic to so realistic a Frenchman as the hard-headed Poincaré?

The *Times* reviewer ridicules my contention that Russia and France advised caution on Serbia in order to gain time for their military preparations. This is, however, the only hypothesis which in any sense conforms to the Franco-Russian procedure in 1914. Even more, this thesis is absolutely confirmed by Premier Pashitsch's telegram of July 31, 1914, to his chief of staff telling him that the Russians had informed the Serbian Minister in St. Petersburg that the Russian government was merely negotiating to gain time and that as soon as the mobilization was completed the Russians would declare war on the Austrians. The Russian generals, Dobrorolski and Palizyn have both fully confirmed this view.

There is no doubt that Izvolski retired voluntarily from the post of Foreign Minister in 1910 or that he chose the Paris post because it was the best place from which to direct his plans. It is true that he was rather under a cloud in St. Petersburg because of the failure of his 1908 *coup*, but the Paris post was his choice, even though he may have been personally relieved to escape from the presence of his Russian critics. Count Muraviev once told Ernest Judet that Paris was a much better place than St. Petersburg from which to direct Franco-Russian diplomacy. Nothing could well be sillier than to take the position of Lord Grey and the *Times* reviewer, to the effect that Izvolski became an unimportant person in Russian diplomacy after he became Ambassador to France. No one who is informed as to the personalities of the two men could imagine Sazonov dominating a person like Izvolski. Sazonov was a mediocrity of high personal character but lethargic disposition; Izvolski was one of the most unscrupulous characters in history, but a man of real ability and of boundless energy and ambition in diplomatic intrigue. Further, by December 8, 1913, Sazonov sent a long memorandum to the Tsar confessing to his conversion to Izvolski's Balkan politics, and on December 31, 1913, and February 8, 1914, he presided at Russian ministerial councils where European war, in conformity with Izvolski's policies, was discussed and planned. No doubt, Izvolski was personally unreliable in every way but it can scarcely be held that he would have lied to his own government concerning anything so vital as the understanding and execution of the foreign policies he had so much at heart.

My description of the *Livre Noir* is quite accurate, when taken in connection with the context from which the reviewer has torn it. I made it plain that the Stieve collection was a much fuller account of the Paris-St. Petersburg correspondence and that the London-St. Petersburg communications were contained in the Siebert collection. No one would have been misled by my description, and there are ample references to the *Livre Noir* in my book

to demonstrate my acquaintance with it. Indeed, I count M. Marchand among my personal friends.

The *Times* reviewer waxes indignant that I should have mentioned an English understanding to come to the aid of France in the case of a war with Germany which existed in 1912. This cannot be denied unless one is willing to admit that Poincaré, Sazonov, and Grey, one or all, lied about the matter. In his report to the Tsar in September, 1912, Sazonov told him how Grey had voluntarily confirmed what Poincaré had already told him, namely, that a secret agreement existed whereby England was bound to aid France on land and sea in the event of war. This was, by implication, reduced to writing in the Grey-Cambon correspondence two months later. While Grey was too slippery a person to allow himself to be bound explicitly, we know that he had no personal hesitation in regarding himself as bound to intervene in 1914. He was merely afraid of being deserted by the Cabinet and the House of Commons unless he could exploit the rape of Belgium. But we know from the British Documents that the Serbian and Belgian issues did not play any part whatever in the deliberations of Grey, Crowe and Nicolson in 1914 with respect to their reasons for deciding to aid France and Russia.

Moreover, Grey's communication to Cambon on August 2nd, 1914, did, for all practical purposes bind England to enter the War. As Cambon noted in his diary, a country does not make war by halves, its army lying idle while its navy participates. Further, before he made his speech in Parliament on August 3rd, Grey had absolute assurance from Germany that she would not attack the French channel ports if England would remain neutral. Therefore, there was quite evidently something deeper than formal written promises in the Anglo-French arrangement.

There is little need for rehashing the Belgian question again. Grey admits in his memoirs that he would have resigned if England had refused to enter the War, irrespective of what happened to Belgium. The British Documents show that the British decisions as to the issues in 1914 had no relation to the Belgian question whatever. Bourgeois and Pagés have shown from unpublished French documents that Grey told Cambon he was personally convinced that England should intervene, before he received his reply from Germany as to her probable attitude towards Belgium. Finally, there is no doubt whatever that Grey rejected Lichnowsky's proposal that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, in return for which England should remain neutral. Some have asserted that it would have been immoral for Grey to have bargained with Germany concerning Belgian neutrality. They have not shown, however, why it would have been worse to bargain with Germany for an end which involved Belgian protection and the probable avoidance of war than it was for him in 1914 actually to bargain with France, with the result of the invasion of Belgium and the coming of a World War!

As to the development of the details of the Straits policy, that was not a part of the purpose of my book. I indicated that Russia's desire to have access through the Straits was the major element in her Near Eastern—indeed, her whole foreign—policy. As to the development of policy from access to control, that was wholly incidental to the larger issue of being able

to make use of the warm water port on the Black Sea. In a detailed monograph on the development of Russia's Straits policy from 1908 to 1914 this matter would have had a legitimate place. Yet, to have emphasized this progress would have really made the case against Russia worse, as the aspiration to annex the Straits was more of a threat to European peace than the desire to have unlimited access through them.

The question of Germany and Grey's plans for a diplomatic settlement of the crisis in 1914 have been amply dealt with in my book (pp. 260-64, 503-11) and need not be repeated here. Germany rejected only one of more than a half-dozen British proposals for peace, and for this she proposed a substitute which Grey himself admitted in 1914 to be the best plan of all suggested at the time, namely, direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Indeed, we now know from the British Documents that this was Grey's original and favorite plan, which had been rejected by Poincaré at St. Petersburg as early as July 22, 1914. What then, becomes of the *Times* reviewer's assertion that Germany suggested no alternative plan for the rejected conference scheme? Or whence his indignation at my charge of mendacity against Grey, because Grey states in his memoirs that Germany's rejection of his proposed conference destroyed all hope of a peaceful solution in 1914, when Grey himself then admitted the method of conversations to be a better one? As to Sazonov's attitude towards a conference, the reviewer does not call attention to Sazonov's sharp warning on July 27th that he would tolerate no outside interference with Russia's attitude towards Austria. Already, on July 25th, Nicolson had warned Grey that he must not try to restrain Russia. Further, the reviewer ignores entirely Dobrorolski's candid admission that all of Sazonov's diplomacy in 1914 was a fake, designed solely to deceive Europe, especially Germany and Austria, while the Russian military measures were being perfected.

There is no reason for modifying my reference to the German navy as insignificant, when compared with the combined British, Russian, French and Italian navies. Numerically, of course, it was greatly inferior to the British, and, if the British feared it, then they should have turned to the improvement of the efficiency of their own naval forces rather than devoting themselves to opposing the German plans. Personally, I do not approve of the German naval program before 1914, because British antipathy was too great a price to pay for realizing it, yet it is hard to see why Germany did not have a right to plan naval increases if she chose to do so. Indeed, Admiral von Tirpitz has explained to me how he held that it was his task to prepare Germany to defend herself, prior to the time when her civil government had secured sufficiently satisfactory diplomatic arrangements to make armament less essential to German safety. Finally, after Tirpitz had agreed to the 16:10 arrangement proposed by Churchill in 1913, there was no need for British alarm.

In short, the eminent *Times* reviewer will need to advance beyond the technique of chiding me for failure to distinguish between a letter and a memorandum before he can achieve significant results in undermining Revisionism.

Harry Elmer Barnes

X. A MASTER OF DISINGENUITY.

DISSERVICE TO THE TRUTH[1]

By J. W. Headlam-Morley, C. B. E.

It is impossible to read this book[2] without a feeling of exasperation, and almost despair. As everyone knows, there is in progress what we may call a concerted movement for the revision of the opinions regarding the origin of the War generally held among the Allies during the time of the War, and embodied in the Treaty of Versailles and the accompanying documents. It is a movement confined to no one country, but is carried on by historical scholars in many countries, who bring to the work well-trained minds experienced in historical research and a genuine desire to attain to the truth in an extraordinarily tangled and difficult problem. Perhaps the most important contribution to this controversy is that of M. Renouvin, who, though, as Professor Barnes points out, he occupies a semi-official position, has not refrained from showing how untenable are many of the opinions and statements on which the original Allied case was based. It is a controversy in which, in particular, Americans, such as Professor Coolidge, Professor Fay, and Mr. Bernadotte Schmitt, have taken a distinguished part. And then comes Professor Barnes, who once more takes the whole subject out of the sober attitude of scientific historical analysis and reintroduces into it many of the worst elements of wartime propaganda.

He claims to have discovered the real truth which has been obscured by the "excessive timidity or interpretative incapacity of many revisionist scholars who appear to the writer to be unwilling to draw the inevitable conclusions from the facts which they present." The "inevitable conclusions" are that Germany was for all practical purposes completely innocent, and that the whole thing was a put-up plot and conspiracy arranged chiefly between Poincaré and Isvolsky, who were helped by M. Paul Cambon, and who succeeded in bamboozling Sir Edward Grey. The author would persuade us that these conclusions arise from a study of the facts. The test of the book will be then primarily whether the facts are correctly stated; if they are not, then, of course, the whole conclusion falls to the ground. Judged in this way the judgment on the book must be decisive. There is no work on this subject, including even those written during the height of the propaganda fever during the war, which is so completely unreliable, in which elementary facts are so constantly misstated, and in which every fact incompatible with this theory is so consistently ignored.

It is impossible in a short review to give the full critical analysis which is necessary to support these words. What we propose then to do is simply to take one single topic, one indeed of primary importance—the Belgian question—and show how the author deals with it.

Let us take first the following quotation:

"There was no treaty obligation whatever binding England to protect the neutrality of Belgium. Such an obligation was alleged by Grey and his

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[1] The London *Observer*, October 3, 1926.

[2] *The Genesis of the World War.* By Harry Elmer Barnes.

associates to reside in the treaty of 1839, but this only bound the various signatory powers not to violate Belgian neutrality themselves. *It did not in any way bind them to intervene to protect Belgian neutrality.* When the treaty was drawn up, its purpose was merely to continue the separation of Belgium and Holland, and did not take into consideration the matter of any military invasions of France or Germany through Belgian territory." Incredible as it may appear, neither in this passage or anywhere else does he even refer to the guarantee of Belgian neutrality which was attached to the Treaty. We are quite aware that there are some writers (we think they are profoundly mistaken) who maintain that the guarantee did not imply an obligation to go to war in defense of Belgian neutrality, but what can we say of an author who never tells his readers that there was this guarantee, and never attempts to discuss what it meant! The last sentence of the quotation is completely untrue; it could not have been written by anyone who had even attempted to inform himself as to the history of the Treaty; the whole point of the guaranteed neutrality was to give primarily to Holland, and secondly to Germany, security against a French attack, a security which had hitherto been given by the annexation of Belgium.

Again, not once, but repeatedly, he states that "Germany had offered not to invade Belgium" if England would remain neutral. Of course, she never did anything of the kind; this is a palpable untruth; all that happened was that Lichnowsky asked the question whether England would remain neutral if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality. As Grey points out and as we now know to be true from the German records, Lichnowsky had no authority to ask this question or to make this suggestion, and it would certainly have been repudiated at once by the German Government. For, as Professor Barnes must well know, the whole scheme of campaign, if there was to be a war with France, was based on the invasion of Belgium. This scheme had been carefully planned years ago; there was no alternative, and it was completely impossible for the Germans at the last moment to alter it and to devise another plan of campaign. In this connection we must note that he never tells his readers that the ultimatum to Belgium had been drafted, and had been dispatched to the German Minister at Brussels two days before this conversation took place; he obviously omits to do so, as the whole history of this document is most discreditable to Germany, and is quite inconsistent with his theory.

Again, he asserts that Grey practically intimidated Belgium into appealing to England to intervene in order to protect Belgian neutrality, and he justifies this extraordinary statement by a comparison of a telegram sent on August 3, in which the Belgians say: "In the actual circumstances we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers," and another telegram of August 4, in which Belgium appeals to them to coöperate as guarantee Powers in the defense of her territory. Would it be believed that he never refers to the fact that between the dispatch of these two telegrams German forces had actually entered Belgian territory? It was this and not, as he suggests, a hint from Great Britain, which explains their action. On the 3rd, confronted by the German ultimatum, they made "a supreme appeal for diplomatic intervention"; on the 4th, when their territory was actually invaded, they appealed to the guarantee for armed assistance. Could the wilful suppression of vital facts go further?

This is the way in which he treats one of the most important points; we see in it every fault of which an historian could be capable: complete ignorance as to the origin and purport of the Treaty, positive misstatements as to essential facts during the final negotiations, and suppression of essential points which are inconvenient to him. This is no single or exceptional instance. If his handling of any other matter is analysed in the same way, it will be found that all these qualities recur. In fact the whole basis on which his elaborate and pretentious structure is built up will be found to be completely rotten.

XI. PROF. BARNES' REPLY.[1]

TRYING TO SHATTER "MYTH" OF ENGLAND'S "HOLY WAR"

To the Editor of The Republican:

I have read the article on British opinions of my book which you published in your issue of the 24th. Your writer was evidently desirous of sparing my feelings as he did not mention the worst strictures of Mr. Headlam-Morley, nor did he quote from a savage attack upon the book, presumably by R. W. Seton-Watson, in the London *Times* for September 30. He need not, however, have exhibited this courteous solicitude, for these British writers merely insist upon affording overwhelming confirmation of the thesis advanced on pages 17-18 of the preface of my book to the effect that "there is today more need for realistic education on the matter of the relation of Great Britain to the World War than on any other subject connected with the general subject of war guilt. . . . There exists an almost unbelievable need for education on this subject in British quarters in spite of the works of Morel, Gooch, Loreburn, Ewart and Beazley."

The need for enlightenment in Great Britain still appears to be unimpaired. Even writers like Lowes Dickinson, who are no longer under any illusion, resent having anyone other than an Englishman puncture the bubble of Entente mythology (see the *New Republic* for July 28 and October 20). and there exists in England an unofficial boycott of Mr. Dickinson's own admirable and disconcerting *International Anarchy*.

Mr. Headlam-Morley states that my book led him almost to the point of despair. He leaves one with the impression that what he despairs of is the possibility of getting currency and acceptance for the truth with respect to war origins, but what he really despairs of is the hope of long continuing the myth of England's "holy war" and the unimpeachable sincerity, honesty and pacific endeavors of Sir Edward Grey. He and Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed may hold the bridge for a few months by indiscriminately abusing those who challenge the Grey legend, but their day is not for long. The seeds of treason are in evidence even in England itself, as evidenced by the writings of Professors Lowes Dickinson and Raymond Beazley and of Miss Edith Durham, whose review of my book in the London *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1926, might be fruitfully compared with the heated diatribe of Mr. Headlam-Morley.

As has been uniformly the case with British critics of my book, they have confined their wrath chiefly to my treatment of the role of Grey and

[1] Springfield *Republican*, October 24, 1926.

England, and this in spite of the fact that my moderation in this regard has been the chief cause of criticism of the book in every continental country of importance. And of all of Grey's acts the Belgian imposture is, quite naturally, the one on which the English myth-mongers are most sensitive. Mr. Headlam-Morley, after a paragraph of generalized abuse in the opening section of his review in the London *Observer* for October 3, devotes all of his space to the Belgian affair, endeavoring to prove that England was obliged to act individually to defend the neutrality of Belgium and that Germany made no offer to keep out of Belgium if England would remain neutral.

Mr. Headlam-Morley rests his case chiefly upon the fact that I did not cite the text of the treaty of 1839, but rested content with citing the authority of those who had written on the subject. Now, had I done what he suggested, namely, cite the text of the treaty and state my view that it did not bind England to act individually, he would have pounced upon me and asked, "Who is Barnes, and what does he mean by opposing his views to those of Oakes, Mowat and others who hold that England was obliged to intervene?" I foresaw this contingency, and, instead of offering my own views, I consciously based the interpretation advanced in the book upon the opinions of the two most distinguished British authorities who had examined the problem, namely, Lord Loreburn, the former Lord High Chancellor of England, and Dr. John S. Ewart, King's Counsellor of Canada, and Canadian representative in the international fisheries dispute. Likewise we can bring to our support the view of the leading British authority on the subject, Dr. George Peabody Gooch. In the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* (Vol. III, p. 503) Dr. Gooch says: "The Guarantee of 1839, as Palmerston pointed out, gave a right, but did not impose an obligation, to defend Belgian neutrality. Gladstone's treaties with France and Prussia in 1870 were only necessary because that of 1839 did not automatically invoke action."

Further, I showed that their views were in entire accord with the attitude of the leading English statesmen who were faced by this problem during the 19th century, Lord Derby, Mr. Gladstone and the Marquis of Salisbury. In 1870-71 Mr. Gladstone so fully recognized that the treaty of 1839 was inadequate to the guaranteeing of the neutrality of Belgium that he felt he needed to make a separate treaty to put England in a position where she could legally guarantee Belgian neutrality. Does Mr. Headlam-Morley suppose that Derby, Gladstone and Salisbury were unable to obtain competent technical advice as to the meaning of the treaty of 1839? It is amusing to note that after all his noisy protest about my failure to cite the sentence in the treaty of 1839, Mr. Headlam-Morley likewise fails to cite it and simply offers his own private judgment as opposed to that of the best British authorities and to the precedents and opinions of his own government in the period since 1839!

Mr. Headlam-Morley contends that Germany never made any substantial proposal that she would keep out of Belgium if England would remain neutral. He contends that this was an unofficial proposal of the German Ambassador which was unauthorized and would have been instantly repudiated by his home government. Grey himself, by his attitude toward Lichnowsky at the time, by his submitting the proposition to the Cabinet and to Paris, and by his telegraphing of the proposal to Sir Edward Goschen,

British Ambassador at Berlin, proved that he took this as an authorized offer from Germany, and Lichnowsky has shown it to be such. Further, if Grey had doubted the good faith of this proposal he could have put Germany in an extremely bad hole by accepting it in principle and then awaiting results. If Germany had refused to come through and make good Grey could have revealed her duplicity with the most telling effect.

Mr. Headlam-Morley contends that Germany had no other possible plan of war than to go through Belgium into France. He should know that there was an alternative plan of fighting on the defensive in the West and throwing the bulk of her forces against Russia. While the general staff had decided in 1912 that the western offensive was preferable it would still have been possible on August 1 to have changed to the Russian offensive if British neutrality had been assured. No. 123 of the British *Blue Book* makes it clear that Grey would not promise British neutrality irrespective of either a German promise to keep out of Belgium or any other conditions which Germany might offer England. He, himself, admits in his memoirs that he would have resigned if he had not been able to throw England into the war without regard to the Belgian issue.

I did not specifically mention the German ultimatum to Belgium as having been sent to Brussells several days before Lichnowsky's conversation with Grey on August 1, as it was not to be presented unless conditions warranted, and these conditions were primarily the attitude of Belgium and Great Britain. Neither did Mr. Headlam-Morley mention the fact that as early as February, 1914, there was in the British War Office a document already drawn up describing the rate of exchange according to which the British soldiers in France and Belgium were to be paid, or refer to the continued mobilization of the British navy after July 25! But, after all, neither of our omissions is of great consequence in estimating war guilt. Mr. Headlam-Morley concludes his review by a statement that the rest of my book is as bad as the handling of the Belgian problem. I entirely agree with him!

Mr. Headlam-Morley is as much disturbed over the tone of my book as he is over its content. Now I did not pretend to be writing for the purpose of being advanced from an assistant professor to an associate professor in a conventional American university. What I was endeavoring to do was to make some slight dent upon public opinion and to enlighten some small portion of the educated public regarding one of the most important issues of contemporary times.

For this the tone and style of the book were, it still appears to me, very well adapted. I do not by any means regard the book as even approximating perfection, but my chief regret is that it is not a better book of the type which I tried to make it. I would not even consider changing its general character. What is the trouble with Mr. Headlam-Morley is that he has not yet awakened from his Rip Van Winkle slumbers, induced by the shell shock of the first cannonading of 1914, and he still believes that anything which frames a case against the Entente is rhetorical invective and propaganda. He needs to bump his head against a row of the new books and monographs which have been coming out on this question since 1922. He is due for a good bit of intellectual stretching and eye-rubbing when he does begin to register some response to the *Kriegsschuldfrage* alarm clock.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

Chapter X.

ALMOST PERSUADED: MACK EASTMAN AND CANADIAN MISGIVINGS

THE following discussion between Professor Mack Eastman of the University of British Columbia and the present writer is of interest as presenting the objections to Revisionism, formulated by a most intelligent and progressive historian, under no illusions as to modern diplomatic methods whatever, but tied to France by sentimental bonds. In other words, Professor Eastman's views of war guilt represent the sincere efforts of an honest and intelligent historian to rationalize his Francophilism and to adapt the Revisionist viewpoint to the result. He is not in any sense blind to the new evidence, as is the case with such American Francophiles as Hazen, Davis and Anderson.

I. FRESH LIGHT ON WAR ORIGINS.[1]

By Harry Elmer Barnes

The basic causes of the war were such general ones as nationalism, imperialism, and militarism, for which no single country can be held either uniquely or primarily responsible. They were fanned and intensified about equally by German militarism, French revenge aspirations, British navalism and Imperialism, and the century-old Russian ambition to get control of Constantinople and the Straits. Whatever the case earlier, Germany was relatively less prepared for war in a military sense in 1914 than Russia and France. General Buat admits that in 1914 the French active army was 910,000, as against 870,000 for Germany with nearly twice the population of France; and Colonel Repington has admitted that the German army was in regard to equipment, manoeuvres, and leadership inferior to the French. This was especially true in the artillery branch. The active Russian army numbered 1,284,000.

As to the attitude of the various classes in each state towards war, it must be admitted that the military and naval circles in every state were willing to accept war, whether it were the German General Staff or Churchill and the British naval clique. It must likewise be asserted that in no country did the mass of people want war, but that the difficulties in the way of converting the people to the war view were at least slightly less in Germany than in the other countries. As to the responsible civil governments there

[1] *Canadian Forum*, July, 1925.

was. however, a great contrast. There is no doubt that the civil authorities in Austria desired a war on Serbia. It is also true that the group in control of France wanted a European war in 1914 before England could be detached from active participation in the Entente through her negotiations with Germany in June, 1914. In Russia it is certain that the Tsar desired peace, that the Grand Duke Nicholas, his followers in the Court, and Izvolski, ambassador at Paris, ardently desired a European war to secure the Straits, and that the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, wavered between peace and an ardent lust for Constantinople, which he knew could be obtained only by war. In Germany, England, and Italy there was a solid sentiment for peace in 1914 on the part of the civil governments, and in this desire for peace no one was more genuine, within the limitations of his temperament, than the Kaiser. No one of importance in the German civil government was in June or July, 1914, willing to favor any proposal for anything beyond a justly punitive war on Serbia, and it required the atrocious assassination of the Archduke to bring them even to this point.

The immediate responsibility for the World War goes back to 1912 rather than to 1914, and is to be found in the growing collusion between Poincaré and the Russian militarists, actively led in relation with France by Izvolski, who obtained vast sums of money from Russia to bribe the French press so that it might convert the French popular sentiment to an aggressive Franco-Russian attitude, particularly in the Balkans. Poincaré took a leading part in deciding as to the specific distribution of this money to the French papers. He also encouraged Russia to adopt a strong policy in the Balkans, and promised substantial French aid, under the stipulation that he should have a supervisory control of Russian policy in the Near East lest it might take forms which would not redound to the furtherance of his policy and that of Izvolski. This policy was to exploit a European war over the Balkans, in order that Russia might secure the Straits and France recover Alsace-Lorraine, which had been Poincaré's chief aspiration since boyhood.

This led Russia to encourage Serbian nationalism after 1913, which was rendered easier by the aggressive attitude of Austria towards Serbia from 1912-1914. This intensification of Serbian nationalistic agitation and intrigue led to the planning by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievitch, chief of the Intelligence Division of the Serbian General Staff, of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke. Jovanovitch has exultantly confessed that the Serbian Government was fully aware of the plan for the assassination of the Archduke. Nikola Nenadovitch, another prominent Serb, has also recently admitted that the Serbian Government was fully aware of this plot, that it attempted to have Dimitrievitch assassinated, and later executed him for treason, lest he might reveal the secret. In spite of its knowledge of the plot, the Serbian Government did not properly warn Austria, the responsibility for which failure, as Leopold Mandl has shown, rested chiefly upon Serbia and perhaps slightly upon disaffected Austrian officials.

In spite of the fact that Austria did not have positive knowledge of Serbian official complicity in July, 1914, she had plenty of evidence of the general responsibility of Serbia, and her attitude towards Serbia was the only practicable one if she hoped to maintain the territorial integrity of the

Dual-Monarchy. The Serbian consciousness of the inadequacy of her reply to the Austrian ultimatum is proved by the fact that Serbia had ordered the mobilization of her army several hours before sending her reply to Austria.

The Austrian policy in July, 1914, did not embody in any sense the desire for a world war, but the Austrian statesmen were willing to *risk* the undesired possibility of such a conflict, rather than postpone any longer attention to the Serbian nuisance. Germany, who had restrained Austrian policy towards Serbia in 1912-14, was now willing that Austria should punish Serbia, but the civil government in Germany and the Kaiser were distinctly opposed to a world war on the subject and put every pressure on Austria to restrain her as soon as this prospect loomed up. They would probably have been successful if Poincaré and the Russian militarists had had not been able to precipitate the Russian general mobilization which brought on the war. Until after Poincaré's visit to Russia in July, most European countries admitted that Austria was justified in strong action against Serbia. As an illustration of the disastrous effect of the military groups on diplomacy, it may be stated that at the very time the German civil government was attempting to restrain Austria, von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, was secretly telegraphing to Hötzendorf, the Austrian Chief of Staff, urging him to stand firm in aggression.

Poincaré, carrying out a plan earlier arranged, visited Russia in July, 1914, and, before knowing the terms of the Austrian demands upon Serbia, gave Russia a free hand in the Serbian crisis, and promised vigorous French aid. This was the crucial step in bringing on the immediate outbreak of the conflict. It alone encouraged the ambitious but cowardly Russian militarists sufficiently to go ahead with the mobilization, which both French and Russians knew would mean certain and inevitable war. There has been a tendency of late to throw the responsibility for the immediate occasion of the declarations of war upon Russia, but few reputable scholars believe that Russia would have taken any active stand against Germany and Austria without the ardent incitement and encouragement of Poincaré. Even Fabre-Luce, in the most recent and objective French book on the origins of the war, admits that after Poincaré's visit to Russia there was never any real chance of averting the war.

The French officials made no effort to prevent the Russians from proceeding with the fatal military preparations, but urged them to hurry these along (provided they covered up their acts and intentions adequately) in order that more time might be gained on Germany. In this attitude Poincaré and his group were ably and enthusiastically aided by Izvolski and the Russian militarists in the army and the civil government. The Allies rejected a practicable Italian scheme to secure mediation, and Sir Edward Grey, in spite of his earlier desire for peace, either through confusion or intent, strongly influenced the later phases of the Russian general mobilization.

England was bound to enter the war whether Belgium had been invaded or not, and would have done so, though the Cabinet might have encountered serious difficulties in uniting the nation as strongly behind war as was possible after the heaven-sent episode of the invasion of Belgium.

The English conscience was not acute about Belgium, as the English Government had made repeated, if vain, efforts to get the Belgians to consent to the landing of British troops on Belgian soil in the event of war. Nor were the French and British authorities horrified or surprised at the German invasion of Belgium. They had expected it, but were actually surprised at, and unprepared for, the rapidity of the German progress through Belgium.

Probably the best summary of the facts is the brilliant epigram of Fabre-Luce: 'The actions of Austria and Germany made the war possible; those of the Entente made it inevitable.' While such matters are scarcely amenable to reduction to strict mathematical categories and expressions, if one were to list the Great Powers in the order of their responsibility for the immediate outbreak of the war he would have to agree that Russia and France tie for first place, and are followed in order by Austria, Germany and England.

The really important aspect of the above material is not, of course, the satisfaction of our curiosity as to the historical facts regarding war origins, but the important bearing which these facts have on public and international policy at the present time. As the whole European international policy is still based upon the assumption of unique German responsibility for the War, it is evident that the facts demand the repudiation of this program and the adoption of a more fair and constructive policy. The Dawes Plan and any current American and European agreements as to its enforcement, while immensely better than the Poincaré policy, are comparable to efforts to reduce the living expenses of the wife of a man known by all to be innocent, whose death sentence has been reduced to life imprisonment. What we need to do is to adopt a broad, constructive, and farsighted policy. The guilt for the World War having been distributed, the expense of indemnifying the sufferers should likewise be distributed. The United States might well use its undoubted financial power to induce France and England (the latter would probably gladly welcome the proposal) to forego all notion of any reparations from Germany, and to adopt the program of a mutual sharing of the burdens of reconstruction and rehabilitation. The United States could with great propriety indicate its good-will and intentions in the circumstances by cancelling the debts of the European powers on the above condition. Once England and France give some such evidence of international honesty and decency, one of the chief obstacles and objections to the United States joining the League of Nations would be removed. We may agree with Fabre-Luce that though the war-time slogan that America and the Entente entered the war for the purpose of ending all war was at the time pure hypocrisy, yet we shall have lost both the war and the peace if we do not now take steps to make it an achieved reality. The beginning of any such move must be found in an apprehension of the facts concerning the origins of the World War.

II. NEW MYTHS FOR OLD: PROFESSOR BARNES AND WAR ORIGINS.[1]

By Mack Eastman

I have dwelt too long upon ex-Chancellor Marx. I had hoped to come more quickly to an equally remarkable article which appeared last July in *The Canadian Forum*, and which escaped my eye until recently. Professor Barnes' 'Fresh Light on War Origins' merits attention, even at eight months of distance, on account of the brilliant qualities and intrepid character of the author as well as the distinctive traits of the contribution itself.

In a foreword, Mr. Barnes mentions three 'convincing' works by scholarly and courageous Frenchmen, MM. Fabre-Luce, Morhardt, and Judet. Later on he implies that Fabre-Luce is objective also. While thoroughly appreciating the excellent qualities of these writers, I cannot consent to calling them objective or convincing. Fabre-Luce is talented and attractive, but highly interpretative and highly subjective. His indictment of M. Poincaré is clever but overdone. When Dr. Barnes says, 'Even Fabre-Luce admits that after Poincaré's visit to Russia there was never any real chance of averting the war,' it is as if someone wrote, 'Even E. D. Morel admitted that English policy was wrong.'

As for the 'convincing' quality of Matthias Morhardt, I shall convey an impression of it to my Canadian readers more readily by quoting his estimate of Sir Edward Grey rather than of M. Poincaré, who labours under a certain disability as a 'foreigner.' After denouncing Sir Edward's 'bad faith,' 'ill will,' and 'criminal attitude,' Morhardt concludes:

> "He showed that in reality he was merely preoccupied with setting a trap for the commercial and industrial adversary of England, and that, in addition he was perfectly resolved to suppress this competitor. British diplomacy carried through this programme right to the end with cynical perseverance. If we think of the cost of the immense drama which, merely for the material benefit of England, unfolded itself during more than four years, we cannot help feeling a sense of disgust and shame."

Morhardt is heavily documented and in deadly earnest, and he goes after M. Poincaré even more 'convincingly.'

As for the unhappy Ernest Judet, his bitter hatred of his persecutors, Poincaré and Clemenceau, 'this generation of reptiles,' naturally detracts from the historic value of his interpretations, although his chivalrous vindication of Georges Louis makes fascinating reading.

All three writers, says Professor Barnes, 'unhesitatingly agree in placing the responsibility for the aggressive Russian mobilization and the precipitation of the war upon Poincaré and the military group in France . . .' This is half right and half wrong. Their one *bête noire* is Poincaré without any military group to share his guilt.

So much for the foreword. We now come to the opening paragraph. 'Whatever the case earlier, Germany was far less prepared for war in a military sense in 1914 than Russia and France.' This was not Bernhardi's opinion. Early in 1914, he held that France would need three years more

[1] *Canadian Forum*, May 1926.

to prepare. On the eve of the war, Senator Humbert made startling disclosures as to the dilapidated state of the frontier fortresses, the infantry's lack of boots, etc. In uniforms also there was grave unpreparedness. The blazing red trousers had been condemned three years before, but funds had not been found to equip more than a few units with 'horizon blue' or similar 'invisible' apparel. Nor did Russia hope to be ready until 1917 when her system of strategic railways would be complete.

'General Buat admits that in 1914 the French active army was 910,000, as against 870,000 for Germany, with nearly twice the population of France.' True, the Three-Year Law had been a frantic effort to throw everybody available into the first line of defence, since Germany's double population provided masses of reserves with which France could not compete. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Buat is writing an apologia for the French General Staff, which had been accused of leaving the country inadequately protected, and that consequently for him the highest figures are the truest. His estimate is higher even than that of the German experts, who make it 794,000 Frenchmen, with an allowance of 19,000 more for the Foreign Legion and 67,000 for the coloured troops. General Sir Frederick Maurice gives the Germans an initial advantage of 90,000 plus a number equal to the number of Frenchmen doing garrison duty abroad. (*Foreign Affairs*, N.Y., July, 1925, p. 617). All these estimates include French troops stationed in Algeria and Morocco, as well as the colonial garrisons scattered far and wide, so that even the available 'active army' was considerably less than the German. Furthermore, the German Army Law of 1913 provided for a final increase of 60,000 in October, 1914. In other words, had the war been delayed till October, the Germans would have had over 900,000 men available, as against possibly 750,000 French soldiers actually in France. This aspect of the question is not of supreme importance, since reserves, artillery, munitions, and factories were the ultimate factors, but if a writer is citing just one authority, it would be wiser not to quote a notorious extremist.

'Colonel Repington has admitted that the German army was, in regard to equipment, manoeuvres, and leadership, inferior to the French. This was especially true in the artillery branch.' Doubtless this pathetic unpreparedness of the German army accounts for the incredible rapidity of its nearly successful rush upon Paris. However, the uninitiated should be warned that, in spite of Mr. Barnes' use of the perfect tense here, Colonel Repington made his luckless estimate in October, 1911, to the great and well-founded disgust of the Germans. Even in the artillery, the French superiority was confined to the 'seventy-fives,' while their weakness in 'heavies' and in machine-guns was a source of anxiety to scientifically-minded Frenchmen who disapproved of the General Staff's policy of spending its money upon crowding the barrack's instead of developing the mechanical side of the army.

'It is also true that the group in control of France wanted a world war in 1914 before England could be detached from active participation in the Entente.' Some such bold guess as this is necessary to round out Mr. Barnes' main thesis, but in default of any proof we may be pardoned for considering probabilities. The reader should know that in May, 1914, the general elections had registered the popular reaction from the warlike tension of 1912-

13, and the Chamber had a strong Leftward and pacifist majority, unfriendly to the maintenance of the Three-Year Law. Hence the choice of the socialistically-minded Viviani as Premier, and his selection of a true Leftward ministry. Viviani disliked military men, and the only one in his cabinet was the Minister of War, Captain Messimy, a man who certainly would not influence the course of events. When the war did break out, the Nationalists thought it a tragic joke that such a 'group of bleating pacifists' should have been obliged to call the country to arms against the invader. In March of that year, having a pretty good idea of the dangerous drift of 1912-13, I had felt constrained to warn an assembly of United Farmers of Alberta and other audiences in Calgary of the disaster toward which we were or had been heading (*Grain Growers' Guide*, May, 1914.) The salutary Leftward swing of the May elections in France, and the definitive change in 'the group in control,' gave me an absolute assurance that henceforth the inevitable tendency of the new French Government would be to put the brakes on the war-chariot, and to strive, however weakly, toward the pacification of Europe. The German Social Democrats were delighted with the composition of the new French Chamber. For the Americans, however, 'a president is a president,' and Mr. Barnes will insist that President Poincaré himself was 'the group in control.' Neither Professor Gooch nor M. Renouvin think that Poincaré wanted war in 1914, and in any case he could do nothing without the assent of the new government.

'The immediate responsibility for the World War . . . is to be found in the growing collusion between Poincaré and the Russian militarists . . . He also encouraged Russia to adopt a strong policy in the Balkans.' Certainly the Soviets rendered history a true service by opening the Czarist archives, and as certainly the resultant revelations are embarrassing for M. Poincaré and others. In the *Livre Noir*, M. Isvolsky very frequently gives his superiors to understand that M. Poincaré is their man. However, one finds a bit of everything in these documents, and there are a number of cases where France sought to moderate Russian action. Let us pick two or three examples. First, take Sazonoff's report upon his visit to Paris in the autumn of 1912 while Poincaré is really still in power, or 'in control,' or, in other words, Premier. Sazonoff tells the Czar that France 'feels disquietude' at the thought that Balkan events, by involving Russia and Austria, might eventually drag her into war (*Livre Noir*, II, p. 356.) Second, July 25, 1913, a fortnight after the Chamber has accepted the Three-Year Law, M. Poincaré being merely President of the Republic, Isvolsky wires Sazonoff: 'The Minister of Foreign Affairs (Stephen Pichon) refuses to admit—in spite of the "very painful impression" that his declarations may provoke in St. Petersburg.—that Russia may commit an act which would constitute a danger to peace.' (The act in view is a demonstration against Turkey in Armenia). (*Livre Noir*, II, p. 113). Third, late in 1913, when the Radical Doumergue has succeeded the Conservative Barthou as Premier, with Caillaux as Minister of Finance, and the pendulum shows signs of swinging Leftward again, the Russian Prime Minister reports to the Czar that, 'as at present composed the French Government shows the undoubted and hardly hidden tendency to avoid every eventuality which might set France back upon the path of adventures. . . . We observe a single tendency: that of maintaining calm and peace.' Quotations of this sort spoil hopelessly the symmetry of the plot.

Doumergue made way early in June, 1914, for a Socialistic-Radical Ministry headed by Viviani.[1] Let us now reach forward an instant to a continuation of Dr. Barnes' indictment of 'the group in control of France.' We are trembling on the brink of a catastrophe:

'The French officials made no effort to prevent the Russians from proceeding with the fatal military preparations, but urged them to hurry these along (provided they covered up their acts and intentions adequately) in order that more time might be gained on Germany.' This sweeping declaration requires some qualification. For one thing, the Russian preparations began without the knowledge of the French officials. For another, Premier Viviani and President Poincaré were both on the sea and out of effective touch with events from July 23 to 29 inclusive. The only chance the French Government had to express an opinion was on the morning of July 30 when Russia was thinking of passing from partial to general mobilization. Isvolsky wired Sazonoff that because of the peace parleys still going on the French Government judges it extremely desirable that whatever preparations the Russians are making '*eussent le moins possible un caractère apparent et provocateur.*' So far, so good; but the telegram continues; the Russian military attaché tells Isvolsky that Captain Messimy has told him that the Russians might declare themselves ready for peace's sake to slow down their preparations, even if they not only continued them but intensified them, provided they avoided serious transportation of troops. Mr. Barnes, who habitually condemns M. Isvolsky and the Russian military caste, nevertheless believes implicity in the good faith of the attaché and of the wily ambassador the moment they put a French minister in a bad light. He then generalizes poor Messimy into his collective capacity as 'the French officials.' Whether or not M. Messimy let slip a perfidious phrase, the Premier and the Political Director of the *Quai d'Orsay*, far from urging Russia on, did both insist against general mobilization at this time. (*Livre Noir* II, pp. 280-1; *Livre Jaune*, p. 101). Accordingly, the artistic unity of Mr. Barnes' tragedy must suffer again.

'Poincaré . . . gave Russia a free hand in the Serbian crisis, and promised vigorous French aid.' If we added 'in harmony with the terms of the defensive Franco-Russian Alliance,' this statement could be allowed to stand. 'The (Russian) mobilization which both French and Russians knew would mean certain and inevitable war.' This raises a very debatable question. Certainly the German General Staff held that their own general mobilization meant war; and the French and Russian Staffs agreed to accept German (or Austrian) mobilization as a sure sign of opening hostilities. However, the special reasons operating in the case of Germany did not apply to a vast, slow-moving country like Russia. Even in Austria mobilization did not mean war during the Balkan troubles of 1912-13. Mobilization doctrines depend on the nature of the country concerned as well as on the character of its plan of operations. When you mobilize on a Schlieffen Paris-and-return plan, that means war.

Continuing our study of the Powers of Darkness, we learn that 'the Allies

[1] To beginners in contemporary French and European history, may I recommend the truly objective and mercilessly accurate work of Seignobos, *L'Europe Contemporaine*, I, 275-8 (Paris, Colin, 1924).

rejected a practicable Italian scheme to secure mediation, and Sir Edward Grey . . . strongly influenced the later phases of the Russian general mobilization . . .' In view of Professor Barnes' reference to Morhardt, I must suppose that he is basing this grave accusation upon *Les Preuves*, chap. vii. Here, Morhardt, in blind wrath, rages 'convincingly' against the 'felony' and 'perfidy' of Sir Edward Grey and against England's spirit of 'cupidity and low piracy,' her 'entirely ignominious attitude,' and the 'wickedness of her secret designs.' His documentation is complete and scrupulously accurate, but it doesn't say what Morhardt hears it say. Since Mr. Barnes (like Professor Fay, ex-Chancellor Marx, and M. Poincaré) has recognized elsewhere the superiority of Renouvin, it is extraordinary that he has not noticed how easily this specialist has disposed in a paragraph and a footnote of Morhardt's myth (*Les Origines Immédiates*, p. 128). The Italian scheme was admirable. The only drawback was that Berchtold had let Sir Edward understand that Austria would accept no discussion on the Serbian note. When the first version of this 'practicable' Italian suggestion had reached the Kaiser the preceding day, this monarch, who, as Mr. Barnes wittily says, had a genuine desire for peace 'within the limitations of his temperament,' made two encouraging notes in the margin: 'Nonsense!' and 'I'll have nothing to do with it.' But the poor old Kaiser has been hung too often for me to hang him afresh. As far as I can see, the excellent Italian proposal was finally killed when Austria answered that since she was now at war with Serbia the latter's 'integral acceptance' of the ultimatum would no longer suffice.

For Mr. Barnes, Austria used to be the naughty nation. However, she has been growing in grace. 'Her attitude toward Serbia was the only practicable one, if she hoped to maintain the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy.' Undoubtedly Austria had a right to reparations and guarantees, but that is not what her government wished. Vienna wanted or needed war against Serbia. The terms of the ultimatum were drawn up purposely so that Serbia could not accept them. On July 7, at the cabinet meeting held in Vienna, the idea was that 'such broad demands must be made of Serbia as to ensure refusal and to allow of preparing the way to a radical solution by means of military intervention' (*Pièces diplomatiques*, publiées par la République d' Autriche, I, p. 8). Three days later, Count Berchtold confided to the German ambassador that he was reflecting over 'the conditions which might be laid down to Serbia so as to render acceptance completely impossible' (*Deutsche Dokumente 29*). This attitude, Mr. Barnes assures us, was 'the only practicable one.' Serbia understood it and mobilized (unwisely) in self-defence.

Furthermore, 'the Austrian policy in July, 1914, did not embody in any sense the desire for a world war. . . . The civil government in Germany and the Kaiser were distinctly opposed to a world war.' Obviously, if the Central Empires could have crushed Serbia without any European complications, they would not have worked up a world war for the fun of the thing. It is none the less true that at the aforesaid cabinet meeting of July 7 in Vienna, war with Russia was considered '*très vraisemblable*' if the Austrian army invaded Serbia. There was even a long discussion as to whether it was in the interest of the Empire to delay a European war. As for Germany, on July 6 the Kaiser envisaged the possibility of a general war and advised

the military authorities not to lose sight of that eventuality, although he rather thought Russia would not dare fight because she was not ready (*Deutsche Dokumente*, preface, passim). At this time he did nothing toward avoiding this possible European conflict. True, three weeks later, after July 27 (*Pièces diplomatiques*, II, p. 68) the German Government regretted having given Austria a free hand, and sought to restrain her. Why? Fear of English intervention (*Deutsche Dokumente*, Nos. 258, 265, 384), a detail Mr. Barnes seems to have overlooked.

In the preceding paragraph I have drawn attention to a few of the more noticeable exaggerations or inaccuracies in this wholesale indictment of the Entente; and possibly I may now be permitted to recall a few facts so well-known to Mr. Barnes himself that he has not thought it necessary to refresh the memory of his Canadian readers or even to take account of them in his own generalizations. In considering the case of Austria, it is impossible to forget (1) her refusal on July 28 to engage in direct conversations with Russia; (2) her declaration of war upon Serbia on the same day, an act purposely hastened in order to head off intervention by putting Europe in the presence of a *fait accompli* (*Pièces diplomatiques*, II, 78); (3) her refusal on July 30 and 31 to accept the British proposal of mediation although it permitted her occupation of a bit of Serbian territory as security (*Pièces diplomatiques*, III, 79; Conrad von Hötzendorff, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit*, IV, 147). This is a fact of capital importance.

Likewise in trying to estimate the degree of responsibility attributable to Germany, we are bound to remember (1) her refusal on July 27 of Sir Edward's proposal of a conference; (2) her refusal to accept arbitration at the Hague (*Deutsche Dokumente*, 391); (3) her refusal on July 31 to study any new proposal for conciliation (Blue Book, Nos. 121 and 130).

In conclusion I must beg my readers not to infer that I am out of sympathy with what Mr. Barnes calls the 'revisionist point of view.' I am a 'revisionist' by temperament and through historical study. With regard to the World War, I was a 'revisionist' before it broke out, while it was in progress, and after it closed. For me it was the inevitable product of sets of forces, which speeded up and intensified in their operation by the progress of industry and science, must at length cause havoc unless the nations learned in time to organize internationally. It would be cold comfort for the stricken peoples to believe their neighbours were to blame. In truth, I said, the immediate responsibilities will be 50-50, evenly divided, or all tangled together and scientifically inseparable. When the cataclysm did occur, I thought it probably not 50-50, but 49-51, leaving me a margin to fight on but not to lie on. The notion of Germany's exclusive responsibility has always appeared to me unutterably absurd; and I am for the revision of Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. When American writers, having outrageously 'bamboozled' the American public when Germany was the foe, set about courageously to de-bamboozle this same public, I can only applaud. But when these same writers begin to re-bamboozle this same public, when, in their neophytic zeal they sell it new myths for old, when they flop from Germanophobia into Francophobia,[1] when in their incurable *navieté* of devil-

[1] e.g., Frederick Bausman in his frantic polemic entitled *Let France Explain* (Allen and Unwin, 1922).

worshippers, they first shout, ' 'Twas the Kaiser did it!' then, 'No! 'Twas Poincaré!'—I am confirmed in my conviction that most of them are fickle weathercocks. Since 1919, for various reasons, political and financial, the prevailing wind has been anti-French. Automatically, the pen-pointed vane swings straight on Paris. 'If,' says Mr. Barnes, 'one were to list the Great Powers in the order of their responsibility for the immediate outbreak of the war, he would have to agree that Russia and France tie for first place, and are followed in order by Austria, Germany, and England.' The atmospheric conditions have been telling on Mr. Barnes. Twenty months ago, in *Current History*, he was according Austria first place in the Rogues' Race. France and Russia are now neck and neck. With several laps to go, the odds are all in favour of France—unless, *unless* she hearken to the voice across the waters, and 'forego all notion of any reparations from Germany.' So, we see, Mr. Barnes' drama is a *pièce à these*.

What then is this thesis? Briefly this: 'The guilt for the World War having been distributed, the expense of indemnifying the sufferers should likewise be distributed.' The United States 'might indicate its good-will and intentions by cancelling the debts' of France and England upon condition that they 'forego all notion of any reparations from Germany,' and 'adopt the programme of a mutual sharing of the burdens of reconstruction and rehabilitation.' Now this is a most welcome thought! Nothing could rouse greater enthusiasm in these two guilty countries. Instantly the French government would exclaim, '*Messieurs les Américains, tirez les premiers!*' The franc would rise to five cents; the distribution of the expense of indemnifying the sufferers would reduce the French internal debt to a degree that would surprise the aforesaid much-bamboozled American public. A cancellation of the inter-allied debts would mean vastly more to France (not to speak of Britain) than all the Dawes Plans imaginable. The American Commission recognized this last September when it refused Caillaux the safeguard clause he so earnestly demanded. Does Mr. Barnes not realize that the pressure of American claims upon Britain, involving British and American pressure upon France, was the final, determining factor in Poincaré's mad plunge into the Ruhr? Indeed the adamantine firmness of America's original refusal to consider cancellation was in part responsible for the Peace Conference's first fantastic estimates of what Germany must pay. Has Mr. Barnes forgotten Frederick Bausman's quotation of Mr. Lamont? 'From start to finish of the Peace Conference, President Wilson and his advisers, without exception, opposed vigorously and finally any such suggestions or proposition of cancellation.' [1] America likewise rejected every proposal for 'a mutual sharing' of any burdens whatsoever. Yet at that time she knew nothing of the 'war-guilt' of her companions. However, the Dawes Plan and the general principles of reparations are not 'based upon the assumption of unique German responsibility for the war.' Reparations were agreed upon before Germany surrendered and long before the egregious Section 231 was ever penned. 'The boxer pays for his music-hall,' and Germany's loud-resounding music-hall was the shattered north of France.

'Once England and France give some such evidence of international honesty and decency, one of the chief obstacles and objections to the United

[1] *Let France Explain*, p. 55.

States joining the League of Nations would be removed.' This surely caps the climax! Is the reader to take it seriosuly? No, no, Mr. Barnes! America rejected the League while she was still under the illusion that England and France were decent and honest. Their moral deformities had nothing to do with the case. The immediate reason for her rejection of the League was that it was sponsored by the losing side in American politics. The ultimate reason was that in majority her citizens imagined themselves better off without it. Personally, I am firmly convinced that their attitude is as utterly mistaken as it is entirely natural and explicable. It is the fundamental misfortune of the League, of Europe, and of the world. Had America honoured her President's signature, France would have felt secure; Poincaré and the Right would not have overthrown Briand and the Left; there would have been no invasion of the Ruhr; Germany would have entered the League long ago, and world peace would be more nearly assured. In final analysis the origin of the World War was in the lack of world organization. The failure of the League would be the prelude to the next war. The 'guilt' of the next war would rest ultimately upon the heads of those who, by refusing to support the League, constituted themselves inevitably an almost insuperable obstacle in its path. All honour to the American minority which understands and proclaims this truth!

III. OLD MYTHS IN NEW DRESS: A REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR EASTMAN. [1]

By Harry Elmer Barnes

I have read with interest Professor Eastman's two articles attacking Professor Fay and myself on the ground that we are guilty of substituting the new myth of Franco-Russian responsibility for the World War in the place of the old myth of unique German responsibility. I may refer those readers of *The Canadian Forum* who are ardently interested in the question of war guilt to my recently published book, *The Genesis of the World War*, where all of Professor Eastman's objections are considered in detail and laid to rest, as indeed all such thoroughly mellow corpses should be. For the sake of those whose opinions upon the question of war responsibility are shaped primarily by their reading of the public journals, I shall present a summary rejoinder to Professor Eastman's complaints.

Let me say at the outset that I have the highest respect for Mr. Eastman as a professional historian. He has grasped the conception of the new history in a remarkably intelligent fashion, and is a person with an unusually emancipated and progressive outlook. I regard it as a real reflection upon the intelligence of the historians of Canada and the United States that he has not been, long ere this, appointed to an important chair in one of the leading graduate schools of the East. At the same time, any one who is personally acquainted with Mr. Eastman and his career recognizes that he is an ardent Francophile, comparable in his zeal for all things French to Professors Hazen, Anderson, and Davis in the United States. Hence, on this emotion-charged question of the Franco-Russian responsibility for the war it is obvious that his views must be taken *magno cum grano*.

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[1] *Canadian Forum*, August, 1926.

We may now turn to a discussion of the main points raised by Professor Eastman in his article in *The Canadian Forum* for May, 1926.

(1) Professor Eastman says that he has long been a revisionist, and that he believes in the 'fifty-fifty' distribution of responsibility between the Central Powers and the Entente. Just why he should hold that France, Russia, and England bear any responsibility whatever does not appear in his article. But lest any reader should suspect that my thesis of the primary responsibility of France and Russia is a purely 'Hunnish' doctrine, I may refer them to the following sentence from the excellent article on war guilt, published by the eminent Frenchman, Georges Demartial, in the New York Times *Current History* for March, 1926: 'We are convinced that we can no more accept the thesis of divided responsibility than we can accept that of the exclusive responsibility of Germany.'

(2) Professor Eastman's judgments expressed on Fabre-Luce, Renouvin, Morhardt, and Judet certainly require modification. He gives the impression that Fabre-Luce is a relatively emotional and subjective writer. I should like to go on record as stating that I believe the work of Fabre-Luce, with respect to war origins, to be the most objective and dispassionate which has yet been produced in any country, with the possible exception of that of Dr. Ewart. It is preposterous to represent Renouvin as more unbiased and objective than Fabre-Luce. Renouvin is an older and more experienced student than Fabre-Luce, but he is by no means as independent and objective in his writings. He is in reality the official historical apologist for the French Government, and the wonder is that he has been able to emancipate himself as much as he has from political pressure and patriotic pride. Further, as a number of impartial reviewers have pointed out, his conclusions as to war guilt are markedly divergent in many cases from the facts upon which he bases them. As to Morhardt and Judet, they are indeed vehement, but they are certainly notable examples of frigid detachment as compared to the late M. Viviani, in whose veracity and pacifism Mr. Eastman expresses so much confidence. Further, the worst that can be said about these men is that they are vehement in their efforts to overthrow the lies about war guilt and to pave the way for a dissemination of the truth.

(3) In regard to the Franco-German war preparations, we are not concerned with the opinion of Bernhardi or any other publicist, but with the hard facts as revealed in the statistics. The 'trousers' of the French soldiers may have been inferior to those of the Germans. Indeed their equipment in 'B.V.D.'s' may have fallen far short of the resources of the Huns in this respect. What we are concerned about is the size, training, and military equipment of the two armies. Here we may unquestionably accept the opinions of General Buat. If Buat endeavoured to deceive his countrymen he certainly was not discredited thereby, as he was still retained as the French military expert at the Washington conference in 1921. Professor Parker T. Moon, who cannot be regarded as in any sense an apologist for the French general staff, also puts the active and well-equipped French army as distinctly larger than the German army in July, 1914. Mr. Eastman does not explain the necessity for the 'frantic effort' to throw every available Frenchman into the first line of defence in 1913. Certainly there was no reason to fear an unprovoked attack by Germany. About the ultimate resources

of France and Germany with respect to available soldiers there can, of course, be no question. What I tried to do in my brief article in *The Canadian Forum* was merely to point out the absurdity of the old view that Germany alone among the European states was armed to the teeth, and suddenly and unexpectedly jumped upon her helpless, terrified, and unprepared neighbours.

The rapid and unexpected success of the Germans in the first few months of the war simply proves that they got more for their money than did the French and Russians in their military expenditures. There are two other crucial matters involved, not directly connected with the per capita preparations of Germany or France; namely, the fact that the Belgian forts yielded more rapidly than had been expected to the German heavy artillery, and that Hindenburg's unique knowledge of the Masurian Lake districts enabled the Germans to destroy the Russian invaders in East Prussia. Without this victory at Tannenberg it is quite possible that the expectations of Poincaré and the French general staff would have been realized, and the Central Powers might have been compelled to sue for peace in the winter of 1914 and 1915, granted the incompetence of von Moltke, Bülow and others.

(4) If Mr. Eastman is in any doubt about the concern of France and Russia with respect to the successful progress of the Anglo-German negotiations relating to the Portuguese colonies and the Bagdad railway, early in 1914, he can secure adequate illumination from Mr. Morel's *Secret History of a Great Betrayal*, and from the easily accessible Russian documents, to say nothing of the editorials in the officially inspired French, Russian, and English journals. Sazonov and the Czar put themselves on record as holding that the Entente plans for European war would be futile without the assured participation of England.

(5) Mr. Eastman contends that the Radical gains in the French general elections of May, 1914, and the appointment of a number of pacifically-minded individuals to the French Cabinet is a definite proof that the French authorities in the summer of 1914 were not disposed to war. If Mr. Eastman had more carefully examined Ernest Judet's edition of Georges Louis' diary, he would have discovered that Paul Deschanel told M. Louis that Poincaré and his clique decided upon war in July, 1914, primarily because of this very Radical victory which they recognized would jeopardize the permanence of the French Three-Year Service Act. The pacifist gains in the French election of 1914 had about as much significance with respect to restraining the war decision of the dominant figures in French politics as Mr. Wilson's election in the fall of 1916 on the slogan 'He kept us out of war.'

(6) Mr. Eastman suggests that I am not familiar with the constitutional provisions of the French government and that I confuse the relatively powerful American President with the relatively weak French Chief Executive. I freely grant that, in general, the American President has much more extensive powers than the French President; but with respect to foreign affairs the French President is certainly more powerful and independent than the American President. If an adroit politician and a powerful personality, the French President can in person assume an almost arbitrary control over foreign policy. We might refer Mr. Eastman in this respect to the illuminating article by Professor Lindsay Rogers on the French President

and foreign policy, in the *Political Science Quarterly* for December, 1925. Again, if Mr. Eastman were to examine the Russian documents more thoroughly, he would find that Poincaré, immediately upon his accession to the Presidency, informed Izvolski that he still retained the control of French foreign policy and that Izvolski was to come to him directly with all important matters, instead of consulting the man who happened to be at any time the formal Foreign Minister of France. Still further, any one familiar with the details of the control of French policy in July and August of 1914 is fully aware of the completely arbitrary way in which Poincaré controlled the action of France, easily dominating the pacific but weak-minded Viviani and ignoring the Chamber of Deputies entirely.

Mr. Eastman would also doubtless contend that because Delcassé was not in the Cabinet at this time he had little or no influence upon foreign policy. We would refer him upon this point not only to the actual diplomatic achievements of Delcassé in this period, particularly on the Russian mission of 1913, but to the analogy with Colonel House, so well pointed out by Mr. Villard in his magisterial review of Colonel House's Memoirs in the New York *Nation* for April 14, 1926. Mr. Villard makes it clear how a plain Texan citizen, without any official position whatever, actually dominated American foreign policy during the most crucial period of our history and greatly influenced the matter of our entry into the World War.

(7) Mr. Eastman's citation, in the first column on page 240, of specific statements by French and Russian officials is of little significance. The men he cites are not those whose opinions carried any serious weight. Pichon was a mere figurehead, and the Russian Prime Minister, Kokovtsov, was opposed to the warlike plans of Izvolski and Sazonov. If one investigates the secret statements at the ministerial councils of Poincaré, Izvolski, Sazonov, and other directing and controlling individuals, he will find quite a different side to the picture. He will find that on November 17, 1912, Poincaré agreed to follow Russia into any war over the Balkans in which Germany was also involved. He will find that on the 8th of December, 1913, Sazonov admitted to the Czar that he was convinced that Russia must have the Straits, and that they could be obtained only by war. He will find that on December 31, 1913, Sazonov stated that he believed that English support must be assured to make this forthcoming war successful. He will find that on February 8, 1914, the Russians held a secret ministerial council in which they decided not to strike for Constantinople and the Straits unaided, but to await the anticipated general European war which they believed to lie in the near future. He will find further that the Czar at this very time received the Premier of Serbia, encouraged him to proceed with the Serbian nationalistic intrigues, and promised him Russian aid in preparing Serbia for her part in the forthcoming European conflict. He can also discover in these documents the opinion of the calm and judicious Russian Ambassador in London, Count Benckendorff, that France would accept a European war with more enthusiasm than any other European state.

(8) Mr. Eastman endeavours to give the impression that the French were kept in the dark as to the Russian military preparations, and that the French discouraged the fatal Russian mobilization. This is a most astounding attitude and position. We have absolute proof that Poincaré, when in

St. Petersburg between July 20 and 23, 1914, renewed his promise to stand behind Russia in a war over the Balkans and specifically stated that the impending conflict between Austria and Serbia would constitute a valid basis for unwavering French aid of Russia. Before leaving St. Petersburg, he enjoined the French Ambassador to Russia to see to it that Sazonov did not weaken in his resolution for war. Further, there was a very exact synchronism in the Franco-Russian military preparations. Both took the first decisive steps towards preparatory mobilization on July 24, and both began definite war preparations on July 26. Again, Baron Schilling's recently published journal, together with the earlier available documents, make it certain that, when the first Russian order was given for general mobilization on July 29, telegrams were at once sent to inform the French Government of this decision and to ask for French approval. This matter was taken up in a secret conference under the direction of Poincaré, Viviani, and Messimy on the night of July 29, and the Russians were heartily assured that France stood firmly behind the promises of Poincaré in November, 1912, and July, 1914. As Fabre-Luce has clearly proved, there is no unfalsified document in the *Livre Noir* or elsewhere which gives any evidence of French disapproval of the Russian mobilization. One will certainly hesitate to believe that Izvolski would have falsified on any matter of such crucial significance to the safety and success of his own country as the matter of the French attitude toward Russian mobilization.

Mr. Eastman's suggestion that Russian general mobilization did not mean war is pure sophistry. The terms of the Franco-Russian military alliance of 1893 offer no possible doubt with respect to this. There it is specifically stated that 'mobilization is war.' Dobrorolski has also clearly revealed the fact that the Russians fully understood that the telegraphing of the mobilization order throughout Russia meant irrevocable war. Indeed, he frankly confesses that, so far as the Russian army was concerned, the World War was on by July 25, the day after the Russians first learned of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.

(9) I do not regard the matter of the Italian conference plan as of great significance, except insofar as it proves hypocrisy in Sir Edward Grey's denunciation of the Germans for rejecting his inferior conference plan a day earlier.

(10) In a discussion of the Austrian plans in 1914, Mr. Eastman describes the extreme program of Berchtold and his group before Count Tisza forced a complete transformation of the scheme of the extremists. Tisza compelled the Austrian ministers to make a show of diplomacy before risking a military attack, and further forced them to issue a public statement that Austria would not annex any Serbian territory. If Austria has grown in grace at all in my estimation since May, 1922, it is not because I think more of Austria, but because I have come to think less of Serbia in the light of the revelations with respect to the responsibility of the Serbian military and civil authorities for the assassination of the Archduke. Jovanovitch's revelations with respect to the Serbian knowledge of the assassination plot a month before the assassination, and with regard to the failure of the Serbian civil government to give any adequate warning to Austria, certainly constitute valid grounds for modifying our views of the relative guilt of

Austria and Serbia. Added to this is the recently revealed condensation and falsification of the report of Dr. von Wiesner to the Austrian Government in July, 1914. This falsification, be it said to their lasting discredit, was the work of the American experts at the Paris Peace Conference, particularly Secretary Lansing and Dr. James Brown Scott.

(11) Mr. Eastman suggests that the reason that Germany tried to restrain Austria toward the close of July, 1914, was because she feared English intervention. This we may grant for the sake of argument, but it only serves to explain why Germany *actually worked for peace* instead of war. The fear of German intervention was not adequate to induce Sir Edward Grey to make any effort to restrain France or Russia. Few Revisionists would be simple-minded enough to suspect Germany of disinterested idealism in her pacific efforts.

(12) Mr. Eastman's paragraph in regard to the attitude of Germany toward the diplomatic proposals of 1914 is preposterous. Sir Edward Grey in July, 1914, admitted cheerfully and immediately that the German plan of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg was preferable to his own plan of a conference of the nations. No nation in the history of diplomacy had ever submitted to the Hague a question as serious as the Austro-Serbian crisis. This proposal was a mere jocular subterfuge, which even Sazonov refused to credit with any seriousness. Any proposal of a conference on or after July 31 was entirely irrelevant, as Germany was then faced by actual knowledge of the Russian general mobilization which Entente authorities had long admitted was equivalent to a Russian declaration of war upon Germany. Until Russia suspended her mobilization the only possible procedure for Germany was to prepare for the imminent war thus forced upon her. Like Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Eastman fails to point out that the French and Russians were as much opposed to a European conference on the Austro-Russian dispute as was Germany to a conference on the Austro-Serbian issue. Further, Mr. Eastman fails to indicate that on August 1st, Sir Edward Grey learned of the Austrian decision of July 31st to discuss the British proposal of mediation, but did nothing about it.

(13) I am afraid that Mr. Eastman confuses 'neophytic zeal' with intensive study of the evidence concerning war responsibility and open-mindedness on this subject. I have not changed my opinions any more rapidly than the accumulation of new documents would warrant. On the other hand, I have not hesitated to modify my views when the newly-revealed facts have rendered this necessary. From the standpoint of 'pure' logic and casual argumentation, I regret that it has seemed necessary to substitute one set of devils for another. I should much prefer to defend the thesis of distributed responsibility, if this could possibly be made to square with the facts. Nevertheless, I am not engaged in winning an intercollegiate debate through an arbitrary selection and rejection of arguments. I refuse to reject important facts and inevitable conclusions which flow from them, simply because they may possibly offer ground for a casual and specious objection to my conclusions. If Mr. Eastman had been giving careful attention to what has been coming out in the field of war guilt since May, 1924, when my *Current History* Article was published, he would find something far more than 'atmospheric conditions' has been responsible for the transformation

of my estimate of the order of war responsibility. Nearly as much progress has been made in the study of war guilt since May, 1924, as had been wrought out between 1919 and 1924. If any intensive student of the problem of war guilt has not radically modified his views in the last twenty months, we might legitimately express grave doubts as to his intelligence or his integrity or both.

(14) The notion that Germany should pay for the reconstruction of France is essentially based upon the obsolete theory of sole German responsibility for the War. The fact is that France was, as in 1870, disappointed by having to play on the 'home grounds,' whereas she had hoped to celebrate on the other side of the Rhine. We should also remember that Germany offered to bear the burden of reconstructing the devastated areas of France and Belgium in lieu of reparations, but this offer was coldly rejected. If one invites his neighbour over to a rough-and-tumble fight, he cannot legitimately object if the neighbour tears up some sod in his front lawn during the performance.

(15) Mr. Eastman suggests that America rejected the League while she was still fairly convinced that England and France were decent and honest. If Americans were still convinced in the summer of 1919 of the honesty and disinterestedness of the Entente after the Secret Treaties had been published and given full publicity, then something was seriously lacking in their intelligence or in their criteria of honesty and decency. Nevertheless, I have always been in favour of America's joining the League, and still hope that she may make a belated entry into this promising organization. On this point I thoroughly agree with Mr. Eastman, as I also would in any indictment he might care to offer of the selfish and provincial policy of isolation which our country has pursued since Mr. Wilson's debâcle. At the same time, citizens of the Entente states can scarcely complain over the decline of American enthusiasm for the League since the publication of the Secret Treaties and the Treaty of Versailles.

IV. BETWEEN THE MYTHS.[1]

By Mack Eastman

I am sure the readers of the *Canadian Forum* were grateful to me for having drawn from Professor Barnes, in form of a rejoinder [2], an article so well worthy of the subject, the author, and his readers, and providing in all these points a happy contrast with the original diatribe, on which I had felt constrained to offer some friendly observations.

Mr. Barnes is a criminologist of repute, and my objections formed the necessary complement to his attorney-like indictment of Allied rascality; but although I was moralizing against the moralizer, this does not mean that my suggestions were at any point 'preposterous,' 'astounding,' or sophistical. As my reply took frankly the form of a counterblast to a rabid arraignment, it made no effort, as Mr. Barnes correctly remarks, to show 'just why (I)

[1] *Canadian Forum*, January, 1927.

[2] August number, p. 336.

should hold that France, Russia and England bear any responsibility whatever,' that was not my task then, nor can I undertake it now. I accept for myself the advice I gave my readers in the April number: 'The public will do well to suspend judgment a while longer until the French and British archives are more largely at our disposal, and until a few historically-minded men [1] . . . have finally digested the whole subject and given us its essentials. The truth resides somewhere between the old myth and the new.' While taking cognizance of the books, articles, and documents which pour monthly from the press, I remain sceptical of the 'absolute proofs' of Mr. Barnes and similar enthusiasts, and hold still to my pre-war forecast that 'the immediate responsibilities will be evenly divided, or all tangled together and scientifically inseparable'—like the responsibilities for all other large-scale wars and complications.

For these War documents are to us as was the Bible to our forebears—with a new Book of Revelations added at least once a month. Like scholastics of the Middle Ages or theologians of the Reformation, we may oppose text to text and system to system. To Mr. Barnes' fifteen points I could reply with a contradicting set of extracts and authorities. For example, I say the mobilization question is 'very debatable.' Mr. Barnes snorts: 'Pure sophistry!' I now retort: 'But it is being debated! Witness only the articles by Altschul and Grelling in *Current History* for June and September.' Mr. Barnes could argue still. Only on rare occasions is his absolute rightness absolutely wrong, as when in Point 3 his inexperience leads him to ignore the fact familiar to every 'Doughboy' that uniforms are a part of 'military equipment,' and that flaming colours are more to be dreaded than defective rifles; or as when in Point 6 he confidently affirms that 'with respect to foreign affairs the French President is certainly more powerful and independent than the American President,' and then rashly refers me to 'the illuminating article' by Professor Lindsay Rogers in the *Political Science Quarterly* for last December. This scholarly article, accurate in every respect, evidently failed to illuminate Mr. Barnes, for it contradicts him almost rudely. It shows how impossible it has always been for a French President to assert himself except with the acquiescence of Premier and Cabinet. In 1924 President Millerand, who alone had dared to compare 'the French and American conceptions of the Presidency to the discredit of the former' and to advocate a revision of the Constitution in the American direction, was roughly turned out of office by Herriot and the new Chamber of Deputies. Thus, concludes Professor Rogers, 'the idea of French Presidency on the American model has been dealt a blow from which recovery will be delayed.' In course of his study he makes it clear that in 1913-14 Poincaré's exceptional influence with European diplomats was dependent upon the fact that 'no disavowals or public criticism showed that the Cabinet differed with or objected to the policies of the President.' Later during the

[1] A Canadian reader has asked me to recommend a list of four books setting forth the revisionist point of view. I venture to recommend:

(a) Fabre-Luce: *La Victoire* (Paris, 1924).

(b) Barnes: *The Genesis of the World War* (N.Y., Knopf, 1926)—with especial attention to the excellent preface.

(c) A book which Professor Sidney B. Fay may have published before this note is printed.

(d) Another summary, by Professor G. P. Gooch, to appear shortly.

Peace Conference, we see this same 'powerful personality' relegated to impotent obscurity by the Clemenceau Government (while his American counterpart holds the center of the stage and, with unrivalled though short-lived power and independence, determines momentous and enduring decisions whose scope is world-wide).

Mr. Barnes' lapse of memory with regard to this article may be attributable to his obsession with M. Poincaré's gigantic historical proportions. Carlyle's hero-worship is as nothing to Mr. Barnes' devil-worship which exalts the little Lorrainer far above the 'Corsican Adventurer' in world wrecking achievement. Perhaps it is this conception of contemporary history, so paradoxical in a professor of Historical Sociology, which subconsciously forces Mr. Barnes to find 'absolute proof' of the 'completely arbitrary way in which Poincaré controlled the action of France' during the supreme crisis and incited Russia to war (Points 8 and 6). If he has 'absolute proof' it should be easy to produce. Bernadotte Schmitt,[1] in his review of Mr. Barnes' book, declares boldly, 'There is not a document which warrants any such assertion.' Other specialists, likewise. Mr. Barnes may be right, but a good guess is not an absolute proof. I am not 'attacking' this gallant controversialist: I am merely scolding his headlong haste. If he could only learn to hold his horses, he would be less likely to upset his chariot.

In Point 13 he candidly declares: 'I have not changed my opinions any more rapidly than the accumulation of new documents would warrant.' But who is going to guarantee him against the further accumulation of new documents and against further changes in his own opinion? It is a perilous adage which says: Twice armed is he whose cause is just, but thrice armed is he who gets his book out first.

Let us now turn back to the beginning of Mr. Barnes' 'rejoinder,' where, after a characteristically generous personal tribute, for which I thank him cordially, he concludes in favour of disqualifying me for the discussion on the ground of my ardent Francophilia. Let me first plead guilty to this charge, but, like the American Senate, with reservations. To Francophobes, I appear Francophile; to Germanophobes, Germanophile; to Americanophobes, Americanophile; to Russophobes, pro-Bolshevik. Did not the Apostle say, 'I am made all things to all men?' This I hold to be especially the duty of professors of contemporary history, who may well have grave misgivings if they find themselves always drifting with the currents. 'Public opinion' is too often national prejudice or collective emotion whipped into action over material interests, real or imaginary. It is nearly always in extremes. The Professor's task should be to moderate it, correct it, and often to oppose it.

The dark 'career' which Mr. Barnes says rules me out, consists of three years in Paris at the University and in the Archives, during which period I confess to having taken an intense interest in French politics, domestic and foreign. However, if he had the slightest personal acquaintance with France, Mr. Barnes could not have framed such a paradoxical phrase as 'zeal for all things French.' France is the country *par excellence* of antitheses and contrasts. Your zeal for one thing French excludes zeal for its negation.

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[1] *Foreign Affairs* (N.Y.), 1926.

In my time zeal for Jean Jaurès excluded zeal for Maurice Barrès; zeal for the international outlook of the Left excluded zeal for the foreign policies of the Right. The Frenchmen I approved were Germanophile, just as the Germans I approved were Francophile; and both categories strove toward international collaboration. A man who today in international relations is pro-Briand-Painlevé-Herriot must of necessity have been anti-Poincaré both before and after the War, (although that does not oblige him to believe that M. Poincaré is as conscious a malefactor or as stupendous a world-mover as Mr. Barnes affirms).

It is none the less true that, whatever his sympathies in the matter of present policies, it is quite possible for a student of history to depict French affairs with sufficient objectivity; and if Mr. Barnes had ever read my war-time or peace-time articles,[1] he would never have charged me with zeal for *all* things French, or expected me to share his innocent and horrified surprise at 'secret' treaties, or compared my slender studies with Professor Hazen's manual. A glance at my last chapter [2] in another textbook would show how my tone differs from Hazen's in treating of Franco-German relations. The essential task of the historical writer, and especially of the textbook writer, is to explain rather than to judge, for judgments are usually subjective and tendencious. Moralizing is unscientific, although *counter*-moralizing (as in my first reply to Mr. Barnes on his critique of Professor Hazen) may occasionally prove salutary. Mr. Barnes would be amused to know that when I was in the front-line trenches, one of the charges of pro-Germanism brought against me was on the ground that I had recommended the use in the high schools of *Outlines of European History*—that epoch-making textbook by our great teachers, Robinson and Beard—which did not moralize with sufficient unction against Germany. I recall such points merely to illustrate the fact that not all North-American history-men lost their balance in war-time, and that study abroad cannot very well fill the student with undying zeal for *all* things pertaining to the countries in which he studies.

For that is the prejudice implicit in Mr. Barnes' accusation—a prejudice which others have defended in print. Recently I read an ingenious Irish argument which held that a Dublin student interested in the Japanese problem in California should study it only from Dublin, for fear that if he went to California he would become imbued with zeal either for all things

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[1] To mention only three typical cases:
(a) *University of Toronto Monthly*, June, July, 1910: a photograph of French political parties.
(b) *The New Review*, N.Y. (now defunct), October, 1915: another photograph: French Politics and the War.
(c) *The Grain-Growers' Guide*, Winnipeg, May, 1914: an appeal to Canadian farmers and trades-unionists to join hands with the anti-war organizations of Europe against an impending catastrophe arising out of the politico-economic rivalries of European groups and the consequent competition in armaments.

[2] Written at close of 1923. For example p. 747: 'Unfortunately, the Chamber of Deputies, elected in 1919, retained its war-time psychology, hearkened to its eminent military counsellors and measured security in terms of military strength. There remained none the less surely the liberal France, which in time would regain the ascendancy, and which might indeed make its voice heard in the choice of the new Chamber in 1924' (West's *World Progress*—Canadian Edition, Allyn and Bacon).

American or for all things Japanese. This attitude may commend itself to Mr. Barnes and some Canadians, but it implies a reversal of all our ideas about post-graduate studies in history and the unrivalled stimulus and mental discipline of a changed intellectual environment.

At all events, in his brave struggle toward impartiality, this is the attitude which Mr. Barnes has adopted practically, although he delicately refrains from capitalizing it boldly in his rejoinder. In a foreword to his article in *Current History* of May, 1924, he 'authorised the statement that he had never had German or Austrian affiliations either in study or in any personal relationship . . . .'; and the text of the article showed that this was only too true. It also suggested that he had scant personal knowledge of England, France, or Europe in general. Otherwise he might not have been so undiscriminatingly anti-German, 'pro-English and pro-French' when the long-threatening struggle finally began. Nor would he have been in a position to avow (or to boast) with good-humored candour that he had 'in the summer of 1917, . . . aided a bullet manufacturer in preparing for the National Security League almost as absurd and misleading an account of the background of the War as that which appeared in Professor Hazen's text.' [1]

I do not think Mr. Barnes is much addicted to the *argumentum ad hominem*; it is awkward when the *homo* argues back. However, this time he chose this weapon playfully to put me *hors de combat*, not even caring whether it were a boomerang. These then are some of Mr. Barnes' especial claims to competence and impartiality in this 'emotion-charged' question: (1) that in 1917 he believed and wrote stuff and nonsense against the national enemy, (2) that only in 1920 did Sidney B. Fay awake him from his 'dogmatic slumbers,' (3) that he remained till 1926 evidently innocent of all personal contact with Europe—coming over this year not to learn but to teach, (4) that while he had produced numerous and remarkable works in sociology, criminology, social and intellectual history, he had never found time for even a fleeting volume on contemporary Europe by way of preparation for the *Genesis of the World War*, (5) that by an ingenious reversal of the genetic method advocated by the 'New History,' having first built the superstructure in his *Genesis of the World War*, he is now preparing to lay the foundations in a volume to be entitled 'Ten Years: 1905-1914,' (6) that finding himself in the entirely new and unfamiliar field of contemporary European history he, nevertheless, thanks to his phenomenal capacity for labour and unquestioning self-confidence, has devoured in record time the bulk of War Origins literature, and (7), as a guarantee of his complete detachment, impartiality and international outlook, he has told a German nationalist gathering, presided over by the nationalist Governor Schnee, in the University of Berlin, that Germany in 1914 was innocent, her enemies guilty, and that in consequence she must soon be excused from all further effort at reparation.[2] (I am not condemning his Berlin lecture. I merely agree with *Vorwaerts* (July 27) that he 'overshoots the mark.'

If we glance back over the preceding paragraph we must agree that

[1] *New Republic*, March, 1924.

[2] *Berliner Tageblatt*, July 27.

claim No. 6 is certainly worthy of admiration, but inadequate in itself. The value of documentation depends upon sureness of interpretation, which in turn depends upon a thorough mastery of the environment and lurking background which produced the documents. The regrettable lacunae and misinterpretations which occur in Mr. Barnes' articles and book are not due to malignity or bad faith, as dull reviewers often say, but rather to the newness, the vastness, the infinite complexity and unsuspected pitfalls of this fascinating subject which this undaunted youth has sought to conquer, in a trice, by a *tour de force* somewhat in the style of Douglas Fairbanks.

Claim No. 7 is the natural sequel to No. 1—a sort of *Chapelle Expiatoire;* but I doubt whether its view of reparations be quite sound. Reparations antedated the Treaty of Versailles by fifteen months. They were an integral part of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, enunciated in a spirit of idealism and universality on January 8, 1918. Point 7 was: Restoration of Belgium; Point 8: Restoration of the invaded regions of France. There was no allusion to war guilt or responsibility in this enumeration of war aims. Far from objecting to the Fourteen Points, the Germans have always clung to them as a safeguard which they had received as part and parcel of the Armistice terms.

Is not the restoration of devastated regions by the invader a necessary conception, no matter how responsibilities may be ultimately distributed? Otherwise, is not a premium placed upon 'preparedness' and 'preventive war?' In future is it to be admitted that one nation may begin *defending* itself in the midst of another's fields? There is no absolutely perfect solution for this knotty problem, but the best that has been thought out thus far is contained in Article 15 of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, sponsored by such idealists as Macdonald and Herriot, where it is assumed that the aggressor State, refusing arbitration, has operated in its neighbour's territory, and where it is stipulated that the aggressor nation shall bear the whole cost of the war and reparations 'up to the extreme limit of its capacity.' The judges would hardly be moved to leniency by an aggravating circumstance such as the wilful, wanton, wholesale destruction of agricultural and industrial property during the retreat of the invader—destruction intended to handicap the neighbour nation economicallly for many years. Practically, as far as German reparations are concerned, there exists already the 'programme of a mutual sharing of the burdens of reconstruction' (advocated by Mr. Barnes in his first article), inasmuch as the Dawes Plan aims at only a partial reimbursement of France and others for what they have actually spent on reconstruction without any consideration of the tremendous loss of productivity since 1914 resulting from the devastation. The only performer whose name is not on this programme is America. It is her move!

I wish next to express my cordial sympathy with the fundamental desire and aim of Professor Barnes, which is the ultimate improvement of international relations through the unfolding of historic truth. It is only with his method that I can occasionally find fault, for the method frequently defeats the desire. When, for instance, in his article in *The Canadian Forum* of July, 1925, he rants like a hostile war-time propagandist about England and France's lack of 'international honesty and decency,'

surely he realises that that is just the kind of phrase which is picked up by the world press, harped on by the journalists, and bitterly resented by British and French readers who henceforth turn contemptuously away from the most sound and salutary revisionist conclusions and most unjustly confound their author with the sorry tribe of anti-European scribblers suffering most acutely of late from a greed-engendered, anti-French complex. Again, in the concluding paragraph of his rejoinder, Mr. Barnes assured us that he has 'always been in favour of America's joining the League.' Unfortunately, many credible American witnesses have told me that the onslaught of 'Barnes & Company' upon the reputation for 'honesty and decency' of Entente nations and their statesmen has, on the contrary, created quite an anti-League current in quarters hitherto favourable to America's participation in the arduous task of organizing co-operation and peace among the nations. The American correspondents, even of such serious papers as *Le Journal de Genéve*, have on occasion corroborated this unwelcome testimony.

Mr. Barnes generously declares that he would agree with me in any 'indictment' I might care to offer of America's 'selfish and provincial policy of isolation.' But what the nations need is *self*-criticism. An outsider's indictment more often than not proves harmful, for it is interpreted as hostile. On the contrary, what I strive to do in conversing with anti-Americans is to prove that the Americans are merely acting as other humans would act in the American environment. The only part of this vast question which is 'emotion-charged' for me is the future of the League and the League ideal, and these last considerations were the determining factors in inducing me to appeal to Mr. Barnes in the most friendly spirit to make haste more slowly, and to his readers to cultivate the only too rare gifts of healthy scepticism and suspended judgment.

Some weeks ago Mr. Barnes, M. Morhardt, Professor Delbrück and others addressed a letter to the Secretariat at Geneva, inviting the League to appoint an impartial committee of investigation into War Origins. Their object was praiseworthy but impracticable. Such requests can be received only from State Members, and in this case, as far as can be foreseen, only when the German Government is willing to invoke in its support Article 19 of the Covenant, which says: 'The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.' [1] Whether any official and politically appointed committee would arrive at any decision other than a transaction, is open to question. In the meanwhile, specialists of various countries may group themselves spontaneously into free and impartial committees; and they will one day meet with Mr. Barnes in the middle path between the myths.

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[1] October 2: Mr. Stresemann said that 'Germany is ready to present herself before any impartial tribunal for the examination of the causes and the origins of the World War.'

V. BEYOND THE MYTHS.[1]

By Harry Elmer Barnes

Pressure of work has prevented me from answering more promptly Professor Mack Eastman's critique in your January issue. It seems rather amusing that Professor Eastman and I should be lined up against each other in such a debate. It would be difficult to find two men whose interests in history are more similar or whose ultimate aspirations in regard to world peace and world organization are more closely identical. It would appear that I should save my ammunition for some such historian of the school of Pollyanna and Rip Van Winkle and such an outstanding 'die-hard' and 'straw-clutcher' as Raymond Turner, while Professor Eastman might better reserve his shots for writers with an uncompromising philosophy of isolation and of opposition to the League of Nations. Yet the discussion may not prove barren of enlightenment concerning this all-important problem of responsibility for the World War.

(1) I deny that I have contributed any diatribes or anything rabid to the columns of *The Canadian Forum*. The test of a diatribe is not its deviation from the conventional myths which are complacently accepted, and rabidity should be differentiated from clarity and lucidity in expression.

(2) As to the suggestion that we await the publication of the documents in the French and British archives, it may be stated that we now have the British documents of 1914. They confirm in every particular the indictment of the Entente drawn in my book, and even make the case against France and Russia much stronger and more definitive. Further, they offer the last final blow to the venerable myth that the invasion of Belgium bore any relation whatever to the English decision to go to war in aid of France. As to the French documents, what reason is there to think that they will ever be published unless France is captured by the Communists—a very remote contingency? No other country falsified its documents so extensively as France, and who could be foolish enough to believe that, if the French documents would help the case of France, Poincaré would not have ordered their publication long ere this? Since Professor Eastman wrote, Georges Demartial, the most minute and exacting French student of war guilt, has published his *L'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay*. This is a book of two hundred pages devoted to such lies in the French *Yellow Book*, concerning the single topic of the Russian mobilization, as have been discovered from inadvertent leaks and corroborative information. We may well admit that we shall have to wait for the French documents before we can know the whole extent of the guilt of the Entente, but we certainly cannot expect that they will in any way mitigate the case against the Allies or augment the one per cent of innocence by which, according to Mr. Eastman's precise diplomatic arithmetic, the Allies have the shade on the Central Powers.

(3) With respect to the problem of equality of guilt, I pointed out, in my reply to Lowes Dickinson in the *New Republic* for October 20, 1926, and Bernadotte Schmitt in the *Progressive* for December 1, 1926, that we must define what we are talking about. There was certainly equality of guilt

[1] *Canadian Forum*, April and May, 1927.

among all for the international anarchy which made war likely or possible. There was likewise equality of guilt for the alliances and the diplomacy from 1870 to 1912. From 1912 to 1914, however, the major guilt shifted distinctly from the Central Powers to France and Russia. This we must affirm, even after listening patiently to Poincaré's long and laboured defence. As for the crisis of 1914, it can no longer be maintained with a straight face that the Central Powers wanted a general European war. The only countries that desired and made necessary a general conflagration were France, Russia and Serbia. Austria desired a local war, but not a European conflict. Germany, England, and Italy would have preferred no war at all, but were too slow or stupid in their diplomacy to prevent the disaster. Nor was the war inevitable in 1914. If Tisza had been the Austrian Foreign Minister, if Kokovtsov had been in charge of the Russian Foreign Office, if Caillaux had been in control of matters in France, and if Lord Morley had been in Sir Edward Grey's shoes, it is completely unthinkable that there could have been any European war following the murder of the Archduke.

(4) Relative to the matter of whether the Russian mobilization meant war or not, further discussion is both fruitless and needless. The whole matter is finally disposed of by Gunther Frantz in *Current History* for March, 1927, in which he quotes, for the most part, Russian opinion. The fact that a matter is being debated does not mean that it is legitimately or intelligently debatable. We still have debates held on astrology and evolution! And Altschul and Grelling are poor examples to cite. Mr. Altschul is an estimable and venerable banker of pro-French sympathies without any training whatever as a technical historian. In the August *Current History* (1926) Dr. Ernest F. Henderson utterly destroyed his contentions by quoting the relevant parts of the very documents utilized by Altschul. Grelling is completely discredited even among the Kaiser-baiters. It is well and definitely known that his work has been subsidized by the French since the outbreak of the World War.

(5) In regard to Professor Rogers' article in the *Political Science Quarterly* on powers of the French President, I would once more recommend that Professor Eastman read it. On page 551 he will find that Professor Rogers makes it clear that if the French President conducts his diplomatic negotiations in a secret fashion and has a weak cabinet—exactly the situation in 1914—he is practically absolute in foreign affairs. Still further, on the same page Professor Rogers points out that in 1913-1914 Poincaré even went beyond legal right and constitutional precedent. Worse still for Professor Eastman, Professor Rogers read the chapter in my book dealing with France and Poincaré and did not even question my interpretation of the extent of Poincaré's influence on foreign affairs, though he stated that one must reserve his right to an opinion as to how far Poincaré was overtly plotting for war. We are not so much specifically interested here in the abstract problems of French constitutional law as we are with the specific and concrete facts of the years 1912-1914.

(6) Bearing upon Professor Eastman's allegation of my exaggeration of the part played by Poincaré, he should remember that I was quoting Morhardt's comparison with Napoleon. But I will state my essential agreement with Morhardt on this point. The World War certainly produced a

greater international dislocation than the Napoleonic Wars, and I hold Poincaré far more responsible than any other person for the onset of the War. In fact, I would contend that the War could not possibly have come in 1914 but for the specific personal part played by Poincaré from July 20th onward. Professor Eastman cites Professor Schmitt as stating that there is no evidence to support my assertion of the part played by Poincaré or that France desired to regain Alsace-Lorraine by war. If both Professor Schmitt and Professor Eastman will read Fabre-Luce's *La Victoire*, Judet's *Georges Louis*, p. 143, No. 76 of the new British Documents, Demartial's *L'Evangile*, and the documents in the appendix to Stieve's *Isvolsky and the World War*, they will both augment their information and get a new grip on diplomatic realities. They might further consult with profit Professor Langer's estimate of the bearing of the British documents on French war guilt in the *Saturday Review of Literature* for April 30, 1927.

(7) As to my charge of Franco-mania against Professor Eastman I have never wished to imply that Professor Eastman has an offensive or unreasoning mania for anything. He is too urbane and civilized a person for this. Yet, I doubt if any one acquainted with him will question my assertion that he has a greater emotional fixation upon France than upon any other modern state. I will say, however, that I was unfair in my allegation of his passion for 'all things French.' This was a rhetorical figure. Professor Eastman is a discriminating person and could not be conceived of as having a passion for 'all things' connected with any national culture or any institution—even the League of Nations. I know that Professor Eastman has met with much criticism in Canada for his sanity and moderation in regard to international relations, and I am glad to attest to my belief that he is a very valuable 'sanitary influence' in the pathological diplomacy of to-day. We happen, however, to be talking here about the question of war guilt.

(8) Professor Eastman chides me for not having travelled more widely in Europe, and holds that if I had done so I would have had more moderation both during the war and at the present time. No one regrets more than I do the fact that it has not been my privilege to travel more extensively in Europe. If Professor Eastman knows of any one who desires to endow me for foreign travel, I shall be most happy to agree to go to Europe annually for the next quarter of a century. Yet it is doubtful if European travel can prove a safeguard against international bias, particularly in the time of the war. The most travelled American professor of history, and the man whom Professor Eastman and I admire more than any other living historian, became the head of the National Board for Historical Service as soon as the United States entered the War, and the most violent Germanophobes in the United States—such men as Thayer, Hazen, Davis, Munroe Smith, *et al.*—were the very men who had spent the most time in European travel. William Stearns Davis was actually caught by the War when in Europe. Professor Eastman is quite wrong about the purpose of my trip to Europe last summer. I went to learn rather than to teach, and I learned more than in any other similar period of my life. But what I learned did not refute the content of my *Genesis of the World War*. It only served to confirm it, though I did my best to listen to both sides of

the argument. Such lecturing as I did was the result of persistent invitation and embodied nothing sensational, being only the conclusions and recommendations contained in my *Genesis of the World War*. There would seem to be no good reason why one should not be allowed to speak the truth with as much candour in Berlin as in Geneva. And the opinion of *Vorwaerts* is scarcely to be relied upon, in the light of the well-known effort of German radicals to hush up the war guilt controversy, lest it react to strengthen the cause of monarchy in Germany. But Mr. Eastman well knows that my views on war guilt do not please the German reactionaries, who hold that England was the chief culprit.

(9) I regret that Professor Eastman has insisted upon pursuing the argument *ad hominem*, as it renders it necessary for me to step rather hard upon a man for whom I have much personal and professional fondness:—

A. There is nothing especially to be ashamed of for having been deceived as to the facts of war guilt in 1917, when the secret evidence was not available. Nor is it surprising that it was Professor Fay's articles which first thoroughly aroused me. He was the first to set forth the facts revealed by the recently published Austrian and German documents. The situation which is truly disgraceful is to be still (in 1927) in a state of peevish or persistent somnolence in regard to the *Kriegsschuldfrage*.

B. Professor Eastman, in common with Professors Turner, Schmitt, and Davis, resorts to the secondary and indirect mode of assault by insinuating that, whatever the conclusions in my studies of war guilt, they could not possibly be trusted because I am not a historian, but a criminologist, sociologist, psychologist, social economist, etc. Now if Professor Eastman was not aware of the facts about my academic history he could easily have acquainted himself with this relevant material by consulting the leading biographical annuals available in Europe and America. He would then have discovered that, however many works I may have written in the field of sociology, theoretical and applied, and however unimpressive my work in the field of history, strictly speaking, I have been trained as an historian, am now an historian, and always expect to remain such. Nor does his allegation of my innocence of the history of contemporary Europe square with the facts, even those well known to Professor Eastman. During the greater part of my academic career I have offered courses in contemporary European history, and during much of the time to graduate students. That Professor Eastman once held a flatteringly high opinion of my competence here is to be discovered in the fact that he sent three of his more brilliant graduates from the University of British Columbia to study modern European history (not criminal jurisprudence or penology) with me when I was at Clark University. As all of these men were close personal friends of Professor Eastman, it can scarcely be believed that he would have cared to play a practical joke on them of such proportions as would have been involved in sending them on an 8,000 mile journey to study with an eccentric ignoramus. Further, Professor Eastman is fully aware of my work as editor of the *Journal of International Relations*, as bibliographic editor of *Foreign Affairs* for three years, and as a student of the special problem of responsibility for the World War. This should have convinced him that I have devoted far more technical and prolonged attention to the question at issue than he would even pretend to have given

to it. I frankly concede that Professor Eastman should know more about the general history of modern Europe than I do, but there is no reason to believe that he has devoted one-tenth as much time as I have to the immediate diplomatic background of the World War. Moreover, I gave the readers of my book the additional protection of having the work as a whole read in advance of publication by Professor W. L. Langer, who has a more precise knowledge of European diplomatic history than Professor Eastman would even care to possess, while each chapter was read by one or more of the foremost specialists in America on the particular field. Having read my book, Professor Eastman knows, from the announcement of the 'Ten Years: 1905-1915' on the cover of the *Genesis of the World War*, that it was not intended to be a general diplomatic history of Europe during these years, but merely an expansion of my chapter on the part of Sir Edward Grey and England in bringing about the crisis of 1914, a task which can now be abandoned with pleasure and assurance since the appearance of the magisterial work of Hermann Lutz on this subject.

(10) Professor Eastman refers lightheartedly to the numerous errors and the 'regrettable lacunae and misinterpretations' which occur in my book, but he fails to specify what these are. My book, even in its first edition, was criticized in detail last summer by a group of a dozen of the foremost authorities on war guilt from all over Europe, was read in detail by Max Montgelas and Professor Beazley, and has been subjected to many critical reviews, yet only three errors of fact have been detected: one concerning the Germans and the resignation of Delcassé, one referring to the distribution of Russian troops in 1914 against Germany and Austria, and the third bearing on the relation between the German declaration of a state of imminent war and the French order for general mobilization. There are, of course, many debatable points relative to emphasis and interpretations in the book. Yet I believe that there is not more than one important interpretation or generalization which is open to any serious challenge, namely, the question of whether France and Russia were plotting to precipitate a crisis or were merely awaiting a convenient crisis for the precipitation of the European war. But this has little bearing upon the guilt of France and Russia in 1914, and even so judicial a writer as Lowes Dickinson holds that Russia would, in all probability, have precipitated war by 1916. All the important documentary and monographic material which has appeared in the last year has served to confirm the facts and interpretations advanced in the book. It should be made clear, however, that I do not personally take the credit for what I believe to be the essential trustworthiness of the book, but gladly assign the responsibility to the highly competent and long-suffering scholars who read my material in copy and proofs.

(11) If my book were as full of errors and misinterpretations as Professor Eastman insinuates, it should have been easy for critical reviewers to have demolished it directly point by point. Yet, it is no exaggeration to say that there has not been a single hostile review of the book which has not been trivial, disingenuous, or both. Mr. Lowes Dickinson, in the *New Republic*, declared the book to be 'counter-propaganda,' but he was unable to bring forward any cogent evidence to support his view, and showed himself to be merely piqued because I did not regard Grey as a

shining angel of light with a record for veracity and integrity surpassing even that of the traditional George Washington. By quoting from Mr. Dickinson's own conclusions I was able to show that, point by point, he was in absolute agreement with the conclusions in my own book. J. W. Headlam-Morley, official historian and propagandist of the British Foreign Office, attempted to destroy me in the London *Observer*. He rested satisfied with an attack upon my treatment of the Belgian issue, taking himself a position opposed not only to the English statesmen who faced the issue—Palmerston, Derby, Gladstone, and Salisbury—but also to the leading British authorities—Loreburn, Gooch, Beazley, and Ewart. He then wiped me off the map with the general statement that the remainder of the book was as bad as the treatment of the Belgian problem, a verdict with which I heartily agree. Subsequently, in the *Quarterly Review*, Mr. Headlam-Morley disposed of me merely by stating that he has demonstrated the worthlessness of my book in the *Observer*. The reviewer in the London *Times* was equally careful not to grapple with any of the basic issues in the book, but contented himself with a disingenuous reference to my characterization of the *Livre Noir*, with a criticism of my failure to define carefully the progress in Russia's aspirations for the Straits (really a point in favour of my thesis), and with the assertion that most of my important charges against the Entente were based upon such secondary French writers as Dupin and Morhardt. He evidently trusted to the hope and probability that few of his readers did or ever would consult either the *Livre Noir* or my book, and in the latter discover that I have never quoted Dupin or Morhardt except for the purpose of emphasizing points, for the establishment of which I relied upon the original sources. Professor Schmitt, in *Foreign Affairs* (American) flayed me vigorously for five pages, but failed to bring to the surface more than one minor error, and in referring to this he was as wide of the truth as myself. I pointed out at length in the *Progressive* for December 1, 1926, that but a few months earlier Professor Schmitt had publicly declared himself in essential agreement with the facts and conclusions set forth in my book, as read in advance at our Chicago debate in April, 1926. He differed only with respect to the myth which he and Heinrich Kanner have concocted regarding the alleged plot laid by Moltke and Conrad in 1909, and pulled off in 1914. Professor Fay, in the *American Historical Review* for January, 1927, and Count Montgelas, in the *Revue de Hongrie* for November 15, 1926, have absolutely demolished this Schmitt-Kanner Myth as easily as Professor Fay earlier levelled the Morgenthau Myth concerning the Potsdam Conference. Professor Slosson, in the *American Historical Review*, relies almost exclusively upon insinuations and hypotheses, except for a charge that I am ignorant of the history of European nationalism, which happens to be the subject in European political and cultural history to which I have given the most attention. He proves his own competence in these fields by comparing the primitive Serbian plotting and intrigues with Italian nationalism under Mazzini, and by questioning the assertion that the Russian general mobilization rendered war inevitable unless suspended!

(12) With reference to Professor Eastman's assertion that reparations antedated the Treaty of Versailles by fifteen months, I would remind him that I am referring to the actual reparations included in the Treaty and

not some hypothetically ideal system of reparations which would be assented to by the Germans as well as by Professor Eastman and myself. Germany freely agreed to pay for the restoration of Belgium and France. Further, it would be hard for Professor Eastman to show that Germany has not already paid enough to reimburse Belgium and France. Again Germany could demonstrate that the detestable and utterly indefensible Allied blockade of Germany after the Armistice, and the French occupation of the Ruhr in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, caused almost as much damage as the German occupation of France and Belgium and should be take into account in any reparations scheme. If the Dawes Plan is designed, as Professor Eastman states, solely to provide for the reimbursement of France and Belgium, why has there not been some computation of what is due France and Belgium on this score and the specific payments then indicated on this basis? We agree with Professor Eastman as to the excellence of Article 15 of the Geneva Protocol, but we note that Professor Eastman does not dilate upon just how this would work out now if applied to the situation which existed in 1914. The Entente has never been willing to reopen the reparations issue on the basis of the facts of war guilt or of the actual expenses involved in the rehabilitation of Belgium and France.

(13) I am not aware of having ranted against England, and I find that my views on war guilt are most enthusiastically shared by those groups in England whose economic, social, and political philosophy conforms most closely to that shared by Profesor Eastman and myself. What I meant, in referring to the lack of 'international honesty and decency,' was the British unwillingness and failure to renounce the war-guilt lie which they 'sold' to America in the manner so blithely described by Sir Gilbert Parker in *Harper's Magazine* for March, 1918. The plant of Locarno can never flourish in the pot of Crewe House or of Versailles.

(14) As for the League of Nations and the problem of war guilt, if the League suffers as a result of the progress of truth in regard to war responsibility, then suffer it must. The supporters of the League of Nations, among whom I number myself, must reckon with Demartial's indictment formulated on page 696 of my book, and the confidence of the sceptical will not be advanced by placing Serbians in prominent positions in the League. We believe, however, that the truth about war guilt should ultimately prove helpful to the protagonists of the League, if the latter honestly face the realities in the circumstances. The American who is, perhaps, the foremost supporter of the League in this country has always generously supported my studies in war guilt and has never questioned the sincerity or value of my work on the question of responsibility for the World War. Further, we might remind Professor Eastman and others at Geneva that the League opponents are given much more ammunition by such scandals as those in the disarmament situation, revealed so thoroughly by Count Montgelas in *Foreign Affairs* (English) for August, 1926, and in *Hochland* for January, 1927, than they are by any writers on war guilt.

(15) World peace and international co-operation will not be found 'with the myths' or 'between the myths.' They can only be achieved in that world of reality and understanding which lies *beyond the myths.*

Chapter XI.

OFFICIAL FRENCH EXPOSITION OF WAR GUILT: THE CASE OF ALPHONSE AULARD AND PIERRE RENOUVIN

ONE of the most interesting aspects of the war-guilt controversy has been the completc unwillingness of the French professors of history to produce a book on war origins which squares with the facts revealed in the documents. In this respect France stands alone among the Entente countries. In England Dickinson, Gooch and Beazley, among others, have frankly faced the truth and condemned the war-timc misrepresentations. In Russia, men like Professor Adamov have taken the lead in exposing the older régime. In Italy Lumbroso, Barbagallo, Torre and others have written books on war origins thoroughly espousing the Revisionist point of view. But in France not a single professor of history has produced a systematic treatise on war responsibility embodying the new facts revealed in the documents published since 1919. The only book written by history professors in France on the subject is the servile apology of Bourgeois and Pagès, which even repeats the Potsdam Conference myth. The only French professor to compose a systematic manual ostensibly squaring with the well established facts has been Pierre Renouvin, not professionally a formal historian, but a war veteran interested in military history and head of the French War Museum. For the past decade Georges Demartial has challenged M. Aulard, the dean of living French historians, to debate the issue of war-guilt with him, but to no avail whatever. Professor Renouvin's book on *The Immediate Origins of the War* has recently beсn translated into English under the auspices of Professor Seymour of Yale University and seems likely to exert a wide influence upon American students.

We herc set forth: (1) Demartial's exposure of M. Aulard and the French academic historians; (2) Professor Renouvin's denunciation of the present writer's work on war-guilt; (3) the writer's review of Renouvin's book; and (4) Demartial's scathing exposure

of Renouvin's attempt to save the French case through his defense of Poincaré's apology for July, 1914, in volume IV of his Memoirs. Those interested in the amazing silence of the French academicians in the face of Demartial's taunts and challenges should consult the latter's remarkable book, *L'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay*, in which he riddles the French *Yellow Book* and inquires as to why the French historians do not give evidence of honor and honesty and take cognizance of the bankruptcy of the French official myth. These academicians cannot in any sense take refuge in the assertion that Demartial is not a man worth noticing, as no French professor at the Sorbonne is a man of greater distinction or integrity than Demartial.

I. THE NEO-PACIFISTS AND HISTORY

By Georges Demartial

Professor Aulard has gone to Berlin (in winter of 1927) to preside at the annual congress of the International Union of Associations for the League of Nations. In an article which appeared in *l'Oeuvre* on May 20, 1927, he took occasion to put in a plea for the cause of peace and of understanding among nations. He preached moral disarmament. "It is particularly necessary," he said, "that in all countries instruction in the Universities, especially instruction in history, be conceived in a scientific spirit of truth and of peace."

Let us ask Mr. Aulard how he himself conceives this spirit. On August 2, 1916, he published in *Le Journal* an article entitled: The Anniversary of a Great Crime. "The most efficacious and odious of the Kaiser's lies," one reads therein, "was the refined hypocrisy with which he made France and the world believe for more than a quarter of a century, that he wanted peace. Duped by this comedy, the other governments did not prepare for war, and it is because they did not prepare for it that this war is so long, so bloody. . . . The Kaiser wanted war, and he willed it at the supreme, decisive moment when his accomplice Austria, was about to consent to a Europeanization of the Serbian question, perhaps to an acceptance of mediation. Then with mad determination, he declared war on Russia."

Of all the legends about responsibility for the war, the most stupid one is that the governments of the Entente were not prepared for it, and the one most contrary to facts is that Germany declared war on Russia to prevent Austria from accepting mediation. Mr. Aulard, along with many other historians, with all the others, for that matter, was not afraid to accept these legends as truth, for he was one of the most important aids in the work of Propaganda.

However, it is the Germans whom Mr. Aulard accused of possessing the genius for lying. In the same newspaper, on October 12 following, Mr. Aulard depicted Germany as "a factory for the manufacture of lies." In a

pamphlet entitled. *The Crimes of the Barbarians* (1914-1918), and distributed by bales at the close of the war, he wrote, "Lying is the national industry of the Germans, their system of government; it is upon it that the Hohenzollerns erected the Prussian power, and then, to the profit of Prussia, the German power," etc.

Since the war, Mr. Aulard has shown the same voluntary blindness. After the notorious Mr. Grelling had published in *La Revue de Paris* of March 1, 1922 a romance in which he accused the German government of having provoked the Russian mobilization by issuing the false news of the German mobilization, Mr. Aulard lauds him for his "diligent erudition." (*Rappel*, March 15, 1922).

The German historian, Hans Delbrück, who carried his impartiality on the question of war origins to the point of refusing to sign the manifesto of his colleagues, the 93; who accuses the German government of having partly caused the war by irritating and alarming the English government with its naval policy; who brought against the policies of General Ludendorff during the war charges that are most devoid of sympathetic consideration; in short, the one man in the world least suspected of wishing, out of prejudice, to prove his country right; the man most disposed on the contrary, to seek a middle ground of conciliation between the conflicting theses—Professor Delbrück, I say, had proposed to the late Professor Lavisse a debate on the question of the origins of the war, orally or by writing, according to scientific methods. Mr. Lavisse having given a deaf ear to this proposal, Mr. Delbrück made the same proposition to Mr. Aulard, who after many evasions, refused in these words: "We do not speak the same language. Mr. Delbrück is in the service of his emperor and of the principle of authority. I am in the service of truth and of the French principle of liberty." (*Ere Nouvelle*, March 24, 1922).

In my work, *The Gospel of the Quai d'Orsay*, I have just proposed to Mr. Aulard that, if the accusations of lies and errors which I bring against the *Yellow Book* are not justified, he refute them. He remains silent.

In London, on May 18, 1927, the President of the Republic took advantage of a banquet at the Lord Mayor's to say: "Impartial history will render this justice to Great Britain and to France that they, to the last minute, did all that was possible to prevent the outbreak of hostilities." The editor of the German review, *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, whose object is the study of the origins of the war, published at the head of the June number [1927] a question addressed to the French historians in which it is stated: "We beg to ask the French historians if one of their number will take it upon himself to defend this official declaration and to support it by an objective development in our Review. In case he does, we shall publish his article in French and in German, as well as the opinion of a German scholar of the same rank. If a controversy between the two historians should result, it would be equally welcomed in our columns."

No one is better qualified than Mr. Aulard to reply to this invitation. The presidential thesis is either conformable to truth, in which case he ought to jump to its defense with his pen; or it is untenable, in which case he ought to disallow its claim to be "impartial history." If he doesn't, what will he do with this "spirit of truth and of peace" which he desires to inject

into the teaching of history, and which he has recently taken with him as a new Holy Grail for the Germans? But one may rest assured that he will continue to be silent.

II. PROFESSOR RENOUVIN'S OPINION OF ADVANCED REVISIONISM[1]

The problem of the immediate origins of the conflict of 1914 remains even today dominated by the war spirit. Among the numerous works which appeared some years ago, only a few take into account all aspects of the question, and consider with any degree of care the arguments brought up by both sides, for analysis and criticism. Some of them plead the cause of the nation whose recognized advocates they are. Others, in an attempt to be independent, end by systematically discounting all official statements which contain any traces of passion. It did not seem unreasonable to hope that, at least in countries whose governments were not directly involved in the crisis of July 1914, writers would approach the problem in a calmer frame of mind and would escape the charge of prejudice. The inquiry which was to have been undertaken by a "neutral" commission formed at The Hague has not led to any appreciable results. Even American opinion has become a prey to polemical writers, (I refer in particular to the work of Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War, an Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt*, 2nd ed., New York, Knopf, 1927), whose works may be inspired by strong conviction, but are certainly not based upon an objective study of the documents themselves. Such controversial writings have, at least, given occasion for the real historians to present a more balanced point of view. It is just such a balanced presentation of the documentary evidence that the present writer hopes to achieve.

III. OFFICIAL HISTORY MOVES ON.[2]

Professor Seymour, Mr. Hume, and the Yale University Press have placed us in their debt by giving us in English dress the notable book of Pierre Renouvin of the French War Museum on the immediate causes of the World War.[3] This is the definitive official French version of this highly controversial subject, and it is very useful to have the work made accessible to American readers. It is fortunate that the translation was delayed until the second French edition had appeared, even though Professor Renouvin has been amazingly reluctant to correct the errors of fact and judgment which were pointed out by his critics in the first edition.

While Renouvin lacks the unerring impartiality and absolutely consistent logic of Georges Demartial, his book is the most competent detailed summary of the crisis of 1914 which has thus far appeared in France. Yet the author is not, as Professor Seymour would lead us to believe, the French Sidney Bradshaw Fay, but is rather the Bernadotte Schmitt of France. Indeed,

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[1] From P. Renouvin. *The Immediate Origins of the War*, p. 1.

[2] From the New York *Nation*, May 2, 1928.

[3] *The Immediate Origins of the War, 28th June—4th August, 1914.* By Pierre Renouvin. Translated by T. C. Hume, with a Preface by Charles Seymour. Yale University Press.

a great French scholar has recently denominated Schmitt the American Renouvin. Renouvin is not, as Professor Seymour maintains, free from national spirit, completely objective, or judicious and logical in drawing his conclusions, but he is amazingly impartial and sweet-tempered for an official French chronicler, especially one who was distressingly wounded and mutilated in battle on behalf of his country. He has a long way to go to match Fabre-Luce or Demartial in candor and objectivity, but it is almost miraculous that he has advanced as far as he has.

The most fundamental criticism of the book is that it is not an objective attempt to study the evidence to discover what the facts of war responsibility actually were, but is rather an effort to see how much of the Entente myth can be saved without accepting forged documents and impossible interpretations.

In almost every case Renouvin interprets the important documents in the manner most unfavorable to the German and Austrian case, in some instances clinging resolutely to archaic views long since abandoned by up-to-date students of the problem—for example, his defense of the Versailles interpretation of the Szögyény telegram. He still mentions Potsdam Conferences with the implication that they had the same tenor as the "Potsdam Conference" of Mr. Morgenthau's imagination. In dealing with the great moral issue involved in the question of war-guilt, namely, whether Austria was more justified in attacking Serbia than Russia was in protecting Serbia, M. Renouvin warily avoids the verdict so definitely stated by Dr. Gooch, namely, that while Austria attacked Serbia in self-defense Russia attacked Austria for the sake of prestige and territorial gain. With respect to the fundamental military problem in war responsibility, that of Russian mobilization, Renouvin tries quite ineffectively to maintain the thesis that Germany decided on war on July 30th before she had heard of the Russian mobilization. To support this view he relies, not on the documents, but upon the opinions of Richard Grelling and Heinrich Kanner, two utterly discredited Germanic renegades, and he ignores the utterly crushing exposure of Grelling and Kanner by Professor Fay and Count Montgelas. Renouvin's procedure in accepting Grelling and Kanner as against Fay and Montgelas is not incomparable to favoring Captain Cook as against Admiral Peary in regard to the facts of polar exploration. He nowhere mentions the assurances given to Russia by Austria as to Serbian sovereignty and territorial integrity, though it is this which chiefly destroys all validity in the Russian case. Likewise, he is at all points as favorable to France as he could be without making use of the forged and distorted "Yellow Book." His account of French attitude towards the Russian mobilization is palpably absurd in the light of Demartial's *L'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay*, published before M. Renouvin finished his second edition. He even clings to the conventional theory of the ten-kilometer withdrawal in spite of the complete exposure of the hoax in the British documents. He fails to reveal with proper emphasis Viviani's notorious falsification of the mobilization dates and of the German attitude toward Austria. Russia and England are also treated with great delicacy. He ignores Pachich's letter of July 31, and has not seen Sazonov's memoirs in which the latter admits that he paid no attention to Austro-German diplomatic proposals after July 29. This enables Renouvin to hold that Russian diplomacy in 1914 was sincere and not a mere

effort to gain time, as both Dobrorolski and now Sazonov have admitted to have been the case. He makes a great deal of the allegation that Germany brutally declared war on France in 1914 solely on the basis of charges of French violation of neutrality, mostly faked. He does not call attention to the large number of faked charges of German aggression with which Viviani endeavored to influence British opinion. Nor does he make it clear that the German declaration of war on France was a pure formality, fully expected by the French and following as naturally from the German-Russian conflict and the French refusal of neutrality as did French intervention in behalf of Russia. Finally, the conclusions are rarely compatible with the facts as set forth in the body of the book. With all respect to Professor Renouvin, it must be said that this concluding portion of the work wavers between disingenuousness and Jesuitry.

Yet the book is very valuable and should be read to make it clear how little of the war-time propaganda against the Central Powers and of the indictment of Germany and Austria by Lansing, Scott, and others at Versailles can be salvaged by a clever and informed person whose efforts as conserver-in-chief are limited only by the bounds of formal honesty. Professors Hazen, Edward Turner, Anderson, and Stearns Davis are bound to find it a bitter pill to swallow, when they reflect that this is the very best that an honest Frenchman can do to save the case to which they gave their sweat and blood from 1914 to 1919.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

IV. THE TREASON OF THE INTELLECTUALS: THE OFFICIAL HISTORIANS OF WAR RESPONSIBILITY

By Georges Demartial

Mr. Renouvin has just published in the *Revue d' histoire de la guerre mondiale* "The Historical Review of the World War" of which he is the editor-in-chief, a "critical review" of the last volume of the Memoirs of Mr. Poincaré: "The Sacred Union." The chief interest in this book by Mr. Poincaré is the fact that the author denies that the French government had the slightest share of responsibility in the Russian mobilization: "nothing caused it [The French government] to forsee it." Mr. Renouvin sets forth this denial with great emphasis, and he concludes his article by placing as against "legends" the historical value of this book which is, he says, "in the broadest sense of the word, a work of history."

Thus Mr. Renouvin, prince of the historians of the origins of the war, finds neither in his reason, nor in the facts, nor in the texts of the Franco-Russian alliance, nor in the known documents, any objection to the thesis that the Russian government, mobilizing without the agreement of France, and even without informing it, had called to the latter to join in the war, as a hunter calls to his dog to take up the chase. On August 4, 1914, Mr. Poincaré announced in parliament to the French people, to the world, that "France is entering the war faithfully seconded by her ally." Though Mr. Poincaré says today that this ally crossed the Rubicon without even warning France, Mr. Renouvin, unmoved, sees in that assertion only another occasion in which to render homage to the former's truthfulness and innocence.

Well, grant it. But then, why the presence in the 1914 *Yellow Book*, and precisely in the matter of the Russian mobilization, of these lies and errors which I have patiently pointed out and denounced in *The Gospel of the Quai d' Orsay*, about which Mr. Renouvin's Review has taken care to mention not a word? Are lies and errors the attributes of innocence?

Why has Mr. Renouvin maintained the same silence about the article which I myself devoted to Mr. Poincaré's book (in *Evolution*, December, 1927, and *Plain Talk*, April, 1928), and whose conclusions are exactly contrary to his? If I am wrong, it is so easy for Mr. Renouvin to blot me out. If I am right, he is betraying his duty as an historian by keeping quiet.

Why does he not submit our two articles to an impartial jury with instructions to declare whether Mr. Poincaré's book absolves the French government from all responsibility in the war. If it is objected that it is presumptuous for a non-professional to measure lances with the Sorbonne, I shall reply that, in the Dreyfus affair, civilians got the better of the General Staff.

In any case, I defy Mr. Renouvin to explain how he reconciles the thesis that the Russian mobilization could not have been foreseen by the French authorities, with the fact:

(1) that on July 26th the French Ambassador in Russia announced mobilization in four out of the seven military districts and preparations for it in the other three;

(2) that the *Temps* correspondent announced on the same date mobilization in Kiev and in Odessa;

(3) that on the 27th our African troops received the order to embark;

(4) that on the same date our Minister of War recommended to the Russians that they prepare to take the offensive;

(5) that on the 28th an officer in the ministry of war wrote to the Colonel of the 120th; "Chances of war 7 to 10. Russia will mobilize first, thus gaining time and making herself ready with everybody else."

(6) that on the 29th the *Temps* correspondent announced: "Troop trains are passing every quarter of an hour on the Varsovie line. Mobilization is going on in Kiev, Vilna, Odessa, Varsovie, and even in Petersburg."

(7) that in his manuscript, *Les Responsables* (The Guilty Parties) Mr. Caillaux wrote: "A cabinet meeting took place on the afternoon of July 29th at the Elysée. The government was at grips with a most formidable question. Russia was asking France if she ought to mobilize;"

(8) that during the night of this same day the Russian Ambassador in Paris brought to Viviani at 3 o'clock a telegram from Sazonov thanking the French government for its support and announcing that Russia was going "to hasten its military preparations," which, as Mr. Renouvin himself recognized in his treaties on the origins of the war, signified general mobilization;

(9) that on the evening of the 30th Paléologue announced that the first steps in a general mobilization had just been taken secretly;

(10) that in order to extract the order from the Czar, Sazonov told him that tergiversation would "embarrass France;"

(11) that, finally, at the Caillaux trial, Viviani said: "It would have been an unusual responsibility to have undertaken to say to Russia not to mobilize."

If it is true, nevertheless, that the Russian government did mobilize unknown to France in order to precipitate her into the war despite herself, will Mr. Renouvin, if not as a man and a Frenchman, at least as an historian, say what he thinks of this culmination of the Franco-Russian alliance? We are frequently told about the lessons of history. If it has nothing to teach us about an event like that, of what use is it, of what use are the historians?

May Mr. Renouvin see nothing irreverent in that remark. In the course of my visits to the War Library, I have met with the greatest courtesy from him despite my heretical opinions, and I shall always be indebted to him. I am merely pursuing the object to which I have been attached for ten years: to induce a representative of the official thesis of war responsibility to debate the question.

As I have never succeeded in doing it, and since Mr. Renouvin disappoints my last hope, it is still further proof that this thesis is false, that its defenders know it, and that they are sacrificing intellectual integrity to a policy. I herewith express to them my indignation, which is the only way I can protest, since they will not debate the matter. If there is another way, let someone indicate it to me.

In the light of the above observations on Renouvin's methods and conclusions, one may be somewhat astonished to read the following in the *Saturday Review of Literature* (June 16, 1928), from the pen of a man with so enviable a reputation for fairness and objectivity in dealing with international relations as Carlton J. H. Hayes:

> It will be a long time, if ever, before any generally acceptable final judgment can be rendered upon the relative amount of guilt attributable to the several actors in the colossal tragedy of 1914. The best thing for the layman to do in the meantime is to avoid heat and seek light. . . . Towards these ends it will be of incalculable service to the layman if he will give eye to the sane studies of such competent historians as Professor Sidney Fay in America and Professor Pierre Renouvin in France.

We hesitate to think what will be the resulting state of mind of the poor "layman" who searches through the books by Fay and Renouvin expecting to find uniformity and coherence in their mutual accounts of the outbreak of the War. In factual content, Fay's book is a veritable annihilation of most of Renouvin's major theses and contentions.

One need not, however, be particularly indignant with Professor Hayes regarding his opinion of Renouvin. He has not concerned himself technically with the problem of war responsibility, and his

estimate was probably the well-intentioned, if unfortunate, product of bad advice and ill-judgment on the part of certain colleagues in the profession with whom he had discussed Renouvin's work and its general status in the war guilt literature. Much more amazing and much less pardonable is the following assertion by Professor Sidney B. Fay, himself, in the *American Historical Review* for July, 1928:

> One cannot fail to admire the clarity, grasp and judiciousness with which M. Renouvin has sifted the mass of documentary evidence, punctured and discarded untenable legends, and written what seems to the reviewer quite the best comprehensive treatment in any language which he has read on this difficult and thorny subject.

According to any reasonable meaning of the term "best," as applied to an historical work, it must imply that the book makes the closest approximation to telling the truth on the subject at issue, in the clearest and most logical manner. Now Professor Fay has summarized his final judgment as to war responsibility in the following manner:

> While it is true that Germany, no less than all the other Great Powers, did some things which contributed to produce a situation which ultimately resulted in the World War, it is altogether false to say that she deliberately plotted to bring it about or was solely responsible for it. On the contrary, she worked more effectively than any other Great Power, except England, to avert it, not only in the last days of July, 1914, but also in the years immediately preceding.

M. Renouvin, on the contrary, continues to place the guilt for the World War overwhelmingly on the shoulders of Germany, and goes the whole way with M. Poincaré in contending for the absolute innocence of France in the crisis of 1914. Therefore, Renouvin and Fay stand at the opposite poles in regard to their general assessment of responsibility for the World War. Moreover, with respect to practically every important controverted issue related to the responsibility for the outbreak of the War, these two men differ diametrically in their statement and interpretation of the facts. In every case, it is the view of the present writer that Professor Fay is decisively right and M. Renouvin markedly divergent from the truth. Renouvin makes concessions to Revisionism only when a point is so well established by prior research or accessible documents as to make its non-acceptance ridiculous and self-condemnatory.

Now, it may be conceded that it is the prerogative of all free American citizens to hold whatever opinion they choose concerning any book, but when Professor Fay designates Renouvin's book as the "best" book on war responsibility in any language, and then, simultaneously with the publication of this opinion, brings out a book of his own which takes a diametrically different view of the whole subject, with regard to both the larger issues and the controverted details, then he must recognize that he has created a problem for logicians and lexicographers. The writer frankly and willingly grants that Renouvin's work is the best, and, perhaps, the final defense of the pro-Entente version of war responsibility. In his *Genesis of the World War* the writer went as far as his conscience allowed in paying tribute to Renouvin's achievements in breaking away from the grosser aspects of the Entente Epic, and even conceded him a place among Revisionist scholars. This is, however, quite a different thing from identifying him with Professor Fay or stating that he has written the best summary of the Revisionist position. If American historians have respect for candor and logic, they are likely to call Professors Hayes and Fay to account on the above score; and certainly, if American historians fail to do so, the duty will not be shirked by European students of the war guilt problem.

As an indication of the state of official opinion in France regarding candid research into the question of war guilt, it is interesting to point out that Demartial has recently been suspended from the Legion of Honor for five years for his masterly article on war guilt in the *New York Times Current History Magazine* for March, 1926. There is an excellent account of the accusation and Demartial's courageous and invincible defense in *Current History* for July, 1928 (pp. 641ff).

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PUBLISHER'S APPENDIX

THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR

IT is the earnest hope of the National Historical Society that the readers of this book will proceed to carry their study of this subject further through an examination of Professor Barnes' more systematic and complete survey of war responsibility embodied in his *Genesis of the World War*. By special arrangement with the publisher the National Historical Society is prepared to distribute this larger volume by Professor Barnes to all who desire to obtain it.

The second part of the present volume has been devoted by Professor Barnes to a refutation of the more vigorous attacks upon his *Genesis of the World War* by the "bitter-enders," but it has been deemed desirable by the National Historical Society also to publish in a brief appendix some representative opinions of the book, in order to confound the epic-mongers who contend that the revisionist point of view in regard to war responsibility has no real standing among the scholars and publicists of the world.

OPINIONS OF DISTINGUISHED HISTORIANS AND PUBLICISTS

"It is not an exaggeration to say that several tons of books and pamphlets" and official documents have been published since August 1, 1914, on the moot question of who was responsible for the World War. More than one American library which desires to collect all printed matter bearing on this subject has been embarrassed by its volume. Librarians have confessed to me their strong temptation to throw much of it away, but they have resisted the desire to weed out and discard because they realized that it was an issue which would grow in importance for some years to come. Prof. Barnes therefore needs to make no apology for his contribution of a book of more than 700 pages to the genesis of the world war or for giving a volume of this size the cautious subtitle, "An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt."

"We know American historians of repute who, while admitting Prof. Barnes' indefatigable scholarship, deny him credit and merit for the conclusions he has drawn from several years of wide study in this field. Being hopelessly biased and subjective in their attitude on war guilt, they are unable to judge another man's objectivity. And we know others whose enthusiastic acceptance, without independent investigation, of the Barnes point of view makes them unsafe evaluators. The ineradicable difficulty with the war guilt issue is that virtually everybody who has spoken on this subject or

written about it or made a compilation of official documents has been like a lawyer presenting a brief. Most of the war guilt literature is a despairing combination of denunciation and apology; it reeks with half-truths, with *suppresiones veri* and *suggestiones falsi.* Unless one is a specialist and able to give time to sources and to the weighing of evidence, what can one think about it all?

"But we cannot refuse to think about it. Statesmen, publicists, editorial writers and those of the rank and file, who want to follow international affairs must reckon with this question. Five years ago Lloyd George told the Germans in London that it was a closed question and could not be reopened, because the admission of Germany's sole responsibility was both the foundation and the justification of the Treaty of Versailles. And yet it has been reopened, in allied and neutral countries, as well as in Germany, by reputable and careful scholars. Their lectures and writings have done much—and will do more—to upset the Treaty of Versailles. Lloyd George was right in his fear. We must, therefore, pay attention to books like this.

"Prof. Barnes has written here a volume that will in time enhance his reputation. He is frank and honest and sober in his statements. He has studied the evidence with care; and he has presented his case in the temper of a historian rather than a lawyer. But it is a case all the same—a case and not an objective and dispassionate historical narrative, weightily as it is documented."

—Herbert Adams Gibbons, in New York *Sun*, October 30, 1926.

"As for Professor Barnes' work, *'The Genesis of the World War,'* there are few words adequate to describe its brilliancy and power. As a sheer *tour de force*, it is unparalleled by anything we have encountered in our experience. From the scholarly point of view, the book is impregnable. Professor Barnes has studied all the documents, read all the memoirs, and here they are, chapter, verse, and line. From the literary point of view, the book is again matchless. The author writes with superb clarity and passion. He has abundant heat, as he rages against the propagandist lies of the war-period, but this at no sacrifice of light. He masses his data, gathered out of so tremendous an accumulation of material, with magnificent effectiveness—a little repetition, inevitable in his scheme, but everything with a place and everything in this place. Withal there is a narrative ardor, a thrill of mere story telling, which makes the reading of the book an absorbing experience. The whole work is popular in the best sense of the word, with no sacrifice of scientific accuracy and authority. Again and again Barnes reminds us of the immortal Huxley for his combination of exact knowledge with popular speech, his love of truth, his immense scorn of ignorance, prejudice and stupidity, his joy in battle, and his will to victory.

"Professor Barnes' interpretation of pre-War events is perfectly simple. The immediate causes of the War, as distinguished from the remote and basic causes which Professor Barnes amply recognizes, he finds in their inception at the joining of hands of Poincaré and Isvolsky, respectively French premier and Russian ambassador at Paris, in January, 1912. From this time on we have a plan, a plot, a conspiracy, for the isolation of Germany, the acquirement of Constantinople and the Straits by Russia and of Alsace

and Lorraine by France, with the fomenting of Balkan disturbances as the occasion for launching war against Germany for her destruction. Into this plot were dragged England and later Italy. The necessary Balkan crisis was precipitated at the favorable moment by the murder of the Austrian Archduke with the connivance of the Serbian military and civil authorities. The conspiracy unfolded itself with awful rapidity in the next three weeks, with Russia casting the die of conflict by her mobilization on July 30th. Thus does Professor Barnes carry us from the one pole of German guilt to the opposite pole of Franco-Russian guilt. No middle ground for him! And he seems to prove his case. The evidence is not yet all in, of course. The British documents, now being studied by Messrs. Gooch and Temperley, have yet to be published, and the French archives will probably remain hidden for years. But it is difficult to imagine how they can do other than confirm and strengthen what Professor Barnes has here laid down. It is the opinion of no less a scholar than Professor Ferdinand Schevill, of Chicago University, as stated in the *Christian Century* (June 17, page 778), that Professor Barnes' 'case must in all its essential features be held as proved.' 'The bulk of the book,' he concludes, 'will probably stand the test of time.'

"What a whirligig of change in a few short years! Recall the days, if you can, when Germany was 'the mad dog of Europe,' when Germans were 'Huns,' when the Kaiser was Satan returned to hurl his black legions against the shining ramparts of heaven. 'No single document of the hundreds brought to light since 1918,' says Professor Schevill, 'has given the least substantiality' to this picture. On the contrary, we know now that just the opposite was true—that Germany was the victim and France and Russia, the arch-conspirators.

"Of course, at bottom, the devil-theory of human events, whether applied to Germany or to the Allies, is shallow and superficial. Here Lowes Dickinson is right—it was political anarchy and economic rivalry and not wicked men on either side which brought about disaster. But Professor Barnes is also right when he points out that vast impersonal forces of this kind do not 'operate independently of the individual actors in the historic drama.' The gun, in other words, has a trigger, and somebody pulls it; the explosion is set off by a match, and somebody scratches it. From this standpoint, there is personal responsibility involved in every such event as the World War. And in this War the responsibility lies with an overwhelming burden of guilt upon the Allies."

—John Haynes Holmes, in *Unity*, July 12, 1926.

"A marvellously straight, swift, cogent presentation of facts and conclusions," Carl Becker, Cornell University.

"One of the most striking books of late years." Joseph V. Fuller, Dept. of State.

"Could not be more successfully presented at the present stage of our historical knowledge." William L. Langer, Harvard University.

"Will do a useful service to the world." James Kerney, Trenton, N. J.

"The first full narrative account by an American studied from the documents. His case must in all its essential features be held as proved. . . ."

Ferdinand Schevill, University of Chicago, in *Christian Century*, June 17, 1926.

"Professor Barnes sustains his thesis with facts gleaned from publications brought to light in Austria, Germany and Russia by Revolutionary Governments. A hot reception is predicted for this book. And it is to be hoped that it will get a hot one, for only by an examination of the facts such as a reading of this book will stimulate can sensible people realize that treaties signed at the point of gun do not necessarily tell the truth or do justice. . . ." Elbridge Colby, *Saturday Review of Literature*, July 24, 1926.

"The most thrilling reading I have done for a long time." Preserved Smith, Cornell University.

"It is very doubtful whether new facts will invalidate Mr. Barnes' main thesis. He has made his book interesting and pre-eminently readable—which is not far from a miracle. . . ." John Bakeless, *Living Age*, in New York *Herald-Tribune*, July 4, 1926.

"The legend of William the Damned vanishes under the evidence. . . . A thoroughly honest, admirably generous book. . . ." R. L. Duffus, New York *Times*, June 27, 1926.

"On the whole it must be admitted that the facts support a great part of Mr. Barnes' thesis. . . . The whole effect is cumulative and powerful enough to shake any but the blindest from the dogmatic attitude of belief in the war-time myths. . . ." W. Y. Elliott, Harvard University, in *Christian Science Monitor*, July 7, 1926.

"Gives evidence of an astonishing knowledge of every phase of the war guilt problem. . . . We believe it scarcely possible to provide a better book than this one, which has mastered in so intelligent, lucid and comprehensive fashion the difficult problem of responsibility for the World War." Alfred von Wegerer, Editor of *Kriegsschuldfrage*.

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"Professor Barnes is thoroughly familiar with the huge accumulations of diplomatic materials bearing on the Origins of the World War. . . . Before his powerful argument, buttressed with relevant facts, the Sunday School theory of war guilt is utterly demolished. . . ." Charles Austin Beard in *Current History*, August, 1926.

"The best general survey which has yet been written of the origins of the war. . . ." Grillot de Givry, in *Evolution*, August 15, 1926.

"The most comprehensive book on the subject of war guilt, and must be considered the standard work on the subject. . . ." Max Montgelas, Editor of *German Documents on the Outbreak of the War*.

"The most important work on the subject in the English language. . . ." Guillaume de Huszar, Editor of the *Revue de Hongrie*, August 15, 1926.

"The facts are admirably marshalled in a splendid piece of work. . . ." Irene Cooper Willis, author of *England's Holy War*.

"An excellent and fearless book which should be read by all scholars and historians. . . ." Frederick Bausman, in New York *Nation*, September 1, 1926.

"No other American scholar has done so much as Professor Barnes to familiarize his countrymen with the new evidence which has been rapidly accumulated during the last few years, and to compel them to revise their war-time judgments in the light of this new material. . . ." G. P. Gooch, in *Contemporary Review*, October, 1926.

"M. Barnes, first believing the official thesis of the Entente, has come to doubt it; he has had the sincerity to study the question in an historic manner; he has had the courage to publish in a book the results of his researches which demolish the thesis of the exclusive responsibility of the Central Empires. . . . This book is one of the best and most complete published on the subject of the responsibility for the World War. . . . Though he has as his primary purpose the furthering of World Peace, it is most gratifying that he has at the same time furnished so precious a contribution to the history of the World War." Alcide Ebray, Ancien Ministre-resident de France in *Revue de Hongrie*, October 15, 1926.

"The most remarkable instance of this reaction against the war-time theories of the responsibility for the World War is the very remarkable work, '*The Genesis of the World War*' by Professor Harry Elmer Barnes. . . . Call it a piece of special pleading, if you will, the book remains a powerful instance of advocacy, fully documented and supplied with accurate references to a vast body of evidence. The conclusion is a tremendous indictment of statesmen who were regarded as national heroes less than ten years ago. . . ." Henry W. Nevison, in *Saturday Review of Literature*, November 20, 1926.

"The author writes with a sure hand and a trenchant style; he expects his conclusions to be attacked, and he evidently anticipates with pleasure further opportunities to cross swords with his critics.. . . It is a stimulating and challenging book. It is not designed primarily for the academic world, but is a popular presentation of the results thus far of the work of the revisionists in all lands. . . ." C. C. Eckhardt, in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, December, 1926.

"The work is the cumulation of much serious study and is probably the most thorough and best developed attempt to throw light upon an international question which is growing increasingly turbulent. . . . The book is written in this author's characteristic style—short, crisp and to the point—the kind of style that never bores. Whether or not we accept all of its conclusions, it is, nevertheless, worth reading if for no other purpose than to foster *intelligent* Americanism." Adolph E. Meyer, International Book Review of the *Literay Digest*, August, 1926.

"Here is an edifying book for Hundred Percenters and devotees of Walter Hines Page. It exposes with painful clarity and with documentary proof the folly of trying to place upon Germany and her late allies the full blame, or even the major blame, for the World War. . . . The story is not a pleasant one, but it strikes much nearer the truth than does any of the propaganda which has been fed to the public since the summer of 1914." Wayne Gard, in the Chicago *Daily Post*, June 13, 1926.

"Barnes has presented the case for the first time in a form which is likely to get across to the man in the street. He has written clearly and well, summarizing the points of each chapter, stating his case in compelling form. The book can be understood by any American of average intelligence, and for the most part it carries the documentary evidence that is necessary to bring conviction." Granville Hicks, in *Christian Leader*, July 10, 1926.

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"Professor Barnes' work on the war guilt question is unquestionably an achievement of the first order and of great significance. The book presents a complete synthesis of pre-existing research on the problem of war responsibility, and on this very account takes a leading place within the literature of war guilt." Paul Herre, in *Kriegsschuldfrage*, Sept., 1926.

The "*Genesis of the World War*" is a very readable book, written with much conviction and based upon a good quantity of proofs. . . . Taken all in all this book is a brave, honest and interesting piece of work." N. Japikse, in *Journal of the Netherland Commission for the Investigation of the Causes of the World War.*

"Please permit me to say that I have not in a long while read a work which seemed to me to be comparable in significance and utility to yours." W. P. Trent, Columbia University.

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"*The Genesis of the World War*" is one of the first readable and trustworthy attempts to present the revised views on war responsibility. It is not only readable and trustworthy, I must confess it is also comprehensive. Herein both the student and scholar, on the one side, and the average intelligent man-in-the-street, on the other, may find a stimulating and searching treatment of the roots and causes of the Great War of yesterday." C. Raymond Beazley, University of Birmingham.

"It seems to me one of the very best books I have read about the war. I am delighted with the breadth of view of the writer. It is quite natural that the London *Times* should attack the book, but we can take a more disinterested view here in Ireland." George William Russell. ("AE")

"Your *Genesis of the World War* stands without a rival. It is at once brilliant, forceful, lucid, and—I know you scarcely expect this characterization—moderate. Ewart over organizes his two great volumes. Montgelas, admirable as his book is, lacks drive, at least in the translation. Of the rest, any of the larger books leave one confused in the effort to recapitulate the evidence, while few of them even attempt to deal with the whole mass of material from all sources. Your book will no more be superseded, except as its own subsequent editions replace each other, than was the 'American Commonwealth' in its own time. The book is epochal in American historiography."—Professor Paul N. Crusius.

"Professor Barnes has established himself as the most vigorous and effective promoter of the struggle for truth with respect to the war guilt problem in America. Through his provocative and courageous book he has rendered a real service, not only to the cause of Germany, but also to the cause of mankind at large which will never be forgotten."—Hermann Lutz, author of *Lord Grey and the World War.*

"I have just finished reading *The Genesis of the World War* and take the liberty of addressing you to express the deep feeling of gratitude and appreciation I have for your work. The actual reading of your book has been a revelation of firmness and candor."—Francis Burton Harrison, former Governor-general of the Philippine Islands.

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